Wednesday, March 13, 2024

After Joy's Death: How C. S. Lewis Lost His Faith in the Rational Defense of Christianity

 

                                         Joy and Jack Lewis in Oxford at Their Home ("the Kilns")




                                          Joy Davidman at a Younger Age in New York City


After writing a series of posts on C. S. Lewis a month ago, I thought I had said enough about him for now.  But one unanswered question about him has continued to bang around my brain.  

William Nicholson raised the question in Shadowlands--his 1985 television screenplay, 1989 stage play, and 1993 screenplay for the motion picture (with Anthony Hopkins as Lewis and Debra Winger as Joy Gresham).  Based on his careful reading of Lewis's writings, Nicholson tells the love story of Lewis and Gresham and Lewis's suffering when she dies from cancer after only three years of joyful marriage.

Nicholson's play has two acts (Nicholson 1991).  Act One begins with Lewis lecturing to a popular audience and asking: "If God loves us, why does He allow us to suffer so much?"  Lewis's answer is that God uses suffering to teach us that we need God--that we need God to save us from life in this world so that we can enter another world after death where we can live our "real life."  

In a subtle way, Nicholson's play leads us to wonder whether Lewis's personal experience with the pain of suffering Joy's death forced him to doubt this faith in God's goodness and love for human beings.  My hesitant conclusion is that in his grief, Lewis wavered in his Christian faith, but he did not lose it, although he did lose his faith that Christianity could be rationally defended as supported by evidence.  In other words, Lewis resolved that he would believe that God is good, and that eternal bliss is achieved in another world after death, even though all the evidence from his suffering contradicted this belief.

In Mere Christianity, Lewis wrote:  "I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it" (123).  After the death of Joy, Lewis changed his mind, because then he asked us to accept Christianity by faith even when the weight of the evidence is against it.  If I am right about this, then after a long life of trying to engage in the Reason/Revelation debate (particularly, in the Oxford Socratic Club), Lewis decided that such debate was impossible, because there is no common ground ("the weight of the evidence") on which rational debate could be conducted.

In the lecture at the beginning of Act One, Lewis asserts that while "God doesn't necessarily want us to be happy," "He wants us to be lovable."  And to make us lovable, God must use suffering to break through our selfishness.

"God creates us free, free to be selfish, but He adds a mechanism that will penetrate our selfishness and wake us up to the presence of others in the world, and that mechanism is suffering.  To put it another way, pain is God's megaphone to rouse a deaf world.  Why must it be pain?  Why can't He wake us more gently, with violins or laughter?  Because the dream from which we must be awakened is the dream that all is well."

"Now that is the most dangerous illusion of them all.  Self-sufficient is the enemy of salvation.  If you are self-sufficient, you have no need of God.  If you have no need of God, you do not seek Him.  If you do not seek Him, you will not find Him."

"God loves us, so He makes us the gift of suffering.  Through suffering, we release our hold on the toys of this world, and know our true good lies in another world."

"We're like blocks of stone, out of which the sculptor carves the forms of men.  The blows of His chisel, which hurt us so much, are what make us perfect.  The suffering in the world is not the failure of God's love for us; it is that love in action."

"For believe me, this world that seems to us so substantial is no more than the shadowlands.  Real life has not begun yet" (2-3).

In Act One, Nicholson tells the story of Jack and Joy becoming friends.  Joy had been a Jewish communist atheist in New York City who converted to Christianity, and who had been deeply influenced by reading Lewis's writings.  She was forced to divorce her husband because of his sexual affairs with other women and his drinking.  She moved to London, became a good friend of Lewis's, and then moved to Oxford to be close to Lewis.  When she discovered that her visa for staying in England would not be renewed, Lewis agreed to marry her so that she could have British citizenship.  They agreed that this was not a "real" marriage, but only a way to continue their friendship.  But the audience for the play and the movie can tell that they have fallen deeply into romantic love, although neither one will acknowledge this.

But then at the end of Act One, Joy is walking in her home and falls to the floor.  A bone in her leg has broken because she has a cancer that has spread into her skeleton.  Doctors will tell her that her cancer will probably kill her in a short time.

Act Two begins with Lewis delivering another popular lecture on suffering and the goodness of God that closely resembles the lecture at the beginning of Act One.  But Lewis starts this second lecture by reflecting on Joy's suffering:

"Recently, a friend of mine, a brave and Christian woman, collapsed in terrible pain.  One minute she seemed fit and well.  The next minute she was in agony.  She is now in the hospital, suffering from advanced bone cancer, and almost certainly dying.  Why?"

"I find it hard to believe that God loves her.  If you love someone, you don't want them to suffer.  You can't bear it.  You want to take their suffering onto yourself.  If even I feel that, why doesn't God?  Not just once in history, on the cross, but again and again?  Today.  Now."

He then goes on to make the same argument he had made in the first lecture about how God uses suffering to teach us that "our true good lies in another world."  But Nicholson has this note at the beginning of Act Two for whoever plays the part of Lewis: "As the talk proceeds, there are signs that he is using it to persuade himself of a belief that is beginning to slide.  However, at this stage, he hardly realizes this process himself" (59).

Through the rest of Act Two, we see the ever deeper crisis of faith for Lewis.  Lewis and a friend of his who is an Anglican priest pray that God will intervene to give Joy a miraculous recovery.  And indeed her cancer does go into remission, and her doctors say it looks like a miracle.  But Lewis tells Joy that "Miracles frighten me," because "I'm frightened of loving God too much for giving you back to me.  That way, I could just as easily hate God, later" (81).

After two years of delightful life together, the cancerous growth returns, and Joy dies.  Lewis is thrown into the deepest grief and he tells his friends that his faith makes no sense of what has happened.  He tells his brother Warnie: "I'm so terribly afraid.  Of never seeing her again.  Of thinking that suffering is just suffering after all.  No cause.  No purpose.  No pattern.  No sense.  Just pain, in a world of pain" (97).

As she was dying, Joy had worried about Jack's grief.  She told him: "What I'm trying to say is that pain, then, is part of this happiness, now.  That's the deal" (90).

Lewis repeats this thought from Joy in the last words of the play, when he says: "I find I can live with the pain, after all.  The pain, now, is part of the happiness, then.  That's the deal.  Only shadows, Joy" (100).

The movie differs in two ways.  In the play, Lewis is imagining himself speaking to Joy.  In the movie, he is speaking to Douglas, his stepson.  And in the movie, Lewis ends with "That's the deal."

By dropping the sentence "Only shadows, Joy," Nicholson might be implying that Lewis is wavering in his belief that this life is only "shadows" of the "real life" after death in another world.  That "the pain, now, is part of the happiness, then" is "the deal" in this life, and there's no promise of another life.

In any case, Lewis seems to have concluded that the Christian faith in the good and loving God cannot be defended rationally based on evidence.

Shortly before he moved to Cambridge University in 1954, Lewis read his last paper to the Oxford Socratic Club on April 30, 1953 (Hooper 1979: 170-172).  The paper was called "Faith and Evidence," and Professor H. H. Price, the Professor of Logic at Oxford who was an agnostic, responded to the paper.  Lewis's paper was later published under the title "On Obstinacy in Belief" (Lewis 2017).

Lewis began by noting that in some of the papers read to the Oxford Socratic Club, people contrasted the Christian attitude of believing without evidence or despite the evidence against it and the scientific attitude of proportioning the strength of one's belief to the evidence and withdrawing belief for which there is insufficient evidence.  If this were true, Lewis observed, these two groups of people would have nothing to say to one another, and neither side could comprehend the other.

