Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Donald Trump Is (Probably) Not Going to Heaven. And He Is (Probably) Not God's Chosen One for America. But the Bible Is Too Obscure to Know for Sure.

 

                             Trump's Extended Interview with Ross Douthat for "60 Minutes"




For only $1,000, you could have purchased the President Donald J. Trump Signature Bible with Trump's hand-written signature inside the front cover.  Unfortunately, these Bibles are sold out.  But don't cry, because you can still purchase The Presidential Edition Bible "Commemorating the 45th and 47th Presidency of the USA Donald J. Trump" for only $99.99, although it doesn't have Trump's signature.  This Bible has the King James Version of the Bible and copies of the handwritten chorus to "God Bless the USA" by Lee Greenwood, the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the Pledge of Allegiance.  

These Bibles were printed in China and shipped to the United States at a cost of $3 each.  Trump's 2025 financial disclosure included royalty payments amounting to $1,300,000 for his endorsement of this Bible produced by Lee Greenwood.

For many evangelical Christians this is proof that Trump is not only a Christian but a Christian Nationalist who recognizes that America was founded as a Christian Nation, and that Trump has been chosen by God to save America's Christian heritage from the attacks of the anti-Christian Democrats.

That raises lots of questions.  If Trump is a true Christian, does that mean that his Christian faith makes him secure in his salvation, and so he will go to Heaven?  But if he is unsure about whether he is going to Heaven or Hell, does that suggest he is not a believing Christian?  

What bearing do our answers to these questions have on the idea of America as a Christian Nation?  Does a Christian Nation require a Christian President?  Or is it enough that God has chosen Trump to save America, even though Trump is not a Christian, just as God chose the pagan Persian Cyrus as the "messiah" or "anointed one" to liberate the Children of Israel from their Babylonian captivity?   Or does the separation of church and state and the "no religious test" clause of the Constitution mean that we cannot enforce a profession of Christianity or any religious belief for the officers of government including the President or for the citizens?  

If America is in some sense a Christian Nation, what exactly does that mean?  Does that include the liberal Christianity of people like Roger Williams and James Talarico?  Or is it restricted to the illiberal Christianity of people like John Winthrop and Ken Paxton?  

Does the Bible give us any clear answers to these questions?  Or is the Bible too obscure to give us any clear answers to such questions?

The first set of questions--concerning Trump's eternal destiny after death--were raised by Ross Douthat in his "60 Minutes" interview of Trump.


TRUMP "BEFORE THE JUDGMENT THRONE OF GOD"

At about 48 minutes into Douthat's interview (the extended interview on YouTube), Douthat says: "Let's talk about death."  Trump says: "Okay."  Douthat suggests that Trump's surviving multiple assassination attempts--one coming very close to killing him--must have had some effect on how he thinks about mortality.  Trump says: "Yeah."  Douthat then asks: "What do you think happens when you die?"

"Well, I hope I'm missed," Trump answers.  Douthat responds by suggesting that Trump has misunderstood the question: "No, I mean--I mean to you."  But Trump repeats his answer: "No, but I really mean it.  I hope I'm missed. . . . I think I've done a good job as--I--I--."  Douthat rephrases his question four or five times: "What do you think happens to Donald Trump when you die? . . . Not your memory, yourself."  Finally, Trump understands his question: "Okay.  You mean where I go?"  "Exactly," Douthat says.

"Well, I'm a religious person," Trump responds, "so in theory I go to Heaven."  Douthat asks: "Do you think you're going to Heaven?"  And Trump answers: "I hope so.  I don't want to go to Hell."

Douthat then reminds Trump of Charlie Kirk's memorial service, at which Erica Kirk, his widow, "gave some very moving remarks about Christian forgiveness, how you have to forgive your enemies and your opponents," and therefore she said that she had forgiven the young man who murdered Charlie.

Douthat then reminds Trump of what he said after Erica Kirk's remarks:

And you followed her, and you said, and I know this was a little bit of a joke, but I think facts come through jokes.  You said, quote, "I hate my opponents, and I don't want the best for them."  Let's say you pass away, you're entering the next life, and all you have to do to enter Paradise is feel love and forgiveness for James Comey, Nancy Pelosy, anyone who you have expressed hate for over the years. Do you think you can do it?

Trump responds: "I found them to be extremely dishonest people, very bad people, very bad for our country."

Douthat asks: "Is the answer no then?"

Trump answers: "The answer is no."

"Before the judgment throne of God?" Douthat asks.

"Before the judgment," Trump responds.  "No, I think they were very bad people and--I dislike, I can use the word hate, I do hate some of my enemies.  I think they're--they've been terrible."

Douthat presses him: "You are telling me you couldn't find it in your heart to forgive some of your enemies?  After all that's been given you?"

Trump refuses to budge: "I probably cannot do that, no, because I do hate some of my enemies, and I always will."

Douthat then turns to one last question.  "Lots of presidents are remembered for a single line.  'He freed the slaves.'  'He won the Cold War.'  A hundred years from now, as you're working out your situation in Purgatory, what's the line that your presidency is remembered for?"

Trump's answer: "That I made America great again."

Notice that when asked about "what happens when you die?," Trump's first response is to hope that he will be missed and that he will be remembered for the good things he did.  This is what I have called (following Stephen Cave) "the legacy narrative" for life after death.  There are four possible ways that we might achieve immortality.  The Staying Alive Narrative says that we could become immortal if we could find a way to postpone death indefinitely.  The Resurrection Narrative says that even if death is unavoidable, we might be brought back to life.  The Soul Narrative says that even if our bodies must die, our souls can live forever because they are immaterial and thus not subject to bodily decay, and our souls are the most essential part of us.  Finally, the Legacy Narrative says that we can live on after death through those that live after us--either because they remember us or because they carry our genes.  Trump wants to be alive after death through being remembered as a great president who "made America great again."  

But as Douthat suggests in the interview, our memory of Donald Trump after his death will preserve a copy of Donald Trump but not the living personal reality of Donald Trump.  Douthat wants to know whether Trump believes that he will live on after death--Donald Trump the person.  And for a Christian like Douthat, that means either the "soul narrative" or the "resurrection narrative" or both at different stages.  So for many Christians, one traditional view is that after we die, our souls live on separated from our dead bodies, but then later our bodies are resurrected and joined to our souls to form what Paul called "spiritual bodies" that live forever either in Hell or in Heaven after they have faced the Last Judgment.

Finally, then, Douthat gets Trump to say: "I'm a religious person, so in theory I go to Heaven," and he hopes to go to Heaven because "I don't want to go to Hell." 

Strangely, Trump does not say that he is a Christian, but rather he says he's a "religious person," and every religious person "in theory" goes to Heaven; and his fear of Hell makes him hope that he will go to Heaven instead.  Is Trump implying that there is no single true religion because all religious people--Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and others--can be saved and go to Heaven?  

Douthat doesn't raise this question.  Instead, he continues his questioning as if they agree that Christianity is the only religion that sets the standards for going to Heaven or Hell.  He implies that Erica Kirk was correct in interpreting Jesus as teaching that we must love our enemies and forgive them if we want to be saved and enter heaven.  He suggests that when Trump dies, he will go "before the judgment throne of God," and the one requirement to enter paradise will be to feel love and forgiveness for his enemies.  So when Trump says, "I do hate some of my enemies and I always will," even facing God's judgment, that would seem to mean--at least by Douthat's standards--that Trump is going to Hell.

