The Darwinian Lockean Liberalism of Goldstein's Mattering Instinct

 

                                               "What's It All About?" Cartoon by Patrick Hardin

The General Diagram for Eric Chaisson's Course on "Cosmic Evolution," Available at His Website.

The Darwinian Lockean Liberalism that I have defended on this blog supports Goldstein's theory of the mattering instinct in four ways.  

The Darwinian evolution of life explains life's self-mattering as resistance to entropy.  Lockean evolutionary psychology explains the human mattering instinct as rooted in self-ownership and religious enthusiasm.  The Lockean evolutionary psychology of morality explains the multiplicity of mattering projects as different rankings of the twenty natural desires of our evolved human nature.  Finally, Darwinian Lockean Liberalism explains how we can rightly condemn some mattering projects as immoral when they assume that mattering is a zero-sum game in which there is not enough mattering to go around.

LIFE'S SELF-MATTERING AS RESISTANCE TO ENTROPY

Patrick Hardin's cartoon shows the biological evolution of complex systems (from the less to the more complex) among vertebrate forms of life--from fish to primates to humans.  Eric Chaisson's diagram shows the cosmic evolution of complex systems from shortly after the Big Bang to the present, which includes purely physical systems as well as biological and cultural systems.  The common underlying theme is the ascent from simple disorder to complex order, or rising complexity.

That ascent to ever more complex order might seem to violate one of the fundamental laws of physics--the Second Law of Thermodynamics--which is the principle that in any natural process, the entropy (the disorder) of the Universe increases, so that energy naturally flows from hotter to colder systems, and not the reverse.  So, for example, a pot of hot soup will tend to cool off over time until it has the same temperature as the surrounding environment; and it will not spontaneously reheat itself.  Similarly, a house of cards will tend to collapse with time; and we can't expect a random collection of playing cards to assemble itself spontaneously into some ordered structure.

But this is true only for "closed systems" in which there is no flow of energy from outside the system.  In "open systems," a flow of energy from outside the system can create and maintain order in the system, and thus resist the tendency to entropy.  You can heat up the pot of soup on a stove.  And you can build a house of cards.  In both cases, you are introducing energy from outside the system to counter the tendency to entropy.  In the one case, you are turning up the gas or electrical heat from the stove.  In the other case, you are exerting your energy in building the house of cards.

The same is true for creating and maintaining the complex order of any system against the tendency to disorder--there must be a flow of energy from outside the system that sustains the order of the system.  And so life on Earth depends on capturing energy (mostly from the Sun through photosynthesis) that can be put to work in sustaining the complex systems of life and resisting entropy.  Animals capture the energy of sunlight through eating and digesting food, and through respiration, animals employ oxygen to release the energy in carbohydrates.  But while being alive is to be in resistance to entropy, eventually entropy wins, and everything that lives must die.

This explains why some evolutionary psychologists have said that "the Second Law of Thermodynamics Is the First Law of Psychology" (Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett 2003).  Darwinian natural selection is the only known counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to the entropic loss of functional organization.  Organisms with anti-entropic mechanisms that sustain functional organization are more likely to survive and reproduce than organisms that fail to resist entropy.  

For organisms with brains, natural selection will favor psychological mechanisms that resist entropy.  As indicated in Hardin's cartoon, all vertebrates will have psychic mechanisms that incline them to "eat, survive, reproduce"--or better stated, each animal will prioritize its own eating, surviving, and reproducing, which is what Goldstein identifies as the organic message of self-mattering--every organism acts as if its own existence in this world, its persistence and flourishing, matters.  In organisms with brains, with some capacity for mental attention, this self-mattering drives them to acquire information about their environment and to seek out sources of free energy needed to resist entropy, while also avoiding threats to their existence that might hasten their death.

Chaisson's "Epic of Evolution" shows how the Second Law of Thermodynamics Is Also the First Law of Cosmic Evolution.  The ascent of the Cosmos over almost 14 billion years through eight epochs--the Particulate, the Galactic, the Stellar, the Planetary, the Chemical, the Biological, the Cultural, and the Future--moves from simpler systems to more complex systems.  At each level of complexity, these systems require a flow of energy available to work to sustain their complex order against the thermodynamic tendency to disorder.

Chaisson argues that this correlation between energy and complexity allows us to use "energy rate density" as the universal metric of complexity for all complex systems--from physical systems to biological systems to cultural systems.  Energy rate density is defined as "the amount of energy passing through a given system per unit time per unit mass" (Chaisson 2006:293).  This can be quantified as the number of ergs per second per gram (erg/s/g).  

By this measure, human beings are more complex than stars like the Sun because the energy rate density for a human being is much higher than for the Sun.  And within human beings, their brains are one of the most complex systems in the Universe.  Although our brain occupies only about two percent of our body's mass, our brain uses almost twenty percent of our body's total energy intake because of the high metabolism required to maintain the electrical activity of about 86 billion neurons with about 100 trillion synaptic connections (Chaisson 2006:295).

Although Goldstein does not cite Chaisson's work, she agrees with his central idea about energy rate density as the metric of complexity: "All life, all flourishing, depends on capturing energy (from sunlight or food) and applying it in local anti-entropic resistance.  And the more complicated the system, then the more ways for it to be disordered, and hence the more resistance required.  Again, our brains are the most complicated objects yet discovered in the universe and, not coincidentally, require a lot of energy" (57).

THE HUMAN MATTERING INSTINCT AS ROOTED IN SELF-OWNERSHIP OR DIVINE OWNERSHIP

The unique complexity of the human brain has created an emergent difference in kind from other animal brains, such that human beings are unique in their mattering instinct.  Every animal is driven by an organic mandate that ensures it matters to itself--that it pays attention to itself and to what it needs to do to secure its survival and flourishing.  But we human beings are the only animals for whom it is not sufficient that we subjectively feel that we matter to ourselves, because we must persuade ourselves that we truly objectively deserve to matter.

In persuading ourselves that we truly matter, we must appeal to one of two kinds of the mattering instinct of our evolutionary psychology--one grounded in divine ownership and the other grounded in self-ownership.  The natural human experience of religious transcendence--of being possessed by religious enthusiasm--can persuade us that we belong to God because He created us to serve His purposes, and therefore we matter because we matter to God.  In that case, we are transcenders on Goldstein's Mattering Map.

Or the natural human experience of self-ownership can persuade us that since we naturally own ourselves--our bodies and our minds--we are naturally free to pursue whatever conception of happiness or human flourishing that is best suited to our individual temperament, circumstances, and talents, and therefore our life matters because we are striving for some kind of moral or intellectual excellence in our life.  In that case, we are either socializers, heroic strivers, or competitors on the Mattering Map. 

 

In his Second Treatise, Locke seems to support the transcenders by grounding his law of nature in the "workmanship" of God in creating human beings:

The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches al Mankind, who will be consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's Pleasure. And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours (para. 6).

Locke believed that the workmanship argument would require a rational theology that could prove the existence of God.  From “the idea of ourselves as understanding, rational creatures,” we would have to infer “the idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are."  Through an anthropomorphic analogy, we could project from the idea of our own minds and other human minds the idea of a Divine Mind.  Thus, man would create God in man’s image.  But then Locke admitted that having the idea of God in one’s mind does not prove God’s real existence (ECHU, IV.3.18; IV.3.27; IV.10.1; IV.10.7; IV.10.19; IV.11.1).

Similarly, some evolutionary psychologists—such as Justin Barrett and Jesse Bering--have argued that the natural evolution of religious belief is rooted in the propensity of the human mind to detect rational agency in humans and other animals and then to infer a supernatural intelligent agency analogous to that of human minds.  But this anthropomorphic analogy between human and divine minds is dubious, and even if this explained the natural evolution of the idea of God in the human mind, that would not prove the existence of God.

This led Locke to conclude that believing in the existence of God is ultimately not a matter of reason but of faith.  And since “faith is not knowledge,” we cannot know what the true religion is (Locke, 1870, pp. 94-96; 1997, pp. 248-50; ECHU, IV.17-18). 