But in fact, Lewis argued, this contrast is not true.  Usually, even when there is some evidence that appears to contradict Christian beliefs, there is also some favorable evidence.  Some of the favorable evidence is "in the form of external events: as when I go to see a man, moved by what I felt to be a whim, and find he has been praying that I should come to him that day" (2017, 25).  Therefore, answered prayer is an example of evidence favoring Christianity, even though it is not absolutely conclusive empirical proof.

In his essay on "The Efficacy of Prayer," Lewis referred to the miraculous recovery of Joy in answer to prayer as an example of this.  

"I have stood by the bedside of a woman whose thighbone was eaten through with cancer and who had thriving colonies of the disease in many other bones as well.  It took three people to move her in bed.  The doctors predicted a few months of life; the nurses (who often know better), a few weeks.  A good man laid his hands on her and prayed.  A year later the patient was walking (uphill, too, through rough woodland) and the man who took the last X-ray photos was saying, 'These bones are as solid as rock.  It's miraculous" (2017: 2).

But, a few years after this essay was first published, and after Joy's death, Lewis wrote this in A Grief Observed, his notebook of his thoughts about grieving for her death:

"Sooner or later I must face the question in plain language.  What reason have we, except our own desperate wishes, to believe that God is, by any standard we can conceive, 'good'?  Doesn't all the prima facie evidence suggest exactly the opposite?  What have we to set against it?"

. . .

"What chokes every prayer and every hope is the memory of all the prayers H. [Joy] and I offered and all the false hopes we had.  Not hopes raised merely by our own wishful thinking; hopes encouraged, even forced upon, by false diagnoses, by X-ray photographs, by strange remissions, by one temporary recovery that might have ranked as a miracle.  Step by step we were 'led up the garden path.'  Time after time, when He seemed most gracious He was really preparing the next torture."

"I wrote that last night.  It was a yell rather than a thought.  Let me try it over again.  Is it rational to believe in a bad God?  Anyway, in a God so bad as all that?  The Cosmic Sadist, the spiteful imbecile?" (42-43)

One sees here that while Lewis did not doubt God's existence, he did doubt His goodness, because all evidence was against it and in favor of God as the Cosmic Sadist.  So, in A Grief Observed, he wrote:  "Not that I am (I think) in much danger of ceasing to believe in God.  The real danger is of coming to believe such dreadful things about Him.  The conclusion I dread is not 'So there's no God after all,' but 'So this is what God's really like.  Deceive yourself no longer.'" (18-19).

But then in the last lines of A Grief Observed, Lewis indicated that God's goodness would be vindicated by Joy's mystical union with God in Heaven:  "How wicked it would be, if we would, to call the dead back!  She said not to me but to the chaplain, 'I am at peace with God.'  She smiled, but not at me.  Poi si torno all' eterna fontana" (89).  The last line is from Canto 31 of Dante's Paradiso, where Dante described Beatrice looking at him for the last time in Paradise:  "So I prayed; and as distant as she was, she smiled and gazed at me.  Then she turned back to the Eternal Fountain."

But notice that Lewis must rely on Dante's poetic invention without offering any evidence supporting the belief in Joy's eternal bliss.

In some of her last words to Lewis, Joy professed to believe this, but she suggested a lack of confidence: "Only shadows, Jack.  That's what you're always saying.  Real life hasn't begun yet.  You'd just better be right" (91).

Joy and Jack believed this as a matter of blind faith even though the weight of the evidence was against it.  They had lost their faith in the rational defense of Christianity.


REFERENCES

Hooper, Walter.  1979.  "Oxford's Bonny Fighter."  In James T. Como, ed., C. S. Lewis a the Breakfast Table, and Other Reminiscences, 137-185.  New York: Macmillan.

Lewis, C. S.  1952.  Mere Christianity.  New York: Macmillan.

Lewis, C. S.  1989.  A Grief Observed.  New York: HarperCollins.

Lewis, C. S.  2017.  The World's Last Night, and Other Essays.  New York: HarperOne.

Nicholson, William.  1991.  Shadowlands.  New York: Penguin. 

Monday, March 04, 2024

The Supreme Court Rejects the Original Meaning of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment in the Trump Disqualification Case

 I have argued that under the original meaning of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, Donald Trump is disqualified from holding any public office in the United States.  Consequently, I agreed with the ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court that Trump was disqualified from running for the presidency.  But still I have suggested that the Congress should debate the possibility of granting Trump amnesty.

I have also said that this illustrates the evolutionary psychology of constitutional law: human beings have an evolved mental capacity for symbolism that allows them to create the moral idea of someone having the authority of a president as prescribed by the language of a constitution.

Today, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Trump v. Anderson overturning the Colorado Supreme Court decision.  Remarkably, the Justices were unanimous in concluding that state governments and state courts do not have the power to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.  They give two reasons for this.  First, they are unanimous in saying that allowing the states to enforce Section 3 would create "a chaotic state-by-state patchwork" of standards for applying Section 3.  Second, five of the Justices believe that enforcement of Section 3 requires congressional enforcement under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.  

This is a bad decision because both of these reasons violate the original meaning of Section 3.  Thus, we see here a clear case in which the originalist Justices on the Court have departed from the original meaning of the Constitution.

The worry about a chaotic patchwork of state court decisions makes no sense.  Clearly, state courts have the power to interpret the U. S. Constitution as applied to the cases that come before them.  When the state courts disagree in their interpretations, then one of the primary functions of the United States Supreme Court is to resolve these disagreements by declaring a uniform interpretation.   So, in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court needed to formulate uniform standards for interpreting Section 3 as applied to Trump. There is nothing in the 14th Amendment that denies the power of state courts to interpret that amendment subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the Constitution clearly grants to state governments and state courts the power to judge the constitutional qualifications of candidates for federal office--for example, the requirements that the president must be at least 35 years old and a "natural born" citizen of the United States.  In a 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Neil Gorsuch upheld a Colorado state official's decision to bar from the ballot a presidential candidate who was not a natural born citizen.  The Colorado Supreme Court decision in December cited this opinion by Gorsuch.  But now that Gorsuch is on the U.S. Supreme Court, he is contradicting this earlier decision without any explanation for why he is doing this.

Nothing in the 14th Amendment limits the pre-existing power of state courts and ultimately the Supreme Court to adjudicate a presidential qualifications dispute before the election.  The majority in this case, however, claim that Section 5 of the 14th Amendment means that Section 3 cannot be enforced by the courts without congressional legislation.

Section 5 reads "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."  Notice that this says "power" and not "the power."  Nor does it say "exclusive power" or "sole power."  Elsewhere, the Constitution does speak of "the sole Power" (Art. 1, sec. 2, cl. 5, and sec. 3, cl. 6) and "exclusive Legislation" (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17).

In Art. I, sec. 10, "No State shall" is used for more than 15 prohibitions.  This phrase "No State shall" also appears in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment.  But this does not appear in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.

Furthermore, it has been generally understood in many Supreme Court opinions that state courts and state governments can enforce the provisions of the 14th Amendment even without any congressional enforcement legislation under Section 5.  Otherwise, as the Colorado Supreme Court observed, Congress could nullify the 14th Amendment by not passing enacting legislation.  Why should Section 3 be any different?  Today's decision does not even ask that question much less answer it.

Today's decision also makes a deceptive argument about the "lack of historical precedent" for the "state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders or candidates in the years following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 9 of the Per Curiam decision).  In a footnote, they admit: "We are aware of just one example of state enforcement against a would-be federal officer.  In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional election, because--in the Governor's view--Section 3 made Christy ineligible to serve.  But the Governor's determination was not final; a committee of the House reviewed Christy's qualifications itself and recommended that he not be seated.  The full House never acted on the matter, and Christy was never seated."

