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Wednesday, October 13, 2021

The Evolution of Democracy is Natural But Not Inevitable: Locke and Sagard on the Huron in the State of Nature

To explain the history of democracy, it is often said that it was invented in ancient Athens.  After it died out in ancient Greece and Rome, democracy vanished from Europe for over a thousand years.  It then reemerged in early modern Europe, in some of the Italian city republics and in England.  In England and the United States, it eventually evolved into the modern form of democracy with competitive elections and universal suffrage.  This modern democracy then spread around the world. 

In The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today (2020), David Stasavage denies this story by arguing that democracy did not need to be invented by Europeans because it has arisen naturally in human societies throughout the world over thousands of years.  This became clear, Stasavage observes, when Europeans first explored the Americas and discovered that some of the native Americans were living in democratic political systems.  For example, in North America, the French saw that the Huron Confederacy was ruled by a system of councils with broad popular participation.  In Mesoamerica, the Spanish discovered that the people of Tlaxcala were ruled by what looked like a democratic republic that had resisted conquest by the Aztec Empire.

The Huron and Tlaxcala illustrate how democracy has evolved naturally throughout history around the world: whenever the circumstances are such that those trying to rule over a society are compelled to seek the consent of the people they govern, then democratic practices are likely to arise.  Stasavage admits, however, that this is not inevitable, because whenever the circumstances are such that rulers can govern a society through a state bureaucracy without the direct consent of the people, then autocratic institutions are likely to arise.  In the Americas, the Aztec and Inca Empires were illustrations of such autocracy.  So autocracy is also natural but not inevitable.

Stasavage thinks that all governments depend either directly or indirectly on the consent of the governed.  But that consent can be either the express consent of the people through some kind of popular council or assembly in a democracy, or it can be the tacit consent of the people to an autocracy by their not revolting against it. 

In contrast to the early forms of democracy that have arisen in many regions of the world throughout history, Stasavage contends that modern democracy--with representatives chosen in competitive elections with universal suffrage--is a European invention that arose from the particular historical circumstances of modern Europe that led eventually to modern democracy in England and the United States.

I find most of Stasavage's reasoning persuasive.  And yet I would put more emphasis than he does on two points--that democracy first arose among our earliest hunter-gatherer ancestors, and that the political ideas of thinkers like John Locke have been crucial for the history of democracy.


DEMOCRACY IN HUNTER-GATHERER BANDS

In only one sentence (p. 34), Stasavage mentions the possibility that some form of democracy appeared among early hunter-gatherer societies.  In fact, that would explain why democracy is natural for human societies, because it arose in our earliest evolutionary history in Paleolithic hunter-gatherer bands, so that it is part of our genetically evolved human nature.

This might seem odd if we identify foraging bands as anarchistic societies, because being "stateless societies" (as anthropologists call them), they seem to lack any governmental rule at all.  But as I have argued in a previous post, if "anarchy" is taken in its literal sense of "no rule" or "no governance," then foraging societies are not anarchic, because they do have some form of governance, even if the governance is informal, fluctuating, and decentralized.  Pure anarchy is a fiction, because no human society can endure as a social order without some governance.

Some anarchist theorists have implicitly conceded this point.  For example, the best history of anarchist thinkers and movements is Peter Marshall's Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (2010).  Anarchists begin by distinguishing between society and the state, he indicates, and then they argue that a society can be a self-regulating order of governance without a state.  He writes: "Pure anarchy probably never existed.  Stateless societies and peasant societies employ sanctions of approval and disapproval, the offer of reciprocity, and the threat of its withdrawal, as instruments of social control.  But modern anthropology confirms that in organic or 'primitive' societies, there is a limited concentration of force.  If authority exists, it is delegated and rarely imposed, and in many societies no relation of command and obedience is in force" (12).

If the minimal requirement for a democracy is having the people of a society actively consenting to their governance, then a stateless society of a foraging band in which the people employ "sanctions of approval and disapproval" to control their leaders so that there is "no relation of command and obedience" would seem to be democratic.

I have written about how John Locke saw this in the state of nature in America from his reading of Jose de Acosta's report in his Natural and Moral History of the Indies.  In the Second Treatise (par. 102), Locke quoted Acosta's claim that in America there were many societies with "no government at all" and "no kings," but with "captains" or "chiefs" that the people chose to lead them when they needed leadership in war or peace.  

It seems confusing or even self-contradictory to say that while there was "no government at all," the people chose those who governed them.  But there's no contradiction if we understand "no government" to mean no centralized bureaucratic state in a hunter-gatherer society that does have some governance by leaders chosen by the people and a system of customary laws enforced by public approval and disapproval.

This is the first of three levels in the history of government that Acosta saw in America.  Acosta assumed that the first settlers in America who crossed over from Asia to North America lived in hunter-gatherer societies (Acosta 380-81).

The second stage came later in history when some groups lived in "free associations or communities, where the people are governed by the advice of many, and are like councils.  In time of war, these elect a captain who is obeyed by a whole tribe or province.  In time of peace, each town or group of folk rules itself, and each has some prominent men whom the mass of the people respect; and at most some of these join together on matters that seem important to them to see what they ought to do" (359).

Acosta's third stage is that of autocratic monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good."  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as beasts and treated themselves as gods (346, 359, 402).

In some passages of his book, Acosta combines the first two stages and suggests that even the most primitive hunter-gatherers had some informal leadership by which prominent people could mediate disputes and lead them in war, but always constrained by the informal consent or resistance of the community.  The one passage quoted by Locke is an example of this, as though Locke figured out that even primitive foragers would have some episodic and informal structure of rule in which some individuals would have more influence than others, although excessive dominance would be checked by popular resistance.

In other words, politics is constant in all human societies, in that some individuals will be politically ambitious in seeking the support of others in becoming leaders, and there will be political rivalry in the competition for positions of leadership.  The many other individuals who do not wish to rule will defer to those who lead them, but they will also resist oppressive dominance by their leaders.  Human beings really are political animals by nature.

Acosta's three levels of political order corresponds at least roughly to what some modern political anthropologists have identified as a four-leveled typology of preindustrial political systems: band, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Flannery and Marcus 2012; Service 1971; Lewellen 2003:15-41).  In bands and tribes, political power is decentralized and egalitarian.  In chiefdoms and states, political power is centralized and inegalitarian.  In bands, people live by hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants.  In tribes, people continue hunting and gathering, but they are also horticulturalists who engage in some small-scale farming of domesticated plants and pastoralists who herd some domesticated animals.

Locke identified both bands and tribes as societies in the state of nature, because people in these societies are naturally free and equal in that all adult individuals are free from any coercive subordination to anyone else.  They live by customary rules of good conduct, and each individual has the right to enforce those rules by punishing those who violate them.  No adult individual feels compelled to take orders from anyone else, although people will voluntarily consent to informal and situational leaders.


DEMOCRACY IN HORTICULTURAL TRIBES

One of Locke's sources for information about tribal societies in America was Gabriel Sagard's Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons, which was first published in French in 1632.  Locke bought this book during his stay in France, 1675 to 1679.  His notes on the book date from 1679, when he had returned to England, in the midst of the Exclusion Crisis.  Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, was leading those members of Parliament who wanted to exclude James, the Duke of York, from inheriting the throne from his brother King Charles II, because James was a Catholic; and Shaftesbury's group feared that a Catholic king of England would promote the royal absolutism of the French Catholic monarchy.  Locke was associated with Shaftesbury and his group, which would become the Whig party.  Their opponents would become the Tory party.  According to Peter Laslett, Locke began writing his Two Treatises on Government in 1679, in response to the Exclusion Crisis, although it would not be published until after the Revolution of 1688.

In Locke's notebook, his notes on Sagard are under the heading Immitanda, indicating that Locke regarded Huron society as worthy of being imitated.  And, indeed, much of what Locke says about the state of nature as the original condition of humanity was shaped by his reading of Sagard (Talbot 2010: 27-44).

In 1610, the French exploring Canada began to visit the four confederated Iroquoian-speaking tribes they called the Huron, who called themselves the Wendat.  The French found their settlements scattered across a peninsula located between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe northwest of Lake Ontario.  Some of these settlements had as many as 2,000 people.  The total population for about twenty settlements was about 30,000.  The larger settlements were surrounded by palisades to protect them from attack, because the Huron Confederacy was often at war with the Iroquois Confederacy of five tribes settled south of Lake Ontario.  The Huron were a horticultural society based primarily on the cultivation of corn, but also beans and squash.  The women did most of the farming work.  The adult men brought in other food from hunting, gathering, and fishing.  The men were also warriors who took pride in their courageous fighting against the Iroquois.  The men also engaged in extensive trading networks.  Political alliances were built around trading relations.