Since he doubted that reason could prove God’s existence in support of the workmanship argument, Locke developed the self-ownership argument that would provide a purely natural ground for his law of nature.  He wanted to appeal to a rational theology of divine workmanship, but if that failed, he could fall back onto his natural self-ownership argument.  These two tracks—God and nature--are suggested by Locke’s repeated appeals to “the Laws of God and Nature” (FT, 56, 124; ST, 60, 66, 90, 93, 142, 195).  The “fixed and permanent rule of morals” could be “firmly rooted in the soil of human nature,” and human nature could be understood as created by “nature or God” (1997, p. 125).  Notice that the creative source of human nature is nature or God.

Locke affirms individual self-ownership in his chapter on property in the Second Treatise:

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. (para. 27)

From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, yet Man (by being Master of himself), and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of Property. (para. 44)

Here the foundation of Locke's political philosophy of natural rights is not God's ownership of the world and His rule by natural law, but rather the idea that human beings have natural rights because they are self-owners. Moreover, it is this natural autonomy of human beings, rather than their natural subordination to God, that informs the modern understanding of human rights.

Evolutionary science can show that the evolved psychology of ownership is rooted in self-ownership.  The human brain has an evolved interoceptive sense of owning the body that supports self-ownership and the ownership of external things as extensions of the self-owning self.  In this way, evolutionary neuroscience supports a Lockean liberal conception of equal natural rights rooted in natural self-ownership.  We can see how this sense of each person’s self-ownership arises in the evolved neuroanatomy of the brain to serve the survival and well-being of the human animal.  We can understand this as expressing interoception—the neural perception of the state of the body.

HUMAN FREEDOM AFFIRMS THE MULTIPLICITY OF MATTERING PROJECTS

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke says that in all of their actions, all human beings are moved to satisfy their natural human desires, and while there are many natural desires--I have identified twenty--they are all part of the human pursuit of happiness.  Human beings differ, however, in how they rank the natural desires.  For example, some human beings rank the natural desire for religious transcendence above all, while others rank the natural desire for intellectual understanding as the greatest pleasure.  So while there is no single summum bonum or highest good for all people, there is a single summum bonum for each person, and the pursuit of that highest good will be that person's mattering project (ECHU, 2.21.31-73).

If every human being is free to pursue his summum bonum, then every person's life matters.  The Lockean liberal regimes promote that freedom.  Countries that rank high on the "Human Freedom Index" tend to be countries that secure the widest pursuit of happiness and the multiplicity of mattering projects.  That is confirmed by the patterns of immigration: generally, people want to leave the less free societies and immigrate to the free societies.  Human beings vote with their feet for freedom.

HUMAN FREEDOM DENIES THE ZERO-SUM MATTERING PROJECTS

And yet a free society cannot tolerate all mattering projects.  It cannot tolerate those immoral mattering projects in which one person's sense of mattering comes from denying the mattering of others.  For example, when Frank Meeink was seventeen-year-old neo-Nazi skinhead, he was sent to prison for three years for kidnapping and torturing a teenage boy whom he believed to be a SHARP (a Skinhead Against Racial Prejudice), and thus a traitor to the neo-Nazi movement.  Meeink's mistake was in thinking that mattering is a zero-sum game in which one person's gain is another person's loss because there isn't enough mattering to go around.

On the contrary, the fundamental moral principle in a Lockean liberal social order is that all lives matter because there really is enough mattering to go around, as Goldstein argues (271-292).  Locke conveyed this thought in Some Thoughts Concerning Education when he advised parents about the importance of instilling the virtue of "civility" in their children, so that they would show "general good will and regard for all people," knowing that we are "not to think meanly of ourselves and not to think meanly of others" (secs. 141, 143).

REFERENCES

Chaisson, Eric. 2006. Epic of Evolution: Seven Ages of the Cosmos. New York: Columbia University Press.

Locke, John. 1870. Four Letters on Toleration. London: Ward, Lock, and Tyler.

Locke, John. 1997. Political Essays. Ed. Mark Goldie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tooby, John, Leda Cosmides, and H. Clark Barrett. 2003. "The Second Law of Thermodynamics is the First Law of Psychology." Psychological Bulletin 129:858-865.

A Rebuttal of Jonathan Leaf's Rebuttal: Combining Phylogenetic and Convergent Evolution Explains Human Nature

Jonathan Leaf loves straw man arguments.  In my review of his book The Primate Myth for Law & Liberty, I criticized him for making a straw man argument.  Now he has written a reply to my criticism by . . . making a straw man argument.

In my review, I pointed out that evolutionary biologists and anthropologists generally agree that to explain the evolution of human nature--or of any animal nature--they need to consider both phylogenetic evolution and convergent evolution.  Phylogenetic evolution explains why human beings are similar to other primates with whom they share common genetic descent.  Convergent evolution explains why human beings are different from other primates and similar to non-primate animals that have evolved adaptations for environments of evolutionary adaptation similar to the human environments of evolutionary adaptation.

Convergent evolution explains why a dolphin looks like a fish: it has evolved to have the fish-like anatomy that allows it to swim smoothly through its aquatic habitat. But phylogenetic evolution explains why a dolphin is not a fish but a mammal: it has all the mammalian traits that it inherited from its mammalian ancestors that were originally adapted for a terrestrial habitat.

Similarly, we need to consider both phylogeny and convergence in explaining the evolution of the human mind.  Leaf correctly argues that the convergent evolution of the earliest human ancestors, as adapted for collaborative hunting, set them apart from other primates, who show very little collaborative hunting.  But we also need to understand the phylogenetic evolution of the human brain.

Leaf criticizes what he calls the Primate Myth--the idea that humans are most like primates and unlike all non-primate animals--because this denies the convergent evolution that makes humans more like herd and pack animals than primates.  But this Primate Myth is a straw man because most evolutionary scientists recognize both the phylogenetic similarities of humans to other primates and the convergent similarities of humans to herd and pack animals.

So, for example, Frans de Waal could see how similar humans are to chimps and bonobos because they share a common phylogenetic ancestry.  But he also could see how similar humans are to some non-primates because of convergent evolution.  For instance, de Waal recognized that while chimps and bonobos were sexually promiscuous, with no enduring pair-bonding of sexual mates, convergent evolution had made humans more like the pair-bonding animals.  He observed: "The intimate male-female relationship, which zoologists have dubbed a 'pair bond,' is bred into our bones.  I believe this is what sets us apart from the apes more than anything else."

Therefore, in attacking the Primate Myth that phylogenetic evolution counts for everything, and convergent evolution counts for nothing, in explaining human nature, Leaf is attacking a straw man.

In his rebuttal, Leaf criticizes me for "asserting that leading primatologists have not said that their study of apes is a means by which we might infer aspects of human nature."  "Actually," he says, "they have been saying this for decades."  Then he quotes from the first page of Chimpanzee Politics de Waal's remark that "apes hold up a mirror to us."

So here we go again with another straw man.  I have not asserted that leading primatologists have never said that the study of apes can illuminate some "aspects of human nature."  What I have asserted is that leading primatologists like de Waal have said that we need to study both phylogenetic evolution and convergent evolution to see how humans can be similar to apes in some ways but similar to non-primate animals in other ways.  

It's the same for explaining the evolved nature of other animals.  Emergent evolution explains why dolphins look similar to fish.  Phylogenetic evolution explains why they are actually mammals and not fish.

Would Leaf have to say that since dolphins are so similar to fish that must mean that they really are fish and not mammals?  Should his next book be all about dolphins with the title The Mammal Myth?

Or are we constructing a straw man here?

How Bird Brains Endow Corvids and Parrots with Primate-Like Intelligence

 

                                               Comparing the Brains of a Monkey and a Raven

                                                          A Diagram of the Avian Brain

"Bird brain" is a derogatory term.  But it shouldn't be.

Yes, bird brains are smaller than primate brains.  And bird brains don't seem to have a mammalian cerebral cortex or prefrontal cortex, which are largely responsible for complex cognition among mammals.  So we might not expect much from a walnut-sized bird brain.

But many of the studies of animal intelligence have shown that some birds--particularly, corvids (crows, jays, ravens, and jackdaws) and large parrots--have a complex cognitive psychology comparable to that of primates (Emery and Clayton 2004).  They use and manufacture tools.  They engage in causal reasoning.  They show flexible learning strategies.  They have some social intelligence.  They can use their imagination to form cognitive maps of their world and run simulations of future situations.

