Showing posts sorted by relevance for query No Kings. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query No Kings. Sort by date Show all posts

Sunday, October 19, 2025

More Waa-Barking at the "No Kings!" Protests



 No Kings! Protest Overflows Grant Park in Chicago



                                              No Kings! March Fills Downtown Chicago


Yesterday, I was at the "No Kings!" protest in Chicago.  This was one of over 2,500 protests across the United States.  It was probably the single biggest mass protest in American history, with estimates of over 8 million people turning out.  The second biggest protest was the previous "No Kings!" protests in June.

There are reports that the march after the rally in Chicago stretched out over 22 city blocks.  I can attest to that.  And while it's hard to estimate crowd sizes in such circumstances, I would say the crowd had to be over 300,000.  My point of reference for that estimate is my experience in going to Dallas Cowboys football games at AT&T Stadium in Arlington, Texas.  Counting standing-room-only tickets, that stadium can hold over 100,000 people.  I have been to games with counts close to that.  Comparing those crowds exiting the stadium with what I saw yesterday suggests to me that the crowds yesterday must have been at least three or four times larger.

So what were all of these people in Chicago and around the country doing?  As I have previously said about the protests in June, when I attended the one in Grand Rapids, the "No Kings!" protests are the waa-barks of America's chimpanzee politics of resistance to Trump.  Subordinate chimpanzees utter pant-grunts to signal their fear and submission before a dominant chimp.  But subordinates can also utter waa-barks to signal their defiance of a dominant chimp.  If enough subordinates scream their waa-barks, and if the dominant chimp does not have a sufficiently strong coalition of supporters, he can be overthrown.  

If you look at the C-SPAN videos of Trump's cabinet meetings, you see Trump ordering his cabinet members to pant-grunt to him.  It often takes over an hour to go around the table with every cabinet member praising Trump as the greatest, most intelligent, most lovable leader in the history of the world.  Or if you look at the video of Trump in Ohio when he endorsed Vance for U.S. Senator, you'll hear him brag about how Vance was once a fervent critic of Trump, but now, Trump says, "he's kissing my ass."  "Kissing my ass" is Trump's fancy term for pant-grunting.

At Trump's birthday on June 14th, we saw a military parade for Trump that was a display of pant-grunting.  But we also saw that the number of spectators at the parade was small, and many of them were looking at their phones to see images of the massive crowds at the "No Kings!" protests on that same day.  The waa-barks were louder than the pant-grunts.  Yesterday, the waa-barks were even louder.  Waa-barks are one of the weapons of nonviolent resistance to oppressive dominance.

Last week, MAGA politicians warned that the "No King's" protestors were "domestic terrorists" and "Marxists" who "hated America," and that their protests would contribute to the violent insurrection of "Antifa."

I saw no evidence in Chicago for any of this.  I did see a small tent for the "Revolutionary Communists of America."  But I didn't see many people stopping off at the tent.  And I didn't see any evidence that the "No Kings!" protestors were supporting communism.  The protests pledged their loyalty to the Constitution of the United States and the American tradition of individual liberty and rights, which they saw as threatened by Trump.  I can't imagine how communists could do that.  For example, the crowd repeatedly chanted: "This Is What Democracy Looks Like."

Upholding the Constitution against Trump's unconstitutional dictatorship was the overriding theme of the protests as expressed in their signs, their chants, and in the speeches.

The next most prominent them was protecting immigrants--even illegal immigrants--from ICE.  The argument was that hard-working immigrants with families who paid their taxes and contributed to American society should be recognized as Americans with the individual rights of Americans--such as the Fourth Amendment right to due process of law.

An equally prominent theme was "We Love Chicago" and "Hands off Chicago."  Some of the most deeply emotional displays was the determination to defend Chicago and its multiethnic neighborhoods against ICE raids.  A lot of the talk was about neighbors organizing to protect their neighborhoods from ICE by people identifying ICE officers and warning their neighbors by blowing whistles in the streets and helping people escape capture by the ICE masked kidnappers.

One speaker argued that this was similar to Chicago's history of protecting fugitive slaves and refusing to obey the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which made it a crime to help fugitive slaves running away from their slave masters.  I found this particularly interesting because it suggested that the immigration laws being enforced by ICE were unjust laws--like the Fugitive Slave Law--and therefore there was a moral obligation to disobey those laws and the ICE officers enforcing them.

There were no National Guardsmen to be seen--suggesting that the federal court order against the deployment of the National Guard in Chicago was being obey.  Nor were there any ICE officers visible.

There were a lot of Chicago Police officers, but they were mostly stationed around the edges of the crowd.  They were clearly there to intervene if necessary to keep the peace.  But they never engaged the crowd in any way, because there were no disturbances that needed to be quelled.   The remarkable peacefulness of the protestors was crucial for showing that the claim that they were "domestic terrorists" was ridiculous.

But although peaceful, they yelled their waa-barks for all the world to hear.



                     Trump Has Posted This Video as His Answer to the No Kings Protests

Sunday, June 15, 2025

Popular Lockeans at the "No Kings" Protests Against Trump

 


On February 19, 2025, this picture was posted on the official White House "X" account.  Trump had posted: "CONGESTION PRICING IS DEAD.  Manhattan, and all of New York, is SAVED.  LONG LIVE THE KING!"




My wife and I participated in the "No Kings" protest in Grand Rapids, Michigan.  This was one of over 2,000 protest gatherings across the United States attracting millions of participants.  We were surprised by the size of the crowd.  There appeared to be something over 20,000 people, which is about ten percent of the population of the city of Grand Rapids.  The first rally was in the park on the Grand River in front of the Gerald Ford Presidential Museum.  When we arrived, the park was so packed with people that it was impossible for us to get in, which was also true for thousands of other people milling around the area.

