Wednesday, November 24, 2021

The Primate Model of Chief Executive Rulers as Alpha Males

In most political communities around the world and throughout history, one person has held the highest political position--the office of the ruling chief executive.  There is always someone who is the big man, the chief, the monarch, the dictator, the emperor, the prime minister, or the president--the number one man (and it's usually a man).  Much of politics is all about the competition for that alpha male position.

Why is that?  Why do some people strive to be at the top, even when that striving exposes them to hardships and dangers, even death?  Why do many people defer to dominant rulers, while others resist being dominated?

The best way to answer these questions, I believe, is to say that human beings have biological drives to dominance, deference, and resistance to dominance that they share with other primates (monkeys and apes). One of the best theories supporting this view is Arnold Ludwig's primate model of political rule, which he set forth in his book King of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership (University of Kentucky Press, 2002).  A slightly revised version of his model is a fundamental element of what I have called biopolitical science.  (Some years ago, I wrote "Why Males Rule," a review of Ludwig's book for the Fall 2003 issue of The Claremont Review of Books.)

Ludwig presented his theory as an empirical science based on the study of three kinds of data.  His first--and most rigorously collected and analyzed--database was the list of all the political leaders of all independent nations who held chief executive power for any length of time in the twentieth century (from January 1, 1900 to December 31, 2000), which was 1,941 individuals from 199 countries.  From this list, he then identified those who had separate encyclopedia entries in either the Encyclopedia Britannica or the Encyclopedia Americana.  He then did a bibliographic search to identify those on this shorter list for whom there was adequate data available about their personal lives and professional careers, who were selected as a sample for in-depth study and analysis.  This special sample contained 377 rulers.

He then prepared information forms to record all appropriate biographical data about all 377 rulers.  Based on these forms, he prepared data forms consisting of 182 items to be filled out for each individual, with definitions and criteria for recording all these variables.  With this, he could then do statistical comparisons among ruler types and other categorial variables to determine relative frequencies or percentages of certain characteristics or events for these rulers.

For example, Ludwig saw that 36 percent of the rulers in his sample had come to power with the help of mentors or colleagues.  He could then determine the likelihood of their betraying or remaining loyal to those who had helped them.  He found that 58 percent remained loyal, while 42 percent betrayed their friends.  He also saw that 100 percent of the tyrants and 86 percent of the monarchs were betrayers, while only 25 percent of the democratic rulers were betrayers.  It also seemed that betrayal was advantageous because while the loyalists spent an average of eight years in office, the betrayers spent an average of fourteen years in office.  He concluded that this confirmed Machiavelli's advice in The Prince that it is foolish for a new ruler to "keep faith" with those who helped him come to power: "because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them" (94-95).

Ludwig's second kind of data consisted of anecdotal biographical data to illustrate the generalizations from his statistical data.  So, for example, after giving the statistics for betrayal and loyalty, he gives six instances of betrayal by dictators and three instances by democratic rulers.  The first case comes from Pakistan:  "As prime minister of Pakistan, Bhutto appointed General Zia, a little-known military officer at the time, as chief of the army staff in 1976 because he felt he was completely trustworthy.  About one year later Zia overthrew his benefactor and hung him on the charge of murdering a political opponent" (95).  Ludwig relates these biographical anecdotes in vivid and often amusing ways that engage the reader.

This is similar to Machiavelli's writing in The Prince because he often states a general principle or maxim for prudent princes that is followed by dramatically colorful stories that illustrate the point.

Finally, Ludwig's third kind of data came from the reports of primatologists (like George Schaller, Jane Goodall, Frans de Waal, and Robert Sapolsky) that show how the striving for alpha male status among monkeys and apes resembles the political life of human beings.  For example, as evidence that political betrayal and shifting allegiances in the competition for political dominance is common in other primates, Ludwig quoted from Sapolsky's account (in A Primate's Memoir) of the political competition in the savanna baboon troop in Kenya that he had studied for over twenty years.

When Sapolsky was 21 years old, he first joined the troop of sixty baboons in 1978.  Solomon had been the alpha male for three years, but this became his last year because he was unseated by Uriah.  Then, in 1980, Saul deposed Uriah after one day of fighting.  

Saul proved to be an extraordinarily successful ruler.  Whenever he was challenged, even if it was a trivial provocation, he responded with a ferociously vicious attack.  Consequently, everyone learned to never challenge him about anything.  But he never started fights.  He never engaged in aggression pointlessly.  "Saul was what most males aspired to, if only they had a stitch of smarts or discipline or energy" (A Primate's Memoir, 103).  He was the model of a baboon Machiavellian prince.

There was a group of young males in their prime who were frustrated by their lacking the ability to individually challenge Saul.  Finally, they decided to form a cooperative coalition.  Joshua and Menasseh made coalitional appeasement gestures to each other that established their partnership.  They jointly challenged Saul, but he defeated them.  The next day, Joshua and Menasseh formed a coalition with Levi; but Saul forced them to run away after only a few seconds of fighting.  The day after that, four of them--Joshua, Menasseh, Levi, and Nebuchadnezzar--fought jointly with Saul, but they failed.

Then, the next day, these four had formed an even bigger coalition with two others--Daniel and Benjamin--so now it was six against one.  In their fight, Menasseh got in a lucky hit on Saul's haunches.  Saul fell, and all the others jumped on him.  His body was punctured with many canine bites.  He survived.  But he went to the bottom of the hierarchy.

What happened to the victorious coalition of six?  Sapolsky reports:

"The wonderfully cooperative junta that had overthrown Saul lasted all of a morning before it disintegrated into factionalism and both metaphorical and literal backbiting.  All hell broke loose for months afterward.  Joshua, Menasseh, Levi, Nebuchadnezzar, Daniel, and Benjamin were clearly the upper-ranking cohort now.  For example, in a social interaction, any one of them dominated a subadult like David, Daniel's old buddy.  But they didn't have a clue where they stood with respect to each other.  Ranks flip-flopped daily. . . . Chaos reigned.  Everyone was scheming, spending hours forming coalitional partnerships that would collapse within minutes of their first test.  Nearly 40 percent of the time, when it did collapse, the erstwhile partner would wind up on the other side.  The number of fights went through the roof, as did the rate of injuries" (Sapolsky, 169; Ludwig, 124).

Ludwig quotes this to show that political alliances are as easily broken up by betrayal among baboons as among human beings.

There is one weakness, however, in Ludwig's comparisons of human beings and other higher primates as showing the Machiavellian drive for alpha-male dominance:  this does not seem to be true for one ape species--the bonobos--who seem to show female dominance and a more peaceful life than is the case for the other great apes and monkeys.  Ludwig refers to this "apparent exception of the bonobos," but without explaining it (Ludwig, 8-9, 355, 376, 410).


THE PRIMATE MODEL

One way to summarize the primate model of politics is to list the similarities in the struggle for alpha-male dominance among human beings and other primates.  Here's Ludwig's list (355):


GAINING POWER

Males Dominant

No Special Experience or Skills Needed

Danger of Physical Harm

Vie with Competitors for Power

Form Alliances to Topple Leader

Repetitive Attempts to Depose Leader

Physical Prowess and Courage

Cunning and Deviousness Useful


EXERCISING POWER

Greater Access to Females

Breeding Advantage

Material Rewards

Deference by Subordinates


KEEPING POWER

Keeping Peace among Subjects

Risking Harm During Challenges

Repeat Mistakes of Past Leaders

Resist Giving Up Power

Posturings and Displays

Change in Demeanor and Manner

Fending Off Challengers


As I have indicated previously, I agree with Christopher Boehm in seeing a Lockean political rhetoric among chimpanzees that turns on three themes--dominance, deference, and counter-dominance.  Ludwig is not as clear as he should be about the theme of counter-dominance.  To make that clear, I would add a fourth part to his primate model:


LOSING POWER

The Alpha Male Is Overthrown by the Ambitious Few Who Want to Dominate

The Alpha Male Is Overthrown Because the Normally Deferential Many Resist His Oppressive Dominance


SIX KINDS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE RULERS

Ludwig distinguishes six different ways of ruling as an alpha male--four kinds of dictators and two kinds of democrats (41):


DICTATORS

Supreme Monarchs

Consecrated by Church or Authority by Kinship to Esteemed Figure

Absolute Rule or Strong Constitutional Powers

Rule for Life

Endowed with Special Powers Such as Healing Touch, Infallibility

For Example: Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia (1932-1953)


Tyrants

Authority to Rule Based on Military Backing

Decrees and Edicts, Implemented by Force

Commonly Display Cruelty, Greed, Corruption

No Ideological Basis for Governing

For Example: Francois Duvalier ("Papa Doc"), President of Haiti (1957-1971)


Visionaries

Totalitarian Rule

Promotion of a Particular Political Ideology

Social Engineering

No Fixed Term in Office

For Example: Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy (1922-1943), Duce of the Italian Social Republic (1943-1945)


Authoritarians

Dictatorship Established to Preserve Social Stability

Emphasis on Law, Order, and Tradition

Bureaucratic Rule Common with Emphasis on Regulations

No Fixed Term in Office

For Example: Janos Kadar, First Secretary of Hungary's Communist Party (1956-1988)


DEMOCRATS

Transitional Democrats in Emerging Democracies

Rule Country After Liberation or Independence

Introduction of Constitutional Democracy with Fixed Terms in Office

Usually Show Autocratic Tendencies

Many Have Special Status as "Father of Nation"

For Example:  Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe (1987-2017)


Democratic Leaders of Established Democracies

Elected to a Limited Term in Office

Executive Powers Defined by Constitution

Balance of Power with Judicial and Legislative Bodies

Greater Emphasis on Negotiation and Compromise

For Example: Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States (1933-1945)


We do not see these six kinds of alpha-male rulers among non-human primates.  Because many of the factors here--such as ideology and religion--arise from uniquely human traits such as language and hypersociality.  But we do see the dichotomy between dictators and democrats.  For example, Frans de Waal has observed that while rhesus monkeys show a "despotic dominance style" in which subordinates cannot challenge dominants, chimpanzees show an "egalitarian dominance style" in which subordinates can restrain dominants.  Dominant individuals are expected to mediate conflicts within the group and to lead the group in conflicts with other groups.  Among chimpanzees, dominant individuals can be challenged or even deposed if they do not properly carry out their conflict-mediation role.


THE MOST DANGEROUS PROFESSION

Holding high political office is a dangerous profession.  Being a chief executive ruler of a country is one of the most lethal activities known to human beings.  Ludwig's data shows that 12 percent of all twentieth-century rulers died a violent death--either by assassination (7 percent), execution (4 percent), or suicide (1 percent).  Within the sample of 377 rulers, the death rate was 18 percent.

Even if they are not actually killed, rulers have to worry about assassination attempts.  In the twentieth century, if the ruler was a tyrant, there was a 77 percent chance that someone would try to kill him.  For a monarch, it was a 61 percent chance.  For a visionary, a 56 percent chance.  For an authoritarian, a 46 percent chance.  Leaders in an emerging democracy had a 51 percent risk of being attacked.  Leaders in established democracies had a 19 percent chance of being exposed to attempted assassinations.

American presidents have faced many assassination attempts.  Four presidents have been killed in office--Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William McKinley, and John Kennedy.  Others have been shot and came close to death--Teddy Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.