This also implies that those liberal Democrats like James Talarico who teach "love thy neighbor" are more likely to go to Heaven than Trump and the Trump Republicans who teach "hate thy neighbor."

But then, at the end of the interview, Douthat reverses direction and suggests that Trump will be saved and enter Heaven!  He suggests this by his framing of his last question for Trump: "A hundred years from now, as you're working out your situation in Purgatory . . . ."  As a Catholic, Douthat believes in the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory, which is poetically depicted in Dante's Purgatorio.  According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Purgatory is for people "who die in God's grace and friendship, but still imperfectly purified, are indeed assured of their eternal salvation" (para. 1030).

But in suggesting that Trump will "die in God's grace," Douthat contradicts the Catholic Church's teaching about the conditions for receiving God's grace as stated in the Catechism: 

Death puts an end to human life as the time open to either accepting or rejecting the divine grace manifested in Christ [cf. 2 Tim 1:9-10].  The New Testament speaks of judgment primarily in its aspect of the final encounter with Christ in his second coming, but also repeatedly affirms that each will be rewarded immediately after death in accordance with his works and faith.  The parable of the poor man Lazarus and the words of Christ on the cross to the good thief, as well as other New Testament texts speak of a final destiny of the soul--a destiny which can be different for some and for others [cf. Lk 16:22; 23:43; Mt 16:26; 2 Cor 5:8; Phil 1:223; Heb 9:27; 12:23].

I see no evidence that Trump by "his works and faith" has accepted "the divine grace manifested in Christ."  On the contrary, his scorn for Jesus' teaching "love thy neighbor" and his refusal to ask forgiveness for his sins show that he has rejected the divine grace necessary for salvation.  Douthat is wrong, therefore, to suggest that Trump will go to Heaven once he has passed through Purgatory.

After all, if Trump is going to be saved, then everybody is going to be saved.  Well, maybe that's what Douthat is implying--that Purgatory offers everyone the chance to have their souls purified and then go to Heaven.  In that case, Douthat would be a "universalist" who believes that God wants everyone to be saved.

As I have noted in some previous posts, Christian universalists have identified at least 23 texts supporting their view that while some human beings will endure a period of punishment in Hell, ultimately all human beings will be saved and enter Heaven.  There are some clear doctrinal statements in the New Testament of God's intention to save all human beings.  "So, then, just as through one transgression came condemnation for all human beings, so also through one act of righteousness came a rectification of life for all human beings" (Romans 5:18).  "For just as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be given life" (1 Corinthians 15:22).  "Our savior God . . . intends all human beings to be saved and come to a full knowledge of truth" (1 Timothy 2:3).

But then there are some scriptural texts about Hell as eternal torment, such as Revelation 20.  John foresees that Christ will return to earth to rule over all the earth for a thousand years.  At the end of that thousand-year reign, there will be a judgment of Satan, who will be thrown into a lake of fire and "tormented day and night for ever and ever."  Then, there will be a judgment of the dead, and "each person was judged according to what they had done."  "Anyone whose name was not found written in the book of life was thrown into the lake of fire."

These apparently contradictory texts manifest the fundamental problem for scriptural interpretation: the Bible is so obscure that it is almost aways open to diverse interpretations on important matters of doctrine.  And so here the Bible gives us no clear standards for supporting Trump, his presidency, or the appeals to Christian nationalism made by the Trump Republicans.  

On the other hand, the obscurity of the Bible supports a Lockean liberal Christianity that teaches toleration, religious liberty, and the separation of church and state, thus rejecting Christian nationalism.  As I have argued previously, the obscurity of the Bible and the failure of the Holy Spirit to convey the correct interpretation of the Bible creates a religious pluralism among Christians that supports John Locke's liberal theology of Christianity--that since "everyone is orthodox to himself," and "every Church is orthodox to itself," there is no set of universal doctrines binding on all Christians, except perhaps the belief that Jesus is the Messiah; and therefore, there is no one Christian orthodoxy strictly speaking that can be properly enforced by government.  

For this reason, a Lockean liberal social order that secures religious liberty and religious toleration is the best regime for promoting the pluralistic pursuit of religious happiness.  It does this by creating a marketplace of religion in which churches compete for customers, and those churches that best satisfy the desire for religious experience increase their share of the market.  Moreover, as Locke argued, this is what one sees in the New Testament: the early Christian churches were voluntary associations that did not coercively enforce a single orthodoxy on all believers.  It was not until late in the 4th century A.D. that the Roman Emperors enforced the orthodoxy of the Catholic church and punished Christian heretics.


TRUMP AS CYRUS?  OR NEBUCHADNEZZAR?

Similarly, as I have argued, the Bible does not clearly sustain the claim of the Christian nationalists that Trump is God's chosen one--just like Cyrus--even though Trump might be a pagan unbeliever.  In Isaiah 45, God was using Cyrus as His "anointed one" to allow the Israelites to leave Babylon and return to Jerusalem where they could restore the Mosaic theocracy under the Davidic monarchy.  But the New Testament set aside this Old Testament theocracy and established the Christian churches as voluntary organizations--as Roger Williams argued against John Winthrop.  So there is no parallel between Trump and Cyrus.

We should also notice that God used the pagan leader Nebuchadnezzar as "the servant of the Most High God" to punish Judah by taking them into the very Babylonian captivity from which Cyrus would later liberate them (Jeremiah 25).  So if God is using Trump, we can't be sure whether Trump is to be America's savior (like Cyrus) or America's punishment (like Nebuchadnezzar).  And indeed many Christians who have refused to vote for Trump worry that the Christians supporting Trump are showing a shameless lack of moral authority.  Is God punishing these Christians for their hypocrisy?  

Has God used Trump's evil rule to provoke the rise of liberal Christian politicians like Senator Talarico, who promote the Christian politics of "love thy neighbor" against Trump's anti-Christian politics of "hate thy neighbor"?

If that were so, then, in a strange sort of way, Trump really is Making America Great Again--by turning America away from Trump's politics of hate back towards America's politics of love.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

A Midterm Election at the End of History: The Reconstruction of Liberal Democracy and Liberal Christianity

 

James Talarico's Victory Speech:  A Politics of "Love Thy Neighbor" Versus Trump's "Hate Thy Neighbor"


Over the weekend just before the election, I was in Texas for the University of Texas-Mississippi State football game in Austin.  I was shocked to see Talarico signs everywhere and almost no Paxton signs and to hear people talking about their enthusiasm for overthrowing the Republican political establishment in Texas.  I was born in Texas, and most of my childhood (beginning in 1962) was spent in Texas.  So I saw the amazing political transformation of Texas from being a dominantly Democrat state to being dominantly Republican.  Now, I have seen the stunning electoral rebuke of the Texas Trump Republicans.

Seeing this defeat of the Trump Republicans, not only in Texas but across the country, reminds me of what Francis Fukuyama has written in his new book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir in defense of his 1989 proclamation of the triumph of liberal democracy at the "End of History."  He says that a few times every week, he is asked whether he wants to retract that claim because obviously liberal democracy is retreating, and illiberal authoritarianism is on the rise. 

Fukuyama has admitted that there are two serious alternatives to liberal democracy in the world today.  The first--and the single most serious challenge--is China.  In a future post, I will argue that although China looks like a serious challenge, the "China Model" is not a plausible alternative to liberal democracy.