The French descriptions of Huron culture are found mostly in three sources.  The first was Samuel de Champlain's account of his visit to the Huron between may 1615 and May 1616.  Champlain was an explorer, a soldier, a cartographer, and a trader who worked for trading companies involved in the valuable fur trade.  He supervised the development of the French colony along the Saint Lawrence River.  

The second source was Sagard.  He was a lay brother of the Recollects, who were a branch of the Franciscan order.  He went to Canada from Paris to promote missionary work among the Huron.  Before leaving he studied the Huron language, and he later published an important dictionary of the Huron language.  He arrived in Huron country in August of 1623 and stayed there until May of 1624.  At this time, he saw Huron society at its peak of development.  Beginning in 1634, the Huron were decimated by epidemic diseases passed to them by the French--particularly the smallpox and measles.  Over two-thirds of the Huron people died.  Then in 1649, the Huron were devastated by an invasion of Iroquois warriors fighting with firearms acquired from trading with the Dutch colonists.  Those of the Huron who survived were forced to abandon their villages and leave their native territory.  So Sagard's reports are a valuable record of what Huron society looked like before this collapse.

The third source for studies of the Huron is the Jesuit Relations.  The Relations were annual reports published in Paris by the Jesuits to chronicle their activities among the Huron from 1634 to 1650.  They were filled with detailed descriptions of Huron life and culture.

Anthropologist Elizabeth Tooker has paraphrased much of what was written in these three sources in writing her Ethnology of the Huron Indians, 1615-1649 (1964).

In taking notes on Sagard's book, Locke was relying on some of the best anthropological ethnography available to him.  Anthropologist Bruce Trigger is one of the leading scholars today of Huron history, and he has praised the work of Sagard and the other French observers of the Huron in the first half of the seventeenth century.  He notes that they saw the Huron before the extensive contact with the Europeans had altered their way of life.  "Unlike most modern anthropologists, these visitors did not find themselves living among groups who had long been influenced by Europeans and who were under the surveillance and control of a colonial administration that had altered their way of life to accord with European standards of propriety" (Trigger 2002:1).

The archaeological evidence for the earliest human occupation of southern Ontario suggests that the first humans there were foragers who lived by hunting, gathering, and fishing (Trigger 2000:105-176).  Fluted spear points associated with mammoth and mastodon hunting have been dated between 11,000 and 8,000 B.C.  Later, the principal game animals were deer, moose, and caribou.  Around 500 A.D., corn was introduced, and slowly horticulture became more important.  This confirms Acosta's insight that the first human societies in the Americas were hunter-gatherer bands, long before horticultural tribes.

Locke's notes on Sagard (found in Oxford University's Lovelace Collection of Locke's Papers) have never been published.  But Ann Talbot has published some extracts from these notes in her book (Talbot 2010:27-44).

By comparing Locke's notes, Sagard's book, and Locke's Two Treatises and Letters on Toleration, one can see at least nine elements of Locke's account of the state of nature that he could have taken from Sagard:  (1) the law of nature, (2) the state of war, (3) natural punishment, (4) rulers by consent, (5) council governance, (6) religious toleration, (7) marriage and divorce by voluntary contract, (8) property, and (9) egalitarian hierarchy.

(1) The law of nature.  Sagard noted how hospitable the Huron were in their treatment of the Franciscans, freely sharing their lodging and food.  "For they hold it proper to help wayfarers and to receive among them with politeness anyone who is not an enemy, and much more so those of their own nation" (1968:88).  When the Franciscans decided that they needed to build a church to facilitate their mission of teaching Christianity, the Huron helped to build it.  When one young man complained that he did not want to do such work for those who were not his relatives, he was reproved for being so unfriendly.  Sagard observed how remarkable they were in showing themselves "so full of human kindness" in helping in the building of the church (1968:78).

Locke's notes show how impressed he was by this description of the friendly sociability of the Huron.  He noted that they were "merry and even tempered grave and serious but not sullen nor melancholy."  They were "lovers of order."  They "quarrel not with their neighbors."  They were "friendly, liberal, and charitable to all strangers as well as acquaintances except enemies."

In this way, the Huron showed Locke how people in a state of nature without any centralized governmental rule over them could live sociably together according to customary rules of good conduct.  In his Second Treatise, Locke concluded that this showed how the state of nature "has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (par. 6).  In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke said that the American Indians were "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and of the Law of Nature" (Goldie ed., 40). 

If there is such a law of nature in the state of nature, then Thomas Hobbes is wrong in asserting that the state of nature must always become a state of war--a war of each against all--because as Locke says, the state of nature can be "a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation" (par. 19).

(2)  The state of war.  Notice, however, that the Huron were friendly with everyone "except enemies."  Sagard described their frequent wars with the Iroquois and other tribes.  Usually they went to war to avenge the killing of someone by an enemy.  The young men were eager to go to war so that they could win the glory from fighting courageously.  When they defeated an enemy, they took prisoners and brought them back to their villages where they were tortured in the most brutal ways.  They did their best to prolong the torture over many days.  

Sagard saw warfare among the Huron as rooted in their culture of blood revenge and feuding:

"There is scarcely any nation that is not at war and dissension with some other, not for the purpose of possessing their territory and conquering their country, but solely to exterminate them if possible and to take revenge for some slight wrong or unpleasantness, which is seldom a great matter.  But their misgovernment and the want of police, which leaves their wicked fellow-citizens unpunished, is the cause of all this evil. . . . And thus it happens most frequently that for the fault of one man alone two entire tribes make war very cruelly upon one another, and are always in continual dread of being surprised the one by the other" (1968:163-164).

So among the Huron, the state of nature often became a state of war, just as Hobbes warned.  Consequently, it seems that Locke in the Second Treatise must concede this point to Hobbes: "To avoid this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to Heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders) is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature" (par. 21).

Here we see what William Batz (1974:667-68) has called an "anthropological ambiguity" in Locke's historical anthropology.  On the one hand, Locke says that the state of nature was not a state of war, as Hobbes claimed, but rather a state of peace.  On the other hand, Locke says that the state of nature could easily become a state of war, and that's why people consented to leaving the state of nature and establishing government to pacify social life.  This is why scholarly commentators on Locke have debated whether or not Locke was ultimately a Hobbesian.  

The reason for this confusion is that the anthropological reports about native American peoples available to Locke disagreed about whether these people in America were peaceful or bellicose.  They were peaceful insofar as they could live by customary rules of cooperation within each society, and they could even enforce rules for peaceful trading between different societies.  But they also engaged in homicidal violence both within and between their societies.

This anthropological ambiguity continues today in the intense debate among anthropologists about the evolution of human warfare.  The Hobbesian anthropologists argue that our evolutionary ancestors living in stateless societies--bands or tribes--were often at war, and that the establishment of bureaucratic states had a pacifying effect on human life.  The Rousseauian anthropologists argue, on the contrary, that our prehistoric ancestors were peaceful, and that warfare was a cultural invention that arose after the emergence of settled agrarian societies and bureaucratic states.

Often the anthropologists assume that the debate is between two alternatives, represented by Hobbes and Rousseau, and they ignore Locke as taking a third position.  Consequently, I have argued, they fail to see that the evidence supports the conclusion that Hobbes was partly right about the state of nature, Rousseau was mostly wrong, and Locke was mostly right.  

The evidence shows that Hobbes was right about the state of nature being a state of war, and therefore Rousseau was wrong.  But the evidence also shows that Hobbes was wrong in claiming that life in the state of nature was a perpetual war with no peaceful cooperation.  In fact, people in foraging bands and horticultural tribes  have lived in communities with norms of peaceful cooperation that included intertribal cooperation such as networks of trade.  And they sometimes had long periods without intertribal war.

Locke was right to see that the state of nature is a state of peace that easily becomes a state of war: establishing government can therefore have a pacifying effect through the rule of law to settle disputes that easily become violent feuds in the state of nature.

Some of my previous posts on this can be found here, here, here, here., and here.