Prior to the twentieth century, the danger of violent death for rulers was even greater.  In the first systematic and quantitative study of regicide in Europe, Manuel Eisner has collected data on the frequency of violent death and regicide among 1,513 monarchs in Europe between AD 600 and 1800 ("Killing Kings: Patterns of Regicide in Europe, AD 600-1800," British Journal of Criminology 51 [2011]: 556-577).  He has distinguished four categories of violent death: accident, battle death, murder, and legal execution.  He found that in the seventh century, the frequency of regicide was 2,500 murders per 100,000 years in office.  There was a long decline in regicide.  So that by the eighteenth century, the frequency of regicide was about 200 per 100,000 years in office.  By comparison, the homicide rate in Western Europe today is around 0.6-1.5 per 100,000 person-years.  Clearly, then, European kingship before the Industrial Revolution was one of the most dangerous occupations in the world, comparable to that of soldiers in combat.

Eisner found that for most of this history, regicide was carried out within the noble elite in the competition for political rule.  But, then, by the seventeenth century, regicide became increasingly a matter of legal execution--such as the execution of Charles I in 1649 and the execution of Louis XVI in 1793.  In the Glorious Revolution of 1688, James II was deposed without being executed.

Even if they do not die a violent death, rulers face a high chance of bad outcomes.  In the twentieth century, tyrants faced the greatest risks: assassination (15 percent), thrown out of office by election (10 percent), deposed by coup (50 percent), or overthrown in a lost war (10 percent).  As Ludwig said, "that is a whopping 85 percent chance of leaving office in disgrace or in a casket" (120).

Simian alpha males face a similar likelihood of bad outcomes, including assassination.

In my next post, I will apply this primate model of political rule to the history of the Stuart monarchy in seventeenth century England.

The Pathetic End of Richard Spencer's Nietzschean Alt-Right

 


This is Richard Spencer leaving the Federal Courthouse in Charlottesville, Virginia.  He is carrying his daughter's stuffed animal.  He brought it to court every day, he said, to be his "emotional support animal."  This is a good image for the pathetic death of Spencer's Nietzschean Alt-Right.

Yesterday, a jury awarded $26 million in compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiffs claiming damages from the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville in August of 2017.  $14 million of the damages were assessed against James Field, who is serving a life prison sentence for driving his car into a crowd and killed 32-year-old Heather Heyer.  Spencer was ordered to pay $1.2 million.

I have written previously about Spencer (here and here).  Spencer's ultimate aim has been to overthrow liberal democracy and establish a "white ethnostate" in North America and Europe.  For him this kind of thinking all began when he first read Nietzsche as a college student at the University of Virginia.  Then, as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, he began to study Leo Strauss, who he saw as sympathetic with Nietzschean fascist thinking.  (I have written a series of posts on the Strauss-Nietzsche connection.)  Later, he did some graduate work at Duke University where he took a course on "Nietzsche's Politics" from the Straussian political theorist Michael Gillespie; and his paper for that course--"Politics in the Grand Style: Nietzsche, the Judeo-Christian Legacy, and European Unification"--is perhaps the fullest statement of his Nietzschean Alt-Right thinking.  He argued that "the deeper character of the Ethno-State . . . is Nietzschean at its core."

Suddenly, at the trial in Charlottesville, Spencer announced that his Nietzschean Neo-Nazism was all wrong.  He said that this kind of thinking showed him at his "absolute worst," and that it was all a product of his "animal brain."  At one point, he testified: "That was me as a 7-year-old, and it's a 7-year-old that's probably still inside me.  I'm ashamed of it.  Those are not my sincere, thoughtful beliefs.  That is a childish, awful version of myself."

After the verdict, Spencer told reporters that the Alt-Right movement that he created is over.  "That's long dead and gone in my opinion.  And it's buried.  And I don't want to have anything to do with it."

He also said: "I'm going to develop ideas that I think are important to the future of the world.  I've evolved a lot.  I think that populist energy of a few years ago, I think it brought out the worst in a lot of people, and it brought out the worst in me.  I don't think saying I'm sorry would help anyone.  I think the main thing is to move forward with integrity and seriousness."

Is this the death of the Nietzschean Alt-Right?  Surely, some of the Nietzschean Alt-Right thinkers will say that rather than showing the death of the movement, what this really shows is the stupid mistake of people like Spencer who shout in public that the final goal of the Alt-Right is a military ethnostate, which provokes a public backlash.  The smart strategy is to keep quiet about this.  

As I have noted, "Bronze Age Pervert" has recommended to his readers that they should study the idea of the military ethnostate as a guide for their "final aims," but they should be careful not to talk about this in public, because this would only expose them to their enemies.  They should join the Trump movement as the best way to work for overthrowing liberal democracy and moving towards a Nietzschean military dictatorship.  But they should never say that this is their aim because "you must have an instinct for how much normies are able to take" (Bronze Age Mindset, 170-71, 176).

In other words, don't march in a torchlight parade chanting Neo-Nazi slogans and assume that you won't be punished by your enemies!

Can this Straussian "secret writing" strategy of Bronze Age Pervert work?

Well, a recent report on "The Global State of Democracy 2021" concludes that the United States has joined the growing list of countries that are "backsliding democracies"--democracies whose democratic institutions and norms are declining--while at the same time the illiberal authoritarian regimes are expanding.  Does this suggest that the historical conditions in the world today are growing ever more favorable to the ultimate triumph of the Nietzschean Alt-Right?

Sunday, November 14, 2021

The Evolution of Vigilantism and the Right to Self-Defense--Returning to Locke's State of Nature

Closing arguments in the trial of Kyle Rittenhouse are scheduled for Monday.  Rittenhouse, 18 years old, is charged with murdering two men and wounding a third in Kenosha, Wisconsin.  In the summer of 2020, he traveled from his home in Illinois to Kenosha with an AR-style semi-automatic rifle, claiming that he was going to protect property from the violent protests that had been provoked by the shooting of Jacob Blake, a Black man, by a white Kenosha police officer.  He shot three men.  Two died.  The third was badly wounded.

Rittenhouse's lawyers are arguing that he shot these men in self-defense.  They contend that the first man killed--Joseph Rosenbaum--had threatened to kill Rittenhouse, and he was shot after chasing Rittenhouse and lunging for his rifle.  Rittenhouse then killed Anthony Huber after Huber had hit him with a skateboard.  Finally, Gaige Grosskreutz was wounded after he had chased Rittenhouse while pointing a pistol at him.  The defense lawyers argue that this was legal under the Wisconsin self-defense law that allows the use of deadly force only if "necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm." 

It can be argued, however, that Rittenhouse was the "initial aggressor"--he provoked the encounters that led to his use of force.  He went to Kenosha with a rifle that he had illegally, and he pointed that rifle in a threatening way at all three of his victims.  All three of them could have said that they were the ones acting in self-defense.  In fact, Huber and Grosskreutz were responding to Rittenhouse's killing of Rosenbaum; and so they thought they were trying to stop an active shooter.

Although there is disagreement over whether Rittenhouse was truly acting in self-defense, most people (with the exception of some Anabaptists) agree that we all have a right--perhaps even a natural right--to use lethal force in defense of our lives.  What I find most interesting about this is how it seems to confirm John Locke's claim that we all have the right to act as vigilantes in enforcing the law of nature, which includes the law against taking innocent life, whenever we cannot rely on the state to enforce the law; and thus we are thrown back into a state of nature, where we all have "the executive power of the law of nature," which includes the power to execute wrongdoers.

If we accept Max Weber's definition of the state as a public government of officials that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, then the state has never existed, because no state has ever had a complete monopoly of the use of force in enforcing the law and punishing violators.  

Every state must rely to some extent on the self-help of private individuals in enforcing vigilante justice.  That the state must accept killing in self-defense as justifiable homicide is the clearest and most dramatic manifestation of this.


THE GRADUAL (AND ALWAYS INCOMPLETE) EVOLUTION OF THE STATE'S PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

In the evolution of the state's enforcement of law, we can distinguish three eras: the stateless societies of the foraging era (beginning hundreds of thousands of years ago), the presumptive states of the agrarian era (beginning about 5,000 years ago), and the expansive states of the modern era (beginning about 200 years ago).  A good account of this history is the new book by Peter Baldwin--Command and Persuade: Crime, Law, and the State across History (MIT Press, 2021)--although he says almost nothing about the prehistoric foraging era of stateless societies.

Throughout most of human evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers, the only law was vigilante law, which was what Locke called the law of nature.  There was no state to make and enforce law and punish wrongdoers.  But each band of foragers was an ordered society that was governed by customary laws made and enforced by all the adults in the band making decisions by collective deliberation leading to consensus, in which some individuals were recognized as leaders, but no individual adult could command the obedience of any other individual without that individual's consent.  In this way, all adults were equal in their freedom from domination by others and in their freedom to live as they pleased so long as they did not harm others.  Those who did harm others were punished by the group.  The punishment ranged from gossip and ridicule to expulsion from the group or the ultimate punishment--execution.

We could call this vigilante law.  The English word "vigilante" originated in nineteenth-century America as the term for those who formed "vigilance committees" to make and enforce customary laws where enforcement by the state was either absent or unreliable.  For example, in the mining camps of the American West in the first half of the nineteenth century, law and order was provided by vigilance committees.

The latest archaeological evidence as surveyed by James Scott and others confirms that indeed through most of human evolutionary history, for hundreds of thousands of years, our ancestors lived in stateless societies in bands of hunter-gatherers.  For them, all justice was vigilante justice.

About 7,000 years ago, some people in Mesopotamia formed settled villages with farming and herding, but they still organized their social life without a state apparatus.   It was only about 5,000 years ago that the first states began to appear first in Mesopotamia.  Moreover, even after the emergence of states, most human beings continued to live outside the state as "barbarians."  At the time of Locke's birth in the seventeenth century, a majority of the human population around the world was probably living in stateless societies.

The evidence from those first states in ancient Mesopotamia shows a odd contradiction between their claims of absolute sovereignty and the reality of their severely limited powers.  For example, in their written legal codes, one can see what Seth Richardson has identified as "the curious absence of the state in the text." In the prologue and epilogue to Hammurabi's Code, Hammurabi claims absolute divinely granted authority over Babylonia.  But in the hundreds of laws in his code, there is almost no reference to himself or to the central state as providing judgment or enforcement of the law.  Most of the laws seem to assume private enforcement: when something goes wrong, the wronged party must act on his own with the help of local people to investigate, try, convict, and punish the guilty parties. 

What we see here is what Richardson has called the "presumptive state": the early states in Mesopotamia were presumptive in claiming a sovereignty that they did not in fact possess. Their rhetorical claims for absolute sovereignty have been mistakenly interpreted as evidence for the reality of Oriental Despotism.

Over the past 5,000 years, some states have expanded their power to rule through autocratic bureaucracies--for instance, China under the Song dynasty (960-1279).  But even the most powerful states have had to rely to some degree on law enforcement by private individuals acting through customary laws of vengeance and compensation.

Moreover, we should remember that over most of this period most of the human population around the world lived in "stateless" conditions.  They were, as James Scott has said (Against the Grain, pp. 219-20): "hunters and gatherers, marine collectors, horticulturalists, swiddeners, pastoralists, and a good many farmers who were not effectively governed or taxed by any state."  Most historians have denigrated and dismissed these people as "barbarians" who lived outside "civilization."