This complex cognitive functioning in corvids is controlled by the avian pallium, which corresponds to the mammalian cerebral cortex.  The pallium is the layers of grey and white matter that cover the upper surface of the cerebrum in vertebrates.  In mammals, the cortical part of the pallium forms the cerebreal cortex.  Within the avian pallium, the highest cognitive functions are controlled by the high numbers of associative neurons in the mesopallium and nidopallium, which correspond to the prefrontal region of primates (Herculano-Houzel 2020).

Using the isotropic fractionator method, Herculano-Houzel and her colleagues have shown that birds have large numbers of neurons in their whole brain, in their pallium, and in their mesopallium and nidopallium.  Among the songbirds studied, with brain mass ranging from 0.36 to 14.13 g, the total number of neurons in the brain ranges from 136 million to 2.17 billion.  In the parrots studied, brain mass ranged from 1.15 to 20.73 g, while the numbers of neurons ranged from 227 million to 3.14 billion. By comparison, a rhesus monkey brain weighing 70 g has about 1.7 billion neurons. This illustrates how neurons are more densely packed in the brains of birds than in primate brains--just as neurons are more densely packed in primate brains than in the brains of other mammals, which Herculano-Houzel calls the "primate advantage."  So here we see the "avian advantage" (Olkowicz et al. 2016).

                                                              A Blue-and-Yellow Macaw

                                                                A Bonnet Macaque Monkey

The avian pallial neurons of corvids and parrots significantly outnumber the pallial neurons of primate brains of the same mass.  For example, a raven pallium weighs about 10.20 g, and it has about 1.2 billion pallial neurons, while a capuchin monkey pallium weighing about 39.18 g has about 1.1 billion neurons.  A blue-and-yellow macaw with a pallium weighing about 14.38 g has about 1.9 neurons, while a bonnet macaque pallium weighing about 70 g has about 1.7 billion neurons.

The associative pallial neurons in the avian mesopallium and nidopallium are thought to be the functional equivalent to the mammalian prefrontal cortex, which drives flexible and complex cognitive performance.  So if we find similar or even higher numbers of neurons in associative pallial areas in corvids and parrots as in some primate species, that would help explain why these birds have primate-like intelligence.  And, indeed, some research has shown that corvid mesopallium and nidopallium combined can have between 200 and 300 million neurons per hemisphere, which is more than the estimated 68 million neurons in the prefrontal cortical region of the rhesus monkey.

But even though these large numbers of neurons in the bird brain are a major factor in explaining the complex intelligence of corvids and parrot, we should keep in mind that "complex cognitive functions obviously also depend on many other variables like cellular morphology, connectivity patterns, neurochemical properties, and cognition-related regulatory genetic sequences" (Strockens, et al. 2022, 1602).

What we see here is one of the major themes of my writing--the emergent evolution of animal minds in the brain:  differences in degree in the mental capacity of the brain can produce differences in kind when they pass over a critical threshold in the size and complexity of the brain.  That's why the approximately 16 billion neurons in the human cerebral cortex helps to explain why human beings have some mental capacities--such as language and symbolic abstraction--that other animals do not have at all.

Or should we say that the uniqueness of the human mind in its capacity for intellectually understanding the Universe can only be explained by God's miraculous creation of man in His own image by creating the human mind as the image of the Divine Mind?

One of the best arguments for theism is that this theistic doctrine of the human mind as created by God in His image provides the necessary support for the validity of human thought, including the validity of modern science. If we embrace Naturalism--the view that nothing exists except Nature, and so there is no God or nothing like God--we are caught in self-contradiction: if human thought originated not from a divine Mind but from the irrational causes of Nature, then we cannot trust our minds as reliable, and thus we cannot trust our belief in Naturalism. Naturalism destroys itself by destroying the rationality of believing in Naturalism, or anything else. Insofar as science--including evolutionary science--depends on the validity of human thought, and insofar as theism is the indispensable support for trusting in the validity of human thought, science is not only compatible with theism, science depends upon theism.

I have written a series of posts in response to this evolutionary argument against naturalism.

REFERENCES

Emery, Nathan J., and Nicola S. Clayton. 2004. "The Mentality of Crows: Convergent Evolution of Intelligence in Corvids and Apes." Science 306:1903-1907.

Herculano-Houzel, Suzana. 2020. "Birds Do Have a Brain Cortex--And Think." Science 369:1567-1568.

Olkowicz, Seweryn, et al. 2016. "Birds Have Primate-Like Numbers of Neurons in the Forebrain." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113:7255-7260.

Strockens, Felix, et al. 2022. "High Associative Neuron Numbers Could Drive Cognitive Performance in Corvid Species." The Journal of Comparative Neurology 530:1588-1605.

If Humans and Chimps Are 15 Percent Genetically Different, What Difference Does That Make?

Think about how often you've heard it said that the genetic difference between human beings and chimpanzees is only slightly more than 1 percent, and therefore humans are 99 percent similar to chimps.  It is also said that this proves that chimps--and also bonobos--are our closest living evolutionary relatives.  This seems to be confirmed by the fact that chimpanzees and bonobos are more genetically similar to humans than to gorillas.  This 1 percent difference between humans and chimps fits the evolutionary timeline of five to eight million years since humans and chimps diverged from their last common ancestor.

But now an article published last May in Nature (Yoo et al., 2025) reports that a complete sequencing of ape genomes shows that the genetic difference between humans and chimps is a lot greater than 1 percent--more like 15 percent!  And yet perhaps I shouldn't say this article "reports" this because if you read the main article, you won't see this claim of a 15 percent difference.  You have to go to the Nature website and print out the "Supplementary Data" for the article, and even then, you have to work through the technical jargon to find the 15 percent difference.  Casey Luskin has posted a helpful article at the Discovery Institute website that digs deep into the "Supplementary Data" to uncover this remarkable finding.  You would think that such a surprising discovery would be prominently announced in Nature and in press releases: "The Chimp-Human Genetic Difference Is Not 1% But 15%!"  I think Luskin is right to suggest that the editors at Nature must have worked hard to hide this finding because it refutes the popular claim about "only a 1% difference" separating humans and chimps.  

Luskin says this refutes one of the "icons of evolution," as Jonathan Wells called them--that is, widely believed assertions about evolution that the proponents of "intelligent design theory" and "young-Earth creationism" deny.  It's not surprising, therefore, that creationists like Ken Ham have cited Luskin's article as proving that the creationists are right to deny that there is any common evolutionary ancestry linking humans and apes.  Ham explains that Bible teaches us that God created the "ape kind" and the "humankind" separately and created humans as a unique kind made in the image of God.

And yet I don't see that this newly discovered "15% difference" provides any support for the intelligent design theorists or the creationists in their denial of evolutionary science.

But first we need to understand how this new research allows us to calculate genetic difference and similarity.  The title of the article in Nature is "Complete Sequency of Ape Genomes."  The emphasis is on "complete," because the first human and ape genome sequences were incomplete.  They excluded extremely repetitive sequences and large-scale structural differences such as inversions and duplications of genomic sequences.  So the first reports of only 1% differences between human and chimp genomes were based on incomplete drafts of the genomes.  But now the complete sequency in this article allows for a fuller comparison of similarities and differences in the sequences.

The authors found two kinds of differences--"gap divergence" and "single nucleotide variation" (SNV).

Luskin prepared this figure to illustrate the difference between "SNVs" and "Gaps" between two genomes.  Gaps represent nucleotides or segments of nucleotides that don't exist in one of the genomes.  SNVs represent places where the nucleotides are different for the two genomes.  In this illustration, we have 30 nucleotides of the target genome with 3 SNVs and 9 gaps relative to the query genome.  So SNV divergence is 10%, and gap divergence is 30%, which means a total divergence of 40%.

If you go to the Supplemental Data for the Yoo et al. article, you will see that Figure III.12 shows the SNVs in comparing the genomes for humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans--the four "great ape" species who belong to the Hominidae family.  When the human genome is the "target" genome, the "gap divergence" for the gorilla genome is 27.3 percent, for the Sumatran orangutan it's 16.5 percent, for the bonobo it's 14.4 percent, and for the chimpanzee it's 13.3 percent. 

Figure III.11 shows the SNV divergences, which are 2 percent for the gorilla, 3.6 percent for the Sumatran orangutan, 1.6 percent for the bonobo, and 1.6 percent for the chimpanzee.