The other possible alternative identified by Fukuyama is the illiberal or patrimonial populism of Donald Trump and others (like Viktor Orban).  Last month, I predicted that Trump's patrimonial populism would go down in defeat in the midterm elections, as we have just seen last week.


THE GLOBAL ELECTORAL REVOLT AGAINST ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

This is part of a global pattern of electoral losses for illiberal populism over the past year.  I have written about Orban's fall in Hungary in April.  More recently, Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia's longtime nationalist strongman, and ally of Trump, was voted out of power.  Similarly, in Brazil, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva defeated Flavio Bosonaro, whose father, the former president Jair Bolsonaro was jailed for attempting a coup after he lost the last election to Lula.  Flavio secretly fled Brazil and ended up in Miami, where Trump promised to protect him.

All of these elections show the same four features.  First, there were record-breaking high voter turnouts.  When voter turnout is low, and an authoritarian ruler has lost the election, it's easy for his party to engage in tricks that alter the election results in his favor.  But when turnout is high, and he has lost by a large margin, it's hard to overturn the election.

The second common feature is that young people played a major part in the election.  In Serbia, the opposition to Vucic was led by a student protest movement ("the Student List").  In Brazil, young protestors took to the streets when Lula came in second in the first round of voting, and voters under 35 powered Lula to victory in the second round.  Young people worry about their future under an illiberal authoritarian ruler.

The third common feature of these elections was the prominence of corruption as an issue.  Voters become angry when they perceive that they are not doing well economically, but they see that their authoritarian rulers and their family and friends have grown rich from corruption.  Such corruption is intrinsic to patrimonial authoritarianism, because the whole point of patrimonial rule is that rulers use their power to benefit themselves, their families, and their friends at the expense of the public.  Fukuyama has noted that patrimonialism is rooted in human biological nature as shaped by kin selection and reciprocal altruism: human beings are naturally inclined to cooperate with their family members and with their friends with whom they have reciprocal relations.  Those outside the circle of family and friends we treat as strangers or even enemies.

The fourth common feature of these elections is that voters were voting mostly against someone rather than for someone.  Critics of electoral democracy often argue that voters often do not display good judgment in selecting leaders.  That is certainly true because they often elect bad leaders like Donald Trump.  But voting has two purposes: to select rulers whom voters hope will be good in the future and to punish rulers for their past record of bad rule.  Voters are much better in their retrospective judgment of what rulers have done than in their prospective judgment of what rulers might do in the future.  Many of those who voted for Trump in 2024 voted against Trump and the Trump Republicans in 2026 because Trump's record in the first two years of his second term was so unpopular.  In interviews, many voters have said that having voted for Trump and the Republicans in 2024, they were correcting that mistake by voting against them in 2026.  (Actually, the voting for Trump in 2024 was mostly voting against Biden's record.)  We also see that in the other elections in Hungary, Serbia, and Brazil.  Even though Flavio Bolsonaro had no record of bad rule, his father did, and the voters could anticipate that Flavio would rule like his father.

Midterm elections allow the voters to vote against the President even when he is not on the ballot by voting for congressional and state representatives who are likely to resist the President's bad rule.  When Trump told voters to "pretend I am on the ballot," they did that!


CHECKS FROM CONGRESS

The success of American liberal democracy depends critically on Congress checking the power of the President.  The first and longest article of the Constitution is the legislative Article I, which suggests that Congress should be the center of the federal government.  But the Republicans controlling both houses of Congress during Trump's second term have refused to check Trump's authoritarian rule.  Trump has become the chief lawmaker by making laws through executive orders.  And so, for example, Trump has taken over for himself the congressional powers for legislating tariffs and declaring war.  The midterm elections have shown that a big majority of the electorate want to have a Democrat-controlled Congress that will exercise its constitutional duty to check the authoritarian power of the President.

The massive scale of this midterm defeat for Trump and the Trump Republicans shows that it's a realigning election that shifts the balance of power away from Trump's illiberal authoritarianism and backs towards the liberal democracy of the Constitution.  But I would argue that while this was a realigning election in favor of liberal democracy, and thus a vindication of Fukuyama's end-of-history thesis, the voters were not showing a great preference for the Democratic Party over the Republican Party.  In exit polling, 60% of the voters said they had an "unfavorable opinion" of the Republican Party.  But 52% of the voters said they also had an "unfavorable opinion" of the Democratic Party.  One-third of the voters identified as "independents" who reject both major parties.  The great majority of the voters voted for Democratic candidates only because that was their way of rejecting the illiberal authoritarian rule of Trump as supported by the Trump Republicans.

Of course, the Trump Republicans--such as the election analysts at Fox News--have said that this was just a "normal" midterm election punishing the party of the President.  That is not true.  These midterm results were hardly normal.  Consider the Senate races.  The Republicans have lost at least seven Senate races and probably nine (if we include Mississippi and Alaska).  They got blown out in normally red states like South Carolina, Iowa, Ohio, Texas, and Kansas.  Kansas last had a Democratic Senator in 1932!  That's not a "normal" midterm election.

Jeffrey Anderson has noted:  "Of the 47 Senate seats that changed parties in midterm elections between 1990 and 2022, only five were won by candidates whose party had lost by at least ten points during the prior presidential election in that state--in other words, deep in enemy territory.  In only one election over that span [in 2010] had a party lost more than one such seat. . . . On Tuesday, Republicans managed to lose at least five such seats, and probably seven, in just one election--at least matching, and likely surpassing, the combined total lost by both parties in all midterm elections from 1990 through 2022."

The same three factors--high voter turnout, young voters, and corruption--manifest in the recent elections in Hungary, Serbia, and Brazil were crucial for the American midterm elections.  Although the numbers are still being calculated, it appears that the voter turnout was unusually high for this midterm election, and the turnout for young voters was also unusually high.

Moreover, in the exit polling, the number one concern of voters was "government corruption."  An amazing 91% of the voters said that this was either a "crucial" or "major" factor for them.  And those 91% of the voters went with the Democrats by 16 points (57-41%).  So J.D. Vance was wrong when he said that "the reason we lost is the war."  The war in Iran was only the third most important factor for the voters.  74% said that it was a "crucial" or "major" factor.  The majority of these voters backed the Democrats by 30 points (64-34%).  This put the Iran war close to "immigration enforcement" as an influence on voters, because 73% of the voters said this was a "crucial" or "major" factor.

The immigration issue was important for Maria Salazar who was running for reelection to Congress in a South Florida district. In August, she decided that she was losing voter support because of Trump's unpopular immigration policies.  So she produced a political ad that sent a message directly to Trump:

Mr. President, some of your immigration enforcement efforts have gone too far.  In July, 50 percent of the 50,000 people who were detained had no criminal record.  Be careful what your advisers are telling you about immigration policy.  The same Hispanics who helped you get to the White House in 2024 feel betrayed today.

In September, I predicted that this would help her win reelection--despite the fact that Trump called her a "traitor."  She did indeed win reelection by only 1,086 votes.

The second most important issue in the midterm elections was "cost of living."  89% said it was either a "crucial" or "major" factors.  This group voted for the Democrats by 20 points (59-39%).  Now while the cost of living was certainly affected by the Iran War (gas prices), voters pointed to other factors as well.  66% of the voters said that "Trump's tariff policies" have hurt the national economy, and those voters backed Democrats by a huge margin of 63 points (81-18%).  63% of the voters blame "Trump's policies" generally for "higher than usual prices."