(3)  Natural punishment.  The persistence of war in Huron society arises from each individual having the right to seek revenge against any perceived wrongdoer.  This is what Locke in the Second Treatise called "the Executive Power of the Law of Nature"--that "every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature."  Locke concedes that this must seem a "very strange Doctrine to some Men," And yet he argues that the law of nature, like all other laws governing human conduct, would be "in vain" if there were no one with the power to execute that law, which must include the power to execute any murderer (pars. 7-8, 11).

Paradoxically, this natural right to punish that enforces social peace under the law of nature also provokes social conflict when the right to take revenge creates unremitting feuding.  Here we see the "inconveniences of the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every Man's being Judge in his own Case," and we can see why people sought a remedy for these inconveniences by having each individual give up his executive power of the law of nature and resigned it to a governmental order with the power to make, enforce, and adjudicate standing laws of justice.  Here is how centralized political power originates by popular consent to leave the state of nature (pars. 87-89).

Nevertheless, if a monarch is unrestrained by law in exercising arbitrary, absolute power to oppress the people, he has thereby put himself into a state of nature in relation to his people, and they can reclaim their natural right to punish him as they would anyone who aggressively attacks them (pars. 91-93).

It should also be noted that in the state of nature, the natural right to punish has two levels: there is a natural right to punish with physical force those who inflict physical harm on others, and the people must give up this right to public institutions with the establishment of government and civil law; but there is also a natural right to punish with social disapproval those who have engaged in blameworthy conduct, and this right is retained by the people even after the establishment of government and civil law.  This second kind of natural punishment is called the "law of reputation" in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  I have written about this in an earlier post.  Sagard saw this in the Huron because they were generally motivated to win social approval and to avoid social disapproval, and that's how the customary norms of their society were enforced.

(4) Rulers by consent.  In his reading of Sagard's book, Locke saw how a tribal people in a state of nature could establish government by their consent in selecting their rulers.  In his notes on the book, Locke observed that "their kings are successive only when they are heirs to their father's virtues and are obeyed rather by persuasion than by force," and that the Huron "choose for officers those who upon trial they find fit" (Talbot 2010:36).

In his notes on Sagard's History of Canada, Locke wrote under the heading Politia: "The kings of Canada are elective, but the sons never fail to succeed their fathers when they are heirs to their virtues, otherwise not, and their kings are rather obeyed by consent and persuasion, than by force and compulsion, the public good being the measure of their authority.  Sagard, p. 418.  And this seems to be the state of regal authority in its original at least in all this part of the world" (Locke 1997:274).

The reports from Sagard and others about how the American Indians selected their rulers influenced what Locke said in the Second Treatise about the beginning of political societies in the state of nature.  He claimed that the American Indians "by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set Rulers over themselves.  So that their Politick Societies all began from a voluntary Union, and the mutual agreement of Men freely acting in the choice of their Governors, and forms of Government" (par. 102).

Locke identified the need for military leadership in war with other societies as the primary reason for people in the state of nature consenting to rulers.  

"Since then those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another; they could not but have greater Apprehensions of others, than of one another: And therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves under a Frame of Government, which might best serve to that end; and chuse the wisest and bravest Man to conduct them in their Wars, and lead them out against their Enemies, and in this chiefly be their Ruler" (par. 107).

"Thus we see, that the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe, . . . are little more than Generals of their Armies; and though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council.  Though the War it self, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the King's sole Authority" (par. 108).

(5) Council governance.   In saying that matters of war and peace were decided "in the People, or in a Council," Locke was reporting what he had learned from Sagard about how the Huron confederacy was ruled by chiefs with the consent of popular councils (Sagard 1968:148-166).  The accuracy of Sagard's description of the Huron council system has been confirmed by Bruce Trigger (2002:80-96).

This Huron government by councils was organized at four levels: the clan segment, the village, the tribe, and the confederacy.  In each of the twenty villages (communities of up to 2,000 people), each clan segment had two chiefs, one for peace and one for war.  The civil chiefs managed the day-to-day affairs of the clan segment.  The war chiefs were prominent only in times of war.  The chiefs were influential, but they had no power to command anyone to obey their orders without the individual consent of every person subject to the order.  Sagard observed that "a chief has no absolute authority among them, although they pay him respect, and the tribe is led by entreaty, advice, and example rather than by commands" (1968:148).

The chiefships were hereditary in particular lineages, but there was no rule to decide which individual within a particular lineage would inherit the office.  A new chief was selected by the members of the lineage, with the older women of the lineage having the most influence.  They selected the person with the best qualifications for the office.  Chiefs who did not perform their duties well and who therefore became objects of public criticism could be dismissed at any time by the women of the lineage.

The primary duty of a chief was to announce the decisions reached through a process of discussion leading to consensus among all the adult men and women of his group.  Chiefs could not make decisions on their own.  Rather, they acted only as discussion leaders helping their groups to reach agreement, in which every individual had to consent.  Each clan segment was autonomous in making decisions for its group.  Above the level of the clan segment, the Huron had a system of representation in which chiefs represented their clan segments.

The civil chiefs of the clan segments met in a village council, along with the old men of the village.  This village council met frequently, often daily.  Although no chief was superior in rank to any other, one of the civil chiefs was recognized as the head chief or spokesman for the village.  The council met in the house of the head chief.  The head chief announced the topics to be discussed, and then everyone in the meeting expressed their opinions.  Proposals were changed until there was a consensus.  The head chief then announced the council's decision.  Everything that concerned the village as a whole was discussed in these council meetings.  All legal disputes between people in different clan lineages were adjudicated by the village council.

Occasionally, there were general meetings attended by all of the men of the village who were twenty-five years old and older.  No women or young men attended.  But the opinions of the women, particularly the older women, were conveyed through the men that attended.

Each of the four Huron tribes had a tribal council made up of the chiefs of the clan segments from the villages of the tribe.  One of these chiefs was designated as principal chief for the tribe based on his inherited lineage.  The people of each tribe saw themselves as a collection of clan segments, and so each clan segment managed its own affairs, and the chief of the clan segment was independent of the other chiefs.

Any chief could call for a tribal council meeting to deliberate about matters that concerned the entire tribe.  They would meet in the house of the principal tribal chief.  And as with the lower level councils, topics would be discussed until a consensus was reached.

Finally, there was a council for the entire Huron confederacy of four tribes.  This confederacy council was made up of all the civil chiefs who sat on the four tribal councils, who represented all of the Huron clan segments.  The confederacy council met once a year in the spring, and the meeting could last several weeks.  They deliberated about matters concerning the whole confederacy.  Special meetings could be called by any confederacy chief to deal with any problem involving the entire confederacy.

This council system of government for the Huron Confederacy was very similar to the government of the Iroquois Confederacy that united five Iroquoian tribes in northeast North America.  Some scholars have seen evidence that some of the American Founding Fathers--particularly, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams--saw the Iroquois Confederacy as a model for how to organize a federal republic with popular representation (Grinde and Johansen 1991).  Other scholars have argued that the evidence for this is not clear.  

Arguing against Bruce Johansen's claims about Iroquois influence on the Founders, Elisabeth Tooker objected: "The most glaring deficiency in Johansen's discussion . . . is one he himself admits to: a failure to consider the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, most importantly John Locke . . . . If he had done so, he might have realized that the image he holds of the Indian is a legacy from them.  If his account of Franklin's and Jefferson's ideas is correct, so also were theirs--like Johansen, they saw the Indian through Locke's eyes, not through Indian eyes" (1990:294).  Maybe so, but Locke's eyes were looking at the American Indians as presented in traveler's books like Sagard's.  She asserts that "ideas such as 'the state of nature,' 'natural law,' and 'natural rights' are like so many other ideas we hold, Western philosophical ideas, not empirical findings" (1990:296).  But this ignores the fact that Locke really did believe these ideas were "empirical findings" from the study of the Huron and other American Indian societies.

Stasavage has added to these empirical findings by showing that the council governance practiced by the Huron has been widespread in human societies throughout history.  Using data from the Standard Cross Cultural Sample of 186 societies that were representative of the best described societies for specific geographic areas, Stasavage found that for most of these societies there was some council governance, either at the local level or at the level of a central authority (Stasavage 2020; Ahmed and Stasavage 2020).  He also found, however, that autocratic political executives could sometimes develop rule by bureaucracy as a substitute for shared rule with a council.

(6) Religious tolerance.  From his study of the travel literature about the American Indians, Locke concluded that societies in the state of nature show religious tolerance.  He might have found support for this in Sagard's book, because Sagard reports that the Huron were remarkably friendly to the Franciscans, allowing them to freely teach Christianity in the attempt to convert the Huron and turn them away from their native animistic and shamanistic religious beliefs.