Beginning in the nineteenth century, some states began to extend their law enforcement power by inventing modern professional policing.  Previously, people had policed themselves.  Robert Peel founded the London police in 1829.  The English Reform Act of 1835 extended this system of policing to all municipal boroughs.  Boston established the first American police force in 1838.

Even today with modern state policing, most policing is by private individuals.  In the United States, there are three times as many private police as public police.  Even in statist China today, half of the police are privately employed.  That we must still rely so much on private governance shows that absolute statism--the state holding a complete monopoly of power--is impossible.

Peter Baldwin shows that throughout the history of law, for thousands of years, "justifiable homicide" has been a way for weak states to permit vigilante justice:

"Even as the authorities promulgated laws, much remained left to self-help. . . . In medieval common law, victims' widows and children personally dragged killers to the gallows, and a violated woman herself castrated and blinded the rapist.  Justifiable homicide is the polite fiction whereby a weak state agrees that certain killings are legitimate.  Ancient Greek and Roman law defined justified homicide expansively, as did most Western legal codes for the next two millennia.  A highwayman in the act, a robber using force, anyone stealing at night, someone robbing clothes at the public baths, a man having sex with another's wife, mother, sister, daughter, or concubine, a rapist of free-born women or boys: according to various codes, all could be justifiably killed on the spot.  The killer of a manifest felon would likely not be prosecuted in medieval England, or he would be protected against retaliation from the criminal's kin.  Someone burning down a house in medieval Iceland could be instantly killed in the act, as could trespassers.  Absent reliable intervention by the authorities, self-help remained the victim's most likely source of satisfaction" (48-49).


SELF-DEFENSE

Allowing homicide to be justified as self-defense shows that even the formidable power of executing wrongdoers cannot be monopolized by the state.  Locke explained the reasoning for this.  In the state of nature, hunter-gatherers adopted the customary law of nature that it was wrong to harm anyone by threatening their life, liberty, or property.  They also knew, however, that harming others was justified as punishment of those who violated the law of nature.  Consequently, any individual could rightly harm others--or even kill them--if this was necessary as self-defense against aggressive attacks (Second Treatise, secs. 6-11, 16-21).

And yet even if this was true in the state of nature, when people lived in stateless societies, we might think that once the state was established to make and enforce the law, private individuals could no longer claim a right to take the law into their own hands--to act as vigilantes.  But Locke argued that even when people are living under the rule of a state, there are circumstances that throw people back into a state of nature, so that, if only momentarily, they have the natural right to exercise the executive power of the law of nature in punishing those who threaten their life, liberty, or property, which includes the right to kill in self-defense.

Locke observed: "Want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge" (ST, sec. 19).  When a man aggressively attacks me, and there is no time to appeal to our common judge, then I have the liberty to kill that aggressor, because the law offers me no remedy for the irreparable harm that the aggressor might do to me.  By attacking me in circumstances where I cannot appeal for protection from the legal authorities, the aggressor has thrown us into a state of nature where I have a natural right to defend myself with lethal force.

To justly claim that natural right, however, I must satisfy some standards for the justifiable use of force in self-defense.  Brandon Oto has summarized the four main ideas as Ability, Opportunity, Jeopardy, and Preclusion (AOJP).

To rightly invoke your right to use deadly force in self-defense, you must show that you believed that your attacker had the ability to cause you serious harm.  If you thought he had a gun or other deadly weapon, that would have given him the ability.  Or if he was a very strong man, or even a trained fighter, that would have given him the ability to harm you.  But if your attacker was an unarmed woman, and you were a strong man, it would not be clear that she had the ability to inflict great harm on you.

You must also show that the attacker had the opportunity to harm you.  If he had a knife, but he was far away from you, you probably would not be justified in shooting him with a gun.  You have to show that he was right in front of you, and that he could have inflicted harm on you in a few seconds.

You must also show that you were in imminent jeopardy of being harmed.  Even if your attacker has threatened you, he might turn to walk away, and then you are no longer in imminent jeopardy.  Or even if he attacks you, but then he walks away, you cannot shoot him in the back.

Perhaps the most complex standard for justifying the use of force in self-defense is preclusion.  The idea is that you should use force only when the circumstances preclude you from choosing any alternatives to force, so that there are no other safe options.

One feature of the preclusion rule is the principle of proportionality: the kind and the the degree of force that you use against an aggressor must be in due proportion to the threat.  If a man punches you, you are not justified in shooting him, unless you believe that he is capable of killing you with his fists--perhaps he's a trained boxer--and shooting him is the only way to remove his threat.  Or if you're a battered wife, in fear of being killed by your husband, you might justify shooting him as your only safe option.

One form of the preclusion principle is the "duty to retreat."  You cannot rightly use force against an aggressor if you can easily run away and safely avoid a fight.  In the United States, 12 states impose a duty to retreat when one can do so with complete safety.  But in all of those states, the duty to retreat does not apply when someone is in his home and defending it against an intruder.  This is called the "castle doctrine," based on the maxim that "one's home is one's castle."  In some states, this castle doctrine is extended to apply to when a defender is in the defender's vehicle or place of work.  This is a partial exception to the preclusion rule.

Another kind of exception to the preclusion rule is the "stand-your-ground law."  In the U.S., 38 states have laws providing "that there is no duty to retreat from an attacker in any place in which one is lawfully present."  There has been intense debate about the wisdom of such laws.  One famous example is the killing of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman in Florida in 2012.  Martin was a 17-year-old African American.  Zimmerman was a 28-year-old Hispanic American.  Zimmerman was a volunteer for a community watch group patrolling a gated community in Sanford, Florida.  He thought Martin looked suspicious, and he reported him to the Sanford police.  Before the police arrived, Martin and Zimmerman had an altercation; and Zimmerman shot him dead.  Zimmerman convinced the police that he had killed in self-defense, and that this was justified by Florida's stand-your-ground law.  A year later, Zimmerman was acquitted of second degree murder and manslaughter.  Many people saw this as showing how a stand-your-ground law could encourage a "shoot-first" attitude in the minds of racist people acting under the pretense of self-defense.

Even though this illustrates the disagreement over the exact standards of self-defense, there does seem to be a universal--or nearly universal--acceptance of the natural right to self-defense in all legal systems, because this right is rooted in our natural human psychology shaped in our evolutionary history in the foraging state of nature.

There are, however, some possible exceptions to this.  Joyce Lee Malcolm has suggested (here and here) that while the natural right to self-defense was once generally recognized as one of the basic rights of Englishmen, England in recent decades has moved towards denying that right.  In England, the state has really insisted that the government has a complete monopoly on the justified use of force, so the the citizens of England are prohibited from using deadly force in self-defense.  Citizens are told that when they are attacked on the street, they are prohibited from using force against their attackers.  They should shout "Call the Police" rather than "Help."  And bystanders must not help them.  A few years ago, an English householder called the police when burglars broke into his home.  He held them with a toy gun that looked real.  When the police arrived, they arrested him for a firearms offence.

In 1999, Tony Martin, a 55-year-old man, was living alone in his farmhouse in rural England.  His house had been burgled many times, and he had complained that the police had refused to protect him.  One night, two burglars--29-year-old Brendon Fearon and 16-year-old Fred Barras--broke into his house.  They had many prior convictions for various crimes.  Martin shot at them with a shotgun.  Barras was killed.  Fearon was wounded.

Martin claimed that he shot in defense of himself and his home.  But amazingly, he was charged and convicted of murder.  Later, this was reduced to manslaughter.  He served three years in prison.  He had been denied parole, because he refused to express remorse for what he did.

Cases like this suggest that the English no longer have a right to self-defense.  But there also has been an intense public outcry in England against the injustice of these cases, which might indicate that they run contrary to our natural moral sense, which includes the moral intuition that all human beings have the natural right to use force in defense of their lives, their liberty, and their property: vigilante justice is natural justice.


THE TWO FACES OF VIGILANTISM

Vigilante justice is morally ambiguous, because it can serve either good or bad causes.  We can feel moral sympathy when we see the good face of vigilantism:  citizens in the nineteenth-century American West who enforced order in an otherwise lawless territory; Guardian Angels with red berets volunteering for safety patrols in high-crime neighborhoods; or people organizing to drive drug dealers out of their communities.  Many fictional vigilantes evoke the same sympathy--such as Robin Hood, Batman, or the Virginian.

But vigilantism also has an ugly face--as in the hate-filled mob justice of lynching in the American South, or in the long history of killing Jews in pogroms.

The jury in Kenosha will have to decide whether Rittenhouse was showing the good face or the ugly face of vigilante justice.

Friday, November 05, 2021

Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia?

Some years ago, I wrote some posts (here, here, and here) on how "Liberty Begins at Sumer."  Sumer was the earliest human civilization, located in southern Mesopotamia (now southern Iraq).  I was particularly interested in understanding why Pierre Goodrich adopted the cuneiform symbol for the Sumerian word amagi as the logo for the Liberty Fund--the first word in the oldest written language for "liberty."  I suggested that recent archaeological studies of ancient Mesopotamian history confirm Goodrich's insight that here we can find the first written evidence for the human struggle for liberty in the rebellion against autocratic government over 5,000 years ago.  

Recently, I have been thinking more about this after reading David Stasavage's claim in The Decline and Rise of Democracy that democracy began in Sumer and elsewhere in Mesopotamia.  If democracy in its broadest sense means political rule by consent of the people, then democracy began long before Sumer among our prehistoric hunter-gatherer ancestors living in stateless societies.  But in Sumer, we see the emergence of the first "states"--such as the city-state of Uruk, where a city wall was first built around 3,200 BCE--and so here we can look for evidence of how democracy might have first emerged in a society with a specialized state apparatus (with a royal bureaucracy, military, and priestly class).  If there is such evidence, that would indicate that the formation of states did not extinguish the natural desire for democratic liberty that had evolved among prehistoric hunter-gatherers. 


IS IT DEMOCRACY VERSUS AUTOCRACY?

In 1943, Thorkild Jacobsen--a famous Assyriologist at the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago--wrote an article on "Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia."  Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, European archaeologists had led excavations in the Near East that uncovered evidence for the emergence of the first human civilizations--with the first cities, the first writing systems, the first religious temples, and the first bureaucratic states--in the ancient Near East over 5,000 years ago.  The monumental architecture and the written records displayed the grand power of kings ruling with absolute and divine authority, which seemed to confirm what the ancient Greeks had said about the "Oriental Despotism" of the East as the powerful alternative to the freedom-loving world of the Greek polis.  But Jacobsen challenged this old story of Western freedom versus Eastern despotism by arguing that prehistoric Mesopotamia had a tradition of democratic governance that had left some traces even in the autocratic kingdoms of historic Mesopotamia.

Jacobsen assumed a simple dichotomous taxonomy of political regimes--democracy or autocracy.  He defined democracy according to the original Athenian conception of democracy as the regime in which a large portion of the community--the free adult male citizens--consent to all the major decisions, exercise supreme judicial authority, and consent to rulers and magistrates.  He defined autocracy as any form of governance that concentrates power in a single individual and those he appoints to carry out his will.

The ancient Greeks who invented the word democracy (democratia) distinguished three forms of government based on the rule of one, few, or many, corresponding to kingship, oligarchy, or democracy.  Oligarchy was rule by a council of aristocrats or nobles.  Democracy was rule by an assembly open to the great multitude of the people (the demos), or at least the free adult male citizens, which was a large group but still a minority of the whole population of a polis.