"Government corruption" as the number one issue for voters was connected with voters recognizing that Trump's illiberal patrimonialism was responsible for much of the corruption in government.  Asked "which does Donald Trump prioritize more?," 62% said "his own personal interests," while 38% said "the country's interests."  Asked "would you say Donald Trump fights for people like you?," 63% said No.  Asked "do you think the U.S. economic system generally favors the wealthy?," 70% of the voters said Yes.  And of these, 76% were Democratic voters.

Notice how this refutes the intellectual defenders of Trumpism--like those at the Claremont Institute--who say that Trump's populist appeal comes from voters recognizing that he is fighting for the People against the Ruling Class.  On the contrary, most voters see Trump as a corrupt politician fighting for his interests and the interests of his family and friends in the Ruling Class.

All of this leads me to identify this election not only as a "Realignment Election," but also as a "Reconstruction Election," because after two years of Trump trying to destroy constitutional liberal democracy in America, this election is the first step in reconstructing that constitutional regime.  This echoes the Reconstruction that came after the Civil War, when the Confederacy tried to overturn liberal democracy in America.  As I have noted previously, George Fitzhugh, the great apologist for slavery and the Confederacy, said in 1866 that the Union victory in the Civil War was the victory of John Locke's liberalism over Sir Robert Filmer's conservatism.  As I have indicated in some previous posts, some of the Trumpist intellectuals--such as Curtis Yarvin--have explicitly argued for Filmer's monarchism and against Locke's liberalism.

In this midterm election, we have been reminded of Reconstruction by the Mississippi Senate race.  With over 97% of the votes counted, Scott Colom, the Democratic challenger, leads Republican incumbent Cindy Hyde-Smith by a little over 2,500.  If Colom wins, he will be the first Black Senator from Mississippi since Reconstruction.  Hiram Revels, the nation's first Black Senator was elected in Mississippi in 1870.  The last Black Senator from Mississippi was Blanche K. Bruce, who served during the final days of Reconstruction from 1875 to 1881.  [On November 12th, the Associated Press declared Colom the winner.  Trump carried Mississippi by 23% in 2024.  This is even more shocking than Talarico's win in Texas.]

This midterm election begins the Reconstruction not only of the Congress but also other institutional checks on President Trump.


CHECKS FROM FEDERAL COURTS

The federal court system has been a major check on Trump's power.  Grand juries have often refused to return indictments sought by the Justice Department to prosecute cases against Trump's opponents.  The Trump administration has lost most of its cases in the federal courts.  

As I have written in some previous posts, the record of the Supreme Court has been mixed.  The Court has rendered some bad decisions favoring Trump's authoritarianism.  The worst is the 6-3 decision ruling that the President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his "core constitutional powers"--that is, powers that belong exclusively to the President.  And he has at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for any of his "official acts."  But the Court has also rendered some good decisions such as denying the President's power to arbitrarily impose tariffs, and the power to deny birthright citizenship.

A remarkable rebuke of the Trump administration by the Supreme Court came on the Monday night before the midterm election day in a one-sentence denial of a shadow docket application: "The application for injunction pending appeal presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is denied."  As part of its voter suppression efforts, the Department of Justice had asked the federal courts to issue an order to set aside some 20,000 ballots from California voters whom the government claimed it had "identified as likely noncitizens."  Amazingly, the government did not present any evidence that these really were "likely noncitizens."  Lower federal courts had rejected the government's request while questioning both the legality and accuracy of the application.  The government appealed to the Supreme Court--filing an emergency motion for an injunction to force the state of California to segregate the mail ballots from people purportedly "identified as likely noncitizens."  The government's application was so weak that most observers of the Court assumed that the Court would reject it.  But many observers thought that Trump's most loyal Justices--Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito--would dissent.  Surprisingly, it appears that the Court was unanimous in deciding that the government's application was so bogus that it could be dismissed a few hours after it was filed.  So Trump cannot even count on his favorite Justices to give him what he wants.

The midterm election creates the prospect of making the Supreme Court an even more effective check on the President.  Since Thomas is 77 years old, and Alito is 76, they are likely to retire within the next few years.  Presumably, a Democratic controlled Senate will not confirm any Supreme Court nominations from Trump.  And if a Democrat is elected President in 2028, that President could appoint two justices, which would change the Court from having 6 Republican appointees to having 5 Democratic appointees, thus a 5-4 Democratic majority.  If that court overturned U.S. v. Trump (2024)--the decision granting the president absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for his official acts as president--that would be a crucial step towards the Reconstruction of liberal democracy in America.


CHECKS FROM STATE GOVERNMENTS

American federalism makes state governments a check on the power of the President.  The midterm elections have strengthened that check on Trump and any Trump successor by giving massive gains to the Democrats in the state governments.  In 2027, at least 28 governors will be Democrats.  The Democrats have also made gains in the state legislatures.  For example, the Texas House of Representatives will have a Democratic majority for the first time since 2002.  In Arizona, the Democrats will control the governorship and both houses of the legislature for the first time since 1966.  Beginning in January, 24 state legislatures will be under full Democratic control, while Republicans will control both chambers in 22 states, down from 28 states prior to the election.


THE RULE OF LAW AND MILITARY POWER

Why hasn't Trump declared himself a military dictator so that he can overturn the midterm elections with military force?  In 2021, I argued that Trump didn't do this when he lost the 2020 election because he did not have the guns or the guts for becoming a military dictator.  He did not have the guns because military leaders such as General Mark Milley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) made it clear that they would not allow the military to support a presidential dictatorship.  And he did not have the guts because he lacked the courage to assert his dictatorial will in violation of the Constitution.  

I would make the same argument now.  In a liberal democracy, the chief executive might be commander in chief, but that does not allow him to establish a military dictatorship over his country contrary to the rule of law.  In the U.S., military personnel take an oath to uphold the Constitution, which means they have a duty to disobey any unconstitutional order from the President.  That's why Trump became so angry when Senator Mark Kelly and other veterans in Congress publicly declared that the military must disobey any illegal orders.  Trump said this was a treasonous offense punishable by death!  But Trump knows that they were right.

The midterm elections strengthen this check on Trump's power because a Democratic controlled Congress would resist any declaration of military dictatorship. 


THE LOCKEAN LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY OF CIVILITY AND "LOVE THY NEIGHBOR"

The Reconstruction of liberal democracy in America will require not just strengthening the institutional checks on Trump's power but also reviving the moral and religious culture of civility necessary for overcoming the politics of divisiveness--of friends and enemies--that divides the American people and thus makes it easier for Trump to rule over them.

This point has been well made by James Talarico in his victory speech in Texas, which includes most of the major themes in his stump speech for his winning campaign for the U.S. Senate.  A seminarian who hopes to become a Christian minister, Talarico has employed a Biblical rhetoric with emphasis on Jesus' teaching "Love Thy Neighbor."  We must love our neighbor because our neighbors--our fellow human beings--are all created in God's image with sacred value.  This means that despite our differences--in race, sex, religion, classes, or politics--we should respect and even love one another as equal in our human dignity.

But those rich and powerful people who want exploitative dominance over us, Talarico warns, want to divide us into warring political factions, who see politics as us against them, because this is the strategy of divide and conquer: it's easier to conquer us if we are divided against one another.