In his Letters on Toleration, Locke pointed to the American Indians as showing how people could "live together in Society, make one People of one Language under one Chieftain, who shall have no other Power but to command them in time of War against their common enemies, without any municipal Laws, Judges, or any Person with Superiority established amongst them, but ended all their private Differences, if any arose, by the extemporary Determination of their Neighbors, or of Arbitrators chosen by the Parties";  and in such a society the rulers had no power to use public force to compel people to profess belief in any religion. This should show us that "the Care of Souls does not belong to the Magistrate" (Locke 2010:26, 70).

I have written previously about the evolution of religious liberty in the state of nature.

(7)  Marriage and divorce by voluntary contract.  In the Second Treatise, attacking the idea that paternal power is the absolute right of a father, Locked asked:  "And what will become of this Paternal Power in that part of the World where one Woman hath more than one Husband at a time?  Or in those parts of America where when the Husband and Wife part, which happens frequently, the Children are all left to the Mother, follow her, and are wholly under her Care and Provision?" (par. 65).

Sagard was probably one of Locke's sources for this.  Sagard reported:  "If in the course of time husband and wife like to separate for any reason whatsoever, or have no children, they are free to part. . . . Hence it often happens that some woman spends her youth in this fashion, having had more than a dozen or fifteen husbands, all of whom nevertheless are not the only men to enjoy the woman, how much married they be; for after nightfall the young women and girls run about from one lodge to another, as do the young men for their part on the same quest, possessing them wherever it seems good to them, yet without any violence, leaving all to the wishes of the woman.  The husband will do the like to his neighbor's wife and the wife to her neighbor, no jealousy intervening on that account, and no shame, disgrace, or dishonor being incurred" (Sagard 1968:124-25).

Sagard also indicated, however, that if a couple had children, divorce was rare except for some important reason.  And if the parents did divorce, the children were usually divided up, the daughters going to the mother, the sons to the father, although this was not always the rule.

This supported Locke's claim that marriage was a voluntary compact that could be terminated by consent of the spouses, as long as they provided for the procreation and education of their children (par. 81).

It should also be noted that women had great influence in Huron society, because it was matrilineal (inheritance passed through the female line) and matrilocal (husbands joined the wife's family).

(8) Property.  In his chapter on property in the Second Treatise, Locke referred to the American Indians ten times (par. 26, 30, 36-37, 41, 43, 46, 48-49).  Most of what he said followed what Sagard had written about property among the Huron.

The foraging Indian claims property in his food by appropriating it to himself through his labor.  "The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his Life" (par. 26).  "Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one" (par. 30).

The horticultural Indian claims property in the food he has grown, but his farming of the land is not intensive, and so he does not produce much surplus.  And so the Indians are "rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life," and "a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England" (par. 41).

The American Indians had trade networks based on exchange through bartering.  But their commercial activity was limited by their not having invented money (par. 46-49).

(9)  Egalitarian hierarchy.  Locke could see in Huron society evidence for natural human equality, because the Huron asserted the equal right of every individual to be free from coercive dominance by others.  But he also saw that the Huron were not really equal in all respects, because some people had higher social status than others.  Locke had to admit that even the most egalitarian societies in the state of nature show some inequality.  Even if absolute equality is not attainable in any society, Locke suggested, we might expect to see in a free society like the Huron an egalitarian hierarchy.

Locke indicated that in the Second Treatise:

"Though I have said above, Chap. II, That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man" (par. 54).

This could be a description of the Huron.  Age makes a difference, because adults have higher rank than children, and older men and women generally have the highest rank.  Birth makes a difference, because men born into certain clan segments have a greater chance of becoming a chief.  Virtue and merit are also important, because those selected for the office of chief must be judged to have the talents and traits of character required for being a good chief; and war chiefs must be judged to be courageous and wise in their military leadership.  Alliance, benefits, and gratitude are all factors that influence social ranking, so that chiefs are respected only as long as they are generous in giving away much of their wealth to others.  Sex differences are important, because the offices of government are held only by men, and yet women (particularly, in a matrilineal and matrilocal society) have great influence over social life.

In all of these ways, Huron society is hierarchical, in the sense that some people have greater power or status than others.  But then anthropologists have long recognized that all human societies are hierarchical in some manner, even those hunter-gatherer bands that are often identified as the most egalitarian of societies (Flanagan 1989).  As I have indicated in a previous post, all mammalian societies have some form of leadership.

Nevertheless, the Huron can still be understood as having an egalitarian hierarchy, in which their many forms of inequality are compatible with their equality in their natural freedom, so that no individual is forced against his will to obey anyone else.  Huron chiefs have no authority to force their will on anyone.  The chiefs can only announce the decisions that have been consented to by their followers.  Chiefs who become too arrogant in asserting their dominance over others will be criticized, ridiculed, or even deposed.  This is what Chris Boehm has called a "reverse-dominance hierarchy" (1999): although rulers might want to be dominant, and their followers might often defer to them, tyrannically dominant behavior will provoke resistance from those being exploited; and the ultimate punishment of the tyrant is execution.

In an egalitarian society, equality does not mean absolute equality of wealth and status; but it does mean equality in individual autonomy, so that no one can use greater wealth or status to gain power over another (Gardner 1991; Kelly 2013:243-48; Woodburn 1982).  People in egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies have told anthropologists that "we are all headmen," and each person is "headman over himself" (Lee 1979:348).  Similarly, Locke said that in the state of nature, every person must recognize all others as his equal--"all being Kings as much as he" (ST, 123).

Previously, I have written about how it is now possible to calculate the Gini coefficients for inequality in human societies over the past 10,000 years.  The reputation of hunter-gatherers for being egalitarian is warranted because they have some inequality, but it is lower than herding and farming societies.  And among modern nation-states, those that have Lockean liberal social orders have lower inequality than in the illiberal societies.  The United States has a slightly lower Gini number than the small-scale herding and farming societies.  And the Nordic capitalist welfare-states have Gini numbers about the same as the hunter-gatherer societies.  

This suggests that modern Lockean liberal social orders can approximate the equal liberty of human beings in the state of nature.  As I have argued previously (here and here), there is inequality in a liberal order but it is a "good inequality."


REFERENCES

Acosta, Jose de. 2002. Natural and Moral History of the Indies, trans. Frances Lopez-Morillas. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ahmed, Ali t., and David Stasavage. 2020. "Origins of Early Democracy." American Political Science Review 114:502-518.

Batz, William G. 1974. "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke." Journal of the History of Ideas, 35: 663-70.

Boehm, Christopher. 1999. Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gardner, Peter. 1991. "Foragers' Pursuit of Individual Autonomy." Current Anthropology 32:543-72.

Flanagan, James G. 1989. "Hierarchy in Simple 'Egalitarian' Societies." Annual Review of Anthropology 18:245-66.

Flannery, Kent, and Joyce Marcus. 2012. The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancesors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Grinde, Donald A., and Bruce E. Johansen. 1991. Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy. Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center.

Kelly, Robert. 2013. The Lifeways of Hunter-Gatherers: The Foraging Spectrum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Richard. 1979. The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewellen, Ted C. 2003. Political Anthropology: An Introduction. 3rd edition. Westport, CN: Praeger.

Locke, John. 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, John. 1997. Political Essays. Ed. Mark Goldie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, John. 2010.  A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings. Ed. Mark Goldie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Marshall, Peter. 2010. Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. Oakland, CA: PM Press.

Sagard, Gabriel. 1968. Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons. Trans. H. H. Langton. New York: Greenwood Press.

Service, Elman. 1962. Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective. New York: Random House.

Stasavage, David. 2020. The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Talbot, Ann. 2010. "The Great Ocean of Knowledge": The Influence of Travel Literature on the Work of John Locke. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Tooker, Elisabeth. 1964. An Ethnography of the Huron Indians, 1615-1649. Washington, DC: Bureau of American Ethnography.

Tooker, Elisabeth. 1990. "Rejoinder to Johansen." Ethnohistory 37:291-297.

Trigger, Bruce. 2000. The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Trigger, Bruce. 2002. The Huron: Farmers of the North. 2nd ed. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning.

Woodburn, James. 1982. "Egalitarian Societies." Man 17:431-51.