By contrast, Jacobsen thought that oligarchy merged into democracy insofar as both were forms of collective governance as opposed to autocracy.  Even in a democracy, those of high status or seniority (the elders, the wealthy, or the nobles) will often fill the councils of governance, but these councils will sometimes have to have the approval of popular assemblies.  So what Jacobsen calls democracy might be identified as what Aristotle called the "mixed regime," which combined aristocratic and democratic elements.

Stasavage agrees with this, and he points out that classical scholars have recognized that in ancient Greece, "all polis constitutions were mixed" (Hansen and Nielsen 2004:84).  Most oligarchies had both an assembly of the people to which all citizens had access and an oligarchic council to which only the wealthiest citizens had access (Hansen 2006:112).  Some Greek historians (like Thucydides) and philosophers (like Aristotle) identified the balanced mixture of the few and the many as the best regime.

I should add here, however, that there is a good argument for Clifford Bates's claim that the best regime for Aristotle is actually limited democracy--democracy restrained by the rule of law.  All regimes are imperfect, Aristotle suggests, but democracy constrained by law is the least imperfect (Bates 2003).  Bates's book was originally a dissertation at Northern Illinois University that I supervised.

It might seem odd to look for democracy in ancient Mesopotamia, where the monarchic rulers identified themselves as kings with ultimate authority conferred on them by the gods; and so one might think they did not need the consent of their people to their rule.  But if one reads the legal and political documents from ancient Mesopotamia, it is clear that the ruler needed the cooperation of his people for the proper functioning of the state (Van De Mieroop 2017).  He needed soldiers to fight for him.  He needed laborers to work for him.  He needed taxpayers to provide revenue for him.  He needed judges to adjudicate legal disputes.  He also needed his people not to run away from or revolt against his state.  (In fact, as I have indicated in previous posts, over 3,000 years of Mesopotamian political life, there were hundreds of rebellions.)

And, sometimes, the king needed his people to meet in an "assembly" (unkin in Sumerian, puhrim in Akkadian) to consent to public policies.  For example, in the Laws of Hammurabi, which was compiled sometime around 1750 BC by the king of Babylon, it is said that if a judge unjustly overturns a judgment, "they shall unseat him from his judgeship in the assembly, and he shall never again sit in judgement with the judges" (Roth 1997, LH, para. 5).  One form of punishment for a criminal is that "he shall be flogged in the public assembly with 60 stripes of an ox whip" (LH, para. 202).

Jacobsen thought that these public assemblies in the historic Mesopotamian city-states were vestiges of a prehistoric Mesopotamian democracy in which popular assemblies had exercised the ultimate authority of the people to consent to governance, although gradually the government of Mesopotamia had moved from democracy to autocracy.  He offered four kinds of evidence for this.

First,  many Mesopotamian documents indicate that the adjudication of legal disputes, both civil and criminal, was carried out by each city or "town" (alum in Akkadian), and often the word "assembly" was equivalent to the "town," suggesting that the citizenry of each town had the authority to adjudicate cases. That this was open to the citizenry at large is implied by a Babylonian proverb that Jacobsen quotes:

"Do not go to stand in the assembly;

"Do not stray to the very place of strife.

"It is precisely in strife that fate may overtake you;

"Besides, you may be made a witness for them

"So that they take you along to testify in a lawsuit not your own" (Jacobsen 1943:164).

Here is seems that anyone who passes by an assembly could join it and participate in its legal process.

As we have seen, the Legal Code of Hammurabi assumes that the "assembly" will exercise judicial authority.  In previous posts on "The Lockean Social Contract in Ancient Mesopotamia," I have written about Seth Richardson's observation that Hammurabi's Code shows the "presumptive state"--that is, Hammurabi presumes in his code that he has absolute authority to make and enforce laws, but when you read through the laws, you notice that there are few references to the king; and so it seems that the actual exercise of legal power depends upon the people in each city.  The king's rhetorical presumption of absolute autocratic power is contradicted by the reality of popular assemblies exercising the real governing power.

So here we see within the presumptively autocratic state, Jacobsen suggests, a survival of the older traditions of popular rule that dominated the early stateless democracies in Mesopotamia before the emergence of states.

Jacobsen points to a second kind of evidence for the primacy of popular assemblies in prehistoric Mesopotamia in some of the epic tales about Gilgamesh.  The "Epic of Gilgamesh" in Akkadian is the most famous of those stories, which many of us read in college as the first assigned reading in our "world literature" class.  But there also are five Sumerian stories of Gilgamesh, one of which can be entitled "Gilgamesh and Agga."  

The Story of "Gilgamesh and Agga" in the Sulaymaniyah Museum, in the Kurdish Region of Iraq


Gilgamesh was a king of Uruk, who probably ruled sometime between 2900 BC and 2350 BC, although some scholars wonder whether he was a purely mythical creation.  "Gilgamesh and Agga" relates a story about the conflict between Gilgamesh as king of Uruk (or Erech) and Agga as the king of Kish (Kramer 1949).  The envoys of Agga to Gilgamesh ordered him to surrender Uruk to the rule of Agga.  In response, Gilgamesh convened "the assembly of the elders," and he proposed to them: "Let us not submit to the house of Kish, let us smite it with weapons."  But the elders rejected his proposal, saying "Let us submit to the house of Kish, let us not smite it with weapons."  Refusing to accept this advice from the elders, Gilgamesh convened the "assembly of the men of his city," and again he proposed: "Do not submit to the house of Kish, let us smite it with weapons."  This popular assembly agreed with him, and he was pleased: "At the word of the men of his city, his heart rejoiced, his spirit brightened."

Gilgamesh ordered his soldiers to go to battle, and Agga besieged Uruk.  The account of subsequent events is somewhat unclear, but apparently Agga was finally persuaded to lift the siege, and Uruk was not conquered.

In History Begins at Sumer: Thirty-Nine Firsts in Recorded History, famous Sumerologist Samuel Noah Kramer identified this as the story of "The First Bicameral Congress."  Here he saw the Sumerians taking the first steps towards democratic government in which the power of kings was restrained by popular political assemblies.  Like the American Congress, there were two "houses": a "senate" or assembly of elders and a "lower house" or assembly of arms-bearing male citizens.  So Kramer agreed  with Jacobsen in seeing this as evidence for "primitive democracy" in Mesopotamia.  (For the scholarly debate over the interpretation of the "Gilgamesh and Agga" story, see Ridley 2000.)

It was probably because Pierre Goodrich had read Kramer's book that Goodrich decided to put the name of Gilgamesh at the beginning of his history of liberty on the walls of the Goodrich Seminar Room at Wabash College.  (I have written about this in my post on "Amagi: Mesopotamian Liberty in the Goodrich Seminar Room.")  

Jacobsen's third piece of evidence for a prehistoric tradition of Mesopotamian democracy came from the Enuma Elish (named for the first words of the poem "When above"), the Babylonian Creation Myth, and the primary source for Sumerian cosmology (Heidel 1952).  The Enuma Elish was probably first composed during the reign of Hammurabi (1810-1750 BC).  Hammurabi extended Babylonian rule over almost all of Mesopotamia.  This Babylonian dominance of Mesopotamia included spreading the worship of Marduk, the supreme god of the Babylonians.  The Enuma Elish tells the story of how Marduk became the ruler of the gods, which might have provided cosmological justification for Babylonian dominance.

Hammurabi Receiving His Royal Insignia from Marduk (or Shamash), The Relief on the Top Part of the Stele of Hammurabi's Laws, Held in the Louvre in Paris


Since the Sumerians and the Akkadians depicted their gods as human-like in living a life like that of human beings, and thus the stories of the world of the gods were a projection of the human world, Jacobsen inferred that the political life of the gods should be an image of the earliest political life of the Mesopotamians.   He found it significant, therefore, that the political order of the gods looked democratic.

Enuma Elish refers many times to an "assembly of all the gods."  The word "assembly" (puhrum) is used 26 times (see Heidel 1952, I, 55, 146, 151-52; II, 33, 38-39, 125-26; III, 37, 43, 60-61, 95, 100-101, 118-19, 131-32; IV, 15; VI, 86, 162, 165; VII, 13, 37). Before the assembly, the gods sit down to a sumptuous meal with wine and beer, much like the lavish banquets that some Mesopotamians enjoyed.  Once the banquet is over, they talk about whatever it is they must decide.

Enuma Elish tells the story of how the assembly of the gods met to decide how to handle the danger from Tiamat, the goddess of the primeval waters, who was planning war against them.  The young god Marduk offered to lead them in war if they would give him absolute authority as their war leader.  After deliberating, the assembly agreed to this, and Marduk became the war leader of the gods.

Jacobsen observed that not only could the assembly grant kingly authority, it could also revoke it.  Kings were given a "term" (bala) of office, a limited period of rule.  One city and its god could rule over Mesopotamia for a time, but then it could be overthrown by another city and its god.  Texts such as the Lamentation over the Destruction of Ur would then tell the story of how the assembly of the gods had decided that a ruling city and its god had reached the end of its term.

Jacobsen saw this as a projection in religious myth of how popular assemblies in prehistoric Mesopotamia had originally appointed kings to rule over the people of a city, particularly in time of war when they needed a military leader. 

To reinforce this claim that the political order of prehistoric Mesopotamia was democratic, Jacobsen made a fourth argument--that this same kind of primitive democracy could be found in the earliest societies of people around the world.  To illustrate this in the early history of Western Europe, Jacobsen (1943:172) quoted two statements by W. J. Shepard:

"Among all the primitive peoples of the West, there seems to have been some kind of popular assembly which shared with the tribal chief or king and with a council of lesser chieftains the powers of social control."

"The significant political institutions of the primitive Teutonic tribes who overran Western Europe were a folkmoot, or meeting of all the adult males bearing arms; a council of elders; and in time of war a war leader or chieftain.  All important questions, such as peace and war, were decided by the folkmoot.  The council of elders prepared questions to be submitted to the folkmoot and decided minor matters.  It was a rude form of democracy in which government was not differentiated nor law clearly distinguished from religious or social custom."

As I have indicated in a previous post, Stasavage has added to these empirical findings by showing that some form of democratic council governance has been widespread in human societies throughout history.  Using data from the Standard Cross Cultural Sample of 186 societies that were representative of the best described societies for specific geographic areas, Stasavage found that for most of these societies there was some council governance, either at the local level or at the level of a central authority (Stasavage 2020; Ahmed and Stasavage 2020).  He also found, however, that autocratic political executives could sometimes develop rule by bureaucracy as a substitute for shared rule with a council.

So in ancient Mesopotamia, as in all of human history, democracy is natural but not inevitable, as human beings move between the two poles of democracy and autocracy.  Another way to think about this is to say that all governmental rule depends ultimately on the support of a "minimal winning coalition," and in an autocracy, that coalition is very small, while in a democracy, it is large.

Do we see this same choice today in the emerging geopolitical struggle between American democracy and Chinese autocracy for hegemony?


REFERENCES

Ahmed, Ali T., and David Stasavage. 2020. "Origins of Early Democracy." American Political Science Review 114:502-518.

Bates, Clifford. 2003. Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Hansen, Mogens Herman. 2006. Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hansen, Mogens Herman, and Thomas H. Nielsen. 2004.  An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidel, Alexander. 1952. The Babylonian Genesis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jacobsen, Thorkild. 1943. "Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 2:159-72.