The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington has published a good chart of all the cases of "Public Officials Adjudicated to be Disqualified under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment."  There are only eight individuals on this list, which includes John Christy.  And, indeed, Christy is the only example of a state enforcement of the Section 3 disqualification against a candidate for federal office.

But the Supreme Court Justices are silent about the obvious explanation for why this list is so short.  There are two reasons for this.  First, it was so well understood that former Confederates who had taken an oath to support the Constitution before the Civil War were disqualified from holding public office under Section 3 that they either did not seek office, or they petitioned for amnesty.  In fact, thousands of former Confederates petitioned the House Select Committee on Reconstruction of the 40th and 41st Congresses (1867-1871) asking that Congress remove their Section 3 disqualification.

The second reason for why the list is so short is that the Section 3 disqualification for most former Confederates was in effect for less than four years.  The 14th Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868; and Congress passed the Amnesty Act on May 22, 1872, which granted amnesty to most of the ex-Confederates.

The Supreme Court says nothing about this history, which shows clearly that everyone understood the original meaning of Section 3 that anyone who had violated his oath to support the Constitution by engaging in insurrection was disqualified from public office at the federal or state level.

So, it's clear that in order to rule in Trump's favor, the originalists on the Supreme Court had to disregard the original meaning of the 14th Amendment.  Of course, the five originalists (Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Alito) had to do this to win the votes of the four Justices who are not originalists (Roberts, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson).

Here's what the Court should have done.  They should have upheld the Colorado Supreme Court's decision that as an insurrectionist who violated his oath of office to support the Constitution, Trump is disqualified for public office under Section 3.  But they should also have noted that deciding whether disqualifying Trump would be good for the country is a political question rather than a judicial question; and if two-thirds of each House of Congress want to grant amnesty to Trump, they can do that under Section 3.

Actually, the Congress has already passed a general amnesty law--the Amnesty Act of 1872--that could be interpreted as suspending Section 3 after 1872:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each house concurring therein), that all political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments of the Constitution of the United States are hereby removed from all persons whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States."

The language here--"all persons whomsoever, except . . ."--would seem to have set aside Section 3 from all future application after 1872.  But I remain undecided about this. 

Sunday, March 03, 2024

Fabienne Picard Responds to "Religious Experience in the Brain"

Dr. Fabienne Picard has sent me a message in response to my posts on the neurology of ecstatic epilepsy and religious experience.  She has given me permission to publish that message here.

Dr. Picard is an Associate Professor at the Medical School of Geneva, and she is a Senior Attending Physician in the Epilepsy Unit at the Department of Neurology, University Hospitals of Geneva, Switzerland.

Here is her statement.


I am happy you were interested in ecstatic epilepsy, but there are a few misunderstandings.

I totally agree that ecstatic epilepsy is not the only way to have spiritual/ecstatic/mystical/religious experiences.  I agree they are possible also through the normal functioning of the brain, for instance, in response to religious/meditation practices (probably through the letting go of all the system of predictions and anticipations forming the predictive coding system).

I have talked a lot with Buddhist experts who experienced the same ecstatic phenomena through meditation and a body scan session, so a functional alteration of brain functioning achieving the same state of clarity/revelation may occur.

There are people with ecstatic epilepsy reporting religious experiences.  I have not published all the cases I have collected up to now.  In my opinion, each person interprets the state in his way according to previous religious or non-religious beliefs/context.  Some people with ecstatic epilepsy told me that "if I was religious, I would have believed it was a meeting with God . . ."

Because of the ineffability, people try to find a way to describe it in a sense such that other people could have a vague idea of it, maybe they "embellish" with images or interpret with their beliefs.  Maybe the "light" descried by St. Paul was an image of the clarity he experienced, because there are no words to express the sudden mental clarity.  For St. Paul, we do not have descriptions of convulsive seizures (contrary to Dostoevsky, St. Theresa of Avila, Ramana Maharshi, Akbar, emperor of the Mughal Empire); so, I cannot affirm St. Paul had ecstatic epilepsy, but it remains a possibility.

The fact that all patients stimulated within the dorsal anterior insula did not experience an ecstatic phenomenon does not remove any credibility to what we found.  For primary cortices such as the primary motor cortex, each stimulation (in roughly the same region) in any patient gives rise to a movement.  Such complex cognitive states are not so easy to induce, probably some individuals are more prone to them, even when related to meditation or prayers or to the use of psychedelics (only 15-20% of people have mystical experience under psilocybin, so there should be some predisposition to have it or not).

Even for other symptoms, such as deja vu, the stimulation of the entorhinal cortex does give rise to these symptoms only in a certain percentage of people.  The important thing is that only the stimulation of the anterior insula gives rise to such experience, and not all the stimulations by other electrodes in other parts of the brain (in the 6 or 7 patients now with ecstatic epilepsy and the one without ecstatic epilepsy).

Regarding the descriptions of the 52 patients with ecstatic seizures, sometimes the descriptions lacked details (I really took time to let them describe more and more in detail), but the neurologists probably understood it was amazing for the patient.  My first patients, before taking time and explaining to me which extraordinary feelings they felt, only explained to the previous physicians that they had a warmth in the body or lightness rising in the head or like bubbles rising in the head . . . ! 

Friday, March 01, 2024

Religious Experience in the Brain: Saint Paul's Mystical Visions

                 Michelangelo's "Conversion of Saint Paul," a Fresco in the Sistine Chapel


In my previous post, I might have conveyed the impression that religious experience can be fully explained by ecstatic epilepsy triggered in the anterior insula.  If I did, that's a mistake that I need to correct.  I should have been more emphatic about the disclaimer that I put near the end of the post: "Of course, this does not mean that ecstatic epilepsy is the only source in the brain for religious experience.  There are other ways in which the brain might facilitate human access to the divine (Nelson 2011; Newberg 2018)."  I can illustrate this point by considering the neurobiology of Saint Paul's ecstatic mysticism.

In his classic study of Paul's mysticism--The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (1931)--Albert Schweitzer briefly mentioned the possibility that Paul's mystical visions could have come from seizures.  Since then, others have suggested that Paul's visions were caused by ecstatic epileptic seizures.  And, as I indicated in my previous post, Fabrienne Picard has identified the anterior insula as the primary brain structure for the sort of ecstatic seizures experienced by Paul.  But in her book on the neurobiology of Paul's ecstatic experiences, Colleen Shantz concluded that "the suggestion that Paul's visions were caused by epileptic seizures should be laid aside or, at the very least, bracketed as an insufficient explanation" (2009: 151).

Although there are a few cases--such as Dostoevsky--where ecstatic epilepsy seems to be crucial for religious experience, these cases are so rare that they cannot explain most religious experience.  Epilepsy itself affects only a small minority (between 4 and 10 per 1,000) of every human population.  And among those with temporal lobe epilepsy, less than 5% have ecstatic experiences.

The rarity of ecstatic epilepsy is evident in the work of Picard.  In one review article, she surveyed a total of 55 individuals who have had ecstatic seizures, based on reports from 1951 to 2015 (Gschwind and Picard 2016).  As I noted in my previous post, Picard's most dramatic evidence for her "anterior insula hypothesis" comes from his treatment of epileptic patients in Geneva, Switzerland.  In treating one patient with ecstatic epilepsy, she found that he could induce ecstatic auras by the electrical stimulation of her anterior insula.  Even more amazing, she found that he could induce ecstatic auras by the electrical stimulation of the anterior in one patient with temporal lobe epilepsy who had never had ecstatic experiences previously.  But then, after reporting these cases, she made a remarkable admission:  "It must be specified that the induction of an ecstatic aura through the stimulation of the dorsal part of the anterior insula is not the rule, as there are many patients in whom stimulations of this region did not give rise to ecstatic experience" (Picard 2023: 1375).  Shouldn't this failure to replicate her findings count as a falsification of her hypothesis?