We were also surprised that there were no police anywhere, as if the Grand Rapids police had decided that there was no reason to expect any disruptions from the protest crowds.  Moreover, there were no "Proud Boys" or "Michigan militia" types carrying guns who might have caused trouble.  Later in the afternoon, we heard about the political assassination in Minnesota that reportedly caused some of the "No Kings" protests in Minnesota to be cancelled.

These protests were scheduled for June 14 to counter Trump's military parade in Washington to celebrate his birthday and the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Army.  I watched the parade on CSPAN.  The CSPAN cameras showed remarkably small crowds in the bleachers and on the grass.  Of course, the White House claimed that over 250,000 people attended.  But if that were true, the Mall would have been completely covered with people, which was not the case.

To me, Trump's military parade was really dull and lifeless.  Many of the spectators at the parade showed the same reaction.  Here's a picture of some of them:




The "No Kings" protests raise at least two kinds of questions.  First, what motivates millions of people to turn out for these mass protests?  What do they expect to achieve?  And how likely are they to succeed?  

Secondly, what's wrong with monarchy?  Why do most Americans--and perhaps most people around the world today--assume that monarchy is bad?  Should we take seriously the argument of some intellectuals supporting Trump (such as Curtis Yarvin) that monarchy is a better form of government than democracy, and therefore Americans should be happy to have Donald Trump as their king?


NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE AS LOCKEAN NATURAL PUNISHMENT OF DICTATORS

The people participating in these mass protests can be identified as "popular Lockeans."  I have written about that term as used by historian T. H. Breen to describe the ordinary Americans who supported the American Revolution in acting according to the principles of John Locke even though most of them had never read Locke.  In the state of nature, Locke thought, everyone has the "executive power of the law of nature," which is the natural right to punish those who violate the law of nature; and this can be expressed in both violent and nonviolent resistance to tyranny.  The American Revolution began with American nonviolent resistance from 1761 to 1775, followed by the violent resistance in the Revolutionary War from 1775 to 1783.  June 14, 1775 was the day that George Washington was formally appointed Commander of the Continental Army by the Second Continental Congress.  In July of that year, the "Appeal to Heaven" Flag was adopted as a battle flag for the American Army, which explicitly invoked Locke's term for revolutionary violence.

Erica Chenoweth and her colleagues see the "No Kings" protests as part of the growing nonviolent resistance to Trump.  As indicated in some previous posts, Chenoweth has compiled an impressive data set (from 1900 to the present) for violent and nonviolent resistance movements that shows that every campaign of nonviolent protest that achieved the active and sustained participation of just 3.5 percent of the population was successful.  As indicated on the "No Kings" website, the organizers are inspired by the "3.5 principle"--believing that mobilizing only a small proportion of the people in mass protests can overturn a dictatorial ruler.

Over the past 40 years, scholars like Chenoweth and Gene Sharp have developed practical rules for organizing successful nonviolent resistance movements.  One of the most important features of this is avoiding violence by having well-trained "marshals" at every protest whose job is to manage the crowd to suppress any disturbance that might become violent.  We saw those marshals at work at the Grand Rapids protest.

The political theory of nonviolent resistance is Lockean in being founded on the fundamental principle that all governmental authority depends on the consent of the governed, and therefore governments fall when the people withdraw their consent through nonviolent or violent resistance.

As Chenoweth has indicated, protest movements succeed when they gain momentum.  And momentum can be measured through a simple law of physics:  momentum equals mass times velocity (p = mv).  The momentum of dissent is a product of participation (mass) and the number of protest events in a week (velocity).  So as the number of participants in the "No Kings" movement increases, and as the number of protests per week increase, the movement gains momentum, and thus becomes more successful.

The test will come when law enforcement and military people are ordered to shoot the protestors.  Will they obey their orders?  If they disobey, then the protestors have won.  Even if they obey, this will provoke a moral revulsion in the country that will draw more people into the protests.

Another test will come in the mid-term elections in November of 2026.  If opponents of Trump take control of the two Houses of Congress, then the Congress can impeach him.  If Trump's Republicans cancel the elections, then the popular movement to overturn Trump's rule becomes stronger.


THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MONARCHY

But why "No Kings"?  Why are so many Americans not persuaded by Yarvin's argument that Robert Filmer's defense of divine-right monarchy was superior to Locke's theory of government by popular consent?

As I have indicated in previous posts, monarchy was the most common form of government for over 5,000 years, but then around 1900, the number of nonmonarchies began to surpass the number of monarchies.  There are two possible reasons for this.  First, monarchy has always depended on perceiving society as a rigid hierarchy in the chain of command, in which everyone knew his place.  At the top was a ruling elite--the monarch and one or two percent of the people who were nobles and priests.  At the bottom, about 80-90% of the population were peasants.  One possible answer as to why this premodern conception of natural and divine hierarchy has been undermined in modern culture is that modernity has adopted the Lockean evolutionary symbolic niche construction of the bourgeois culture of equal liberty.  "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . ."

Consequently, as I have written previously, the few monarchic governments that survive today--like the British monarchy of King Charles III--are not real monarchies because the king is only a ceremonial head of state without any absolute power.