Kramer, Samuel Noah. 1949. "Gilgamesh and Agga." American Journal of Archaeology 53:1-18.

Kramer, Samuel Noah. 1956. History Begins at Sumer: Thirty-Nine Firsts in Recorded History. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ridley, Ronald T. 2000. "The Saga of an Epic: Gilgamesh and the Constitution of Uruk." Orientalia 69:341-367.

Roth, Martha T. 1997. Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. 2nd edition. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.

Stasavage, David. 2020. The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Van De Mieroop, Marc. 2017. "Democracy and the Rule of Law, the Assembly, and the First Law Code." In Harriet Crawford, ed., The Sumerian World, 277-89.  London: Routledge.

Monday, October 18, 2021

Divine Revelation in "The Last Duel"--The Book and the Movie

 

                                                         Movie Trailer for "The Last Duel" 


The new movie The Last Duel has had its first general theatre release this past weekend.  It is a historical drama based on a book with the same name by Eric Jager.  It's about the last legal trial by combat in France in 1386.    

The film stars Matt Damon as Jean de Carrouges, a knight who challenges Jacques Le Gris (played by Adam Driver) to a legal duel after Carrouges's wife, Marguerite (played by Jodie Comer), accuses Le Gris of raping her.  Ben Affleck stars as Count Pierre d'Alencon, the lord to whom Carrouges and Le Gris are pledged as vassals.  The Director is Ridley Scott.

In the Middle Ages, in legal cases where it was difficult for the courts to reach a decision, one of the parties in the dispute could challenge the other to a duel, in which God would intervene to allow the innocent party to kill the guilty party, who would be condemned to eternal damnation.  In this case, Carrouges was fighting as the champion of his wife, so that if he were killed, this would show God's judgment that both he and his wife were guilty of lying under oath, and Marguerite would be immediately stripped naked and burned at the stake.  Both of their souls would be eternally punished in Hell, while Le Gris's soul would win eternal reward in Heaven.

The screenplay for the movie was written by Damon, Affleck, and Nicole Holofcener.  The screenplay follows closely Jager's book The Last Duel: A True Story of Crime, Scandal, and Trial by Combat (2004).  Jager is a professor of English at UCLA who specializes in medieval literature.  Once he became fascinated by the story, he spent ten years researching and writing the book.  His research is meticulous, which required archival research in France and elsewhere.  Almost every detail in his book is supported by citations of his sources in the notes to the book.  But unlike most such works of historical scholarship, the book has such a vivid narrative style that it reads like a novel.

The movie is very good.  But as we often say, the book is better than the movie.  Most importantly, the book is better in provoking us to think about the religious beliefs that drive the drama of this story.  In at least one scene, however, where the movie's script follows the exact words of the book, the movie does force the audience to wonder about the religious beliefs of these people.

Here's how the book relates Le Gris's last words, after a long brutal fight in the enclosed field for judicial combat, just before Carrouges kills him:

"As the two men struggled, and the huge crowd watched the spectacle in fascinated horror, Carrouges began shouting at Le Gris.  His voice was muffled by his visor, but the nearest spectators could make out his words:

"'Confess!  Confess your crime!'"

"Le Gris shook his head even more violently, as if refusing to admit his guilt even as he resisted the knight's efforts to unlock his visor."

Finally, Carrouges broke the lock, and the visor sprang open, exposing Le Gris's face.

"Le Gris blinked at the light and at his enemy's visored face, which hovered just a few inches away."

"Carrouges drew his dagger, again shouting: 'Confess!'"

"Le Gris, pinned down by the relentless knight, shouted back, trying to make himself heard by all at the field:

"'In the name of God, and on the peril and damnation of my soul, I am innocent of the crime!'"

"'Then be you damned!' cried the knight" (178-79). 

Carrouges then plunged his dagger into Le Gris's throat and mouth up to his brain.

It is almost unbelievable that a man like Le Gris would have had the will and the strength to shout his sacred oath of innocence in these circumstances, because, according to the religious beliefs of the time, if he were really guilty, refusing to confess his guilt before he died would condemn his soul to eternal damnation.

Did Le Gris, Carrouges, and Marguerite really believe what they were professing about God's revelation of his eternal judgment of guilt and innocence?  Did God in fact miraculously intervene to give Carrouges the strength and skill to defeat Le Gris and thus show the innocence of Carrouges and Marguerite and Le Gris's guilt?  If God did this, how would anyone know this to be true?  Would it depend on whether we thought the evidence supported the case of Carrouges and Marguerite?  It was said that Carrouges was sick with a fever when he entered the combat, and Le Gris was healthier and stronger.  If so, does that suggest that only divine intervention could have given Carrouges the ability to prevail?

"Does he truly believe his innocence at the end?" Affleck said of Le Gris in an interview for the Los Angeles Times.  "They took the idea of damnation seriously.  They were very religious.  That was at the root of everything.  And that's one of the things we didn't focus as much on: They truly believed God would make happen whatever was the fair thing to happen, so it would be God's will.  And for him to have to invoke that at the moment of his death and to protest his innocence is interesting." 

If religious belief was "at the root of everything" in this story, then Jager's book really is better than the movie because the book says a lot about the religious beliefs in medieval France, even though Jager clearly suggests that he does not himself share those beliefs, and even though his historical narrative gives us reasons to believe that there was no Revelation of God's will in such a way as to resolve any of the moral and political problems of medieval France.


THE FAILURE OF REVELATION?

Jager draws our attention to the fact that in medieval Europe, there was no Revelation of God's truth to resolve the many conflicts in the religious communities.  By the fourteenth century, Christendom had faced the Muslim threat for more than six hundred years.  Ten years after surviving his duel, Carrouges was killed in 1396 while fighting in the Last Crusade against the Ottoman Turks in the city of Nicopolis, in present-day Bulgaria.  Both Christians and Muslims believed that they were defending the true Revelation against the infidels.  Either there was no Revelation, or there was, but it was not clear enough to settle this dispute.  

Christianity was even at war with itself over conflicting interpretations of Revelation.  From 1378 to 1417, Christendom was divided into warring camps led first by two rival popes (in Rome and Avignon) and then by three popes (with a third pope in Pisa).  Previously, in 1054, there was a split between Western Christianity and Eastern Christianity, which is today the separation of the Catholic Church from the Eastern Orthodox Churches.  And, of course, in the 16th century, the Protestant churches would split off.  

These disagreements over Revelation threw Medieval Christian societies into violent conflict.  For example, in 1339 the English invaded France, initiating what came to be known as the Hundred Years War, in which Carrouges and Le Gris fought on the side of France.  By 1378, the Roman pope was blessing England's war of conquest in France, while the Avignon pope was blessing the French against the English.  This led to many atrocities, such as the English raid on Brittany in 1380, during which the English attacked a convent, raping and torturing the nuns.

Jesus prayed to God that all believers would be as one, that they would come to complete unity, "so that the world may believe that you have sent me" (John 17:21).  It seems then that Christians could give witness to the truth of Revelation by showing their agreement about that Revelation.

But in fact Christians have never achieved that goal of Christian unity in their interpretation of Revelation.  Previously, I have written about the failure of Revelation to bring Christian unity in the debate over creation and evolution.  As I indicated, there are three possible explanations for this.  Either there has been no Revelation of God's teaching.  Or there has been a Revelation, but it is so obscure that it conveys no clear teaching.  Or there has been a clear Revelation of that teaching, but human beings have been so blinded by biased thinking that they cannot see it.


CAN WE KNOW THE TRUTH BY REASON ALONE?

If we cannot rely on God's Revelation of the truth, perhaps through a divine judgment revealed in a trial by combat, then we must rely on our human reason to search for the truth.  To decide whether Marguerite was telling the truth about Le Gris raping her, we must use our reason in examining the evidence to decide whether it is probable or not that she was telling the truth.

But can we trust reason without Revelation to lead us to the truth?  Some Christian philosophers like Alvin Plantinga would say no, because we must accept at least one revealed truth--that God has created the human mind in His image--if we are to trust our minds.  If we embrace Naturalism--the view that nothing exists except Nature, and so there is no God or nothing like God--we are caught in self-contradiction: if human thought originated not from a divine Mind but from the irrational causes of Nature, then we cannot trust our minds as reliable, and thus we cannot trust our belief in Naturalism. Naturalism destroys itself by destroying the rationality of believing in Naturalism, or anything else.

As I have previously argued, however, the weak link in Plantinga's argument for metaphysical naturalism as self-defeating is his assumption that adaptive behavior is completely unrelated to true belief. The evidence of evolutionary history suggests that evolution produces cognitive faculties that are reliable but fallible. The mental abilities of animals, including human beings, are fallible because evolution produces adaptations that are good enough but not perfect, and this results in the mental fallibility that is familiar to us.  But despite this fallibility, the mental faculties cannot be absolutely unreliable. Even Plantinga concedes (in his debate with Daniel Dennett) that in the evolution of animals, "adaptive behavior requires accurate indicators."

In the case of judging criminal guilt or innocence, we must rely on our evolved adaptations for detecting and punishing cheaters.  As Morris Hoffman has said, "evolution built us to punish cheaters."

But even if that evolved capacity for judgment in criminal cases is reliable, it is not infallible; and in a case like Marguerite's accusation of rape, there can be disagreement over what counts as the truth.  Le Gris's lawyer--Jean Le Coq--kept a private journal where he wrote out his thoughts about the case.  At one point, he wrote: "No one really knew the truth of the matter."

The movie is divided into three chapters, suggesting three different points of view.  The first chapter is entitled "The Truth According to Jean de Carrouges."  The second chapter is "The Truth According to Jacques Le Gris."  The third is "The Truth According to Marguerite de Carrouges."  So there was a different truth for each of these three people.  And yet, immediately after the title for the third chapter has faded from the movie screen, "The Truth" is flashed on the screen.  So the script writers want the audience to see that there really is only one truth, and it's Margarite's.  

This third chapter of the movie was written by Nicole Holofcener, who invented many details for her story that are not found in Jager's book, which allowed her to turn this into a modern "Me Too" story of how women suffer from the patriarchal oppression of men.  Actually, Damon and Affleck allowed Holofcener to push the entire movie towards this theme.

When Jager has been asked about the historical accuracy of Holofcener's writing, he has said that it is at least 75% accurate.  Most importantly, he agrees with her conclusion that the evidence in the case favors Marguerite's story as most likely true.

In his book, Jager makes four arguments for why we should be persuaded by Marguerite's accusations.  First, some people have suggested that even if she was raped, she might have been mistaken in identifying Le Gris as the rapist.  Marguerite had met Le Gris only once, a little over a year before the night of the rape.  So she may have had only a vague memory of what he looked like.  And if she did not have a clear view of the rapist's face, she might have mistakenly thought the rapist looked like Le Gris.  But as Jager observes, this is implausible.  Marguerite swore in court that two men were responsible for her rape, and that she had a clear view of both men.  She said that Adam Louvel--a friend of Le Gris--helped Le Gris in holding her down on her bed, while Le Gris raped her.  She also said that Louvel was the first one to appear at her door, and that he specifically mentioned Le Gris by name before Le Gris entered her room.  This makes it highly unlikely that she was mistaken in identifying both men.