EXPLAINING PAUL'S MYSTICAL VISIONS?

Picard could support her hypothesis if she could show that people with ecstatic epileptic seizures have religious experiences like those of Paul's mystical visions as reported in the New Testament.  But she fails to do that.

Acts 9:3-9 describes the famous conversion of Paul on the road to Damascus.  Paul had been persecuting the Christians, and he was traveling from Jerusalem to Damascus where he planned to take some Christians as prisoners.  But then he had an amazing experience of conversion:

"As he neared Damascus on his journey, suddenly a light from Heaven flashed around him.  He fell to the ground and heard a voice say to him, 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?'  'Who are you, Lord?' Saul asked.  'I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting,' he replied.  'Now get up and go into the city, and you will be told what you must do.'  The men traveling with Saul stood there speechless; they heard the sound but did not see anyone.  Saul got up from the ground, but when he opened his eyes, he could see nothing.  So, they led him by the hand into Damascus.  For three days, he was blind, and did not eat or drink anything."

In Damascus, a disciple named Ananias had a vision in which the Lord told him that he was to meet Paul, restore his vision, and tell him that he had been chosen to proclaim Jesus to the Gentiles and the Jews.

Later, Paul said he should be considered an apostle of Christ because he had seen and talked with Christ like the original apostles.  Writing to the Corinthian Christians, he even described his experience in ascending into Heaven:

"I must go on boasting.  Although there is nothing to be gained, I will go on to visions and revelations from the Lord.  I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven.  Whether it was in the body or out of the body I do not know--God knows.  And I know that this man--whether in the body or apart from the body I do not know, but God knows--was caught up to paradise and heard inexpressible things, things that no one is permitted to tell" (1 Cor. 12:1-4).

Here Paul might have shown the influence of some Jewish mystical traditions.  Some Jewish texts identified "paradise" as the restoration of Eden in Heaven that might be established in the renewed Earth.  There was disagreement about the number of heavens, but the most common view identified three or seven heavens.  The "third heaven" was probably the highest heaven, where God was.

So, if Picard were right about the anterior insula being the prime locus for religious experiences like this, we would predict that people having ecstatic epileptic seizures in the anterior insula would report visions and revelations similar to what Paul reported.  But when we examine the 52 cases of ecstatic seizures surveyed by Gschwind and Picard, and look at the signs of ecstatic experience, we see very little resemblance to what Paul reported (Gschwind and Picard 2016: 4-9).  We see a lot of vague descriptions of a euphoric state such as "sensation of joy," "pleasant butterfly in stomach," "sudden feeling of happiness," "calm euphoria," "feeling union with the whole world," "feeling like orgasm," and "intense feelings of bliss and well-being."  But in these 52 cases, there is only one reference to "heaven," one reference to "paradise," three references to "God," and no references at all to Jesus Christ.  This hardly looks anything like Paul's mystical experiences.


THE NEED FOR A COMPLEX NEUROBIOLOGICAL MODEL

If there is any neurobiological explanation for religious experiences like those of Paul, it must be more complex than simply identifying the posterior insula as the prime mover.  That more complex neurobiological model has been emerging in the research surveyed by people like Shantz (2009) and Andrew Newberg (2018).  In contrast to Picard's attempt to explain religious experience as caused by a brain disorder--temporal lobe epilepsy--Shantz and Newberg see religious experience as made possible by the normal functioning of the brain in response to religious practices that alter the brain.

There have now been over one hundred neuroimaging and physiological studies of people engaged in religious activities such as rituals, meditation, prayer, and speaking in tongues (glossolalia), which work on the autonomic nervous system to induce the altered states of consciousness that constitute ecstatic religious experiences.  This can work on the sympathetic nervous system (the arousal system) to induce states of hyperarousal and ultimately a feeling of ecstasy.  Or this can work on the parasympathetic system (the quiescent system) to induce states of hyperquiescence and ultimately a sense of bliss.



                                         A Ten-Minute Video on the Autonomic Nervous System


For example, Newberg and his colleagues have led neuroimaging studies of a group of Franciscan nuns engaging in the spiritual practice of centering prayer (Newberg 2018: 214-19).  Centering prayer requires that one concentrate one's attention on a particular prayer or phrase from the Bible and meditate on its meaning with one's eyes closed for a prolonged period--from twenty minutes to several hours.  Over time, the spiritual state of the person deepens until they feel open to God's presence.

Although the technique of centering prayer was first developed by some Trappist monks in the 1970s, it draws from the tradition of contemplative prayer that stretches back to the early days of Christian monasticism.

Newberg and his colleagues have found that centering prayer begins with increased activity in the prefrontal cortex, particularly in the right hemisphere, and in the anterior cingulate gyrus, which are involved in focusing attention.  The prefrontal cortex must then activate the thalamus, which can block sensory information getting into the parietal lobe, so that fewer distracting outside stimuli arrive in the visual cortex and parietal lobe.  A primary function of the parietal lobe is to gather all the sensory information we receive and use it to give us a spatial representation of our body in the world.  So that blocking sensory information from entering the parietal lobe can blur the boundaries between self and world, and we can feel a sense of oneness with everything in the universe, which could explain the experience of the nuns feeling intimately connected to God in their centering prayer.  Centering prayer is also associated with important structures in the limbic system such as the amygdala that are involved in intense emotions.


THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF PAUL'S ASCENT INTO HEAVEN

This doesn't explain much about the specific content of Paul's ecstatic visions.  But as Shantz argues, a neurobiological reading of 2 Corinthians 12:1-4 can illuminate two of the puzzling features of Paul's ecstatic experience--his confusion about the location of his body and his inability to speak about what he heard in heaven (Shantz 2009: 93-109).  Paul said that when he ascended into Heaven, he did not know whether he was "in the body or apart from the body."  And he "heard inexpressible things, things that no one is permitted to tell."  Why was Paul so bewildered about his body?  And why was he so confused about how to describe his experience?

To answer the first question, as Shantz suggests, we can begin by considering how our normal experience of our body depends on the representation of our body in our brain.  Our brain carries a neural map of our body--sometimes called the homunculus map--composed of two maps:  a set of sensory correlates on our parietal lobes and a set of motor correlates on our frontal lobes.  Amazingly, these bodily coordinates are mapped out on our brains from our toes to our tongue.  This neural mapping of the body is connected with the somaesthetic association area in the parietal lobes, with the right parietal lobe being predominantly in control.

                                                                   The Homunculus Map


The normal functioning of this somatosensory representation of the body in the brain gives us our subjective sense of our embodiment and the orientation of our body in space.  But as I have noted in some previous posts, damage to the right cerebral hemisphere (such as from stroke) can produce a loss of body identity, such as in somatoparaphrenia, when people feel that their left leg or arm is not really theirs.  

Shantz suggests that Paul's ecstatic experience of trance put him into an altered state of consciousness that was "somewhere between" the "healthy and impaired functioning" of the brain's somatosensory experience of bodily identity (98).  Although she does not cite any specific neurobiological studies of ecstatic experiences to support this idea, she speculates that Paul's religious mind could have altered (through prayer or other religious activities?) the functioning of his brain so that, on the one hand, the bodily sensations from his body and from his somatosensory cortex were blocked from consciousness, but, on the other hand, the neural impulses from the orientation association area were intensified.