A second reason for the decline of monarchy is that the development of mass communications has made monarchy unnecessary.  In the past, democratic or republican forms of government were possible only in small societies where the people or their representatives could meet all together at one public assembly--Athenian democracy or the Roman Republic, for example.  Larger societies were so disconnected that they needed monarchy as a focal point to which everyone could look as the central authority.  But then with the growth of communications technology--the printing press, newspapers, national postal systems, the telegraph, radio, television, and finally the internet--large societies have become so highly mobilized and interconnected that there is less need for a monarch as a focal point for authority.  

The internet has made it easy for popular mass movements like the "No Kings" protests to form across large societies and even around the globe.  And that's why it's so hard to preserve autocratic rule in the modern world without shutting down or at least censoring the internet.

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

June 14, 2025: The Day Donald Trump Lost the Consent of the People

 As I have thought more about the "No Kings" protests on June 14, and what I saw in the Grand Rapids protest, the more I am inclined to think that was a turning point for the resistance to Trump's dictatorship.

As many as five million Americans participated in the "No Kings" protests across America in over 1,500 communities.  This was possibly the single biggest mass protest in American history.  At the same time, the military parade for Trump's birthday in Washington was a pathetic flop.  If you don't think so, just Google the images of the "No Trumps" protests and the military parade.  Look at Trump and Melania.  Do they look enthusiastic about the parade?  Decide for yourself.  Look at the images of people scattered over the grass and the stands.  Does that look like a big turnout for Trump?  Why were there no Trump supporters at the Grand Rapids "No Kings" demonstrations--or at other "No Kings" gatherings as far as I can tell?

Why didn't my wife and I see Trump supporters at the Grand Rapids rally?  Were they all in Washington for the military parade?  Well, apparently not.  Because the parade was not well attended.

Now, I understand that most of us might assume that overturning a monarchic dictator like Trump might require that a great majority of people would have to rebel against his rule.  But as Chenoweth has indicated, as few as 3.5 percent of the people actively involved in a resistance movement might be enough  to overturn a dictatorial regime.

Most human beings are passively deferential to whatever regime rules over them.  A smaller group are actively supportive of the regime--like Trump's fervent supporters.  But that leaves an active third or so of the people who might actively resist--by protesting--like the "No Kings" protesters.

Donald Trump is aware of that.  That's why he's so visibly disturbed by the fact that his people did not turn out on June 14--either to  support his military parade or to harass the "No Kings" protests.


Sunday, November 11, 2012

Locke's Evolutionary History of Politics

Reading Jose de Acosta's Natural and Moral History of the Indies is essential for understanding John Locke's political thought and how evolutionary anthropology might support Lockean liberalism.  I have only recently come to that conclusion as I have been revising my Locke chapter for the fourth edition of Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Pinker.

Acosta (1540-1600) was a Jesuit priest who worked in Peru from 1572 to 1586, spending his last year in Mexico.  His Natural and Moral History of the Indies was published in Spanish in 1590.  Following the structure of Pliny's Natural History, Acosta's book was a comprehensive survey of the physical, biological, and anthropological history of the New World.  It was one of many travelogue descriptions of the New World that were avidly read in Europe.  (Another reason for my interest in this book is that my wife and I will be touring South America this coming summer, including a few weeks in the Galapagos Islands in connection with the Mont Pelerin Society's meeting there on the topic of "Evolution, the Human Sciences, and Liberty.") 

This was part of a critical turning point in world history, because for the first time in history, the entire Earth was in a global network of human exchange.  The traditional histories of human life in Europe--as formulated in ancient philosophy and Biblical religion--were challenged by the discovery of an unknown world of human experience.  Much of modern political philosophy was a response to this development--particularly, in the speculation about the original state of nature of humanity, which one can see in the work of Montaigne, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Smith.  Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle continued this tradition of global natural history as inquiry into the universal history of humanity on Earth.  

As indicated by Peter Laslett's list of the books in Locke's library when he was writing his Two Treatises of Government Locke had at least eight books on the history of the New World (or the West Indies), including an English translation of Acosta's book.  In his critical edition of the Two Treatises, Laslett has indicated the influence of these books on Locke's writing.  The best work that I know showing how these books shaped Locke's account of the state of nature and the evolution of politics is William Batz's article on "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke."

Acosta's book seems especially important for Locke, because it's the one that Locke directly quotes in the Second Treatise (sec. 102)This comes in Chapter 8 on "The Beginning of Political Societies," in which Locke argues that human beings are originally by nature free, equal, and independent, so that they enter civil society only by their consent. 

He acknowledges that one objection to this argument is that there is no historical evidence for this claim that human beings were once free and equal, and that they established government by consent.  Locke responds by arguing that there are two kinds of historical evidence for this--the history of America and the history of ancient society in the Bible.

Locke's appeal to history here is fundamental not only for his Two Treatises but also for most of his other writings.  Contrary to what many of Locke's scholarly commentators assume, his reasoning depends not on the logical analysis of abstract ideas but on what he identifies in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Intro., 2) as "this historical, plain method."  This method of historical reasoning from observational experience shows the influence of Locke's medical practice and experimental research, in which he followed the lead of his friend Thomas Sydenham, who insisted that medical science be guided by the experimental history of health and disease in particular patients rather than theoretical reasoning about abstract ideas.  Remarkably, with the exception of a few scholars like Laslett and Batz, most commentators ignore this in their reading of Locke.

So, for example, many scholars debate the meaning of Locke's account of the state of nature as if Locke were engaged in a purely abstract argument without reference to the observable experience of history.  This ignores Locke's clear declaration that "in the beginning all the world was America" (ST, 49), and that "the Kings of the Indians in America" is "still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe" (ST, 108).  Thus, Locke follows a methodological assumption that has been fundamental for evolutionary anthropology--that the study of hunter-gatherers who have survived into recent history can illuminate our understanding of what the first prehistoric human beings must have looked like.