If we add the gap divergences to the SNV differences, we get these total degrees of difference between human and ape genomes: 29.3 percent for the gorilla, 20.1 percent for the Sumatran orangutan, 16 percent for the bonobo, and 14.9 percent for the chimpanzee.  That's how we get the estimate of almost 15 percent difference between the chimp and human genomes, which is a lot higher than the purported 1 percent difference.  

It should be noted that these comparisons are for the 44 non-sex chromosomes in the human genome--that is, excluding the X and Y chromosomes.  As compared with chimps, the human X chromosome has a 4.4 percent gap divergence and 1.1 percent SNV divergence, while the human Y chromosome has an amazing 56.6 percent gap divergence and 3.9 percent SNV divergence.

Although this new research shows that the genetic differences between humans and apes are greater than had been previously reported, this does not deny the evolutionary story of the common evolutionary ancestry of humans and apes.  The genetic similarity between humans and apes is still very great--85 percent!  And humans are more genetically similar to chimps and bonobos than they are to orangutans and gorillas, which supports the claim that chimps and bonobos really are our closest living evolutionary relatives.

ALL IN THE GENES?  OR FOUR DIMENSIONS OF EVOLUTION?

There is an obvious problem here, however.  All of us have seen chimpanzees in zoos.  And many of us have seen bonobos if we have gone to zoos in San Diego, Milwaukee, or Cincinnati that have bonobos.  Those zoos often have displays that say something about the 1 percent difference between humans and chimpanzees.  Now those displays might have to be changed to read 15 percent.  But even so, when we look at those apes and compare them with humans, it's very hard to believe that the difference is only 1 to 15 percent.  It's simply not true that humans and apes are 85 percent the same.  The gap between the mental achievements of human beings and those of the apes is staggering.

Most human beings don't believe that evolutionary genetics can fully explain that gap, and that's why so many people reject the science of evolution, and why so many believe that the superiority of the human mind over the ape mind can only be explained by the supernatural work of an Intelligent Designer or Divine Creator.

They are right to believe that evolutionary genetics cannot fully explain the achievements of the human mind.  But that's because genetics is only a small part of evolutionary science.  As I have indicated in some previous posts, there are four levels of evolutionary inheritance--genetics, epigenetics, culture, and symbolism (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005).

The genetic inheritance system is the foundation for the Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. But genetic reductionism and determinism fail to see how gene action depends on the complexity of interacting causes within the genome, within cells, within organisms, within groups of organisms, and within ecological circumstances. Except for a few single-gene genetic disorders, "genetic astrology"--the idea that genes directly control specific traits--must be dismissed as foolish.

The epigenetic inheritance system is evident in the differences between specialized cells. Brain cells, liver cells, and skin cells are very different, although the nucleus of each cell has the same genome. Their differences are epigenetic, rather than genetic, because they have arisen through their developmental history in which there were different patterns of gene activation and interaction within the cell. This developmental information is passed on as these cells divide to produce more cells of the same kind. It is possible for evolution to occur through heritable epigenetic variation even without genetic variation. Just as a musical recording transmits interpretations in musical performances of a musical score, so does an epigenetic inheritance system transmit interpretations of the information in DNA, so that there is a Lamarkian inheritance of phenotypes instead of genotypes. One version of such inheritance that is now under active study is DNA methylation: strands of DNA are chemically modified during development, and these modifications can be transmitted through reproduction.  The chemical modification in epimutation is not in the DNA itself but in the chromatin marking. Methylated DNA has a small methyl group attached to some of its bases. The pattern of methylation influences which regions of DNA are expressed. The different kinds of cells in the human body have the same DNA, but the different patterns of methylation regulate the expression of DNA.

The behavioral inheritance system is the transmission of information among animals through social learning. For example, among some animals (including human beings) mothers transmit food preferences to their offspring, because information about what mother is eating is transmitted either in the womb or through suckling, so that the offspring inherits a preference for that food. More complex forms of social learning come through animal culture. For example, some chimpanzees can discover how to open nuts with a stone and then pass on this practice within their group so that it becomes a social tradition. Different communities of chimps in Africa have different cultures based on distinctive profiles of traditional practices transmitted by social learning. As opposed to genetic evolution, cultural evolution is not blind but targeted to functional change.

The symbolic inheritance system is uniquely human because it shows the qualitative leap that defines our humanity as based on our capacity for symbolic thought and communication. Other animals can communicate through signs. But only human beings can communicate through symbols. The evolution of human language was probably crucial for the evolution of symbolism. Symbolic systems allow us to think about abstractions that have little to do with concrete, immediate experiences. Symbolic systems allow human beings to construct a shared imagined reality. These symbolic constructions are often fictional and future-oriented. Art, religion, science, and philosophy are all manifestations of human symbolic evolution. 

To explain why humans are somewhat similar to the great apes and yet radically different from them, we have understand how all four levels of human evolution have shaped human beings to be the unique animals that they are.

COMMON DESCENT OR INTELLIGENT DESIGN?  OR BOTH?

Although Casey Luskin is an advocate of intelligent design theory as the best alternative to evolutionary science, he stresses that he is not pointing to the new estimate of 15 percent difference between humans and chimps as evidence that refutes evolution.  As long as the five to eight million years since humans and chimps diverged from their last common ancestor is enough time for this 15 percent difference to evolve, then the evolutionary story of common ancestry is still defensible.  

But still, Luskin suggests, intelligent design theory has a better explanation for this genetic similarity--85 percent--between chimps and humans:  "Functional genetic similarities between humans and chimps could be explained by common ancestry or by common design.  Common ancestry is not the only way to explain genetic similarities.  Intelligent agents can re-use functional code in different designs.  Common design can explain shared functional genetic similarities just as well as common descent can."

There are two mistakes in Luskin's reasoning, however.  First, he mistakenly assumes a dichotomy between common descent and common design, as if they were mutually exclusive.  As I have noted previously, one of the leading advocates of intelligent design theory--Michael Behe--argues (in The Edge of Evolution) that the genetic similarity between humans and chimps is evidence that human beings evolved from primate ancestors shared with chimpanzees.  He explains that intelligent design is required to explain the emergence of the higher taxonomic levels of life (kingdoms, phyla, classes) but not the lower levels (orders, families, genera, species).  This means that the evolution of species could be fully Darwinian.

Behe is an intelligent-design evolutionist, because he insists: "The possibility of intelligent design is quite compatible with common descent, which some religious people disdain.  What's more, although some religious thinkers envision active, continuing intervention in nature, intelligent design is quite compatible with the view that the universe operates by unbroken natural law, with the design of life perhaps packed into its initial set-up" (166).  Luskin refuses to recognize Behe's position.

Luskin is also mistaken, however, in assuming the plausibility of the arguments for intelligent design.  He thus ignores my objection that the arguments for intelligent design are fallacious in two respects.  First, intelligent design reasoning depends completely on the fallacy of negative argumentation from ignorance, in which intelligent design proponents argue that if evolutionary scientists cannot fully explain the step-by-step evolutionary process by which complex living forms arise, then this proves that these complex forms of life must be caused by the intelligent designer.  This is purely negative reasoning because the proponents of intelligent design can offer no positive explanation of their own as to exactly when, where, and how the intelligent designer caused these forms of life.  

The second fallacy is the subtle use of the fallacy of equivocation--in the equivocation between human intelligent design and supernatural intelligent design.  We have all had the experience of seeing how human intelligent agents create artificial products by intelligent design.  But it does not follow logically from this that we have all had the experience of seeing how supernatural intelligent agents create artificial products by intelligent design.

CREATED BY GOD IN HIS IMAGE?  OR EVOLVED IN THE IMAGE OF PRIMATES?  OR BOTH?

Ken Ham (2025) argues, on the contrary, that even if we have not seen with our own eyes God creating everything out of nothing, this has been revealed to us through the Bible; and part of that revelation is that God created all the "kinds" of plants and animals separately, and He created the "chimp kind" to be utterly different from the "humankind," which was created in His image.

But as I have said in my previous posts on Ham and his two museums in Kentucky--the Creation Museum and the Ark Encounter--he mistakenly assumes that he is conveying the clear meaning of the Bible and that the Bible's clear teaching is incompatible with Darwinian evolution.