This then leads Shantz into her explanation of Paul's experience in ascending into Heaven:

". . . The human mind is left to interpret this strange combination of neurological silence and noise in an intelligible way.  Thus, the body is perceived as present, but its sensations--its weight, boundaries, pain, or voluntary motion--are all absent from consciousness.  In an attempt to interpret these phenomena as coherently as possible, ecstatics frequently report the sensation of floating or flying without physical boundaries between themselves and the people and objects in their awareness.  Not surprisingly, descriptions of ascent are also common in interpretations of ecstatic experiences.  Paul's ascent is among them.  Like other ecstatic thinkers, Paul genuinely could not know the status of his body by using the sensate signals that would normally inform him.  The question of whether he was in the body or outside it is not simply a rhetorical means of dismissing the issue; it is rather an account of one of the phenomena of trance" (98).

This is a speculative explanation.  But if we assume that for every mental experience there must be some neural correlates in the brain, then, as an extrapolation from what we know about the normal and abnormal functioning of the brain's system for bodily awareness, this is a plausible neurobiological explanation of how Paul's ecstatic experience of ascending to Heaven arose from his brain.  

In principle, we could find experimental support for this by doing brain imaging studies of people having ecstatic experiences comparable to Paul's.  And yet, in this reliance on brain imaging research, we should always keep in mind, as I have argued in previous posts, that brain imaging is not mind reading.  For example, while fMRI detects blood flow in the brain, it's a matter of interpretation as to what that reveals about the structure and functioning of the brain.  Moreover, none of this research gives us direct access to the subjective consciousness of the people we are studying: ultimately, scientific observers must rely on the patients' verbal reports of what they are thinking and feeling.  Neurologists like Picard face the same problem: when they electrically stimulate some part of a patient's brain, they cannot know what is happening in the patient's mind until the patient reports what he thinks is happening in his mind.

But then what would be the neurobiological explanation for the ineffability of Paul's experience--his confusion about how or even whether he could describe his experience?  This is a general problem for the scientific study of religion because so much of religious experience is reported as indescribable in ordinary language, and this creates the suspicion that the object of such ineffable experience is not real.

As with her answer to the first question, Shantz's answer to this question is speculative, and yet plausible so far as it is grounded in present neurobiological knowledge of how some brain activity in the right hemisphere can be ineffable when it is cut off from the language centers in the left hemisphere (101-108).

The primary language centers of the brain are all in the left hemisphere--Broca's area, Wernicke's area, the angular gyrus, and the primary auditory cortex.  And yet the right hemisphere does seem to process the emotional nuances of language.


Brain imaging studies of people during altered states of consciousness (such as that induced by hallucinogenic drugs, meditation, and speaking in tongues) show brain activity dominated by the right hemisphere rather than the left hemisphere.  We can infer, therefore, that if mystical experiences like Paul's ascent to Heaven arise primarily from the right hemisphere of the brain, the language processing centers in the left hemisphere might struggle to express these experiences in clear language.  

But then since we have no direct access to the mind of Paul or any other mystic, or any other human being for that matter, we must rely on their verbal or written reports of their mystical experiences.  And so, to the extent that mystical experiences are truly ineffable, we cannot understand what they are--unless, of course, we have mystical experiences of our own.


THE NATURAL EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THE BRAIN

So what does all of this tell us about the truth or falsity of religious claims, or whether God--or any supernatural being--really exists?

The scientists studying the neurobiology of religious experience often report that people who have had an ecstatic experience say that it was "infinitely more real" than any other experience in their life.  Does that intense feeling of the reality of the supernatural object of their experience prove the real existence of the supernatural?  Or could this subjective imagination of the reality of the supernatural be delusional?  After all, even religious believers often dismiss the religious experiences of people in different religious traditions as illusions.  For example, most religious believers who are not Mormons will doubt whether Joseph Smith really did meet the Angel Moroni, who delivered to him the golden plates on which was written the Book of Mormon.  And, of course, skeptics or atheists do not see religious experiences as testifying to the truth of religious claims about the supernatural.

But still it's hard to see how we could ever prove that there has never been a true revelation of the supernatural through religious experience.  And that's why the Reason/Revelation debate remains unresolvable.

I see the neurobiology of religious belief as evidence for there being a natural desire for religious experience rooted in the evolved nature of the brain.  Some of the evolutionary psychologists of religion (like Justin Barrett) will see this as showing that God guided natural human evolution so that the human brain would be naturally inclined to belief in God.  Others will see this natural evolution of religious belief as an evolved propensity of the human brain to delusional belief in God.  As far as I can see, evolutionary neurobiology is open to either interpretation.

As I have argued in some previous posts, what we see here is the natural emergence of the soul in the brain.  Some religious believers will say that the creation of the human soul was a supernatural miracle by God acting outside the natural order of evolution.  But some theistic evolutionists will say that God chose to use the natural evolution of the brain so that the soul could emerge in the brain.


REFERENCES

Gschwind, Markus, and Fabienne Picard. 2016. "Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures: A Glimpse into the Multiple Roles of the Insula." Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 10:21.

Newberg, Andrew. 2018. Neurotheology: How Science Can Enlighten Us About Spirituality. New York: Columbia University Press.

Picard, Fabienne. 2023. "Ecstatic or Mystical Experience through Epilepsy." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 35 (9): 1372-1381.

Schweitzer, Albert. 1931. The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle. New York: Henry Holt.

Shantz, Colleen. 2009.  Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle's Life and Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Tuesday, February 20, 2024

Mystical Experience Through Ecstatic Epilepsy Triggered in the Anterior Insula

People with ecstatic epilepsy have epileptic auras in which they have mystical experiences.  In recent years, there has been growing evidence that this experience is triggered in the anterior insula in the temporal lobe of the brain.  This raises the question of whether all religious experience can be explained as rooted in the brain, and perhaps crucially in the anterior insula, as a product of the evolutionary history of the brain.  Does this show that there is a natural desire for religious experience as rooted in our evolved human nature?  If this is so, then we must wonder whether this is or is not a sign of the real existence of a transcendent realm of divinity that is the object of mystical experience.


DEFINING RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND MYSTICISM: WILLIAM JAMES

To begin, despite the difficulties of definition in this whole area of human experience, we must define what we mean by mystical experience; and in doing that, we must also define religious experience in so far as it is rooted in mystical experience.  I have found William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) to be a helpful starting point.

James distinguished two branches of religion--institutional religion and personal religion.  Institutional religion is about theology, ceremony, and ecclesiastical organization, by which the social life of religious believers is structured--the external life of a religious group.  By contrast, personal religion is about the inner life of each believer as he conducts his own religious feelings, thoughts, and activities.  James chose to concentrate on personal religion because it seemed more fundamental than institutional religion.  Theological, ceremonial, and ecclesiastical traditions of every religion depend upon the personal religious experience of their founders.  For example, Paul is often considered the founder of the Christian church, but his authority to preach to the early Christian churches depended on his mystical experiences--such as his conversion on the road to Damascus--in which he saw and heard Jesus Christ and received a direct revelation from God.

James proposed:

"Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.  Since the relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily grow" (James 1987: 36).

He then proposed defining mysticism as having four marks.  1.  Ineffability:  By this negative trait, no mystical experience can be adequately reported in words, because it can be known only by direct experience--by being felt rather than understood.  2.  Noetic quality:  Although it is a state of feeling, a mystical experience does convey a profound mental clarity or revelation of the deepest truths about the universe, often an ecstatic sense of oneness with Everything or the Transcendent Order.  3.  Transiency:  Mystical states can be experienced for only brief periods of time--from a few minutes to an hour or two.  4.  Passivity:  Although mystical states can be facilitated by exercises such as meditation, prayer, and reading of spiritual texts, when the mystical consciousness arises, it feels as though it was compelled by a higher power beyond the person's will (James 1987: 343-44).


WHAT IS ECSTATIC EPILEPSY?