That's why Locke turns to Acosta's book and quotes the following as a description of the original state of nature:  "And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no Government at all.  There are great and apparent Conjectures, says he, that these Men, speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither Kings nor Commonwealths, but lived in Troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Bresil, and many other Nations, which have no certain Kings, but as occasion is offered in Peace or War, they choose their Captains as they please" (ST, 102, quoting Acosta, book 1, chap. 25, pp. 73-74). 

Here's a new translation of this passage from Acosta by Frances Lopez-Morillas: "There are clear indications for a long time these men had no kings or any form of government but lived in free groups like the Indians of Florida nowadays and the Chiriguanas and Brazilians and many other tribes, who do not have regular kings but in accordance with the occasions that arise in war or peace choose their chiefs as they like."

Notice the ambiguity in this passage.  On the one hand, there is said to be among these people "no kings or any form of government" or "no government at all," as Locke says.  And yet, on the other hand, it is said that occasionally in war or peace, these people can choose chiefs or captains to lead them.

This is an ambiguity in Locke's account of the state of nature.  At times, the state of nature seems to be an utterly asocial and apolitical state in which people live as solitary individuals with no structure of rule at all, which can be interpreted to mean that Locke is denying that human beings are political animals by nature.  But, at other times, the state of nature does seem to have some structure of rule, because the family is said to be the "first society," and parental power over children is thus the first structure of authority, although this familial society falls short of "political society" (ST, 77).

This ambiguity is seen in Locke's definition of the state of nature as "men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them" (ST, 19).  Living without any common superior or judge with authority might suggest an asocial state of solitary individuals, but "men living together according to reason" clearly indicates some kind of rule-governed social order.

A similar ambiguity is that while Locke says that the state of nature is a state of peace rather than a state of war, and thus disagrees with Hobbes, Locke also says that the state of nature easily becomes a state of war that induces people to establish government to enforce peace, which agrees with Hobbes (ST, 19, 123).  Here is where the Straussians see Locke's Hobbesianism as his secret teaching.

But this assumption that this shows some complicated rhetorical strategy of secret writing becomes less plausible if one looks at the anthropological reports about America that Locke was studying.  For example, one report from the French missionary Gabriel Sagard-Theodat describes the Great Lakes Indians in Canada as organized by familial and tribal attachments under the leadership of their chiefs, which shows, he concluded, that "man is a social animal who cannot live without company."  And yet the reports of violence and warfare among the American Indians show that living without formal government made it hard for them to live always in peace with one another.

What look like contradictions in Locke's arguments actually show Locke's effort to accurately generalize conclusions about the complex variability of this historical experience, in which primitive people can live orderly social lives governed by informal customary rules, even though the absence of formal governmental institutions makes it hard to settle all disputes peacefully.

Acosta distinguishes three levels or stages in the history of government in Peru and Mexico.  The first human beings to arrive in America were savage hunters who crossed over a land bridge from Asia to America.  (Acosta was the first person to propose this theory of the original human migration from Asia to America over a land bridge, a theory that is now widely accepted by evolutionary anthropologists.)  These hunters had no government.  "They had no chief, nor did they recognize one, nor did they worship any gods or have rites or any religion whatsoever" (380-81).

The second stage is "that of free associations or communities, where the people are governed by the advice of many, and are like councils.  In time of war, these elect a captain who is obeyed by a whole tribe or province.  In time of peace, each town or group of folk rules itself, and each has some prominent men whom the mass of the people respect; and at most some of these join together on matters that seem important to them to see what they ought to do" (359).

The third stage is that of monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good" (346).  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as beasts and treated themselves as gods (346, 359, 402).

In some passages of his book, however, Acosta combines the first two stages and suggests that even the most primitive hunter-gatherers had some informal leadership by which prominent people could mediate disputes and lead them in war, but always constrained by the informal consent or resistance of the community.  The one passage quoted by Locke is an example of this, as though Locke figured out that even primitive foragers would have some episodic and informal structure of rule in which some individuals would have more influence than others, although excessive dominance would be checked by popular resistance.

In the state of nature, Locke observes, "they judged the ablest, and most likely, to Rule over them.  Conformable hereunto we find the People of America, who (living out of reach of the Conquering Swords, and spreading domination of the two great Empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoy'd their own natural freedom, though, ceteris paribus, they commonly prefer the Heir of their deceased King; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by and set up the stoutest and bravest Man for their Ruler" (ST, 105).  The American Indian Kings were originally temporary war leaders.  "And though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council.  Though the War itself, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the King's sole Authority" (ST, 108).

This appeal to the historical anthropology of the American Indians as showing that government was originally limited in its powers and its ends is part of Locke's argument for liberal toleration in his Letters on Toleration.  He argues that there is no justification for European rulers in America to compel the American Indians to convert to Christianity, particularly since they are "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and the Law of Nature, and no ways offending against the Laws of the Society" (40).

In his Second Letter on Toleration, Locke writes: "There are nations in the West-Indies which have no other End of their Society, but their mutual defence against their enemies.  In these, their Captain, or Prince, is Sovereign Commander in time of War; but in time of Peace, neither he nor any body else has any Authority over any of the Society.  You cannot deny  but other, even temporal ends, are attainable by these Commonwealths, if they had been otherwise instituted and appointed to these ends" (77).