The Bible says nothing about God creating apes and humans as separate "kinds."  The Book of Genesis never mentions apes.  Actually, in the whole Bible, the Hebrew word for "ape" appears only twice (I Kings 10:22, 2 Chronicles 9:21), and never in the context of creation.  And while Genesis speaks of God creating plants and animals "after their kind," it never identifies human beings as a "kind."  Consider Genesis 1:26--"And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."  The phrase "after our likeness" takes the place of "after their kind," suggesting that in being created in the likeness of God, man is not bound by a "kind."  So there is no Biblical basis for Ham to speak of "humankind."

Moreover, the Hebrew word min that is translated as kind in the King James Bible is ambiguous.  In the Latin translation of the Bible, min is translated as the Latin word species.  Consequently, for almost two thousand years, Biblical believers assumed that God's creating "kinds" meant that God created each "species" separately, and that each species was eternally fixed.  But then after Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859, in which he argued against the "theory of special creation" that God had created each species separating, some Christians began to believe that the created "kinds" in the Bible referred not to "species" but to some higher level of taxonomy.  Then, in 1941, the Christian biologist Frank Marsh coined the word baramin (combining the Hebrew words for "created" and "kind") as the best term for "created kind."  He argued that a "created kind" was not at the taxonomic level of "species" but at or near the level of "family."  This allowed Biblical believers to accept Darwin's theory of the origin of "species" by natural selection while also believing that God had created the "families" of plants and animals to be fixed and separate.  So, for example, we could say that God originally created the "family" of the finches, but within the limits of that "family," the separate species of finches endemic to the Galapagos Islands evolved by natural selection to be adaptive to those islands.

Notice what this means for the taxonomic classification of human beings.  If the "kind" of human beings refers to their taxonomic "family," then in modern taxonomy, human beings belong to the "family" of Hominidae, which includes chimps, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutan.  Even the young-earth creationist Todd Wood (2010) accepts this Hominidae classification of humans with the great apes, although he identifies the "human holobaramin" as the genus Homo.

This idea of "created kinds" was crucial for Ham in solving an old problem with Noah's Ark.  If the Ark carried all the "kinds" of land-based plants and animals, how could the Ark be big enough to hold all of the land-based species--which could be numbered in the millions?

Ham's creationist researchers have solved this problem by calculating that among these land-dependent vertebrate species, there are fewer than 1,400 known living and extinct kinds (that is, families).  This allows them to estimate that Noah had to have fewer than 6,744 individual animals on the Ark.  Once these animals left the Ark, speciation by natural selection within kinds could create all the living and extinct species that we know today.  The Ham's Ark Encounter is designed to show how as many as 6,744 animals and 8 human beings (Noah and his extended family) could survive on the Ark for almost a year.  But notice that this is a speculative reading of the Bible that never defines "kind" in this way.  This is not the clear meaning of the Bible, as Ham claims.  Indeed, if you go to the Ark Encounter in Kentucky, you might notice one display that speaks of the need for "Arktistic license" in making up details in the story of the Ark that have no basis in the Bible.

Since the Bible is so obscure in its creation story, and since so much of that story sounds like a figurative folk tale that was not meant to be a literal account of natural history, many Christians (like C. S. Lewis, Francis Collins, and Deborah Haarsma) have decided that the Bible could be read as allowing for theistic evolution or evolutionary creation.  According to this conception, God created the universal laws of nature at the beginning of the Universe, but then He allowed all the forms of life to emerge by natural evolution.  God is the "primary cause" of everything.  But the evolutionary process unfolds through the "secondary causes" of nature.  Even Darwin himself accepted this metaphysical conception of "dual causality" that reconciles belief in God as First Cause with acceptance of evolutionary science.  At various points in the Creation Museum and the Ark Encounter, there are displays that acknowledge that many if not most Christians accept some version of this theistic evolution.

But what about the creation of human beings in the image of God?  If the "image of God" refers to the God-like intellect of man, then we might argue that the extraordinary mental capacities of human beings could have evolved through the evolution of the primate brain.  I have argued that the evolution in the size and complexity of the primate brain passed over a critical threshold so that now there are 86 billion neurons in the human brain, and of that total, 16 billion are in the cerebral cortex, which includes 1.3 billion neurons in the prefrontal cortex.  That emergent evolution of the brain created the uniquely powerful human mind.  We were created in the image of the primate brain.

Even if we are only 15 percent genetically different from chimps, we are different in kind from chimps because we have the mental capacities for language, morality, and symbolic abstraction that they do not have at all.  That's the difference that makes all the difference.

REFERENCES

Behe, Michael. 2007. The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the  Limits of Darwinism. New York: The Free Press.

Ham, Ken. 2025. "Study Finds Chimp DNA Is Not '99% Identical' to Ours." Answers in Genesis. Ken Ham Blog. May 27. Online.

Jablonka, Eva, and Marion J. Lamb. 2014. Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life. Revised edition. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Luskin, Casey. 2025. "Fact Check: New 'Complete' Chimp Genome Shows 14.9 Percent Difference from Human Genome." Science and Culture Today, May 21, online.

Wood, Todd Charles. 2010. "Baraminological Analysis Places Homo habilis, Homo rudolfensis, and Australopithecus sediba in the Human Holobaramin." Answers Research Journal 3: 71-90.

Yoo, Dong Ahn, et al. 2025. "Complete Sequencing of Ape Genomes." Nature 641: 401-418.

Darwinian Conservatism Supports Emergent Complexity and Immanent Teleology: A Response to Robert Koons

The Darwinian conservatism of the permanent things requires a biological teleology of human nature.  Because one needs to claim that evolved human nature is directed to certain ends or goals that constitute the natural norms (the permanent things) of human existence, so that the fulfillment of those norms can be understood as the human good.

By contrast, the metaphysical conservatives argue that modern science--and particularly Darwinian biology--denies teleology in denying that human beings can have natural ends.  The metaphysical conservatives claim that for modern science, all reality is understood to be nothing but the blind motion of particles in space governed by material and mechanistic laws of motion; and in such a world, there can be no final causation.  At the Kirk Center conference, that claim was made by Robert Koons (University of Texas at Austin) on a panel on "Conservatism and Religion."

Koons said this as part of his general argument that modern science has been "mostly a very bad thing."  On this point, he saw himself as agreeing with C. S. Lewis in The Abolition of Man that "modern science was born at an inauspicious hour and in an unhealthy neighborhood."

I saw two problems in Koons' presentation.  First, he identified modern science with a reductionistic physics, and he was silent about the emergent complexity of biology.  Second, in arguing that modern science rejects teleology, he ignored the distinction between cosmic teleology and immanent teleology.

EMERGENT COMPLEXITY IN DARWINIAN BIOLOGY

In my chapter on "Emergence" in Darwinian Conservatism, I argue for the "emergent evolution of the soul in the brain," and I defend the idea of emergence as an alternative to both reductionism and dualism. As I have argued in previous posts, the simplest expression of the idea of emergence is that the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts. Emergent phenomena are those complex wholes with properties that we could not explain or predict from our knowledge of the parts. For example, when hydrogen and oxygen combine chemically to form water, we see emergent properties in water that we could not have predicted from the properties of hydrogen and oxygen. This emergence of novelty is manifested throughout the evolution of the universe. As we pass through levels of complexity, we find new properties at higher levels that are not fully reducible to the lower levels. This idea of emergence denies strong reductionism, because it denies that the higher levels of organization can be completely reduced to the lower levels. But the idea of emergence also denies dualism, because it denies any radical separation of matter and mind.

In his Descent of Man, Charles Darwin recognized--if only implicitly--that human beings show an emergent difference in kind from other animals.  Darwin noted that self-consciousness is uniquely human: "It may be freely admitted that no animal is self-conscious, if by this term it is implied, that he reflects on such points, as whence he comes or whither he will go, or what is life and death, and so forth" (105).  Morality is also uniquely human: "A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them.  We have no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity. . . . man . . . alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being" (135).  And language is uniquely human: "The habitual use of articulate language is . . . peculiar to man" (107).

Darwin could implicitly affirm such emergent differences in kind without affirming any radical differences in kind.  Emergent differences in kind can be explained by natural science as differences in kind that naturally evolve from differences in degree that pass over a critical threshold of complexity.  So, for example, we can see the uniquely human capacities for self-consciousness, morality, and language as emerging from the evolutionary expansion of the primate brain, so that at some critical point in the evolution of our ancestors, the size and complexity of the brain (perhaps particularly in the frontal cortex) reached a point where distinctively human cognitive capacities emerged at higher levels of brain evolution that are not found in other primates.  With such emergent differences in kind, there is an underlying unbroken continuity between human beings and their hominid ancestors, so there is no need to posit some supernatural intervention in nature that would create a radical difference in kind in which there is a gap with no underlying continuity.