Ecstatic epilepsy is a rare form of focal epilepsy in which people have mystical experiences during the aura before the onset of convulsive epileptic seizures (Picard 2023).  (In Greek, ekstasis means "standing outside oneself.")  Epilepsy affects a small minority (between 4 and 10 per 1,000) of every human population.  It has occurred in every culture throughout history.  It is most easily recognized in its convulsive form, in which people suddenly fall to the ground, lose consciousness, and writhe with seizures. 

In ancient Greece, it was called the "sacred disease" because it appeared to be caused by divine inspiration.  Around 400 BC, Hippocrates (or someone belonging to the Hippocratic school of medicine) wrote "On the Sacred Disease," in which he began by dismissing the popular belief in epilepsy's divine origin: "The disease called sacred . . . appears to me no more sacred than other diseases, but has a natural cause from which it originates, like other affections."  And, in particular, epilepsy is caused by the brain: "Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations."

Since the end of the nineteenth century, neurologists have understood that epilepsy is caused by sudden, abnormal electrical discharges in the cortex of the brain (Sacks 2012).  In generalized seizures, the electrical discharge comes from both hemispheres of the brain simultaneously.  In a grand mal seizure, the person falls to the ground with convulsive twitching of the muscles and loses consciousness within seconds.  In a petit mal seizure, a person loses consciousness for only a few seconds without realizing what has happened.  And even the people around him might not notice anything unusual, as they continue talking with him.

In contrast to such generalized seizures, partial or focal epilepsy arises from a particular area of brain damage or sensitivity that can be genetically inherited or acquired by injury.  Focal conscious seizures are often called "auras," which are sometimes warnings that convulsive seizures with loss of consciousness will soon follow.  During an aura, depending on the location of the seizure in the brain, there will be different kinds of sensory or psychic hallucinations.  So, for example, a seizure in the olfactory area of the brain might produce strange smells, or a seizure in the visual cortex might produce visual hallucinations.

"The symptoms of partial seizures depend on the location of the focus:  they may be motor (twitching of certain muscles), autonomic (nausea, a rising feeling in the stomach, etc.), sensory (abnormalities or hallucinations of sight, sound, smell, or other sensations), or psychic (sudden feelings of joy or fear without apparent cause, deja vu or jamais vu, or sudden, often unusual, trains of thought).  Partial seizure activity may be confined to the epileptic focus, or it may spread to other areas of the brain, and occasionally it leads to a generalized convulsion" (Sacks 2012: 134).

What are here identified as "hallucinations" need to be distinguished from illusions and delusions.  In his Principles of Psychology, James explained:

"Hallucinations usually appear abruptly and have the character of being forced upon the subject. . . .They are often talked of as mental images projected outwards by mistake.  But where a hallucination is complete, it is much more than a mental image.  A hallucination is a strictly sensational form of consciousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there.  The object happens not to be there, that is all" (James 1983: 758-59). 

In ecstatic temporal lobe epilepsy, the hallucinations are mystical experiences of ecstatic or transcendent joy or heavenly bliss, with a feeling of certainty or clarity in the revelation of divine truth (Picard 2023).  For example, one of the first clear reports of ecstatic epilepsy came from Fyodor Dostoevsky, who described his epileptic seizures in his letters and notebooks, and then he described characters in five of his novels as having similar experiences--such as Prince Myshkin in The Idiot (Voskuil 2013).  On one evening before Easter, Dostoevsky was talking with friends about religion.  Then, when a bell tolled midnight, he shouted, "God exists, He exists."  Later, he described his experience in a letter:

"The air was filled with a big noise, and I tried to move.  I felt the heaven was going down to earth, and that it had engulfed me.  I have really touched God.  He came into me, yes God exists, I cried, and I don't remember anything else.  You all, healthy people, can't imagine the happiness which we epileptics feel during the second or so before our fit. . . . I don't know if this felicity lasts for seconds, hours, or months, but believe me, for all the joys that life may bring, I would not exchange this one.

We might assume that people who are already predisposed to religious belief are most likely to have religious seizures.  But doctors who study ecstatic epilepsy have reported some cases of people with no religious belief having a religious conversion as a result their mystical seizures.  Kenneth Dewhurst and A. W. Beard (1970) provided some examples of this.  One was a bus conductor who had an ecstatic seizure while collecting fares:

"He was suddenly overcome with a feeling of bliss.  He felt he was literally in Heaven.  He collected the fares correctly, telling his passengers at the same time how pleased he was to be in Heaven. . . . He remained in this state of exaltation, hearing divine and angelic voices, for two days.  Afterwards he was able to recall these experiences, and he continued to believe in their validity."

But then, three years later, after three seizures over three days, he said that his mind had "cleared," and he had lost his faith.  His religious conversion had been overturned, and he had been converted to atheism!   One of Fabienne Picard's epileptic patients was an atheist physicist who became a Christian after having experienced ecstatic seizures.  Oddly, then, these ecstatic conversions can go from atheism to religion or from religion to atheism.

Gschwind and Picard (2016) surveyed 52 cases of epileptic patients who had had ecstatic auras.  Some of the most common descriptions of what the patients reported included:  ineffable joy, extreme happiness as if one being in Heaven, feeling union with the whole world and with god, feeling like an orgasm, bright and expanding light, complete mental clarity, everything is joined together in one whole, certainty immune to rational doubt, and intense feelings of bliss and well-being.


THE ANTERIOR INSULA HYPOTHESIS: FROM SELF-OWNERSHIP TO RELIGIOUS ECSTASY

In 2009, Picard and A. D. (Bud) Craig proposed the hypothesis that the primary brain structure involved in ecstatic epilepsy was the anterior insula deep in the temporal lobe.



I have written previously about Craig's studies of the insula.  He has shown that the insular cortex is a crucial part of the neural network of the brain that supports interoceptive self-awareness and self-ownership of one's body and the social emotions in which concern for oneself is extended to concern for others.  In understanding this, social neuroscience provides the evolved biological ground in the brain for what John Locke identified as human self-ownership or self-concern that is extended to concern for others in mammalian animals like humans.  The Lockean natural right to property is rooted in this natural sense of self-ownership.

The most dramatic evidence for the anterior insula hypothesis to explain ecstatic epilepsy has come from Picard's treatment of epileptics at the University Hospitals of Geneva, Switzerland (Picard 2023).  Working with a patient with ecstatic epilepsy, who was undergoing presurgical evaluation with intracerebral electrodes, she recorded spontaneous seizures that were associated with electrical discharges in the anterior insula.  Moreover, her ecstatic auras could be reproduced through electrical stimulation of her anterior insula.  Even more amazing than that, Picard found that she could induce ecstatic auras by the electrical stimulation of the anterior insula in one patient with temporal lobe epilepsy who had never had ecstatic experiences previously!

If we're persuaded by this evidence that ecstatic epilepsy is somehow connected to the anterior insula, then the next question would be how to explain this:  What exactly is happening in the anterior insula to cause ecstatic seizures?  Picard's primary hypothesis for answering this question proposes "that temporary disruptions to activity in the anterior insula could interrupt the generation of interoceptive prediction errors, and cause one to experience the absence of uncertainty, and thereby, a sense of bliss," because this would "mimic perfect prediction of the body's physiological state" (Picard 2023: 1372).

Craig has claimed that the posterior insula is the primary place in the brain for the representation of interoceptive signals--the signals of the internal physiological state of the body--and integrating those signals with signals from the external environment.  The signals are combined with information from limbic and frontal cortices, and then they are represented as consciously experienced feelings in the anterior part of the insula.