Jager's second argument concerns the story that sometime after Carrouges won his duel, a man later confessed to being Marguerite's rapist, which vindicated Le Gris's innocence.  Jager points out the implausibility of this considering that Marguerite had accused two men as responsible for her rape.

Jager's third argument responds to the claim that Marguerite knowingly lied in accusing Le Gris, either because she was trying to cover up her adultery, or because Carrouges forced her to fabricate this lie to get vengeance against a man he hated.  This was the claim made by Le Gris in his testimony.  Jager notes the obvious problem with this:  if she was lying, why did she include Adam Louvel in her charges?  Why would she add to her burden of proof by including Louvel in her charges?  If either Louvel or Le Gris had a good alibi, that would deny her story.

Jager's fourth argument is his strongest.  It is hard to come up with any good motivation for Marguerite to lie given that she had very little to gain from this and everything to lose.  She knew that if it was decided that she was lying, she would be executed; and according to her religious beliefs, her soul would be condemned to eternal punishment by God.  Surely the risk of such punishment would have deterred her from falsely charging Le Gris with rape.

There is another complicating factor in this case that I have not yet mentioned.  Marguerite and Carrouges had tried without success for five years to conceive a child.  But when Marguerite and Carrouges appealed their case to the Parlement of Paris, she was pregnant.  She had told Carrouges that she was pregnant at the same time that she told him about the rape, four days after it had occurred on January 18, 1386.  Jager judges that the child was born sometime between early September, nine months after Carrouges had returned from fighting in Scotland, and the middle of October, nine months after the rape.  The duel occurred on December 29, 1386.

Had she been impregnated by Carrouges or by Le Gris?  According to medieval law, if Le Gris was the father, that would prove that he did not rape her, because Galen had taught that sexual intercourse could not cause a pregnancy unless the woman's "seed" was produced by her orgasm; and if she had an orgasm that showed that she was not raped because she had enjoyed the coitus.

Now we know that if a rapist impregnates his victim, that does not show that she felt sexual pleasure, because a woman's orgasm is not required for ovulation.  This should be known by common-sense experience as much as by science, since many women have been fertile without experiencing orgasm.

It seems unlikely, however, that Marguerite was impregnated by Le Gris only four days before she told Carrouges that she was pregnant.

For all of these reasons, we can conclude that it is highly probable that Marguerite was telling the truth about her being raped by Le Gris.  We can reach this conclusion by using our reason to examine the evidence and then to logically draw inferences from that evidence.  Even if this is not a demonstrative proof, it is a probable truth beyond a reasonable doubt.

We can do this by reason alone without any need to appeal to some Revelation of the truth by God through trial by battle or some other means.  We can see this, beginning in the early modern period of European history, as European legal systems shifted to relying on judges and juries to decide legal disputes, which provided an alternative to oaths, ordeals, combat, and other appeals to divine intervention.  Thus did the state take over the role first played by God.

Wednesday, October 13, 2021

The Evolution of Democracy is Natural But Not Inevitable: Locke and Sagard on the Huron in the State of Nature

To explain the history of democracy, it is often said that it was invented in ancient Athens.  After it died out in ancient Greece and Rome, democracy vanished from Europe for over a thousand years.  It then reemerged in early modern Europe, in some of the Italian city republics and in England.  In England and the United States, it eventually evolved into the modern form of democracy with competitive elections and universal suffrage.  This modern democracy then spread around the world. 

In The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today (2020), David Stasavage denies this story by arguing that democracy did not need to be invented by Europeans because it has arisen naturally in human societies throughout the world over thousands of years.  This became clear, Stasavage observes, when Europeans first explored the Americas and discovered that some of the native Americans were living in democratic political systems.  For example, in North America, the French saw that the Huron Confederacy was ruled by a system of councils with broad popular participation.  In Mesoamerica, the Spanish discovered that the people of Tlaxcala were ruled by what looked like a democratic republic that had resisted conquest by the Aztec Empire.

The Huron and Tlaxcala illustrate how democracy has evolved naturally throughout history around the world: whenever the circumstances are such that those trying to rule over a society are compelled to seek the consent of the people they govern, then democratic practices are likely to arise.  Stasavage admits, however, that this is not inevitable, because whenever the circumstances are such that rulers can govern a society through a state bureaucracy without the direct consent of the people, then autocratic institutions are likely to arise.  In the Americas, the Aztec and Inca Empires were illustrations of such autocracy.  So autocracy is also natural but not inevitable.

Stasavage thinks that all governments depend either directly or indirectly on the consent of the governed.  But that consent can be either the express consent of the people through some kind of popular council or assembly in a democracy, or it can be the tacit consent of the people to an autocracy by their not revolting against it. 

In contrast to the early forms of democracy that have arisen in many regions of the world throughout history, Stasavage contends that modern democracy--with representatives chosen in competitive elections with universal suffrage--is a European invention that arose from the particular historical circumstances of modern Europe that led eventually to modern democracy in England and the United States.

I find most of Stasavage's reasoning persuasive.  And yet I would put more emphasis than he does on two points--that democracy first arose among our earliest hunter-gatherer ancestors, and that the political ideas of thinkers like John Locke have been crucial for the history of democracy.


DEMOCRACY IN HUNTER-GATHERER BANDS

In only one sentence (p. 34), Stasavage mentions the possibility that some form of democracy appeared among early hunter-gatherer societies.  In fact, that would explain why democracy is natural for human societies, because it arose in our earliest evolutionary history in Paleolithic hunter-gatherer bands, so that it is part of our genetically evolved human nature.

This might seem odd if we identify foraging bands as anarchistic societies, because being "stateless societies" (as anthropologists call them), they seem to lack any governmental rule at all.  But as I have argued in a previous post, if "anarchy" is taken in its literal sense of "no rule" or "no governance," then foraging societies are not anarchic, because they do have some form of governance, even if the governance is informal, fluctuating, and decentralized.  Pure anarchy is a fiction, because no human society can endure as a social order without some governance.

Some anarchist theorists have implicitly conceded this point.  For example, the best history of anarchist thinkers and movements is Peter Marshall's Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (2010).  Anarchists begin by distinguishing between society and the state, he indicates, and then they argue that a society can be a self-regulating order of governance without a state.  He writes: "Pure anarchy probably never existed.  Stateless societies and peasant societies employ sanctions of approval and disapproval, the offer of reciprocity, and the threat of its withdrawal, as instruments of social control.  But modern anthropology confirms that in organic or 'primitive' societies, there is a limited concentration of force.  If authority exists, it is delegated and rarely imposed, and in many societies no relation of command and obedience is in force" (12).

If the minimal requirement for a democracy is having the people of a society actively consenting to their governance, then a stateless society of a foraging band in which the people employ "sanctions of approval and disapproval" to control their leaders so that there is "no relation of command and obedience" would seem to be democratic.

I have written about how John Locke saw this in the state of nature in America from his reading of Jose de Acosta's report in his Natural and Moral History of the Indies.  In the Second Treatise (par. 102), Locke quoted Acosta's claim that in America there were many societies with "no government at all" and "no kings," but with "captains" or "chiefs" that the people chose to lead them when they needed leadership in war or peace.  

It seems confusing or even self-contradictory to say that while there was "no government at all," the people chose those who governed them.  But there's no contradiction if we understand "no government" to mean no centralized bureaucratic state in a hunter-gatherer society that does have some governance by leaders chosen by the people and a system of customary laws enforced by public approval and disapproval.

This is the first of three levels in the history of government that Acosta saw in America.  Acosta assumed that the first settlers in America who crossed over from Asia to North America lived in hunter-gatherer societies (Acosta 380-81).

The second stage came later in history when some groups lived in "free associations or communities, where the people are governed by the advice of many, and are like councils.  In time of war, these elect a captain who is obeyed by a whole tribe or province.  In time of peace, each town or group of folk rules itself, and each has some prominent men whom the mass of the people respect; and at most some of these join together on matters that seem important to them to see what they ought to do" (359).

Acosta's third stage is that of autocratic monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good."  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as beasts and treated themselves as gods (346, 359, 402).

In some passages of his book, Acosta combines the first two stages and suggests that even the most primitive hunter-gatherers had some informal leadership by which prominent people could mediate disputes and lead them in war, but always constrained by the informal consent or resistance of the community.  The one passage quoted by Locke is an example of this, as though Locke figured out that even primitive foragers would have some episodic and informal structure of rule in which some individuals would have more influence than others, although excessive dominance would be checked by popular resistance.

In other words, politics is constant in all human societies, in that some individuals will be politically ambitious in seeking the support of others in becoming leaders, and there will be political rivalry in the competition for positions of leadership.  The many other individuals who do not wish to rule will defer to those who lead them, but they will also resist oppressive dominance by their leaders.  Human beings really are political animals by nature.

Acosta's three levels of political order corresponds at least roughly to what some modern political anthropologists have identified as a four-leveled typology of preindustrial political systems: band, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Flannery and Marcus 2012; Service 1971; Lewellen 2003:15-41).  In bands and tribes, political power is decentralized and egalitarian.  In chiefdoms and states, political power is centralized and inegalitarian.  In bands, people live by hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants.  In tribes, people continue hunting and gathering, but they are also horticulturalists who engage in some small-scale farming of domesticated plants and pastoralists who herd some domesticated animals.

Locke identified both bands and tribes as societies in the state of nature, because people in these societies are naturally free and equal in that all adult individuals are free from any coercive subordination to anyone else.  They live by customary rules of good conduct, and each individual has the right to enforce those rules by punishing those who violate them.  No adult individual feels compelled to take orders from anyone else, although people will voluntarily consent to informal and situational leaders.


DEMOCRACY IN HORTICULTURAL TRIBES

One of Locke's sources for information about tribal societies in America was Gabriel Sagard's Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons, which was first published in French in 1632.  Locke bought this book during his stay in France, 1675 to 1679.  His notes on the book date from 1679, when he had returned to England, in the midst of the Exclusion Crisis.  Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, was leading those members of Parliament who wanted to exclude James, the Duke of York, from inheriting the throne from his brother King Charles II, because James was a Catholic; and Shaftesbury's group feared that a Catholic king of England would promote the royal absolutism of the French Catholic monarchy.  Locke was associated with Shaftesbury and his group, which would become the Whig party.  Their opponents would become the Tory party.  According to Peter Laslett, Locke began writing his Two Treatises on Government in 1679, in response to the Exclusion Crisis, although it would not be published until after the Revolution of 1688.

In Locke's notebook, his notes on Sagard are under the heading Immitanda, indicating that Locke regarded Huron society as worthy of being imitated.  And, indeed, much of what Locke says about the state of nature as the original condition of humanity was shaped by his reading of Sagard (Talbot 2010: 27-44).

In 1610, the French exploring Canada began to visit the four confederated Iroquoian-speaking tribes they called the Huron, who called themselves the Wendat.  The French found their settlements scattered across a peninsula located between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe northwest of Lake Ontario.  Some of these settlements had as many as 2,000 people.  The total population for about twenty settlements was about 30,000.  The larger settlements were surrounded by palisades to protect them from attack, because the Huron Confederacy was often at war with the Iroquois Confederacy of five tribes settled south of Lake Ontario.  The Huron were a horticultural society based primarily on the cultivation of corn, but also beans and squash.  The women did most of the farming work.  The adult men brought in other food from hunting, gathering, and fishing.  The men were also warriors who took pride in their courageous fighting against the Iroquois.  The men also engaged in extensive trading networks.  Political alliances were built around trading relations.