But Talarico argues that we need to see American politics not as left versus right or Democrat versus Republican but as top versus bottom.  Those at the top--the billionaires or even trillionaires--want to divide us so that they can rule over us.  It was easy for Talarico to identify some examples of those at the top who were involved in the Texas Senate race.  Elon Musk spent over 300 million dollars in the Texas race, which was the biggest political donation in a Senate race in American history.  And yet all that money was wasted because Talarico won the support of ordinary Texans with diverse political orientations--Democrats, Republicans, and independents--who refused to be divided by partisan differences.

Similarly, Talarico could point to the egregious corruption of his opponent--Attorney General Ken Paxton--whose corruption was so blatant that his own staff people reported him to the FBI for his corruption, and whose own party impeached him.  As Attorney General, his government salary was about $140,000 a year.  And yet during his ten years as Attorney General, he amassed great wealth that he could not explain.  Paxton owned 11 houses, Talarico often observed, while many Texans couldn't afford even one house.

Trump and Paxton promoted a politics of hate through personal attacks on Talarico and his supporters as "freaks."  Trump and Paxton said Talarico's real name was "Talafreako."  Talarico responded by selling shirts that said "I'm a Talafreako," and this raised a million dollars for his campaign.  He responded to hateful attacks with humor.

So preaching "love thy neighbor" was Talarico's way of persuading people with very different backgrounds and beliefs to join a coalition of ordinary Texans fighting and defeating the ruling political establishment in Texas.

To argue for "love thy neighbor" in social and political life corresponds to John Locke's argument for the importance of "civility," which he defined as "respect and good will to all people."  A culture of civility is crucial for liberal democracy, where people need to accept the peaceful transfer of political power through elections without demonizing those who disagree with them politically.

Another expression of Christian civility and "love thy neighbor" is the separation of church and state.  Talarico first gained national recognition as a member of the Texas House of Representatives who argued against the bill requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in every public school.  That bill was part of the agenda of the Christian Nationalists who want government to enforce the idea of America as a Christian nation.  As I have written in a previous post, Talarico has condemned Christian Nationalism as an unchristian denial of the teachings of Jesus.  Christian Nationalism, he argues, is "worship of power, not worship of Christ."

Unlike many of his Democratic colleagues who also condemn Christian Nationalism, Talarico justifies his rejection of Christian Nationalism as an expression of his Christian faith.  (He laid out his general line of thinking in talking with Joe Rogan last summer, particularly in the first half of the two-and-a-half-hour interview.)

What I see here is a renewal of the debate between Roger Williams and John Winthrop, in which Talarico speaks for the Christian liberalism of Williams against the Christian illiberalism of Winthrop.  As I have said in previous posts, this was the original debate between liberal America and illiberal America, and ultimately liberal America prevailed.  I would argue that in this new debate, the stronger argument is still on the side of liberal America.  One sign of this is that even the leading proponents of Christian Nationalism--like Douglas Wilson--cannot really defend the Christian illiberalism of Winthrop, and they actually--at least implicitly--embrace the Christian liberalism of Williams.

Talarico's blowout victory in Texas by a hug margin--12%--is a victory for Lockean liberal Christianity based on the civility of "love thy neighbor."

By contrast, Trump has been emphatic in rejecting the Christian teaching of "love thy neighbor" because he believes that politics requires that he hate his enemies.  Remarkably, in his interview with Ross Douthat for CBS's "60 Minutes," Trump even said that he would never ask God for forgiveness for this sin of hating his enemies.  This raises the question of whether Trump will make it to Heaven--a question that I'll take up in the next post.

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Does Liberal Democracy Satisfy the Thymotic Desire for Recognition? Fukuyama's Confusing Answers

In his 1989 article "The End of History?" Francis Fukuyma seemed to agree with Alexandre Kojeve (in his interpretation of Hegel) that history had reached its end (at the level of ideas) once it became clear that liberal democracy is the only regime in which "all human needs are satisfied."  But while the economic liberty provided by modern liberal democracy surely satisfies the economic needs of human beings for a comfortable self-preservation and a life of consumerism, Fukuyama suggested that this would not satisfy the distinctively human need for recognition--the desire to have one's dignity or worth recognized by others, so that one's self-esteem is confirmed by the esteem of others.  

In the last paragraph of his article, Fukuyama questioned Kojeve's belief in the goodness of the end of history:  "The end of history will be a very sad time.  The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. . . . I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. . . . Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again" (18).

Three years after the publication of his article, in his book The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama elaborated his questioning of Kojeve's claim that liberal democracy was the most fully satisfying regime by questioning whether it could satisfy the desire for recognition.  He also explained the desire for recognition as expressing the part of the human soul that Plato called thymos or "spiritedness."

Fukuyama first learned about thymos as a student at Cornell University in Allan Bloom's seminar on Plato's Republic (Fukuyama 2026: 32-34).  This seminar came only about two years after the publication of Bloom's translation of The Republic in 1968.  Bloom was a student of Leo Strauss, and Bloom's translation of The Republic as well as his interpretive essay accompanying the translation relied heavily on Strauss's reading of The Republic in Strauss's City and Man (1964). 

Under the influence of this Straussian interpretation of The Republic, Fukuyama agrees with Plato's Socrates in distinguishing three parts of the human soul: logos or logismos (reason or calculation), thymos (spiritedness), and epithumia (appetite or desire) (Republic, 435b-445e).  Human beings use calculative reasoning (logismos) to devise the best means for satisfying their bodily appetites (epithumia) for the material goods of life.  Fukuyama is clear in affirming that a modern liberal social order serves this economic side of human nature, because liberalism promotes the scientific technological conquest of nature and the capitalist economic growth that make it easier for most human beings to secure the bodily comforts of life.  But Fukuyama is not so clear as to whether modern liberalism can satisfy the thymotic side of the human soul in its longing for the nonmaterial good of recognition.  

Fukuyama explains the relationship between thymos and the desire for recognition:

Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people act as though they are worth less--when they do not recognize their worth at its correct value--then they become angry. . . . Conversely, when other people see that we are not living up to our sense of self-esteem, we feel shame; and when we are evaluated justly (i.e., in proportion to our true worth), we feel pride. . . .

. . . Plato's thymos is therefore nothing other than the psychological seat of Hegel's desire for recognition. . . . It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding recognition.  But esteem is not a "thing" like an apple or a Porsche: it is a state of consciousness, and to have subjective certainty about one's own sense of worth, it must be recognized by another consciousness.  Thus thymos typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition (1992: 165-66).

I suggest that this desire to feel "one's own sense of worth" corresponds to what Rebecca Goldstein calls "the longing to matter."  "We are creatures of matter who long to matter."  We are material beings governed by physical laws of nature that are indifferent to our existence--impersonal natural laws that do not care about or for us.  And yet we are obsessed with the significance or meaning of our lives as something more than mere matter that is destined by the laws of nature to disappear in death.  We want to matter in the sense that we are deserving of attention and truly deserving of all the attention that we must give to ourselves to pursue our lives.  Without that sense that our life matters, our life is not worth living, which is why people who fall into suicidal depression will say, "I don't matter."  We long to prove that we subjectively feel that we matter because we objectively do.  One common way to prove that to ourselves is to be recognized by others as someone who matters, as someone whose life has worth or dignity.