Now we know from the work of neuroscientist Suzana Herculano-Houzel that human beings are unique as compared with other primates in that human beings have 16 billion neurons in the cerebral cortex, which includes 1.3 billion in the prefrontal cortex.  The human mind or soul can arise from a natural process of emergent evolution in which differences in degree become differences in kind after passing over a critical threshold in the size and complexity of the primate brain.  As a consequence of her research, we can now identify that critical threshold as the remarkably large number of neurons in the human cerebral cortex and particularly in the prefrontal cortex.  That probably explains the three points of human uniqueness that Darwin saw--self-conscious awareness, morality, and language.

Koons is silent about this emergent complexity of human biology in asserting that all of modern science must reduce reality to the motion of particles in space.

IMMANENT TELEOLOGY IN DARWINIAN BIOLOGY

Koons is also silent about how Darwinian biologists recognize the immanent teleology of living beings even though they deny the cosmic teleology of the universe.  In insisting that modern science denies teleology, Koons has to assume that cosmic teleology is the only kind of teleology.  And thus he ignores the fact that for Aristotle natural teleology was more clearly biological than cosmological.

As I have argued previously, Darwin recognized the teleological character of his evolutionary science.  In an article in Nature, Asa Gray wrote: "let us recognize Darwin's great service to Natural Science in bringing back to it Teleology; so that instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology."  In response to this, Darwin wrote to Gray (June 5, 1874): "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I do not think anyone else has ever noted that."  So, we can infer, that when Darwin read Aristotle's explanation of biological teleology in the Parts of Animals and expressed his admiration for Aristotle's biological science, Darwin saw that he really was bringing back into science a teleological conception of living nature that was originally formulated by Aristotle.

We need to see that while Darwin denied cosmic teleology, he affirmed immanent teleology. The natural evolution of living beings does not conform to any cosmic design. But that natural evolution does produce species that show an internal teleology in being directed to ends or goals. For example, a mammalian species is naturally adapted for parental care, so that mothers caring for their offspring can be explained teleologically as goal-directed behavior. Such species-specific, immanent teleology is the only kind of teleology that Aristotle saw in the living world, and modern biology confirms such Aristotelian teleology.

Insofar as Darwinian biology allows for emergent complexity and immanent teleology, this is enough for a Darwinian conservatism.

The Evolutionary Symbolic Niche Construction of Liberalism Through Lockean "Consent"

Locke's teaching that government arises from the consent of the people is well known.  But it's not well known that Locke explains the emergence of all social institutions as created by popular consent.  Human beings have created not only government (ST, 95-99) but also languages (ECHU, III.2.8), families (ST, 74-83), morality (ECHU, 28.10), and money (ST, 36) by consenting to their existence.  This is what I have called the evolutionary symbolic niche construction of Lockean liberalism.  Of course, Locke does not use this terminology, but it's the best way to explain what he means in claiming that human beings create social institutions by consenting to them.

We should start by seeing that Locke was answering the fundamental question of modern intellectual life.

HOW MANY WORLDS ARE THERE?

If we accept the modern scientific explanation of the natural world as it arose in the seventeenth century, how can we explain the human mind and human society?

There are at least three ways to answer this question.  One way is to assume that there is only one world, and therefore the mind and society must be explained as arising somehow from the natural world as studied by modern science.  Another way is to assume that there are two worlds, because the natural world of science is separated from the human world of mind and society.  A third way is to assume that there are three worlds--the natural world of objective facts, the mental world of subjective experience, and the cultural world of social ideas and practices. 

According to the first way, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities should become parts of one universal science of nature.  According to the second way, there is an unbridgeable gulf between the natural sciences and the human sciences.  According to the third way, the unbridgeable gulf separates three realms of thought about three different worlds: the natural sciences are separated from the psychological sciences, and both are separated from the social sciences and humanities.

As should be evident from many of my posts, I think the first way is best.  There are two different intellectual strategies for achieving this one-world vision--reductive physicalism and emergent evolution.  According to reductive physicalism, the complete unification of all knowledge of the natural world would ultimately require explaining everything through physics.  According to emergent evolution, which is the position that I take, the history of the universe is a history of emergent complexity, in which higher levels of complexity arise from lower levels, and while those higher levels are consistent with the lower levels, the higher cannot be fully reduced to the lower.  

So, for example, biology must be consistent with physics and chemistry, but biological phenomena have an emergent complexity that cannot be fully reduced to physics and chemistry.  The mind and society are also emergent phenomena that must be compatible with the laws of physics and chemistry, but without being fully reducible to those physical and chemical laws.  Some of my posts elaborating these points can be found here, here, here, and here.

My thinking here largely coincides with the thinking of John Searle, particularly in his book Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2010).  Like me, he thinks the fundamental questions of modern intellectual life are about how to explain human life in a manner that is compatible with modern natural science.

"How can we give an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits--as mindful, rational, speech-act performing, free-will having, social, political human beings--in a world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless, physical particles?  How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of brute physical facts?" (ix)

Like me, Searle assumes that we live in one world--that we live in one reality with physical, mental, and social aspects--and that our explanations of mental and social life must be compatible with the physical sciences but not simply reducible to those sciences.  And so, for example, in Making the Social World,  he offers an explanation of social reality as created and maintained by language, while explaining language as a natural product of the human biological evolution of the brain that enabled the human mind to create social institutions through what he calls "collective intentionality."

I mostly agree with Searle about all of this.  My one major point of disagreement is that Searle fails to see how his account of how human beings create social institutions through collective recognition or acceptance of those institutions is a Lockean social contract theory of morality and politics.  If one sees this, and also sees how Lockean social contract reasoning can be understood in modern evolutionary theory as symbolic evolution and niche construction, then Lockean liberalism can be understood as the symbolic niche construction of liberal institutions.  This can also be described, as it is by Deirdre McCloskey, as a transformation in ethical ideas, moving from an aristocratic ethics that scorned the pursuit of economic gain to a bourgeois ethics in which life in a commercial society became virtuous.

We live in a world of institutional facts that constitute our social reality.  Consider one of Searle's favorite examples--the twenty dollar bill.  Because of its institutional status, I can use that twenty-dollar bill to buy goods and services.  As a physical object, it's only a piece of paper with some ink marks on it.  But as long as we accept its institutional status as currency of the United States, with its stipulated value, it has power as a medium of exchange.  Searle would say that this institutional reality of the twenty-dollar bill has been created by a linguistic or symbolic representation that we can call a Declaration of Status Function, which has the form "X counts as Y in C."  We agree that this piece of paper counts as money in the context of the monetary system of the United States.  It has the status of money that can function as currency because of our agreement to regard it as such.  Remarkably, we have created the social reality of money by declaring our agreement that it should count as such, as long as the paper money has the correct symbols, such as the words "This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private."  (Searle does not realize that he is following Locke here, because Locke stressed that the "invention of money" was "by consent" [ST, 36].)

Similarly, Donald Trump is President of the United States, and has all the rights and duties of the presidency, because we have agreed to count as president anyone who wins a presidential election according to the procedures for the Electoral College and who satisfies the qualifications prescribed in the United States Constitution.  

I am a husband, a professor, and a citizen of the United States.  I own a house, a car, and other property.  I have the rights and duties created by the formal laws and informal social norms of my neighborhood, my city, and my country.  Social facts like these enable us to live a civilized human life.

The mystery here, as Searle indicates, is how we can have an objective knowledge of this social reality that is created by human subjective opinions.  The human capacity for language and symbolism enables us to create a reality by representing that reality as existing and agreeing among ourselves to accept that reality as existing, which allows us to create a social and institutional reality out of language, symbolism, and collective intentionality.

To explain scientifically how this subjective creation of social reality is possible in a natural world of physical facts, we would need to explain the natural evolution of the human brain that created the human capacity for language and symbolism.  Searle offers a conceptual analysis of how language as a natural, biological phenomenon could have evolved among human evolutionary ancestors as an extension of prelinguistic forms of intentionality.  Within evolutionary biology, there is continuing study of the evolution of human language.