The French descriptions of Huron culture are found mostly in three sources.  The first was Samuel de Champlain's account of his visit to the Huron between may 1615 and May 1616.  Champlain was an explorer, a soldier, a cartographer, and a trader who worked for trading companies involved in the valuable fur trade.  He supervised the development of the French colony along the Saint Lawrence River.  

The second source was Sagard.  He was a lay brother of the Recollects, who were a branch of the Franciscan order.  He went to Canada from Paris to promote missionary work among the Huron.  Before leaving he studied the Huron language, and he later published an important dictionary of the Huron language.  He arrived in Huron country in August of 1623 and stayed there until May of 1624.  At this time, he saw Huron society at its peak of development.  Beginning in 1634, the Huron were decimated by epidemic diseases passed to them by the French--particularly the smallpox and measles.  Over two-thirds of the Huron people died.  Then in 1649, the Huron were devastated by an invasion of Iroquois warriors fighting with firearms acquired from trading with the Dutch colonists.  Those of the Huron who survived were forced to abandon their villages and leave their native territory.  So Sagard's reports are a valuable record of what Huron society looked like before this collapse.

The third source for studies of the Huron is the Jesuit Relations.  The Relations were annual reports published in Paris by the Jesuits to chronicle their activities among the Huron from 1634 to 1650.  They were filled with detailed descriptions of Huron life and culture.

Anthropologist Elizabeth Tooker has paraphrased much of what was written in these three sources in writing her Ethnology of the Huron Indians, 1615-1649 (1964).

In taking notes on Sagard's book, Locke was relying on some of the best anthropological ethnography available to him.  Anthropologist Bruce Trigger is one of the leading scholars today of Huron history, and he has praised the work of Sagard and the other French observers of the Huron in the first half of the seventeenth century.  He notes that they saw the Huron before the extensive contact with the Europeans had altered their way of life.  "Unlike most modern anthropologists, these visitors did not find themselves living among groups who had long been influenced by Europeans and who were under the surveillance and control of a colonial administration that had altered their way of life to accord with European standards of propriety" (Trigger 2002:1).

The archaeological evidence for the earliest human occupation of southern Ontario suggests that the first humans there were foragers who lived by hunting, gathering, and fishing (Trigger 2000:105-176).  Fluted spear points associated with mammoth and mastodon hunting have been dated between 11,000 and 8,000 B.C.  Later, the principal game animals were deer, moose, and caribou.  Around 500 A.D., corn was introduced, and slowly horticulture became more important.  This confirms Acosta's insight that the first human societies in the Americas were hunter-gatherer bands, long before horticultural tribes.

Locke's notes on Sagard (found in Oxford University's Lovelace Collection of Locke's Papers) have never been published.  But Ann Talbot has published some extracts from these notes in her book (Talbot 2010:27-44).

By comparing Locke's notes, Sagard's book, and Locke's Two Treatises and Letters on Toleration, one can see at least nine elements of Locke's account of the state of nature that he could have taken from Sagard:  (1) the law of nature, (2) the state of war, (3) natural punishment, (4) rulers by consent, (5) council governance, (6) religious toleration, (7) marriage and divorce by voluntary contract, (8) property, and (9) egalitarian hierarchy.

(1) The law of nature.  Sagard noted how hospitable the Huron were in their treatment of the Franciscans, freely sharing their lodging and food.  "For they hold it proper to help wayfarers and to receive among them with politeness anyone who is not an enemy, and much more so those of their own nation" (1968:88).  When the Franciscans decided that they needed to build a church to facilitate their mission of teaching Christianity, the Huron helped to build it.  When one young man complained that he did not want to do such work for those who were not his relatives, he was reproved for being so unfriendly.  Sagard observed how remarkable they were in showing themselves "so full of human kindness" in helping in the building of the church (1968:78).

Locke's notes show how impressed he was by this description of the friendly sociability of the Huron.  He noted that they were "merry and even tempered grave and serious but not sullen nor melancholy."  They were "lovers of order."  They "quarrel not with their neighbors."  They were "friendly, liberal, and charitable to all strangers as well as acquaintances except enemies."

In this way, the Huron showed Locke how people in a state of nature without any centralized governmental rule over them could live sociably together according to customary rules of good conduct.  In his Second Treatise, Locke concluded that this showed how the state of nature "has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (par. 6).  In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke said that the American Indians were "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and of the Law of Nature" (Goldie ed., 40). 

If there is such a law of nature in the state of nature, then Thomas Hobbes is wrong in asserting that the state of nature must always become a state of war--a war of each against all--because as Locke says, the state of nature can be "a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation" (par. 19).

(2)  The state of war.  Notice, however, that the Huron were friendly with everyone "except enemies."  Sagard described their frequent wars with the Iroquois and other tribes.  Usually they went to war to avenge the killing of someone by an enemy.  The young men were eager to go to war so that they could win the glory from fighting courageously.  When they defeated an enemy, they took prisoners and brought them back to their villages where they were tortured in the most brutal ways.  They did their best to prolong the torture over many days.  

Sagard saw warfare among the Huron as rooted in their culture of blood revenge and feuding:

"There is scarcely any nation that is not at war and dissension with some other, not for the purpose of possessing their territory and conquering their country, but solely to exterminate them if possible and to take revenge for some slight wrong or unpleasantness, which is seldom a great matter.  But their misgovernment and the want of police, which leaves their wicked fellow-citizens unpunished, is the cause of all this evil. . . . And thus it happens most frequently that for the fault of one man alone two entire tribes make war very cruelly upon one another, and are always in continual dread of being surprised the one by the other" (1968:163-164).

So among the Huron, the state of nature often became a state of war, just as Hobbes warned.  Consequently, it seems that Locke in the Second Treatise must concede this point to Hobbes: "To avoid this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to Heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders) is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature" (par. 21).

Here we see what William Batz (1974:667-68) has called an "anthropological ambiguity" in Locke's historical anthropology.  On the one hand, Locke says that the state of nature was not a state of war, as Hobbes claimed, but rather a state of peace.  On the other hand, Locke says that the state of nature could easily become a state of war, and that's why people consented to leaving the state of nature and establishing government to pacify social life.  This is why scholarly commentators on Locke have debated whether or not Locke was ultimately a Hobbesian.  

The reason for this confusion is that the anthropological reports about native American peoples available to Locke disagreed about whether these people in America were peaceful or bellicose.  They were peaceful insofar as they could live by customary rules of cooperation within each society, and they could even enforce rules for peaceful trading between different societies.  But they also engaged in homicidal violence both within and between their societies.

This anthropological ambiguity continues today in the intense debate among anthropologists about the evolution of human warfare.  The Hobbesian anthropologists argue that our evolutionary ancestors living in stateless societies--bands or tribes--were often at war, and that the establishment of bureaucratic states had a pacifying effect on human life.  The Rousseauian anthropologists argue, on the contrary, that our prehistoric ancestors were peaceful, and that warfare was a cultural invention that arose after the emergence of settled agrarian societies and bureaucratic states.

Often the anthropologists assume that the debate is between two alternatives, represented by Hobbes and Rousseau, and they ignore Locke as taking a third position.  Consequently, I have argued, they fail to see that the evidence supports the conclusion that Hobbes was partly right about the state of nature, Rousseau was mostly wrong, and Locke was mostly right.  

The evidence shows that Hobbes was right about the state of nature being a state of war, and therefore Rousseau was wrong.  But the evidence also shows that Hobbes was wrong in claiming that life in the state of nature was a perpetual war with no peaceful cooperation.  In fact, people in foraging bands and horticultural tribes  have lived in communities with norms of peaceful cooperation that included intertribal cooperation such as networks of trade.  And they sometimes had long periods without intertribal war.

Locke was right to see that the state of nature is a state of peace that easily becomes a state of war: establishing government can therefore have a pacifying effect through the rule of law to settle disputes that easily become violent feuds in the state of nature.

Some of my previous posts on this can be found here, here, here, here., and here.

(3)  Natural punishment.  The persistence of war in Huron society arises from each individual having the right to seek revenge against any perceived wrongdoer.  This is what Locke in the Second Treatise called "the Executive Power of the Law of Nature"--that "every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature."  Locke concedes that this must seem a "very strange Doctrine to some Men," And yet he argues that the law of nature, like all other laws governing human conduct, would be "in vain" if there were no one with the power to execute that law, which must include the power to execute any murderer (pars. 7-8, 11).

Paradoxically, this natural right to punish that enforces social peace under the law of nature also provokes social conflict when the right to take revenge creates unremitting feuding.  Here we see the "inconveniences of the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every Man's being Judge in his own Case," and we can see why people sought a remedy for these inconveniences by having each individual give up his executive power of the law of nature and resigned it to a governmental order with the power to make, enforce, and adjudicate standing laws of justice.  Here is how centralized political power originates by popular consent to leave the state of nature (pars. 87-89).

Nevertheless, if a monarch is unrestrained by law in exercising arbitrary, absolute power to oppress the people, he has thereby put himself into a state of nature in relation to his people, and they can reclaim their natural right to punish him as they would anyone who aggressively attacks them (pars. 91-93).

It should also be noted that in the state of nature, the natural right to punish has two levels: there is a natural right to punish with physical force those who inflict physical harm on others, and the people must give up this right to public institutions with the establishment of government and civil law; but there is also a natural right to punish with social disapproval those who have engaged in blameworthy conduct, and this right is retained by the people even after the establishment of government and civil law.  This second kind of natural punishment is called the "law of reputation" in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  I have written about this in an earlier post.  Sagard saw this in the Huron because they were generally motivated to win social approval and to avoid social disapproval, and that's how the customary norms of their society were enforced.

(4) Rulers by consent.  In his reading of Sagard's book, Locke saw how a tribal people in a state of nature could establish government by their consent in selecting their rulers.  In his notes on the book, Locke observed that "their kings are successive only when they are heirs to their father's virtues and are obeyed rather by persuasion than by force," and that the Huron "choose for officers those who upon trial they find fit" (Talbot 2010:36).

In his notes on Sagard's History of Canada, Locke wrote under the heading Politia: "The kings of Canada are elective, but the sons never fail to succeed their fathers when they are heirs to their virtues, otherwise not, and their kings are rather obeyed by consent and persuasion, than by force and compulsion, the public good being the measure of their authority.  Sagard, p. 418.  And this seems to be the state of regal authority in its original at least in all this part of the world" (Locke 1997:274).

The reports from Sagard and others about how the American Indians selected their rulers influenced what Locke said in the Second Treatise about the beginning of political societies in the state of nature.  He claimed that the American Indians "by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set Rulers over themselves.  So that their Politick Societies all began from a voluntary Union, and the mutual agreement of Men freely acting in the choice of their Governors, and forms of Government" (par. 102).

Locke identified the need for military leadership in war with other societies as the primary reason for people in the state of nature consenting to rulers.  

"Since then those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another; they could not but have greater Apprehensions of others, than of one another: And therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves under a Frame of Government, which might best serve to that end; and chuse the wisest and bravest Man to conduct them in their Wars, and lead them out against their Enemies, and in this chiefly be their Ruler" (par. 107).

"Thus we see, that the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe, . . . are little more than Generals of their Armies; and though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council.  Though the War it self, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the King's sole Authority" (par. 108).