Picard has extended Craig's theory through the theory of predictive coding that has become popular with many neuroscientists (Clark 2023).  The idea of predictive coding is that rather than passively perceiving reality, our mind actively predicts it.  Before our brain receives external signals from our environment and internal signals from our body, our brain has already made top-down predictions about what those signals are likely to be; and then when the real bottom-up signals arrive in the brain, they are compared with the prediction.  The mismatch between the prediction and the real incoming signals provides a prediction error, which can then be used to change the future prediction.

Picard's theory is that an epileptic seizure in the anterior insula can interrupt the predictive coding system, so that a person in the ecstatic state will feel the internal state of his body and the external state of his environment as if he had predicted them perfectly.  This would create a sense of clarity, certainty, and unity with everything in the world, resulting in a feeling of perfect, even heavenly, bliss.

Even if this theory proves not to be completely correct, it does look like the kind of theory that would explain how an epileptic seizure in the anterior insula could produce an experience of mystical ecstasy in contact with the divine.

Of course, this does not mean that ecstatic epilepsy is the only source in the brain for religious experience.  There are other ways in which the brain might facilitate human access to the divine (Nelson 2011; Newberg 2018).


"ALL ARE DIVINE, AND ALL HUMAN"

Does this mystical experience affirm the reality of the supernatural realm that fulfills our deepest longings for eternal happiness?  Some of us will say no, because, as James said, it's a hallucination--"a strictly sensational form of consciousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there," but "the object happens not to be there, that is all."  Others will say yes, because, as C. S. Lewis said, the natural desire for Joy manifest in mystical experience is a sign of the real existence of the object that would satisfy that desire.  I see no way to prove which answer is correct.

Even if we are convinced by a neurological explanation of how mystical experiences arise in the brain, that does not prove that those experiences are pure hallucinations.  After all, God could be using the neural apparatus of the brain as a medium for revealing His truth--a natural cause for a supernatural Revelation.

Something like this might have been intimated by Hippocrates at the beginning of "On the Sacred Disease" when he said that epilepsy was "no more divine than other diseases" that have natural causes.  At the end of his essay, he declared:

"The disease called the Sacred arises from causes as the others, namely, those things which enter and quit the body, such as cold, the sun, and the winds, which are ever changing and are never at rest.  And these things are divine, so that there is no necessity for making a distinction, and holding this disease to be more divine than the others, but all are divine, and all human."

In my next post, I will consider the case of St. Paul.  His mystical vision on the road to Damascus might have been caused by an ecstatic epileptic seizure.  But it's not clear to me that that would deny the possibility that it was also a revelation from God.


REFERENCES

Clark, Andy.  2023.  The Experience Machine: How Our Minds Predict and Shape Reality. New York: Pantheon Books.

Dewhurst, Kenneth, and A. W. Beard.  1970.  "Sudden Religious Conversions in Temporal Lobe Epilepsy."  British Journal of Psychiatry 117: 497-507.

Gschwind, Markus, and Fabrienne Picard.  2016.  "Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures: A Glimpse into the Multiple Roles of the Insula."  Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 10:21.

James, William.  1983.  Principles of Psychology.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

James, William.  1987.  The Varieties of Religious Experience.  In Writings 1902-1910, 1-477.  New York: The Library of America.

Nelson, Kevin.  2011.  The Spiritual Doorway in the Brain: A Neurologist's Search for the God Experience.  New York: Dutton.

Newberg, Andrew.  2018.  Neurotheology: How Science Can Enlighten Us About Spirituality. New York: Columbia University Press.

Picard, Fabienne.  2023.  "Ecstatic or Mystical Experience Through Epilepsy."  Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 35 (9): 1372-1381.

Picard, Fabienne, and A. D. Craig.  2009.  "Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures: A Potential Window on the Neural Basis for Human Self-Awareness."  Epilepsy and Behavior 16: 539-546.

Sacks, Oliver.  2012.  Hallucinations.  New York: Random House.

Voskuil, Piet H. A.  2013.  "Epilepsy in Dostoevsky's Novel."  Frontiers in Neurology and Neuroscience 31: 195-214.


Thursday, February 15, 2024

C. S. Lewis on the Fringes of Mysticism

I have been wondering whether evolutionary psychology and cognitive science can explain the varieties of religious experience.  In particular, I have been thinking about the essential religious experience of mysticism--the immediate sense experience of the divine by seeing, hearing, or feeling the Transcendent Order behind or beyond Nature.  I am considering whether mystical experience ultimately expresses the shamanic ecstasy or awe before the Numinous that was the original religious experience in prehistoric foraging bands of human beings, which C. S. Lewis identified as "the seed of religious experience."

A preeminent example of Christian mysticism in the New Testament is the apostle Paul on the road to Damascus.  Paul was a Jewish leader who persecuted the Jewish Christians.  He was on his way from Jerusalem to Damascus where he would persecute the Christians there.  Suddenly, a light from heaven flashed around him.  He fell to the ground and heard the voice of Jesus asking him why he persecuted Jesus.  Those travelling with Paul saw the light and heard a sound, but they did not hear or see Jesus.  When Paul rose from the ground, he was blind, and would remain blind for three days.  In Damascus, Ananias, a Christian disciple, had a vision of Jesus telling him that Paul would be chosen to preach Christ not only to the Jews but also to the Gentiles.  When Ananias placed his hands on Paul, Paul's sight was restored, and he was filled with the Holy Spirit and baptized.  He began to preach that Jesus was the Messiah and the Son of God.  This provoked the Jews to persecute him.  Some of the Roman rulers believed that he was insane (Acts 9:3-19; 22:6-21; 26:12-24).

Although he was not one of the original apostles, Paul claimed that his having seen Jesus entitled him to be considered an apostle.  "Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?" (1 Corinthians 9:1).  He interpreted his mystical vision as a direct revelation from Jesus: "I want you to know, brothers and sisters, that the gospel I preached is not of human origin.  I did not receive it from any man, nor was I taught it; rather, I received it by revelation from Jesus Christ" (Galatians 1:11-12).  He even claimed to have ascended into "the third heaven" and up to "paradise"--"whether it was in the body or out of the body I do not know--God knows" (2 Corinthians 12:1-4).  Paul also affirmed one of the fundamental themes of mysticism--deification.  As believers contemplate God, they become like God.  As Paul said: "we all, who with unveiled faces contemplate (or reflect) the Lord's glory, are being transformed into his image with ever-increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit" (2 Corinthians 3:18).

As the most popular Christian writer of the past one hundred years, Lewis offers a good entry into the modern Christian understanding of mysticism.  David Downing has shown in his book Into the Region of Awe: Mysticism in C. S. Lewis (2005) that Lewis studied the history and literature of mysticism throughout his life, and the themes of mysticism ran through his writings.  The title of Downing's book refers to a passage where Lewis describes his conversion in mystical terms: "Into the region of awe, in deepest solitude there is a road right out of the self, a commerce with . . . the naked Other, imageless (though our imagination salutes it with a hundred images), unknown, undefined, desired" (Surprised by Joy, 221).  

In one of his letters, Lewis defined mysticism as "a kind of direct experience of God, immediate as a taste or colour" (Letters, 3:109).  This echoes the language of Evelyn Underhill, whose work on mysticism Lewis studied, who described mysticism as "the direct intuition or experience of God."  She claimed that while "every human soul has a latent capacity for God," mystics have "realized this capacity with an astonishing success" (Mystics, 9, 11).

Lewis denied that he himself was a mystic.  In his Letters to Malcolm, he observed: "You and I are people of the foothills.  In the happy days when I was still a walker, I loved the hills, and even mountain walks, but I was no climber.  I hadn't the head.  So now, I do not attempt the precipices of mysticism" (85).  In a private letter to a woman who was troubled by some shocking passages in the Bible, Lewis wrote: "But why are baffling passages left in at all?  Oh, because God speaks not only for us little ones but for the great sages and mystics who experience what we only read about, and to whom all the words have therefore different (richer) contents" (Letters, 3:357).