Therefore, if modern liberal social order is to be the most satisfying way of life for most human beings, it must satisfy not only our material needs for physical comfort and pleasure but also our immaterial need to have the moral worth of our lives recognized by others.  Moreover, Fukuyama argues, we must understand that this thymotic desire for recognition can take one of two forms.  Creating two Greek neologisms, he distinguishes between isothymia--the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people--and megalothymia--the desire to be recognized as superior to other people.  Furthermore, megalothymia is Janus-faced or a double-edged sword.  The good face is the striving to be better than other people in the human excellences--in the moral and intellectual virtues, in sports, in the arts, in politics, and so on.  The bad face is the striving to be better than other people in the exercise of tyrannical domination over them.

This creates three possibilities for how liberal democracy accommodates thymos.  Perhaps liberal democracy does not allow for thymos at all.  Or liberal democracy could secure isothymia but not megalothymia.  Or maybe liberal democracy could have both isothymia and the good form of megalothymia.  Fukuyama is confusing in that he seems to affirm all three possibilities.


LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WITH NO THYMOS?

According to Fukuyama, "Hobbes and Locke, the founders of modern liberalism, sought to eradicate thymos from political life altogether, and to replace it with a combination of reason and desire," which would require "changing human nature itself," by creating "a new type of individual" who would have no thymos in his soul.  This new kind of human being would become the bourgeois or Economic Man, "the human being narrowly consumed with his own immediate self-preservation and material well-being, interested in the community around him only to the extent that it fosters or is a means of achieving his private good." 

Locke and the other founders of modern liberalism "hoped to overcome megalothymia altogether by pitting, in effect, the interests of the desiring part of human nature against the passions of its thymotic part."  This required an assault on the social embodiment of megalothymia--the traditional aristocracy.  "The aristocratic warrior did not create wealth, he stole it from other warriors, or more precisely from the peasantry whose surplus he appropriated. . . . War therefore remained central to the aristocratic way of life, and war, as we well know, is 'economically suboptimal.'  Much better, then, to convince the aristocratic warrior of the vanity of his ambitions, and to transform him into a peaceful businessman, whose self-enriching activities would serve to enrich those around him as well" (1992: 160, 185).

Against this Lockean liberal attempt to eradicate thymos, Fukuyama argues, Friedrich Nietzsche sought to revive thymos in the modern world.

The greatest and most articulate champion of thymos in modern times, and the prophet of its revival, was Friedrich Nietzsche, the godfather of present-day relativism and nihilism.  Nietzsche was once described by a contemporary as an "aristocratic radical," a characterization he did not dispute.  Much of his work can be seen, in a certain sense, as a reaction to what he saw as the rise of an entire civilization of 'men without chests,' a society of bourgeois who aspired to nothing more than their own comfortable self-preservation.  For Nietzsche, the very essence of man was neither his desire nor his reason, but his thymos: man was above all a valuing creature, the "beast with red cheeks" who found life in his ability to pronounce the words "good" and "evil." . . . Nietzsche's well known doctrine of the "will to power" can be understood as the effort to reassert the primacy of thymos as against desire and reason, and to undo the damage that modern liberalism had done to man's pride and self-assertiveness (1992: 188-89).

Fukuyama has said that Strauss was "clearly one of the most important intellectual influences in my life, despite the fact that I never met him" (2026: 46).  And, indeed, we can see Strauss's influence in Fukuyama's interpretation of Locke and Nietzsche, and their contribution to what Strauss called "the crisis of liberal democracy."  Strauss interpreted Locke and Lockean liberalism as promoting a degrading conception of life devoted to economic acquisitiveness--the boring life of the bourgeois man who has no moral or intellectual virtues--a life that Strauss called "the joyless quest for joy."  Strauss interpreted Nietzsche as offering an irrefutable moral and intellectual critique of liberalism's flattening of human experience, while also proposing the overcoming of liberalism by the will to power of the Ubermensch (the Superman), which made Nietzsche the godfather of fascism and Nazism.  That the proponents of liberalism had no good answer to Nietzsche--or to Nietzsche's philosophic followers like Martin Heideggr--is what constituted the "crisis of liberal democracy."

It is regrettable that Fukuyama has not recognized how mistaken Strauss was in all of this.  In many previous posts, I have identified Strauss's mistakes.  First, Strauss was mistaken in failing to see how Locke and other liberals like Adam Smith had made powerful arguments for liberalism's moral and intellectual virtues.  One of Strauss's most influential pieces of writing--particularly among the far-right intellectual critics of liberalism--is his interpretation of Locke in Natural Right and History, which presents Lockean liberalism as promoting a vulgar and soul-deadening soft hedonism, which Strauss famously called "a joyless quest for joy."  This is the Locke that "post-liberals" like Patrick Deneen have scorned.

But as I have argued, this ignores much of what Locke wrote about how a free society secures the liberty that allows for the cultivation of moral and intellectual excellence--including the freedom to live the philosophic life (for people like Strauss!).  So, while critics of liberalism like Deneen insist that Lockean liberalism teaches "pursuit of immediate gratification" and the "absence of restraints upon one's desires," he says nothing about how Locke contradicts this claim in Some Thoughts Concerning Education.  In that book, Locke stresses the importance of parents educating their children so that they have a sense of shame in caring about their good reputation (secs. 56, 61, 78).  Locke says that "the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as best though the appetite lean the other way" (sec. 33). "It seems plain to me that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires where reason does not authorize them" (sec. 38). Children must be taught that "covetousness and the desire of having in our possession and under our dominion more than we have need of" is "the root of all evil" (sec. 110). 

Above all, Locke insists, children must be taught and habituated to show "civility"--respect and good will to all people (secs. 66-67, 70, 109, 117, 143-44). Here Locke's emphasis on the need for "civility" is part of what Norbert Elias identified as the "civilizing process" promoted by early modern liberalism to overcome the incivility, violence, and corrupt manners of medieval pre-modern Europe.  Deneen and Strauss are silent about all of this.

Fukuyama recognizes "that Locke gives considerably more scope to pride and spiritedness than is often thought," particularly in Some Thoughts Concerning Education.  But Fukuyama hides this point in the endnotes of his first book (1992: 341, n. 3; 367, n. 15).

Strauss was also mistaken about Nietzsche, and his mistake has shaped Fukuyama's assumption that Nietzsche showed that liberal democracy cannot escape the degradation of human experience that comes with the Last Man--the man with no thymos--and thus liberal democracy has no answer for those illiberal political movements that affirm a thymotic "will to power" as the overcoming of the Last Man.  Strauss's mistake was in failing to see how the "Darwinian aristocratic liberalism" of Nietzsche's middle writings (such as Human, All Too Human) refuted the "Dionysian aristocratic radicalism" of his early and late writings.

The last part of The End of History and the Last Man is entitled "The Last Man."  If you look at the endnotes to this part of the book, you will see that Fukuyama cites Nietzsche's early and late writings--such as The Use and Abuse of History, On the Genealogy of Morals, The Twilight of the Idols, Beyond Good and Evil, and The Will to Power.  But you will see no references to Nietzsche's middle writings--such as Human, All Too Human, Dawn, and The Gay Science.  What this means is that like Strauss, Fukuyama does not allow his readers to see that Nietzsche's endorsement of liberal democracy in the writings of his middle period contradicts the illiberalism in his other writings, and that the liberal political teaching of the middle period is superior--morally, politically, and intellectually--to the illiberal political teaching of the early and late writings, because the teaching of the middle period is rooted in a Darwinian anthropology that supports an aristocratic liberalism that is more defensible than Nietzsche's aristocratic illiberalism.