Other animals have some capacity for communication and social learning that can create animal cultures of inherited behavioral traditions.  But human beings are probably unique in their capacity for language and symbolism that allows them to create imaginary social realities.  (As I have indicated in a previous post, Eva Jablonka argues well for the evolution of symbolic culture as being uniquely human.)

So, for example, some primates have social orders in which some individuals are treated as alpha males.  But this falls short of the human capacity of moral symbolism by which we agree to recognize some individuals in specified circumstances as having the right to rule over us.

Here we see the moral power--or "deontic power" as Searle calls it--implicit in the human creation of social reality.  "Deontic" is derived from the Greek word deon, denoting something we must do or ought to do--our ethical duty.  In creating social facts, we create ethical facts, because we create formal laws or informal norms of social life that constitute rights and duties of individuals in specified social roles.  As a husband, professor, and citizen, I have the rights and duties of those socially created roles.  Moreover, as a human being, I might have the human rights and duties that arise from my socially recognized status as a member of the human species.  Searle argues that this is indeed the case--that our social reality does include the reality of natural human rights, which include the natural rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness, as rights rooted in our biological human nature.

This sounds a lot like John Locke's argument for natural rights and social order constituted by a social contract.  But, oddly, Searle rejects Locke and social contract reasoning, without realizing that his thinking largely coincides with that reasoning.  Searle doesn't see that in explaining how status functions arise from "collective intentionality" or "collective acceptance or recognition of the object or person as having that status" (8), he is adopting the Lockean argument for social authority as arising from the consent of human individuals.

Searle offers two criticisms of Locke and the social contract theorists.  He says that they are wrong about the state of nature, because they don't understand that once human beings have a shared language, they have a social contract and a society.  "If by 'state of nature' is meant a state in which there are no human institutions, then for language-speaking animals, there is no such thing as a state of nature."  His second criticism is that Locke "gives no evidence of seeing that any account of language could show how language underlies society" (62).  Both of these claims are mistaken.

Locke makes it clear that in the state of nature, when human beings lived in bands of hunter-gatherers, there was no formal government, but there were human institutions--particularly, marriage, families, private property, economic exchange, and social norms of moral conduct that Locke calls "the law of nature."  There was a kind of informal government in the governing of children by their parents and in the episodic authority of military leaders in time of war (Second Treatise, pars. 74-75, 94, 105, 107-109, 170).

This was the first human society that was created by informal consent--collective recognition or acceptance--through language, and language itself was a social creation in which certain sounds were given symbolic meaning by a "tacit consent" (ECHU, III.2.8).  But this society was not a political society, because there was not yet any consent to a formal government or legal system (First Treatise, pars. 86-93; Second Treatise, pars. 6-14, 25-35, 77-90).  Searle is mistaken, therefore, in assuming that Locke thought there were no human institutions in the state of nature.

Searle is also mistaken in assuming that Locke did not recognize how language creates society.  In fact, Locke explained in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding that social institutions were created by human beings through the language of "mixed modes" for use in social intercourse (II.2.22; II.28.2-4; II.31.3; III.1.1, III.2.8; III.5).  Echoing Locke's terminology, Searle speaks of "the mode of existence of social entities" (5).

Mixed modes are important for social and political thought, because most of the words used in theology, ethics, law, and politics are mixed modes.  Locke's examples of mixed modes include adultery, incest, murder, parricide, justice, gratitude, glory, and ambition.

Locke emphasizes the arbitrariness of mixed modes.  The ideas of mixed modes are "made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence.  Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable.  But, in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly."  Mixed modes are "the workmanship of the mind" (III.5.3-4). 

This is the same arbitrariness that Searle sees in institutional facts that exist only because we think they exist and say that they exist.  Searle declares: "God can create light by saying 'Let there be light!'  Well, we cannot create light, but we have a similar remarkable capacity.  We can create boundaries, kings, and corporations by saying something equivalent to 'Let this be a boundary!' 'Let the oldest son be the king!'  'Let there be a corporation.'" (100)

But since both Searle and Locke stress the arbitrariness with which human beings freely create their social norms by collective consent through speech, we have to wonder whether this denies that there is any natural foundation or standard for judging our moral ideas.  And if so, wouldn't this contradict Locke's claim that there is a natural law knowable by natural human reason and Searle's claim that human rights are rooted in human nature, which suggest a natural standard rather than arbitrary creation?

Locke says that while mixed modes are made "very arbitrarily," they are not made "without reason" or "at random" (III.5.3, 6-7).  Although our moral ideas are not copied from nature, they are made by human beings for the purpose of communicating standards of conduct that facilitate human social life; and the requirements of such a life are shaped by the natural desires and inclinations of human beings.  The ultimate natural standard for judging social norms is whether they satisfy the natural human pursuit of happiness (I.2.3; III.21.42-73).  In that way, human nature does set standards for our moral ideas.

So, for example, if human beings say that intentionally killing an innocent human being is murder, but killing a sheep is not, this distinction is not simply discovered by just looking at human beings killing one another and killing sheep.  This moral distinction is made by human beings to serve the natural desire of human beings to preserve their lives against attack and to punish those that threaten them (III.5.5-6; FT, 86-88; ST, 7-11).  And if we distinguish the killing of a father or mother as worse than killing others, it's because we agree to recognize the different heinousness of the crime that demands a distinct punishment that fits the crime (III.5.7).  Similarly, if we create the idea of an incest taboo, it's because human beings naturally express moral disgust in response to incest, although there will be cultural variation in how incest is defined based on variable kinship systems.

Like Locke, Searle appeals to human biological nature as the natural standard for natural human rights.  And from that standard, Searle derives a minimal list of human rights that looks much like what Locke would endorse: "the right to life, including the right to personal liberty, the right to own personal private property (such as clothing), the right to free speech, the right to associate freely with other people and to choose with whom one associates, the right to believe what one wants to believe, including religious beliefs as well as atheism, the right to travel, and the right to privacy" (185).

But while Searle sees these rights as status functions created by human beings through their collective intentionality, he recognizes that many people have believed that such rights are insecure if they are not seen as part of the natural order of things or created by God.  He sees this in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident" that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights."  Searle suggests that this belief in divine creationism is false (107, 118-19, 183).  And he indicates that this creates a problem for his theory of social institutions.  In such cases, "the status function only works as a status function precisely because it is believed not to be a status function but a brute intentionality-independent fact about the universe."  But then, he indicates, all that matters is that the people do collectively recognize or accept the system of status functions, even though the collective acceptance is based on a false belief in a divine moral law (119).

Although Locke rejects the idea of the "divine right of kings," he does appeal to the creationist theology of human beings as having a special moral dignity because they are the "workmanship" of God who created them in His image (FT, 30, 52-54, 85-86; ST, 6, 56).  He also, however, grounds the moral dignity of human beings in their self-ownership as beings who claim a property in their own persons (ST, 27, 172-73).  And some readers have wondered whether this could provide a purely natural ground for Lockean natural rights, without the need for appealing to supernatural creationism.

But then when the Declaration of Independence appeals to "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," this suggests a natural creationism--that is, Nature's God creates through natural law, perhaps through a natural evolutionary process.  And indeed many Christians are theistic evolutionists who see God working through natural evolution.  Locke often speaks of the "Laws of God and Nature" (Second Treatise, pars. 1, 4, 60, 66, 142, 195).

Men might be created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights through the human evolution of a large and complex cerebral cortex that allows them to collectively recognize human equality of rights.

In any case, evolutionary biology can recognize the practical efficacy of religious belief--particularly, religious belief in a moral God who cares for human beings and enforces moral law through rewards and punishments.  Research in cross-cultural economic game experiments indicates that those who belong to one of the world religions tend to show a sense of fairness in their playing of the games.  And evolutionary biologists like David Sloan Wilson have argued that religious belief evolved through group selection to support cooperation within groups.

Evolutionary biology could also recognize the success of Lockean liberalism in promoting its moral and political ideas as an expression of symbolic niche construction.  "Niche construction" is a modern term in evolutionary theory that refers to plants and animals constructing the environment to which they are evolutionarily adapted.  For example, beavers alter their environment by building dams, and beavers have adapted this constructed environment (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003; Odling-Smee 2024) 

This idea was first developed in Darwin's last book--The Formation of Vegetable Mould, through the Action of Worms (1881)--in which he studied how earthworms continually alter the surface of the Earth by breaking down soil into fine particles, thus they construct the environment to which they are evolutionarily adapted.  