But even if Lewis was not a mystic, he developed the mystical theme of deification.  He interpreted Paul's teaching about how reflecting God's glory transforms Christians into God's likeness by saying "a Christian is to Christ as a mirror is to an object" (Christian Reflections, 6).  He repeatedly used this metaphor of spiritual growth as mirroring Christ.  Thus, "every Christian is to become a little Christ" (MC, 153).  "The whole purpose for which we exist is to be thus taken into the life of God" (141).  In Heaven, we will be "gods and goddesses" (175).  We will be "true and everlasting and really divine persons only in Heaven" (WG, 174-75).

Since Lewis was not a mystic, he could not directly experience--he could not really see--the divinization of human beings in Heaven.  He could only imagine what this is like and express this through metaphorical imagery.  So, at the end of his Narnia Chronicles--his fairy-tale for children that has sold over 100 million copies, which has become a series of major motion pictures--he evoked a figurative image of eternal bliss in Heaven.  At the end of The Last Battle, Aslan the Lion--the Christ-like ruler of Narnia--has been speaking to the characters about how they now must die and then enter the real Narnia, where they will live forever.  Lewis has Jewel the Unicorn declare:

"I have come home at last!  This is my real country!  I belong here.  This is the land I have been looking for all my life, though I never knew it till now.  The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this.  Bree-hee-hee!  Come further up, come further in!" (196).

Then Lewis writes about death and eternal life in the last sentences of The Last Battle

"And as He spoke He no longer looked to them like a lion; but the things that began to happen after that were so great and beautiful that I cannot write them.  And for us this is the end of all the stories, and we can most truly say that they all lived happily ever after.  But for them it was only the beginning of the real story.  All their life in this world and all their adventures in Narnia had only been the cover and the title page: now at last they were beginning Chapter One of the Great Story which no one on earth has read: which goes on forever: in which every chapter is better than the one before" (210-211).

In his "spiritual biography of C. S. Lewis," Devin Brown adapted these words to give a vision of Lewis (Jack) after death entering Heaven:

"And for us this is the end of Jack's story, and we can most truly say that he lived happily ever after.  But for Jack, it was only the beginning of the real story.  All his life in this world and all his adventures on earth had only been the cover and the title page: now at last he was beginning Chapter One of the Great Story which no one on earth has read; which goes on forever: in which every chapter is better than the one before" (224).

But while Lewis could only evoke the reality of Heaven through the metaphorical language of a fairy-tale, mystics like Paul could actually see Heaven through mystical hallucinations arising from ecstatic experiences in their brains, particularly through ecstatic epilepsy.  That's the topic for my next post.


REFERENCES 

Brown, Devin.  2013.  A Life Observed: A Spiritual Biography of C. S. Lewis. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

Downing, David C.  2005.  In the Region of Awe: Mysticism in C. S. Lewis.  Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Lewis, C. S. 1955.  Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life.  New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

Lewis, C. S. 1960.  Mere Christianity.  New York: Macmillan.

Lewis, C. S. 1964.  Letters to Malcolm, Chiefly on Prayer.  New York: HarperCollins.

Lewis, C. S. 1973.  Christian Reflections.  Edited by Walter Hooper.  Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Lewis, C. S. 1980.  The Weight of Glory, and Other Essays.  New York: HarperCollins.

Lewis, C. S. 1984.  The Last Battle.  New York: HarperCollins.

Lewis, C. S. 2007.  The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis, Volume III: Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy 1950-1963.  Edited by Walter Hooper.  New York: HarperCollins.

Underhill, Evelyn. 1964. The Mystics of the Church.  New York: Schocken.

Sunday, February 11, 2024

The Failure of C. S. Lewis's Moral Argument for God

 In Mark St. Germain's play "Freud's Last Session," but not in the movie, there is one scene where Freud and Lewis disagree about the source of morality (14):

LEWIS. We have to begin by accepting that there's a moral law at work ---

FREUD.  I don't accept it.  There is no moral law, only our feeble attempts to control chaos.

LEWIS.  Moral codes have existed throughout time.  Tell me one civilization that admired theft or cowardice.  Mankind has never rewarded selfishness.

FREUD.  Selfishness rewards itself.

LEWIS.  Then the Nazis are right in their actions?

FREUD.  Of course not.

LEWIS.  So there is a morality you're comparing them with.  A man can't call a line crooked unless he knows what a straight line is.

FREUD.  Ah! Geometric morality.

LEWIS.  Moral conscience is something we're born with.  It grows as we do.  When I was younger, I thought about right and wrong as much as a baboon thinks about Beethoven.

FREUD.  And this "conscience" is God-created?

LEWIS.  Yes.

FREUD.  Ha.  I am laughing.  You might argue God did an adequate job with the sunset, but as far as "conscience," he failed completely.  What you call "conscience" are behaviors indoctrinated into children by their parents.  These become the crippling inhibitions they struggle with all their lives.

Here Lewis is alluding to his moral argument for the existence of God, or what he calls in Mere Christianity "right and wrong as a clue to the meaning of the universe" (17-39).  All human beings--or all normal human beings--have a sense of right and wrong, of what they and others ought to do or ought not to do.  Even though human beings often disobey this moral law, they show their knowledge of this moral law by feeling guilt and shame when they disobey.  And while there is a lot of variation across cultures in their moral standards, there is remarkable agreement:  for example, all agree that lying, stealing, murder, and betrayal of one's friends are wrong.  "It seems, then, we are forced to believe in a real Right and Wrong.  People may be sometimes mistaken about them, just as people sometimes get their sums wrong; but they are not a matter of taste and opinion any more than the multiplication table" (20).  And so, "it begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something above and beyond the ordinary facts of men's behavior, and yet quite definitely real--a real law, which none of us made, but which we find pressing on us" (30).  This intimates "the idea that in the Moral Law somebody or something from beyond the material universe was actually getting at us" (36).  At some point, you realize "that there is a real Moral Law, and a Power behind the law, and that you have broken that law and put yourself wrong with that Power" (39).  There is "a Something which is directing the universe, and which appears in me as a law urging me to do right and making me feel responsible and uncomfortable when I do wrong" (34).  Here we see what Lewis identifies in The Problem of Pain as the third stage of religious development--when human beings believed that the Divine Power before whom they felt dread and awe was the source and the enforcer of the Moral Law.

But Lewis never provides a compelling argument for why the reality of the moral law of right and wrong proves the reality of a Divine Power behind that law.  After all, we could follow the lead of the ethical naturalists--from David Hume to Charles Darwin to Edward Westermarck--in explaining this universal moral law as rooted in a universal human nature shaped by natural evolution.  We could explain the common moral rules as arising from the natural needs and desires common to all human beings.  The natural desires for self-preservation and for respect for life, persons, and property shape the moral rules in all societies.

Even Lewis seems to agree with this when he identifies this Moral Law as "the Law of Human Nature."  One can see this in his book The Abolition of Man, where he speaks of the Moral Law as the Tao or Way that is universal to all human societies.  I have written about this in some previous posts.

Although natural moral law is often assumed to come from a supernatural lawgiver, Lewis insists that understanding the Tao as natural law does not require any belief in the supernatural. He writes:

"Though I myself am a Theist, and indeed a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism. I am simply arguing that if we are to have values at all we must accept the ultimate platitudes of Practical Reasoning as having absolute validity: that any attempt, having become skeptical about these, to reintroduce value lower down on some supposedly more 'realistic' basis, is doomed. Whether this position implies a supernatural origin for the Tao is a question I am not here concerned with" (61).

It seems, then, that there is no necessity for grounding the Moral Law in "a Something which is directing the universe."