In his attack on Locke's Letter on Toleration, Jonas Proast asserted that "Commonwealths are instituted for the attaining of all the Benefits which Political Government can yield; and therefore if the spiritual and eternal Interests of Men may any way be procured or advanced by Political Government, the procuring and advancing those Interests must in all reason be received amongst the Ends of Civil Society, and so consequently fall within the compass of the Magistrate's Jurisdiction" (69).

In response to Proast, Locke insisted that the question was whether government has any power to use force in matters of religion or for the salvation of souls.  The argument against this is that governments are not established to use force for such ends.  Rather, governments are established by men only to protect themselves against injuries from other men for which there is no protection except governmental force.  Religious opinions or forms of worship do not injure those who disagree in any way that requires governmental force against those with those opinions or worship.

To support this conclusion, Locke points again to the American Indians:
"let me ask you, Whether it be not possible that Men, to whom the Rivers and Woods afforded the spontaneous Provisions of Life, and so with no private Possessions of Land, had no inlarged Desires after Riches or Power; should live together in Society, make one People of one Language under one Chieftain, who shall have no other Power but to command them in time of War against their common Enemies, without any municipal Laws, Judges, or any Person with Superiority establish'd amongst them, but ended all their private Differences, if any arose, by the extemporary Determination of their Neighbors, or of Arbitrators chosen by the Parties.  I ask you whether in such a Commonwealth, the Chieftain who was the only Man of Authority amongst them, had any Power to use the Force of the Commonwealth to any other End but the Defense of it against an Enemy, though other Benefits were attainable by it." (76)

Today's evolutionary anthropologists might complain that Locke has confused two levels of primitive social organization--bands and chiefdoms.  But still, Locke is remarkably accurate in describing how foraging societies without formal governments--called "stateless societies" today--enforce customary norms of conduct through private arbitration, while also organizing around war leaders in defense against outside groups.

But notice also that the American Indian societies to which Locke is appealing as a standard for political freedom and limited government are societies of hunter-gatherers in a primitive state, and they survived only as long as they remained out of reach of the Incan and Mexican empires.  Thus, these hunting-gathering societies were both culturally uncivilized and militarily weak.

The problem for Locke's liberalism is how to combine freedom, civilization, and power.

Beginning 5,000 to 10,000 years ago, with the development of agriculture after the Last Ice Age, human beings formed sedentary communities with growing populations, which led to the first agrarian states. In these novel circumstances, it became ever harder for subordinates to organize to resist the despotic dominance of their leaders, who now ruled through elaborate military, religious, administrative, and monarchic bureaucracies.

These agrarian states provided the conditions for high civilization — economic wealth, technological innovation, cultural progress (particularly, through the invention of writing), bureaucratic administration, and military power. But that high civilization came with a big price — the loss of the individual freedom from domination that human beings enjoyed in foraging societies. Among foragers, the inequality of power, wealth, and status is minimal. Foraging societies don’t allow some to tyrannize over others. But agrarian states allow ruling elites to live by exploiting those they rule.

Consequently, the history of politics over the past 5,000 years has been largely a conflict between freedom and domination — with the rulers inclined to tyrannical domination and the ruled looking for ways to escape that domination. There has often seemed to be no good resolution to the conflict, because human beings seemed to be caught in a tragic dilemma of having to choose between freedom without civilization and civilization without freedom.

Classical liberalism attempts to overcome this dilemma through liberal republican capitalism. The combination of a liberal society, a republican polity, and a capitalist economy promotes both freedom and civilization: people can be socially, politically, and economically free, while enjoying all the benefits of a progressive civilization. The natural desires for social status, political rule, and economic wealth will always create inequalities of rank that will incline those at the top to become tyrannical. But we can mitigate this through social, political, and economic structures of countervailing power that create competing elites so that power does not become unduly concentrated or unchecked. For classical liberals, such a system is imperfect. But it’s the best we can do.

The Darwinian history of politics provides scientific evidence and argumentation that supports the account of political evolution found in the writings of Locke, Hume, and Smith. The political history of humanity turns on the shifting balance between authority and liberty, between the natural desire of the few for dominance and the natural desire of the many to resist dominance. This shifting balance underlies the three-stage evolution of political history: the egalitarian hierarchy of Paleolithic politics, the despotic hierarchy of agrarian-state politics, and the modern emergence of commercial republican liberalism based on a new kind of egalitarian hierarchy combined with high civilization.

REFERENCES
Acosta, Jose de, Natural and Moral History of the Indies, trans. Frances Lopez-Morillas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

Batz, William G., "The Historical Anthropology of John Locke," Journal of the History of Ideas, 35 (1974): 663-70.

Burgaleta, Claudio, Jose de Acosta, S.J. (1540-1600): His Life and Thought (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1999).

Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Locke, John, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010).

Some of these points have been developed in some previous posts here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.



Thursday, June 19, 2025

"No Kings!" Is the Waa-Bark of America's Chimpanzee Politics of Resistance to Trump

Last Saturday, we saw a massive display of chimpanzee political rhetoric.  Subordinate chimpanzees utter pant-grunts to signal their fear and submission before a dominant chimp.  But subordinates can also utter waa-barks to signal their defiance of a dominant chimp.  If enough subordinates scream their waa-barks, and if the dominant chimp does not have a sufficiently strong coalition of supporters, he can be overthrown.  The five million people in the "No Kings" protests against Trump were shouting their waa-barks.  The people at Trump's military parade celebrating his birthday were pant-grunting their submission to Trump.  But reporters noticed that the number of spectators at the parade was small, and many of them were looking at their phones to see images of the massive crowds at the "No Kings" protests.  The waa-barks were louder than the pant-grunts.