Sunday, November 11, 2012

Locke's Evolutionary History of Politics

Reading Jose de Acosta's Natural and Moral History of the Indies is essential for understanding John Locke's political thought and how evolutionary anthropology might support Lockean liberalism.  I have only recently come to that conclusion as I have been revising my Locke chapter for the fourth edition of Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Pinker.

Acosta (1540-1600) was a Jesuit priest who worked in Peru from 1572 to 1586, spending his last year in Mexico.  His Natural and Moral History of the Indies was published in Spanish in 1590.  Following the structure of Pliny's Natural History, Acosta's book was a comprehensive survey of the physical, biological, and anthropological history of the New World.  It was one of many travelogue descriptions of the New World that were avidly read in Europe.  (Another reason for my interest in this book is that my wife and I will be touring South America this coming summer, including a few weeks in the Galapagos Islands in connection with the Mont Pelerin Society's meeting there on the topic of "Evolution, the Human Sciences, and Liberty.") 

This was part of a critical turning point in world history, because for the first time in history, the entire Earth was in a global network of human exchange.  The traditional histories of human life in Europe--as formulated in ancient philosophy and Biblical religion--were challenged by the discovery of an unknown world of human experience.  Much of modern political philosophy was a response to this development--particularly, in the speculation about the original state of nature of humanity, which one can see in the work of Montaigne, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Smith.  Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle continued this tradition of global natural history as inquiry into the universal history of humanity on Earth.  

As indicated by Peter Laslett's list of the books in Locke's library when he was writing his Two Treatises of Government,  Locke had at least eight books on the history of the New World (or the West Indies), including an English translation of Acosta's book.  In his critical edition of the Two Treatises, Laslett has indicated the influence of these books on Locke's writing.  The best work that I know showing how these books shaped Locke's account of the state of nature and the evolution of politics is William Batz's article on "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke."

Acosta's book seems especially important for Locke, because it's the one that Locke directly quotes in the Second Treatise (sec. 102).  This comes in Chapter 8 on "The Beginning of Political Societies," in which Locke argues that human beings are originally by nature free, equal, and independent, so that they enter civil society only by their consent. 

He acknowledges that one objection to this argument is that there is no historical evidence for this claim that human beings were once free and equal, and that they established government by consent.  Locke responds by arguing that there are two kinds of historical evidence for this--the history of America and the history of ancient society in the Bible.

Locke's appeal to history here is fundamental not only for his Two Treatises but also for most of his other writings.  Contrary to what many of Locke's scholarly commentators assume, his reasoning depends not on the logical analysis of abstract ideas but on what he identifies in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Intro., 2) as "this historical, plain method."  This method of historical reasoning from observational experience shows the influence of Locke's medical practice and experimental research, in which he followed the lead of his friend Thomas Sydenham, who insisted that medical science be guided by the experimental history of health and disease in particular patients rather than theoretical reasoning about abstract ideas.  Remarkably, with the exception of a few scholars like Laslett and Batz, most commentators ignore this in their reading of Locke.

So, for example, many scholars debate the meaning of Locke's account of the state of nature as if Locke were engaged in a purely abstract argument without reference to the observable experience of history.  This ignores Locke's clear declaration that "in the beginning all the world was America" (ST, 49), and that "the Kings of the Indians in America" is "still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe" (ST, 108).  Thus, Locke follows a methodological assumption that has been fundamental for evolutionary anthropology--that the study of hunter-gatherers who have survived into recent history can illuminate our understanding of what the first prehistoric human beings must have looked like.

That's why Locke turns to Acosta's book and quotes the following as a description of the original state of nature:  "And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no Government at all.  There are great and apparent Conjectures, says he, that these Men, speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither Kings nor Commonwealths, but lived in Troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Bresil, and many other Nations, which have no certain Kings, but as occasion is offered in Peace or War, they choose their Captains as they please" (ST, 102, quoting Acosta, book 1, chap. 25, pp. 73-74). 

Here's a new translation of this passage from Acosta by Frances Lopez-Morillas: "There are clear indications for a long time these men had no kings or any form of government but lived in free groups like the Indians of Florida nowadays and the Chiriguanas and Brazilians and many other tribes, who do not have regular kings but in accordance with the occasions that arise in war or peace choose their chiefs as they like."

Notice the ambiguity in this passage.  On the one hand, there is said to be among these people "no kings or any form of government" or "no government at all," as Locke says.  And yet, on the other hand, it is said that occasionally in war or peace, these people can choose chiefs or captains to lead them.

This is an ambiguity in Locke's account of the state of nature.  At times, the state of nature seems to be an utterly asocial and apolitical state in which people live as solitary individuals with no structure of rule at all, which can be interpreted to mean that Locke is denying that human beings are political animals by nature.  But, at other times, the state of nature does seem to have some structure of rule, because the family is said to be the "first society," and parental power over children is thus the first structure of authority, although this familial society falls short of "political society" (ST, 77).

This ambiguity is seen in Locke's definition of the state of nature as "men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them" (ST, 19).  Living without any common superior or judge with authority might suggest an asocial state of solitary individuals, but "men living together according to reason" clearly indicates some kind of rule-governed social order.

A similar ambiguity is that while Locke says that the state of nature is a state of peace rather than a state of war, and thus disagrees with Hobbes, Locke also says that the state of nature easily becomes a state of war that induces people to establish government to enforce peace, which agrees with Hobbes (ST, 19, 123).  Here is where the Straussians see Locke's Hobbesianism as his secret teaching.

But this assumption that this shows some complicated rhetorical strategy of secret writing becomes less plausible if one looks at the anthropological reports about America that Locke was studying.  For example, one report from the French missionary Gabriel Sagard-Theodat describes the Great Lakes Indians in Canada as organized by familial and tribal attachments under the leadership of their chiefs, which shows, he concluded, that "man is a social animal who cannot live without company."  And yet the reports of violence and warfare among the American Indians show that living without formal government made it hard for them to live always in peace with one another.

What look like contradictions in Locke's arguments actually show Locke's effort to accurately generalize conclusions about the complex variability of this historical experience, in which primitive people can live orderly social lives governed by informal customary rules, even though the absence of formal governmental institutions makes it hard to settle all disputes peacefully.

Acosta distinguishes three levels or stages in the history of government in Peru and Mexico.  The first human beings to arrive in America were savage hunters who crossed over a land bridge from Asia to America.  (Acosta was the first person to propose this theory of the original human migration from Asia to America over a land bridge, a theory that is now widely accepted by evolutionary anthropologists.)  These hunters had no government.  "They had no chief, nor did they recognize one, nor did they worship any gods or have rites or any religion whatsoever" (380-81).

The second stage is "that of free associations or communities, where the people are governed by the advice of many, and are like councils.  In time of war, these elect a captain who is obeyed by a whole tribe or province.  In time of peace, each town or group of folk rules itself, and each has some prominent men whom the mass of the people respect; and at most some of these join together on matters that seem important to them to see what they ought to do" (359).

The third stage is that of monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good" (346).  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as beasts and treated themselves as gods (346, 359, 402).

In some passages of his book, however, Acosta combines the first two stages and suggests that even the most primitive hunter-gatherers had some informal leadership by which prominent people could mediate disputes and lead them in war, but always constrained by the informal consent or resistance of the community.  The one passage quoted by Locke is an example of this, as though Locke figured out that even primitive foragers would have some episodic and informal structure of rule in which some individuals would have more influence than others, although excessive dominance would be checked by popular resistance.

In the state of nature, Locke observes, "they judged the ablest, and most likely, to Rule over them.  Conformable hereunto we find the People of America, who (living out of reach of the Conquering Swords, and spreading domination of the two great Empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoy'd their own natural freedom, though, ceteris paribus, they commonly prefer the Heir of their deceased King; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by and set up the stoutest and bravest Man for their Ruler" (ST, 105).  The American Indian Kings were originally temporary war leaders.  "And though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council.  Though the War itself, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the King's sole Authority" (ST, 108).

This appeal to the historical anthropology of the American Indians as showing that government was originally limited in its powers and its ends is part of Locke's argument for liberal toleration in his Letters on Toleration.  He argues that there is no justification for European rulers in America to compel the American Indians to convert to Christianity, particularly since they are "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and the Law of Nature, and no ways offending against the Laws of the Society" (40).

In his Second Letter on Toleration, Locke writes: "There are nations in the West-Indies which have no other End of their Society, but their mutual defence against their enemies.  In these, their Captain, or Prince, is Sovereign Commander in time of War; but in time of Peace, neither he nor any body else has any Authority over any of the Society.  You cannot deny  but other, even temporal ends, are attainable by these Commonwealths, if they had been otherwise instituted and appointed to these ends" (77).