(5) Council governance.   In saying that matters of war and peace were decided "in the People, or in a Council," Locke was reporting what he had learned from Sagard about how the Huron confederacy was ruled by chiefs with the consent of popular councils (Sagard 1968:148-166).  The accuracy of Sagard's description of the Huron council system has been confirmed by Bruce Trigger (2002:80-96).

This Huron government by councils was organized at four levels: the clan segment, the village, the tribe, and the confederacy.  In each of the twenty villages (communities of up to 2,000 people), each clan segment had two chiefs, one for peace and one for war.  The civil chiefs managed the day-to-day affairs of the clan segment.  The war chiefs were prominent only in times of war.  The chiefs were influential, but they had no power to command anyone to obey their orders without the individual consent of every person subject to the order.  Sagard observed that "a chief has no absolute authority among them, although they pay him respect, and the tribe is led by entreaty, advice, and example rather than by commands" (1968:148).

The chiefships were hereditary in particular lineages, but there was no rule to decide which individual within a particular lineage would inherit the office.  A new chief was selected by the members of the lineage, with the older women of the lineage having the most influence.  They selected the person with the best qualifications for the office.  Chiefs who did not perform their duties well and who therefore became objects of public criticism could be dismissed at any time by the women of the lineage.

The primary duty of a chief was to announce the decisions reached through a process of discussion leading to consensus among all the adult men and women of his group.  Chiefs could not make decisions on their own.  Rather, they acted only as discussion leaders helping their groups to reach agreement, in which every individual had to consent.  Each clan segment was autonomous in making decisions for its group.  Above the level of the clan segment, the Huron had a system of representation in which chiefs represented their clan segments.

The civil chiefs of the clan segments met in a village council, along with the old men of the village.  This village council met frequently, often daily.  Although no chief was superior in rank to any other, one of the civil chiefs was recognized as the head chief or spokesman for the village.  The council met in the house of the head chief.  The head chief announced the topics to be discussed, and then everyone in the meeting expressed their opinions.  Proposals were changed until there was a consensus.  The head chief then announced the council's decision.  Everything that concerned the village as a whole was discussed in these council meetings.  All legal disputes between people in different clan lineages were adjudicated by the village council.

Occasionally, there were general meetings attended by all of the men of the village who were twenty-five years old and older.  No women or young men attended.  But the opinions of the women, particularly the older women, were conveyed through the men that attended.

Each of the four Huron tribes had a tribal council made up of the chiefs of the clan segments from the villages of the tribe.  One of these chiefs was designated as principal chief for the tribe based on his inherited lineage.  The people of each tribe saw themselves as a collection of clan segments, and so each clan segment managed its own affairs, and the chief of the clan segment was independent of the other chiefs.

Any chief could call for a tribal council meeting to deliberate about matters that concerned the entire tribe.  They would meet in the house of the principal tribal chief.  And as with the lower level councils, topics would be discussed until a consensus was reached.

Finally, there was a council for the entire Huron confederacy of four tribes.  This confederacy council was made up of all the civil chiefs who sat on the four tribal councils, who represented all of the Huron clan segments.  The confederacy council met once a year in the spring, and the meeting could last several weeks.  They deliberated about matters concerning the whole confederacy.  Special meetings could be called by any confederacy chief to deal with any problem involving the entire confederacy.

This council system of government for the Huron Confederacy was very similar to the government of the Iroquois Confederacy that united five Iroquoian tribes in northeast North America.  Some scholars have seen evidence that some of the American Founding Fathers--particularly, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams--saw the Iroquois Confederacy as a model for how to organize a federal republic with popular representation (Grinde and Johansen 1991).  Other scholars have argued that the evidence for this is not clear.  

Arguing against Bruce Johansen's claims about Iroquois influence on the Founders, Elisabeth Tooker objected: "The most glaring deficiency in Johansen's discussion . . . is one he himself admits to: a failure to consider the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, most importantly John Locke . . . . If he had done so, he might have realized that the image he holds of the Indian is a legacy from them.  If his account of Franklin's and Jefferson's ideas is correct, so also were theirs--like Johansen, they saw the Indian through Locke's eyes, not through Indian eyes" (1990:294).  Maybe so, but Locke's eyes were looking at the American Indians as presented in traveler's books like Sagard's.  She asserts that "ideas such as 'the state of nature,' 'natural law,' and 'natural rights' are like so many other ideas we hold, Western philosophical ideas, not empirical findings" (1990:296).  But this ignores the fact that Locke really did believe these ideas were "empirical findings" from the study of the Huron and other American Indian societies.

Stasavage has added to these empirical findings by showing that the council governance practiced by the Huron has been widespread in human societies throughout history.  Using data from the Standard Cross Cultural Sample of 186 societies that were representative of the best described societies for specific geographic areas, Stasavage found that for most of these societies there was some council governance, either at the local level or at the level of a central authority (Stasavage 2020; Ahmed and Stasavage 2020).  He also found, however, that autocratic political executives could sometimes develop rule by bureaucracy as a substitute for shared rule with a council.

(6) Religious tolerance.  From his study of the travel literature about the American Indians, Locke concluded that societies in the state of nature show religious tolerance.  He might have found support for this in Sagard's book, because Sagard reports that the Huron were remarkably friendly to the Franciscans, allowing them to freely teach Christianity in the attempt to convert the Huron and turn them away from their native animistic and shamanistic religious beliefs.

In his Letters on Toleration, Locke pointed to the American Indians as showing how people could "live together in Society, make one People of one Language under one Chieftain, who shall have no other Power but to command them in time of War against their common enemies, without any municipal Laws, Judges, or any Person with Superiority established amongst them, but ended all their private Differences, if any arose, by the extemporary Determination of their Neighbors, or of Arbitrators chosen by the Parties";  and in such a society the rulers had no power to use public force to compel people to profess belief in any religion. This should show us that "the Care of Souls does not belong to the Magistrate" (Locke 2010:26, 70).

I have written previously about the evolution of religious liberty in the state of nature.

(7)  Marriage and divorce by voluntary contract.  In the Second Treatise, attacking the idea that paternal power is the absolute right of a father, Locked asked:  "And what will become of this Paternal Power in that part of the World where one Woman hath more than one Husband at a time?  Or in those parts of America where when the Husband and Wife part, which happens frequently, the Children are all left to the Mother, follow her, and are wholly under her Care and Provision?" (par. 65).

Sagard was probably one of Locke's sources for this.  Sagard reported:  "If in the course of time husband and wife like to separate for any reason whatsoever, or have no children, they are free to part. . . . Hence it often happens that some woman spends her youth in this fashion, having had more than a dozen or fifteen husbands, all of whom nevertheless are not the only men to enjoy the woman, how much married they be; for after nightfall the young women and girls run about from one lodge to another, as do the young men for their part on the same quest, possessing them wherever it seems good to them, yet without any violence, leaving all to the wishes of the woman.  The husband will do the like to his neighbor's wife and the wife to her neighbor, no jealousy intervening on that account, and no shame, disgrace, or dishonor being incurred" (Sagard 1968:124-25).

Sagard also indicated, however, that if a couple had children, divorce was rare except for some important reason.  And if the parents did divorce, the children were usually divided up, the daughters going to the mother, the sons to the father, although this was not always the rule.

This supported Locke's claim that marriage was a voluntary compact that could be terminated by consent of the spouses, as long as they provided for the procreation and education of their children (par. 81).

It should also be noted that women had great influence in Huron society, because it was matrilineal (inheritance passed through the female line) and matrilocal (husbands joined the wife's family).

(8) Property.  In his chapter on property in the Second Treatise, Locke referred to the American Indians ten times (par. 26, 30, 36-37, 41, 43, 46, 48-49).  Most of what he said followed what Sagard had written about property among the Huron.

The foraging Indian claims property in his food by appropriating it to himself through his labor.  "The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his Life" (par. 26).  "Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one" (par. 30).

The horticultural Indian claims property in the food he has grown, but his farming of the land is not intensive, and so he does not produce much surplus.  And so the Indians are "rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life," and "a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England" (par. 41).

The American Indians had trade networks based on exchange through bartering.  But their commercial activity was limited by their not having invented money (par. 46-49).

(9)  Egalitarian hierarchy.  Locke could see in Huron society evidence for natural human equality, because the Huron asserted the equal right of every individual to be free from coercive dominance by others.  But he also saw that the Huron were not really equal in all respects, because some people had higher social status than others.  Locke had to admit that even the most egalitarian societies in the state of nature show some inequality.  Even if absolute equality is not attainable in any society, Locke suggested, we might expect to see in a free society like the Huron an egalitarian hierarchy.

Locke indicated that in the Second Treatise:

"Though I have said above, Chap. II, That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man" (par. 54).

This could be a description of the Huron.  Age makes a difference, because adults have higher rank than children, and older men and women generally have the highest rank.  Birth makes a difference, because men born into certain clan segments have a greater chance of becoming a chief.  Virtue and merit are also important, because those selected for the office of chief must be judged to have the talents and traits of character required for being a good chief; and war chiefs must be judged to be courageous and wise in their military leadership.  Alliance, benefits, and gratitude are all factors that influence social ranking, so that chiefs are respected only as long as they are generous in giving away much of their wealth to others.  Sex differences are important, because the offices of government are held only by men, and yet women (particularly, in a matrilineal and matrilocal society) have great influence over social life.

In all of these ways, Huron society is hierarchical, in the sense that some people have greater power or status than others.  But then anthropologists have long recognized that all human societies are hierarchical in some manner, even those hunter-gatherer bands that are often identified as the most egalitarian of societies (Flanagan 1989).  As I have indicated in a previous post, all mammalian societies have some form of leadership.

Nevertheless, the Huron can still be understood as having an egalitarian hierarchy, in which their many forms of inequality are compatible with their equality in their natural freedom, so that no individual is forced against his will to obey anyone else.  Huron chiefs have no authority to force their will on anyone.  The chiefs can only announce the decisions that have been consented to by their followers.  Chiefs who become too arrogant in asserting their dominance over others will be criticized, ridiculed, or even deposed.  This is what Chris Boehm has called a "reverse-dominance hierarchy" (1999): although rulers might want to be dominant, and their followers might often defer to them, tyrannically dominant behavior will provoke resistance from those being exploited; and the ultimate punishment of the tyrant is execution.

In an egalitarian society, equality does not mean absolute equality of wealth and status; but it does mean equality in individual autonomy, so that no one can use greater wealth or status to gain power over another (Gardner 1991; Kelly 2013:243-48; Woodburn 1982).  People in egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies have told anthropologists that "we are all headmen," and each person is "headman over himself" (Lee 1979:348).  Similarly, Locke said that in the state of nature, every person must recognize all others as his equal--"all being Kings as much as he" (ST, 123).

Previously, I have written about how it is now possible to calculate the Gini coefficients for inequality in human societies over the past 10,000 years.  The reputation of hunter-gatherers for being egalitarian is warranted because they have some inequality, but it is lower than herding and farming societies.  And among modern nation-states, those that have Lockean liberal social orders have lower inequality than in the illiberal societies.  The United States has a slightly lower Gini number than the small-scale herding and farming societies.  And the Nordic capitalist welfare-states have Gini numbers about the same as the hunter-gatherer societies.  

This suggests that modern Lockean liberal social orders can approximate the equal liberty of human beings in the state of nature.  As I have argued previously (here and here), there is inequality in a liberal order but it is a "good inequality."


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