Although chimpanzees do not have language, they do communicate with one another through sounds, postures, and facial expressions that convey information.  Often that information is about social rank.  An alpha male might engage in a loud display of intimidation that asserts his dominance over the group.  Other chimps might respond to this by signaling their submission to him.  Or they might respond with signs of resistance and defiance.  And some might even signal that they want to overthrow him.  Thus chimps engage in political rhetoric, because they try to persuade one another as to how their social order should be organized.  

We could also identify this chimpanzee political rhetoric as Lockean insofar as subordinate chimpanzees can protest against despotic dominance by the alpha male and thus limit his power, which moves towards the egalitarian social arrangement seen in human hunter-gatherer bands with an egalitarian style of hierarchy in which the leader is only primus inter pares ("first among equals").  This is what Locke saw in the state of nature in which all men are by nature equally free.  Not that all are absolutely equal, because some will have higher status than others, and some will become leaders of their social groups.  But that all adults have the natural right to be free from being unduly subordinated to anyone else without their consent, and that they have the natural right to punish those who threaten their life, liberty, or property (Second Treatise, pars. 4-10, 54, 94, 105).  

To explain the Darwinian evolution of this human state of nature, we should expect to find precursors of this human egalitarianism in our pre-human primate ancestors.  And if we assume that the common ancestor of humans and the African great apes was similar to a chimpanzee, then we might expect to see evolutionary preadaptations for an egalitarian style of dominance in chimpanzee groups.  In fact, as Christopher Boehm has argued, we can see in chimpanzees similarities to the ambivalent political nature of human hunter-gatherers that shows a tense balance between dominance, deference, and counter-dominance (Boehm 1993, 1999).  

Dominance is the natural propensity of individuals to seek the power over others that comes from superior rank in a group.  The political life of primates is organized around dominance hierarchies in which the old tend to have dominance over the young and males tend to have dominance over females, although females can also have a dominance hierarchy, and sometimes coalitions of females can resist male dominance.  This is a political universal for chimpanzees, both in the wild and in captivity; and for human beings throughout history.  Winning or losing dominance is determined by patterns of coalition formation that depend on shifting circumstances and individual decisions.

Deference is the natural propensity of individuals to submit to those who are dominant.  As political universals, deference is the correlative of dominance.  Among the various species of political primates, there are distinctive behavioral cues, both verbal and nonverbal, by which subordinates defer to dominants.

Counter-dominance is the natural propensity of individuals to resist being dominated.  Among some primates, subordinate individuals can resist excessive dominance and thus limit the power of dominant individuals.  Subordinate individuals can form large coalitions to challenge those at the top of the hierarchy.

The variation in this behavior creates differences in dominance style across species.  As Frans de Waal has observed, rhesus monkeys show a "despotic dominance style" in which subordinates cannot challenge dominants; but chimpanzees show an "egalitarian dominance style" in which subordinates can restrain dominants (de Waal 1996).  Dominant chimpanzees are expected to mediate conflicts within the group and to lead the group in conflicts with other groups.  Dominant chimpanzees can be challenged or even deposed if they do not properly carry out their conflict-mediation role.

Like chimpanzee politics, human politics shows a dominance hierarchy that can be egalitarian in style, based on the principle that leaders are only first among equals.  This egalitarianism is most evident among human hunter-gatherers who use various kinds of sanctions (from ridicule and disobedience to ostracism and execution) to punish leaders who become too despotic in their dominance.  This resistance to dominance was probably a crucial part of human evolutionary history in the Paleolithic era (from about two million years ago to 10,000 years ago).  But with the establishment of large bureaucratic states based on agricultural production, which began more than 5,000 years ago, many states have been more despotic than egalitarian.  The emergence and spread of Lockean liberal democracies over the past three centuries is in some ways a return to the egalitarian dominance of the foraging way of life in which subordinates limit the power of dominants.

To the old question in political philosophy as to whether human beings are naturally hierarchical or naturally egalitarian, the answer from biopolitical science is that human beings are both.  Niccolo Machiavelli was right to see that human political nature is torn by the tension between the propensity of the few to dominance and the propensity of the many to submit to dominance while also resisting oppressive dominance.  The history of political practice and political thought turns on this natural ambivalence interacting over time with particular political circumstances and decisions.

As an illustration of this political ambivalence among chimpanzees, here is Jane Goodall's description of an incident she observed in July of 1964 in Gombe:

"Mike, the new alpha, rests in the shade of a tree.  A sudden crashing in the undergrowth heralds the arrival of Goliath, recently deposed from the top position.  Mike does not move as Goliath charges flat out toward him, dragging a huge branch.  At the last moment Goliath turns aside, swings into a nearby tree, and sits motionless.  Only now does Mike begin to display, swaying the vegetation, hurling a few rocks, then climbing into Goliath's tree and swaying branches there.  When he stops, Goliath displays again, leaping ever closer to his adversary until Mike responds.  For a few moments both are wildly swaying foliage within 2 meters of each other; but there is no fight.  They swing to the ground and charge off through the undergrowth, running parallel, then sit staring at each other.  Goliath stands upright and rocks a sapling; Mike hurtles past, throwing a large rock.  For the next twenty-three minutes the performance continues, and during the whole episode the only physical contact between them is when one is hit by the end of a bough swayed by the other.  Finally, after a three-minute pause, Goliath moves rapidly toward Mike, crouches beside him with loud, submissive pant-grunts, and begins to groom him vigorously.  For half a minute, Mike ignores him, then turns and grooms his vanquished rival with equal intensity.  For more than an hour, they groom until both are relaxed and peaceful" (Goodall 1986, 409).