In his attack on Locke's Letter on Toleration, Jonas Proast asserted that "Commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all the Benefits which Political Government can yield; and therefore if the spiritual and eternal Interests of Men may any way be procured or advanced by Political Government, the procuring and advancing those Interests must in all reason be received amongst the Ends of Civil Society, and so consequently fall within the compass of the Magistrate's Jurisdiction" (69).

In response to Proast, Locke insisted that the question was whether government has any power to use force in matters of religion or for the salvation of souls.  The argument against this is that governments are not established to use force for such ends.  Rather, governments are established by men only to protect themselves against injuries from other men for which there is no protection except governmental force.  Religious opinions or forms of worship do not injure those who disagree in any way that requires governmental force against those with those opinions or worship.

To support this conclusion, Locke points again to the American Indians:
"let me ask you, Whether it be not possible that Men, to whom the Rivers and Woods afforded the spontaneous Provisions of Life, and so with no private Possessions of Land, had no inlarged Desires after Riches or Power; should live together in Society, make one People of one Language under one Chieftain, who shall have no other Power but to command them in time of War against their common Enemies, without any municipal Laws, Judges, or any Person with Superiority establish'd amongst them, but ended all their private Differences, if any arose, by the extemporary Determination of their Neighbors, or of Arbitrators chosen by the Parties.  I ask you whether in such a Commonwealth, the Chieftain who was the only Man of Authority amongst them, had any Power to use the Force of the Commonwealth to any other End but the Defense of it against an Enemy, though other Benefits were attainable by it." (76)

Today's evolutionary anthropologists might complain that Locke has confused two levels of primitive social organization--bands and chiefdoms.  But still, Locke is remarkably accurate in describing how foraging societies without formal governments--called "stateless societies" today--enforce customary norms of conduct through private arbitration, while also organizing around war leaders in defense against outside groups.

But notice also that the American Indian societies to which Locke is appealing as a standard for political freedom and limited government are societies of hunter-gatherers in a primitive state, and they survived only as long as they remained out of reach of the Incan and Mexican empires.  Thus, these hunting-gathering societies were both culturally uncivilized and militarily weak.

The problem for Locke's liberalism is how to combine freedom, civilization, and power.

Beginning 5,000 to 10,000 years ago, with the development of agriculture after the Last Ice Age, human beings formed sedentary communities with growing populations, which led to the first agrarian states. In these novel circumstances, it became ever harder for subordinates to organize to resist the despotic dominance of their leaders, who now ruled through elaborate military, religious, administrative, and monarchic bureaucracies.

These agrarian states provided the conditions for high civilization — economic wealth, technological innovation, cultural progress (particularly, through the invention of writing), bureaucratic administration, and military power. But that high civilization came with a big price — the loss of the individual freedom from domination that human beings enjoyed in foraging societies. Among foragers, the inequality of power, wealth, and status is minimal. Foraging societies don’t allow some to tyrannize over others. But agrarian states allow ruling elites to live by exploiting those they rule.

Consequently, the history of politics over the past 5,000 years has been largely a conflict between freedom and domination — with the rulers inclined to tyrannical domination and the ruled looking for ways to escape that domination. There has often seemed to be no good resolution to the conflict, because human beings seemed to be caught in a tragic dilemma of having to choose between freedom without civilization and civilization without freedom.

Classical liberalism attempts to overcome this dilemma through liberal republican capitalism. The combination of a liberal society, a republican polity, and a capitalist economy promotes both freedom and civilization: people can be socially, politically, and economically free, while enjoying all the benefits of a progressive civilization. The natural desires for social status, political rule, and economic wealth will always create inequalities of rank that will incline those at the top to become tyrannical. But we can mitigate this through social, political, and economic structures of countervailing power that create competing elites so that power does not become unduly concentrated or unchecked. For classical liberals, such a system is imperfect. But it’s the best we can do.

The Darwinian history of politics provides scientific evidence and argumentation that supports the account of political evolution found in the writings of Locke, Hume, and Smith. The political history of humanity turns on the shifting balance between authority and liberty, between the natural desire of the few for dominance and the natural desire of the many to resist dominance. This shifting balance underlies the three-stage evolution of political history: the egalitarian hierarchy of Paleolithic politics, the despotic hierarchy of agrarian-state politics, and the modern emergence of commercial republican liberalism based on a new kind of egalitarian hierarchy combined with high civilization.

REFERENCES
Acosta, Jose de, Natural and Moral History of the Indies, trans. Frances Lopez-Morillas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

Batz, William G., "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke," Journal of the History of Ideas, 35 (1974): 663-70.

Burgaleta, Claudio, Jose de Acosta, S.J. (1540-1600): His Life and Thought (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1999).

Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Locke, John, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010).

Some of these points have been developed in some previous posts here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.



Thursday, February 20, 2025

Democracy and Autocracy Among the North American Indians

I have written some posts about how John Locke studied the history of government among the American Indians.  From his reading of Jose de Acosta and Gabriel Sagard, he learned that there were at least three stages in the evolutionary history of government in Indigenous America.  

First, among the pure hunter-gatherer Indians, there were no formal governmental institutions, but there were informal leaders selected by the people of each band to mediate disputes and to lead them in war.  Second, among the horticultural tribes, there was a government by councils, in which leaders would have to win the consent of the council members for any decision.  In these first two stages, people enjoyed the freedom that came from government by popular consent that looked like a kind of democracy.

Acosta's third stage was that of autocratic monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good."  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as slaves and treated themselves as gods (Acosta, 346, 359, 402).

This political history of the American Indians confirms David Stasavage's claim that both democracy and autocracy are natural but not inevitable in human history.

Recently, there have been two general histories of the North American Indians--Pekka Hamalainen's Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America and Kathleen DuVal's Native Nations: A Millenium in North America.  And they both provide further confirmation for this political history of the American Indians as moving from democracy to autocracy and then back to democracy.

The ancestors of the first people to settle North America came from Upper Paleolithic populations in Siberia and East Asia.  As early as 30,000 years ago, or as late as 14,000 years ago, they migrated into North America by crossing the Bering Land Bridge, and then they probably traveled by boat along the west coast of North America, until some of their descendants reached South America within a few thousand years (Raff 2022).

For thousands of years, these first American Indians lived as egalitarian hunter-gatherer-fishers in bands with informal leaders whose power depended on persuasion rather than coercion.

Somewhere between nine and six thousand years ago, people in the Mesoamerican highlands domesticated corn from the wild grass teosinte.  By 1500 BCE, there is evidence for the systematic cultivation of corn and agrarian village settlements.

Through trading networks, corn seeds from Mesoamerica reached the North American Southwest around 2000 BCE.  Through a long history of domestication, corn evolved into the maiz de ocho variety.  And by 500 CE, farmers were growing beans and squash along with maiz de ocho.  These three domesticated plants became the staples for food production in North America.

A climate shift brought rising global temperatures around 900 CE (the Medieval Warm Period), which lengthened growing seasons and supported more intensive and systematic farming.  Eventually, this allowed for the emergence of cities with centralized power structures (Hamalainen 2022: 12-19).

In North America, the best known ancient cities are in Arizona, Illinois, and Alabama.  In Arizona, it's the Hohokam (or Huhugam) people in the Sonoran Desert (1050-1400).  In Illinois, it's Cahokia, near the Mississippi east of St. Louis (1000-1400).  In Alabama, it's Moundville, near Tuscaloosa (1150-1400) (DuVal 2024: 7-40).

At the peak of their power, these cities were highly centralized power structures ruled by elite chiefs and priests exercising religious, political, and economic dominance over the commoners.  The ultimate source of authority was the claim of the rulers to have access to a sacred realm of supernatural beings.  "Chiefs and priests knew--or claimed to know--how to communicate with other-than-human beings and to control the sun, the Earth, seasons, rains, crops, and game" (Hamalainen 2022: 18).  This power of the rulers extended even into the afterlife.   For example, at Cahokia, to accompany elite people in death, hundreds of commoners could be ritually sacrificed and buried in mass graves.

But then there was another climate shift around 1300 towards colder, drier, and more unstable weather (the Little Ice Age).  Harvests began to fail, and famines became more common.  The elite rulers of the large, centralized agrarian cities lost their supernatural power over the natural forces that determined the success or failure of farming.  The O'odham descendants of the Hohokam people have stories in their oral tradition about ancient people rising up to overthrow their rulers who could no longer provide prosperity.