In his middle writings, Nietzsche sees that a liberal democracy can recognize the equal worth of all men as men while also allowing for the emergence of "free spirits" as "higher men," who constitute a cultural aristocracy.  Thus, Nietzsche sees that liberal democracy can recognize both isothymia and megalothymia.  In some of his writing, Fukuyama sees that as well.


LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WITH ISOTHYMIA BUT WITHOUT MEGALOTHYMIA?

While Fukuyama sometimes says that Lockean liberalism seeks to eradicate the thymotic desire for recognition, at other times he asserts that Lockean liberal democracy satisfies the desire for recognition by allowing people to be recognized as the equals of other people because they are equal in their natural rights.  "The rise of modern democracy is incomprehensible apart from the demand for equal recognition that lies at its core.  In England, there was a progressive shift in the nature of demands for recognition, from the rights of the tribe or village, to the rights of Englishmen, to Locke's rights of man" (2011: 441).

But then Fukuyama suggests that Nietzsche was right to question the value of the equal recognition of all men as men.  "Is recognition that can be universalized worth having in the first place?  Is not the quality of recognition far more important than its universality?  And does not the goal of universalizing recognition inevitably trivialize and de-value it?" (1992: 301).  Even if many people will be satisfied by the equal recognition that comes to them merely by virtue of being human beings, those people who are more more ambitious will want to be recognized as superior human beings.  Moreover, this desire to be recognized as better than others is "the precondition for the creation of anything else worth having in life, whether great symphonies, paintings, novels, ethical codes, or political systems." "Thymos is the side of man that deliberately seeks out struggle and sacrifice, that tries to prove that the self is something better and higher than a fearful, needy, instinctual, physically determined animal.  Not all men feel this pull, but for those who do, thymos cannot be satisfied by the knowledge that they are merely equal in worth to all other human beings" (1992: 304).


LIBERAL DEMOCRACY WITH ISOTHYMIA AND THE GOOD FORM OF MEGALOTHYMIA?

If I am right about the natural desire for social status, human beings desire to be recognized not only as equal in their human dignity, but also as unequal in those traits or achievements that make them superior to others.  This desire for social status is natural because it was formed in the Lockean evolutionary state of nature to become part of the biological nature of human beings.  The meritocracy in a Lockean liberal society satisfies that desire for social status by allowing for the expression of both isothymia and megalothymia.  At its best, liberal democracy secures the equal opportunity to be unequal.  This Lockean liberal meritocracy can also be found in Nietzsche's middle writings--particularly, Human, All Too Human. 

Human beings generally desire social status through comparative social ranking.  This is a human universal found in all human societies.  Human beings' esteem for themselves requires they be esteemed by others whose judgments they respect.  Human beings attain high social status through prestige, fame, or honor within the groups to which they belong.  And they can be ranked differently in different groups.  Although some societies are much less hierarchical than others, all societies rank individuals as higher or lower based on age, sex, kinship, physical formidability, physical attractiveness, social competence, and practical skills.

Individuals become socially dominant through any trait or activity that elicits deference in others.  A few charismatic individuals become heroic leaders because of their extraordinary power to win the respect of the people around them.  

And yet, subordinate individuals can resist excessive or exploitative dominance and thus limit the power of dominant individuals.  Subordinate individuals can form large coalitions to challenge those at the top of the hierarchy, which checks the tyrannical form of megalothymia.

I have also argued that a Lockean meritocracy at its best should be an open and pluralistic meritocracy rather than closed and monistic.  A meritocracy is open when there is no restriction on social mobility up and down the hierarchy, so that the most talented children of lower-class parents are free to rise into the upper ranks of status, wealth, and power, and the less talented children of upper-class parents are allowed to fall into the lower ranks.  A meritocracy is closed when upper-class parents, who may have originally earned their high rank, can secure that high rank for their children even when they are less talented, by giving their children privileges that are denied to the talented children in the lower ranks.

So, for example, parents who as children were admitted to Harvard University based on their cognitive ability and academic achievements might then help their children be admitted to Harvard as "legacy" applicants who are the children of Harvard alumni or as applicants on the "dean's list" because the parents are a big donors to the university.  A closed meritocracy allows this.  An open meritocracy forbids it.

A meritocracy is monistic when merit is measured by only one standard of value.  A meritocracy is pluralistic when merit is measured by many standards of value.  So, for example, we have a monistic meritocracy when the only standard of merit is abstract cognitive ability of the sort that can be measured by an I.Q. test.  We would have a pluralistic meritocracy if we saw merit in many different moral and intellectual virtues and talents.

A good argument for a more pluralistic meritocracy has been made recently by David Goodhart in his book Head, Hand, Heart: Why Intelligence is Over-Rewarded, Manual Workers Matter, and Caregivers Deserve More Respect (Free Press, 2020).  To use his vivid terminology, in recent years, we have given too much prestige and reward to Head (cognitive work) and not enough to Hand (manual work) and Heart (care work).  People who excel in manual work or caregiving should derive as much self-esteem and public honor from that as people who excel in knowledge work.  

There should be a meritocracy in each of these three spheres of work, which would reflect the diversity of human excellences.  This is what Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray had in mind when they said (in The Bell Curve) that in a liberal social order there should be a "place for everyone":  everyone should be able to find an honored place for themselves by developing whatever moral or intellectual talents they might have.

In much of his writing, Fukuyama agrees with me about most of this, although he does not see how this can all be rooted in a Lockean or Nietzschean liberal account of human nature.  First, what he calls "recognition" is synonymous with what I call "status":  "Recognition is the acknowledgement of another human being's dignity or worth, or what is otherwise understood to be status" (2011: 441).  

He also agrees that the desire for status is biologically natural for human beings because it was shaped in the evolutionary state of nature in which human nature was formed.  He notes that the biological roots for status-seeking behavior extend even to chimpanzees and other primates who compete for alpha male or alpha female status (2011: 26-48, 438-441).

Fukuyama also agrees with my argument that the desire for social status is best satisfied in a meritocracy that is open and pluralistic.  He sees that meritocracy in a liberal democracy is pluralistic in the sense that there are many different outlets for megalothymia.  He speaks about five arenas for thymotic striving (1992: 315-27).  First is entrepreneurship and other forms of economic activity.  The most successful businesspeople are not just striving to make a lot of money as a means to acquire goods for their personal consumption, because the money is mostly a symbol of their entrepreneurial ability.  They want to be better than their rivals.  They are ambitious.  They want the glory that comes from managing a successful enterprise.  "The classical capitalist entrepreneur described by Joseph Schumpeter is therefore not Nietzsche's last man" (316).  Notice here that in recognizing entrepreneurial excellence, Fukuyama contradicts his typically Straussian scorn for the bourgeois life as boring and degraded.

A second domain of life for thymotic striving in a liberal democracy is electoral politics.  Politics is an outlet for ambitious people competing for public recognition.  On this point, Fukuyama often cites Alexander Hamilton and James Madison writing in The Federalist.  They foresaw that American politics would be largely a contest of ambitious men striving for the glory of holding high public office.  And so the American presidency, for example, might attract men moved by "the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds."  But they also saw the danger of tyrannical ambition and the need to put institutional checks on power, so that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."  I have written about Abraham Lincoln's ambition and his warning about those with Napoleonic ambition who might become despots who could overthrow the constitutional order.