Notice the ambivalent political rhetoric in this incident.  The male dominance hierarchy is determined by the directionality of displays and pant-grunting among the adult males.  Goodall has kept a quantitative record of this for many years so that she can track the ever-changing history of the dominance hierarchy. If an alpha male is secure in his dominance, he displays towards the others in the group, and he receives pant-grunts from the others; but he never pant-grunts toward any of them.  When Goliath displays towards Mike, Goliath is challenging him, attempting to take the alpha position.  Both are feeling aggressive and fearful at the same time.  Each is trying to bluff down the other.  But while Goliath wants dominance, his fear of Mike finally drives him to signal his submission through pant-grunting; and Mike accepts his submission by reconciling with him.

Displays are more common than physical attacks, because chimps would rather avoid the danger of serious physical injuries that come from attacks.  Charging displays are threats that serve to maintain or challenge the existing order of dominance.  But reversals in rank among the males are usually the result of physical fights.  And while size and strength are important for success in displays and fights, psychological traits--such as intelligence, ingenuity, boldness, persistence, and shrewdness in forming coalitions--are crucial for success.  Mike was actually one of the smaller adult males when he overthrew Goliath, but he figured out how to use empty kerosene cans in his noisy charging displays to shock the other males and throw them into confusion until they submitted to him.  As I indicated in a previous post, Boehm and Goodall have compared Donald Trump's bombastic rhetoric to Mike's displays.

The vocal rhetoric of chimpanzees is complex.  Goodall and other primatologists have identified at least 32 distinct calls that convey particular emotions or feelings (Goodall 1986, 127; Arcadi 2018, 116-23).  One of them is the pant-grunt that Goliath uttered to signal a feeling of social apprehension and submission.  Another is the waa-bark that signals anger and defiance.  Dominant individuals can use waas as a warning to subordinates.  But from his careful study of chimp videotaped vocalizations, Boehm has concluded that most waas are used by subordinates to express their defiance of dominants (Boehm 1999, 164-69).

Boehm has seen this illustrated by what de Waal reports in his studies of the chimps in the Yerkes Primate Research Center in Georgia.  When new adult males were introduced into the community, the Yerkes females acted as a power coalition that rejected males seeking the alpha male position.  Finally, they accepted Jimoh as the alpha male.  But when he acted as a bully, the females punished him.  

For example, one day Jimoh saw that Socko, an adolescent male, was mating with one of Jomoh's favorite females.  Jimoh chased Socko around the enclosure and refused to stop.  Socko was screaming and defecating in fear.

Several females nearby began to waa bark.  They looked around to see the reaction of others.  When others began to join in the waa barking, the intensity of their protests became deafening.  Finally, Jimoh got the message.  He broke off his attack to avoid any further attacks from the females.  It was as though the chimps were taking a vote, and Jimoh had lost the vote.  If Jimoh had not stopped his attack, he might have been overthrown and even killed.

Here are the evolved primate roots of Lockean political rhetoric, in which we see the political ambivalence in the tense balance between dominance, deference, and counter-dominance.

Last Saturday, we saw a great debate between the deference to Trump at his military parade and the counter-dominance of resistance to Trump at the "No Kings" protests.

Steven Cheung, the communications director for Trump, has said: "The so-called No Kings protests have been a complete and utter failure with minuscule attendance."  Of course, that is what he has to say--he has to tell those of us who attended one of the protests that we must not believe what we saw with our own eyes.

Like I say, that's chimpanzee politics.

(Some of the material in this post comes from a previous post.)


REFERENCES

Arcadi, Adam. 2018. Wild Chimpanzees: Social Behavior of an Endangered Species. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Boehm, Christopher. 1993. "Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy." Current Anthropology 34:227-254.

Boehm, Christopher. 1999. Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goodall, Jane. 1986. The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

de Waal, Frans. 1996. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Friday, August 01, 2025

The Lockean Evolutionary Psychology of Lex Rex in the Trial of Charles I

In previous posts, I have written about how some of the most influential intellectuals supporting Donald Trump have argued that the best form of government is a divine right monarchy like that of the Stuart kings in seventeenth century England, which is why they have told Trump that he should rule as a king.  The U.S. Supreme Court has supported this by deciding that as president, Trump has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution, and so in effect he is "a King above the law."  Trump has been happy to accept the crown and to sign the executive orders that empower his Administrative State to execute his will while violating constitutional rights such as due process of law.

It would seem, then, that now is the time to study why and how English revolutionaries overthrew the Stuart dynasty--first through the trial and execution of King Charles I in 1649 and then through the Revolution of 1688 that deposed King James II.

In this post, I consider the trial of Charles I.


RESISTANCE TO CHARLES I

With the death of James I in 1625, Charles I became King of England, Scotland, and Ireland.  Throughout his reign, Charles provoked the opposition of the English Parliament, which resisted his ruling as an absolute monarch.  Particularly unpopular were his levying of taxes without Parliamentary consent and his coercive enforcement of high church Anglican practices against the opposition of Reformed religious groups such as the Puritans and Presbyterians.

In 1628, Parliament approved the Petition of Right, which charged the King with violating certain "Rights and Liberties of the Subjects."  The Petition asked that the King should no longer force anyone to pay loans or taxes without the consent of Parliament, or to be detained or imprisoned without due process of law and lawful judgment of his peers, or to be compelled to receive soldiers or mariners into their houses, or to be subject to martial law contrary to the laws of the land.