By 1400, the cities of Cahokia, Moundville, and Hohokam were abandoned.  People no longer wanted to live in centralized hierarchical cities ruled by elites.  Trade, religion, and politics became more democratized in that people lived in small bands and tribal communities where decisions were made by popular consensus (Hamalainen 2022: 12-24; DuVal 2024: 41-74).

At this point, North America became what Hamalainen has called "The Egalitarian Continent."  And this is the continent that the European colonists saw.  All across Native North America, the Europeans saw a remarkably egalitarian and democratic style of politics among the Indians.

For example, when the British missionary David Jones journeyed through the Shawnee towns north of the Ohio River in 1772-1773, he reported:

They look on it that God made them free--that one man has no natural right to rule over another.  In this point, they agree with our greatest politicians, who affirm that a ruler's authority extends no further than the PLEASURE of the people. . . . Every town has its head men, some of whom are by us called kings; but by what I can learn, this appellation is by the Indians given to none, only as they learned it from us.  The chief use of their head-men is to give counsel, especially in the time of war (Jones 1774: 54).

This confirmed what Locke had seen a hundred years earlier in the European reports about the Indians, who originally lived as free people who were ruled only by those leaders to whom all individuals had consented (ST, 103-107).


REFERENCES

DuVal, Kathleen. 2024. Native Nations: A Millennium in North America. New York: Random House.

Hamalainen, Pekka. 2022. Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America. New York: Liveright Publishing.

Jones, David. 1774. A Journal of Two Visits Made to Some Nations of Indians on the West Side of the River Ohio, in the Years 1772 and 1773.  Burlington, NJ: Isaac Collins.

Raff, Jennifer. 2022. Origin: A Genetic History of the Americas. New York: Twelve.

Tuesday, April 22, 2025

Ten Principles of Darwinian Lockean Liberalism, Part Two

NATURAL PUNISHMENT

3.  The natural rights to life, liberty, and property are enforced in the state of nature by every individual having the natural right to punish offenders of the natural law--either through forcible punishment or through reputational punishment.

Locke thought that in the state of nature, everyone had the "executive power of the law of nature" to punish those who violated the natural law that no one was to harm another.   Locke claimed that in the state of nature, there is a law of nature "that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (ST, sec. 6).  But then he immediately qualified this no-harm principle by saying that one may rightly harm another in punishing someone for an offense against the law of nature.  This must be so because the law of nature could not be a true law if it were not enforced by punishment of those who violate it.  Enforcing the no-harm principle requires harming those who would harm us.


In the state of nature, Locke explained:
"The Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation.  For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders, and if any one in the State of Nature may punish another, for any evil he has done, every one may do so.  For in that State of perfect Equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one, over another, what any may do in Prosecution of that Law, every one must needs have a Right to do" (sec. 7).
Notice that Locke did not rely on divine punishment to enforce the law of nature.  The law of nature, like all the other laws that concern "Men in this World" would be in "vain" if individual human beings did not punish the offenders of that law.  This punishment has two distinct purposes: restraint and reparation (secs. 8, 10-11).  Punishing for restraint is to prevent or deter misconduct, and everyone has the right to punish for this purpose.  Punishing for reparation belongs only to the injured party, who seeks some recompense for the damages he has suffered.

Locke indicated that this human punishment of offenders in the state of nature works at three levels.  Through first-party punishment, individuals punish themselves through conscience and guilt (secs. 8, 21, 122, 209).  Through second-party punishment, individuals punish their tormentor through retaliation and revenge (secs. 8, 10-11, 18-19).  Through third-party punishment, individuals can join with those who have been injured unjustly for a collective punishment of the offender (sec. 10).

Locke also distinguished two general kinds of punishment.  In the Second Treatise, Locke stressed forcible punishment as punishing with physical force those who have inflicted physical harm on their victims, which included capital punishment of thieves and murderers (ST, 11, 17).  In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke identified reputational punishment as a second form of natural punishment: by the "law of reputation," established by a "tacit consent" in "the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world," social opinion calls whatever is socially praised virtuous and whatever is socially blamed vicious; and those who disobey this law are punished with a bad reputation (II.28.10).  In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke advised parents that they should use this law of reputation--social praise and blame--as the most powerful means for shaping the moral character of their children: this was "the great secret of education" for cultivating the moral and intellectual virtues in children and particularly for instilling "civility"--a "respect and good will to all people" (secs. 56-65).

Since the moral standards of this law of reputation vary across cultures, Locke was criticized for being a moral relativist who denied the eternal natural law.  But he responded to this criticism by insisting that despite the cultural relativity, there was some universal regularity in the reputational standards of morality--so that "as to the main, they for the most part kept the same everywhere" (ECHU, II.28.110).

Darwin agreed with Locke.  In his Descent of Man, Darwin explained the evolution of the natural moral sense as rooted in the evolved social instincts of human nature that make human beings intensely attentive to the approbation or disapprobation of people in their social groups, so that they want to have the good reputation for displaying praiseworthy virtues and avoiding blameworthy vices (2004, 120-151).  

Evolutionary anthropologists studying the ethnographic record have confirmed this by finding that there are universal social norms of moral good and evil enforced in societies around the world and throughout history by reputational punishment--norms of social cooperation that include helping kin, loyalty to one's group, bravery, generosity, fairness in social exchange, and respecting property rights (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse 2019; Westermarck 1906).

These ethnographies of foraging bands show that they form moral communities through agreement on moral rules and then enforce those rules through the forcible and reputational punishment of deviants (Boehm 2012).  Through gossip, ridicule, and shunning, those who violate the rules are punished with bad reputations, and people will refuse to cooperate with them.  The most pervasive means of reputational punishment, deeply rooted in our evolutionary history beginning with our hunter-gatherer ancestors, is gossip (Boehm 2012; Feinberg et al. 2012; Feiberg et al. 2014; Hoebel 1955; Raihani and Bshary 2019; Wiessner 2005; Wu et al. 2016a, 2016b).  Through gossip, we ridicule, shame, or denigrate people for their bad behavior and thus punish them by giving them a bad reputation that imposes social costs on them.  Empirical studies have shown that most human speaking time--perhaps 65% across cultures--is devoted to gossip (Dunbar 2004).

If reputational punishment is not enough to enforce obedience to the rules, then the community can use coercive force, such as expelling deviants from the group, or, in the worst cases, killing them.  Nevertheless, foragers resort to capital punishment only rarely, and usually it's to punish a murderer.

Forcible punishment creates two possible problems.  The group can be torn apart by conflict.  Or an angry relative of a person killed can take vengeance on the executioner.  To avoid these problems, the group must reach a consensus on the punishment and even persuade the close relatives of the victim to cooperate.  In rare cases, the entire community might participate in the execution.  Or, more commonly, the group will delegate a close relative of the victim to do the killing.

Executing a bully is often dangerous for the executioner, however, because bullies are often formidable and aggressive enough to fight back and harm the executioner.  The solution to this problem, is killing at a distance.  There is plenty of evidence that human beings evolved for throwing and shooting projectiles--rocks, spears, arrows, and bullets--that can kill even the strongest opponent from a safe distance (Bingham 1999, 2000; Bingham and Souza 2009).

Some ancient cave drawings provide evidence for this.  For example, rock drawings from a cave at the stone age site of Remigia, Castellon, Spain, dated to sometime before 6500 BC, show this.  In one drawing, we see that on the right there are ten men jubilantly holding their bows over their heads.  On the left, we see a man lying on the ground with exactly ten arrows sticking in his body or on the ground.  Given what we know about hunter-gatherer foragers in the ethnographic record, it's more likely that the victim here was a deviant member of the band who had violated the moral rules of the band--perhaps by murdering someone--and he was becoming a bully who was trying to assert his dominance over the group (Boehm 2017).   One study of the ancient rock drawings in the inland regions of the Iberian Mediterranean basin identified forty-nine scenes of violent content (such as battles, ambushes, and fights), which included eight scenes of "execution squads" (Lopez-Montalvo 2015).

CONSENT TO GOVERNMENT

4.  To overcome the insecurity of natural rights in the state of nature, where every individual is judge in his own case, and his judgment is often distorted by his personal bias, human beings have consented to formal governments to secure their natural rights through formal laws and institutions for making, enforcing, and adjudicating impartial laws.