A third arena for ambitious striving noted by Fukuyama is modern natural science.  Most scientists are motivated by their natural desire for an intellectual understanding of nature through science.  But they are also moved by a desire to be recognized for their scientific achievements.  They want to put their name on a scientific discovery and win a Nobel Prize.

Beyond the economic, political, and scientific realms in which people can compete for recognition, there are many arenas of competition such as games and sports in which people can strive to be recognized as superior.  In some of these activities, such as auto racing and Alpine mountain climbing, people will even risk their lives or serious injuries in their striving for distinction in their sport.

Finally, Fukuyama identifies the broadest area of life in a liberal democracy that provides the most important recognition for most people--the associational life of private groups such as business corporations, civic associations, professional organizations, churches, schools, and families (the most basic level of associational life).  The recognition of citizens by a liberal democratic state is impersonal.  By contrast, the members of a social group or a family are recognized in a personal way for those individual qualities that make them the people they are.


THE END OF HISTORY?

So to the question of whether liberal democracy satisfies the thymotic desire for recognition, Fukuyama gives three different answers.  To my mind, his third answer is the most persuasive.  Liberal democracy satisfies the natural desire for recognition or status by allowing people to be recognized as equal to others in their human dignity but also as superior to others in being better than others in some domain of life.

But while I agree with Fukuyama that liberal democracy satisfies this natural desire for social status, I see this desire as only one of as many as twenty natural desires.  And I see liberal democracy as the only social order that promotes the satisfaction of all of those natural desires, which means that Fukuyama was right in 1989 in arguing that liberal democracy has emerged as the best regime at the end of history.  

And yet he was wrong in his Nietzschean suggestion that the "bourgeois society" of the "Last Man" could create "centuries of boredom at the end of history" that could "serve to get history started once again."  Here he allowed the illiberalism of Nietzsche's later writings to blind him to the liberalism of Nietzsche's middle writings.


REFERENCES

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2026. In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Tuesday, October 13, 2026

Marco Rubio's Shallow Understanding of "Thymos" in Western Civilization and Liberal Democracy

 



On October 7th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave a speech at Athens' Pnyx, the ancient meeting place of the Athenian democratic assembly, with the Acropolis and Parthenon rising behind him.  I assume that the speech was written by a Claremont Straussian who has read some of Francis Fukuyama's works--such as The End of History and the Last Man (1992) or his most recent In the Realm of the Last Man.  I say that for two reasons.  First, he puts his most important, and most controversial, idea in the center of the speech, which is one of the features of Straussian "esoteric" writing.  Second, that central idea is the Platonic concept of thymos (or thumos)--the Greek word for the spirited, passionate, or proud part of the human soul--which Fukuyama learned about from his Straussian teacher, Allan Bloom, at Cornell.  

Fukuyama identified thymos with the natural human desire for recognition as understood by Alexandre Kojeve in his interpretation of Hegel.  Thymos is the desire to be recognized as excellent or great in the most challenging competitive endeavors of life--but especially in war and politics--even to the point of risking one's life in competitive struggle for the sake of a glorious fame after death.

Here is how Rubio describes this ancient Greek thymos as the central theme of Western Civilization:

For the Greeks of antiquity, the pursuit of excellence was the very principle of man’s existence. They organized all of civic life around contest, ambition, competition: in philosophy and poetry, in sculpture and drama, in athletics and art, in war and statecraft. The classical Greek city was an arena for great men to test and prove themselves, to hone their potential through perpetual struggle—to be the best, the strongest, the most beautiful, straining to inch ever closer to perfection.

Now I know that to modern ears, what I just described, this way of life, may sound odd; it may even sound cruel. The ideal of many ideologies in our time has, frankly, become a world of perfect safety, devoid of risk or failure, with neither the glory of victory nor the shame of defeat …

The ancient Greek city-states were filled … with intense passion and rivalry and faction and conflict. But from that constant struggle for distinction—from that came the great flowering of art and philosophy and political and intellectual energy that would transform a collective of Mediterranean cities into the birthplace of the greatest civilization in the world.

The thumos, as the ancient Greeks called it—the fire of passion, strength, courage, pride—is the heart of great civilization. And without it? Without it, nations lose their will to fight, the will to strive, the will to survive.

Fukuyama has responded to Rubio's speech by saying: "Marco Rubio seems to have quoted my work on recognition," but "he doesn't understand it."  Actually, it's hard to understand what Fukuyama has written about the desire for recognition because he's unclear about whether the thymotic desire for recognition can be satisfied in a liberal democracy.

Fukuyama says that Rubio's claim that thymos is the core value of Western Civilization is "correct in some fashion, but Rubio's understanding of the idea is very deficient."  Rubio doesn't understand that there are two kinds of thymos--designated by Fukuyama's two neologisms, isothymia and megalothymia--and he doesn't understand that there are both good and bad sides to megalothymia.

Isothymia is the desire for equal recognition, which is the fundamental principle of modern liberal democracy--that all human beings are equal in their dignity as human beings.  Fukuyama explains: "Human beings universally feel resentful and angry when they are disrespected, when their fundamental dignity is held to be lower  than that of another group or individual.  Today's polarized politics is driven by isothymia: left-wing identity politics by the demand of marginalized groups for equal recognition, and an emerging right-wing version based on a narrative of white or Christian victimization."

By contrast, megathymia--the desire to be recognized as greater than other people--is Janus-faced in having both a good and an evil face.  It is, as Fukuyama says, a "double-edged sword."  So, on the one hand, Rubio is right to see that the striving to be better than other people can be the source of human excellences.  But, on the other hand, Rubio is wrong not to recognize that this desire to be better than other people can promote tyrannical and criminal behavior.  "George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Winston Churchill were clearly driven by megalothymia--but so were Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot," Fukuyama observes.

Rubio does not see that the problem for megalothymia in a liberal democracy is "first, distinguishing between the good and bad forms of megalothymia, and second, channeling this passion into activities that benefit the broader society."

Rubio also does not see that the megalothymia of the American Founders was expressed by their ambitious devotion to isothymia.  Rubio sees megalothymia expressed in "the immortal closing words of the Declaration of Independence of the United States which says, 'We mutually pledge to each other our Lives, or Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."  But he is silent about the fact that they were affirming the Declaration's principle of isothymia--"that all men are created equal."  

Rubio says that "under President Trump, the United States has made its choice" for reviving the thymos of Western Civilization through "the unapologetic pursuit of national power."  Does this imply that Trump himself is expressing his megalothymia in projecting his power over the world?

Fukuyama says: "Trump is a perfect example of unconstrained megalothymia.  He cannot distinguish between good and bad attributes that deserve recognition, nor does he care about the quality of judgment of those recognizing him. . . . He recently showed Maggie Haberman a list of history's most powerful rulers, whom he clearly admired and wished to equal.  The list included Genghis Khan, Attila the Hun, Napoleon, Mao, and Stalin, and not a single democratic statesman."

Well, I don't see how Trump can be a perfect example of megalothymia if he doesn't care "about the quality of judgment of those recognizing him."  Fukuyama doesn't note that, as reported by Haberman, the list of history's most powerful leaders, and the claim that Trump was more powerful than any of them, came from Gary Player's golf caddie.  A man who is satisfied by the recognition coming from the flattery of a golf caddie is displaying not megalothymia but a pathetically shallow narcissism.

In my next post, I will have more to say about Fukuyama's sometimes confusing account of whether liberal democracy allows for thymos, or whether liberal democracy creates "the realm of the Last Man," in which there can be no thymos.