We can also see the cultural history of animals as niche construction, in that cultural animals create cultural traditions that are inherited by later generations.  Human beings do this not only through behavioral traditions of culture but also through their uniquely human creation of symbolic realities, including the symbolic systems of religion, morality, and politics.

As a political philosopher who supported the radical Whig program, Locke was engaged in a rhetorical project to transform the religious, moral, and political ideas of England to create what would later be called liberalism.  This was an exercise in symbolic niche construction.  The success of that project began to appear with the success of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and it emerged even more clearly later in the 18th and 19th centuries with the success of Lockean Whig ideas and the emergence of the Bourgeois Era and the Industrial Revolution.

The triumph of Locke's liberalism required a rhetorical change in moral ideas so that a bourgeois way of life could be seen as virtuous.  This is what Deirdre McCloskey has been writing about in her series of books on the "bourgeois virtues."  In a recent article, McCloskey has argued that Searle's social ontology supports her reasoning, because we can see the Bourgeois Era as arising from a status function declaration:  Commercial life counts as honorable in the Bourgeois Era ("Max U vs. Humanomics: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalism," Journal of Institutional Economics 12 [2016]: 1-27.).

Although I generally agree with McCloskey, I do have some questions about her argument.  In her criticism of Douglas North's institutional explanation for the modern move into open access societies, she sets up a stark opposition between social institutions and moral ideas, and argues that it was a change in ideas rather than a change in institutions that explains the modern revolution.  But her acceptance of Searle's social ontology suggests that what she really wants to say is that social institutions rightly understood are created by the social acceptance of the moral ideas that constitute and maintain those institutions.

Another question that I have for McCloskey is also a question for Searle:  Do they give enough weight to violence and war in shaping the moral history of social institutions?  Occasionally, Searle acknowledges that social institutions have to be backed by force, although "forms of organized coercion are themselves systems of status functions" (88, 97, 104, 141-42, 163, 171, 173). 

Locke goes farther than either Searle or McCloskey in stressing the importance of trial by battle when there is some deep controversy over who has the authority to settle disputes over political power.  This is what Locke calls the "appeal to Heaven," the appeal to the God of battles (ST, 19-21, 109, 155, 168, 176, 232, 240-43).

Locke himself was involved in the Whig conspiracies for assassinating and rebelling against Charles II and James II.  Because of that involvement, he was forced to flee to Holland to avoid being tried and executed for treason.  While he lived in Holland, he had to worry about being captured by the King's agents and extradited to England for trial. He supported the Revolution of 1688, and despite its reputation as a "bloodless" revolution, there was a lot of violence in the Revolution (as Steven Pincus has shown in his 1688: The First Modern Revolution [2009]).  Ultimately, the success of the Revolution depended on the defeat of the Jacobite armies that tried to restore the Stuart monarchy.  The military threat of the Jacobites was not finally put down until the battle of Culloden in Scotland in 1746.

The evolutionary history of liberalism is a rhetorical history of persuasive speech, but it is also a military history of war that has turned on the unpredictable contingencies of battle.  

As Winston Churchill observed, "Great battles, whether won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform" (Marlborough: His Life and Times).

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AS LOCKEAN SYMBOLIC NICHE CONSTRUCTION

If Lockean social contract reasoning can be understood as symbolic evolution and niche construction, then Lockean liberalism can be understood as the symbolic niche construction of liberal institutions.  We can see this manifested in the Declaration of Independence, particularly in its famous second paragraph that echoes Locke's Second Treatise ("We hold these truths to be self-evident . . .).

The Declaration of Independence is what Searle calls a Declaration of Status Function, which has the form "X counts as Y in C."  The American Revolutionaries declared that "these United Colonies [X] are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States [Y]" in the European system of states [C].  The success of that Declaration depended on whether in their "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," they could persuade world opinion to recognize their status as "Free and Independent States."  

Their success depended on both the intellectual persuasiveness of their reasoning in the Declaration and the forceful persuasiveness of their winning the Revolutionary War.  Of those people both inside and outside the American colonies who were not persuaded by the intellectual argument of the Declaration, many were persuaded to accept it once the Americans had won the war.  Going to war to settle the dispute was what Locke called the "Appeal to Heaven"--the appeal to the "God of Battles."

In March of 1776, the Continental Congress asked for prayers "that it may please the Lord of Hosts, the God of Armies, to animate our officers and soldiers with invincible fortitude."  In the following October, King George III issued a Proclamation "putting Our Trust in Almighty God, that he will vouchsafe a Special Blessing on Our Arms, both by Sea and Land" (Shain 2014: 407-408).  This is the same as what Abraham Lincoln saw in the Civil War: "Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other" (Second Inaugural Addess).  The "God of Armies" will decide.

The first major victory for the Americans was in the Battle of Saratoga in 1777.  When French King Louis XVI saw this, he agreed to a formal Franco-American alliance.  This proved to be a turning point in the war (Weddle 2021).  If the British had won that battle, that might have been enough to refute the Declaration of Independence.  As I have argued in previous posts, there is a sense in which might does make right.

The Continental Congress was a practical demonstration of the truth of the Lockean principles of the Declaration of Independence.  Acting in a state of nature, the Congress exercised the Lockean executive power of the law of nature in punishing Great Britain for violating that natural law, in establishing the Continental Army to settle the dispute by force of arms, and in instituting a new government to secure their natural rights.

THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS SYMBOLIC NICHE CONSTRUCTION

In writing new constitutions for governments at both the state and national levels, the Americans had to debate what kind of constitutional language would best secure their natural rights.  Beginning with the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, it was common for the state constitutions to have a list of rights that must be protected.  The U.S. Constitution of 1787 did not have a bill of rights, but many of the state ratifying conventions recommended amendments that would provide a bill of rights.  In the First Congress of 1789, James Madison and others proposed such amendments, which were ratified in 1791, and these first ten amendments became known as the Bill of Rights.  Here then is another example of symbolic niche construction through a declaration of status function:  the American people agreed to recognize the first ten amendments as a statement of human rights in America as secured by constitutional law.

One of those stipulated rights is due process of law as stated in the Fifth Amendment: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  A similar provision became part of the Fourteenth Amendment: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

But as I have indicated in some recent posts, Trump has recently claimed that as President he has the power to suspend the right to due process of law--particularly, in his deportation of immigrants who have been sent to a prison in El Salvador.  Trump's argument is that this cannot be an absolute right for all persons in the United States, because in time of emergency, the President must have the power to remove people from the United States without due process of life if he identifies them as dangerous threats to America.

Trump has appealed to the Alien Enemies Act as giving him this power to protect America from "invasions," and he claims that illegal immigrants constitute an "invasion" of the U.S.  The Courts, however, have said that as used in the Alien Enemies Act, "invasions" clearly means military invasions.  And since Venezuela has not invaded the U.S. militarily, Trump cannot deport Venezuelans without due process of law.

There are reports that Trump is considering suspending the writ of habeas corpus, which would be another way to suspend the right of due process of law.  He could cite the Constitution's provision in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ at the beginning of the Civil War, claiming that the Confederacy was clearly in a "rebellion" against the United States, and the public safety required that his commanders in the field needed to suspend the writ to arrest and detain people suspected of being spies or saboteurs for the Confederacy.

Trump would have to convince the courts and the American people that the many illegal immigrants in the U.S. count as an "invasion," which makes it necessary for the President to suspend the writ to protect the public safety of Americans threatened by the criminal violence of illegal immigrants.

Trump could also claim that he was exercising what John Locke identified as executive prerogative--the power of the executive "to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it," which could include suspending individual rights in time of emergency (ST, 160).

This is an illustration of how Americans often have to debate the meaning of their symbolic niche construction of individual rights.  If Americans have agreed to the establishment of due process of law as an individual right, must they agree that this is an absolute right never to be infringed?  Or are their circumstances--perhaps a national emergency of some sort--in which the public good would require suspending that right?  But if so, what counts as a true emergency in which the public good would require allowing the President to exercise dictatorial power in denying individuals the natural rights that we usually want to protect?

The courts and the American people will have to decide.