Locke recognized that there are at least three problems with relying on the individual right to punish to enforce the law of nature in the state of nature (secs. 123-126).

First, there's the problem of knowledge:  many individuals do not have a clear and unbiased knowledge of the law of nature.  In the Letter Concerning Toleration (43), Locke says that the American Indians are "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and the Law of Nature."  But in the Second Treatise (sec. 123), he says that in the state of nature "the greater part" of men are "no strict Observers of Equity and Justice."  In fact, some men are so "degenerate" that they have no knowledge of the law of nature, and they become like wild animals in their violent attacks on others (ST, secs. 10-11, 128).

Second, there's the problem of partiality: individuals being partial to themselves often cannot render impartial judgment in their own cases, and they are often negligent or unconcerned in judging the cases of others.

Third, there's the problem of cost:  punishment can be too costly to execute, because the offender will fight back and inflict injury on those who try to punish him.

To solve these three problems, people will give up their powers in the state of nature for legislating, judging, and executing the law of nature (secs. 128-131).  They will consent to enter a political society with governmental institutions for legislating, judging, and executing positive laws for the whole community that conform to the law of nature.  This can solve the problem of knowledge, because the legislative power will publicly promulgate the laws.  This can solve the problem of partiality, because the judicial power will decide legal cases through impartial and fair judges.  This can solve the problem of cost, because the executive power will employ the collective force of the community to punish lawbreakers in ways that minimize the costs of punishment for individuals.  All of this should serve the common good of the whole community--in securing the natural rights of all individuals to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

So while Locke disagreed with Hobbes' claim that the state of nature was always a state of war, Locke agreed that there was such a propensity for the state of nature to become a state of war that people would consent to government to secure a more peaceful life.  Some anthropologists have objected that hunter-gatherer societies have been generally peaceful, even calling them the "harmless people" who have never known war (Fry and Soderberg 2013).  

But Darwinian anthropologists have argued that if hunter-gatherers appear to be peaceful, this is because usually by the time anthropologists have contact with them, the foragers have come under state control, which has had a pacifying effect, just as Hobbes and Locke said: because the state of nature easily becomes a state of war, people will benefit from having governments to enforce laws collectively that dampen their tendency to violent conflict.  Once anthropologists probe into the distant history of foragers, they discover a history of extreme violence that was reduced once they came under governmental authority (Boehm 2012; Lee 1979, 370-400; Wrangham and Glowacki 2012).  

For example, the most violent society ever studied by anthropologists are the Waorani, living in the remote Ecuadorian rainforest, among whom for some time about 60% of all deaths were homicides.  The Waorani themselves wanted to end the killing, and they were happy when they came under a governmental authority that reduced the killing (Robarchek and Robarchek 2008).

Of course, even if people have consented to government to secure their peaceful enjoyment of their natural rights to life, liberty, and property, that government can itself become the greatest threat to their rights.  The inevitable conflicts of interest that arise in every community will incline those with political power to use that power to favor their own interests over the interests of others, and thus government will often fail to promote the public good in securing the natural rights of all.  If government becomes utterly tyrannical, then the rights of those being exploited are less secure under government than they would have been in the state of nature, because in a tyrannical government, the rulers can use the collective force of government to exploit the ruled (secs. 91-93).

Although Locke spoke of individuals "wholly giving up" their right to punish offenders against the law of nature in consenting to government, he made it clear that individuals could reclaim this right whenever they were thrown back into the state of nature (ST, 99, 127-130).  So, for example, we have the natural right to kill a thief who threatens our life and property if there is no officer of government available to protect us, because when the thief exercises force without right against us, and there is no common judge with authority to protect us, we are in a state of war with that thief (18-19).

Similarly, if a tyrannical government exercises force without right in threatening our life, liberty, and property, we can rightly defend ourselves against that government that has put us into a state of war (199-204).

Moreover, even if in consenting to government, we have partially given up our natural power of forcible punishment of those who threaten us, we still retain our natural power of reputational punishment of people through our power of approving or disapproving their conduct, and thus enforcing by popular opinion our social standards of virtue and vice (ECHU, II.28.10-11).

What Locke calls the law of reputation is what evolutionary theorists of cooperation--beginning with Richard Alexander (1987)--have called "indirect reciprocity."  In direct reciprocity, we reciprocate the cooperation or defection of others: if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours (Trivers 1971).  In indirect reciprocity, we reciprocate someone's reputation for cooperation or defection:  if you have the reputation for scratching other people's backs, I will scratch yours.  In large societies, where we need to interact with many people who are not our kin, and with whom we have not had any previous interactions, we rely on their reputations to decide whether we can trust them; and our social happiness depends on our maintaining our own good reputations for being virtuous people.

Insofar as Locke saw this moral law of reputation as compatible with individual liberty, he would have agreed with Friedrich Hayek's criticism of John Stuart Mill's "no-harm principle" in On Liberty.  Mill wrote:

"The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion.  That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any f their number is self-protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. . . . The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (1956, 13).

Following this principle, Mill condemned "social tyranny" as "tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling" and the "despotism of custom." 

Hayek disagreed: "the fact that conduct within the private sphere is not a proper object for coercive action by the state does not necessarily mean that in a free society such conduct should also be exempt from the pressure of opinion or disapproval. . . . John Stuart Mill directed his heaviest attack against such 'moral coercion.' . . . it probably makes for greater clarity not to represent as coercion the pressure that public approval or disapproval exerts to secure obedience to moral rules and conventions" (1960, 146).  In a free society, Hayek believed, society but not the state enforces moral virtue.  The enforcement of moral rules through the social pressure of public approval or disapproval should not be seen as coercion (1960, 62-63, 402, 451).

When Patrick Deneen (in Why Liberalism Failed) scorns Locke's liberalism for its "atomistic individualism" and its failure to cultivate the moral virtues of social life, he says nothing about this--about how Locke insisted on the importance of promoting social virtue through social praise and blame.

Locke thought he could understand the history of government by studying the history of the American Indians.  From his reading of Jose de Acosta and Gabriel Sagard, Locke learned that there were at least three stages in the evolutionary history of government in indigenous America.  

First, among the pure hunter-gatherer Indians, there were no formal governmental institutions, but there were informal leaders selected by the people of each band to mediate disputes and to lead them in war.  Second, among the horticultural tribes, there was a government by councils, in which leaders would have to win the consent of the council members for any decision.  In these first two stages, people enjoyed the freedom that came from government by popular consent that looked like a kind of democracy.

Acosta's third stage was that of autocratic monarchy or empire--like that of the Incan Empire or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good."  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as slaves and treated themselves as gods (Acosta, 346, 359, 402).

Today, political anthropologists and paleo archaeologists who study the evolutionary history of government have seen a roughly fourfold evolution--from bands to tribes to chiefdoms to states--that resembles Acosta's three levels.  For example, in the political history of Indigenous North America, there seems to have been a movement from democratic bands and tribes to autocratic chiefdoms and then back to democratic bands and tribes (DuVal 2024; Hamalainen 2022).

For thousands of years, the first American Indian settlers in North America lived as egalitarian hunter-gatherer-fishers in bands with informal leaders whose power depended on persuasion rather than coercion.

Then, between 1500 BC and 500 AD, there is evidence for the systematic cultivation of corn, beans, and squash, which allowed some tribal peoples to settle into horticultural villages that were probably governed by tribal councils and leaders with popular consent.

Around 900 AD, a climate shift (the Medieval Warm Period) brought rising global temperatures, which lengthened growing seasons and supported more intensive and systematic farming.  This eventually allowed for the emergence of cities with centralized power structures.  The best known of these cities are Hohokam (Arizona), Cahokia (Illinois), and Moundville (Alabama).  At the peak of their power, these cities were ruled by elite chiefs and priests exercising religious, political, and economic dominance over the commoners.

But then there was another climate shift around 1300 towards colder, drier, and more unstable weather (the Little Ice Age).  Harvests began to fail, and famines became more common.  By 1400, the cities of Cahokia, Moundville, and Hohokam were abandoned.  People no longer wanted to live in centralized hierarchical cities ruled by elites who exploited the people under them.  Trade, religion, and politics became more democratized in that people chose to live in small foraging bands and horticultural tribal communities where decisions were made by popular consensus.

This popular rebellion against exploitative elite rule illustrates the fifth principle of Locke's political philosophy.


To be continued . . .