Although King Charles formally accepted this Petition, he rejected Parliament's interpretation of this Petition as limiting the king's prerogative--the exercise of absolute discretionary power without Parliamentary consent.  After dismissing Parliament in 1629, Charles governed by a purely personal rule without Parliament until 1640.  

In 1639, when Charles attempted to impose his Anglican religious practices on Scotland, he provoked a massive resistance by the Scottish Reformed religious believers who insisted on a Presbyterian church governance by elders and deacons rather than an Anglican governance by bishops.  Charles ordered the raising of armies in England and Ireland for an invasion of Scotland, but the attempt at an invasion failed.  

Wanting to launch a new campaign against Scotland, Charles needed financing that could only come from Parliament.  In 1640, Charles was forced to call for a new session of Parliament, which met in April, but then less than a month later, he dissolved what became known as the "Short Parliament."  A few months later, he summoned a new Parliament that came into session in November (the "Long Parliament").  Most of the members of this new Parliament were opponents of the King.

In 1641 and 1642, the conflicts between the King and Parliament had become so severe that by the middle of 1642, both sides had begun military preparations for Civil War.  On August 22, 1642, Charles declared war on Parliament by raising his standard outside Nottingham Castle.  By June of 1645, the King's army was decisively defeated by Parliament's New Model Army at the Battle of Naseby.  In 1646, Charles surrendered to a Scottish army.  Later, the Scots turned him over to Parliament.  

Leaders of Parliament negotiated with Charles, attempting to get his agreement that if he were reinstated as King, he would become a constitutional monarch--with no control of the army, sharing policy with Parliament, and making a religious settlement that would favor Calvinism but with some degree of toleration for other religious sects.  During this time, Charles was secretly plotting to rally his foreign, English, and Scottish supporters for a second civil war.  The New Model Army leaders intercepted Charles' letters to his wife telling her that he would not keep any agreements he might make with the army or Parliament once he had the power to break them.

In July of 1648, Charles gave the signal for a Scottish military force under the Duke of Hamilton to invade England, hoping that a second civil war would restore his absolute power over England.  This Scottish army was quickly defeated by the New Model Army under the military leadership of Oliver Cromwell and Thomas Fairfax.

The costs of these civil wars were devastating.  Historians estimate that about ten percent of the entire population of England died in the wars.  Often Charles ordered his military commanders to kill innocent civilians and soldiers who had surrendered. 


JOHN COOKE FOR LEX REX

From September to early December in 1648, the Presbyterian majority in Parliament negotiated with the King, hoping that he would agree to a constitutional monarchy in which his kingly power would be checked by Parliament.  But many of the leaders of the Army thought the King could not be trusted to negotiate in good faith.  Eventually, debates within the Army over the King's fate moved towards some kind of trial of the King and possibly his execution for his crimes.  When the majority of the House of Commons voted to negotiate a settlement with the King and rejected the Army's proposal for a trial, Colonel Thomas Pride led a troop of soldiers to Westminster Hall where they arrested the Presbyterian MPs who had supported negotiations with the King (later called "Pride's Purge").  This left Parliament under the control of an Independent majority, which was soon dubbed "the Rump" Parliament.

On January 6, 1649, this Rump House of Commons passed an Ordinance for a trial of the King.  Remarkably, the Commons asserted its right to make law without the assent of the King or the Lords:  "The Commons of England assembled in Parliament declare that the people under God are the origin oof all just power.  They do likewise declare that the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by and representing the people, have the supreme authority of this nation" (Robertson 2005: 140).  This was the first modern statement of the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the people or those who represent the people.

On January 8, 1649, in accordance with the Ordinance of Parliament, the Judges of the High Court of Justice for the trial of the King met for the first time.  They appointed John Bradshawe as their president.  John Cooke was appointed Solicitor-General and the lead prosecutor for the trial.

Cooke prepared the indictment--A Charge of High Treason, and Other High Crimes--which he read at the first session of the trial on January 20.  The indictment charged Charles with two crimes--tyranny and treason.  His tyranny was said to be a violation of his "trust":

That the said Charles Stuart, being admitted King of England, and therein trusted with a limited power to govern by and according to the laws of the land, and not otherwise; and by his trust, oath, and office, being obliged to use the power committed to him for the good and benefit of the people, and for the preservation of their rights and liberties; yet, nevertheless, out of wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and liberties of the people, yea, to take away and make void the foundations thereof, and of all redress and remedy of misgovernment, which by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom were reserved on the people's behalf in the right and power of frequent and successive Parliaments, or national meetings in Council (Gardiner 1906: 371-74).

That the King's power was limited by the laws of the land was not a new idea because Chief Justice Edward Coke had asserted this before King James I, and it was reaffirmed in the Petition of Right.  But the new idea here was that if the King did not rule for the good of the people and the preservation of their rights and liberties, he was guilty of tyranny.  Although tyrannical rule had been condemned for thousands of years, this was the first time in human history that a monarch was charged in a court of law with the crime of tyranny.

Charles was also charged with committing the crime of treason by initiating two civil wars against Parliament and the people therein represented--the first in 1642 and the second in 1648.  The indictment listed the exact dates and locations for each time the King led a military assault in the civil wars.

For the second session of the trial, on January 21, the King prepared a statement of his reasons for denying the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice.  Although he was not allowed to read this at the trial, he had it published as a tract that was widely disseminated.  He stated seven reasons why the Court had no authority to put him on trial (Gardiner 1906: 374-76).

The first reason was that God's law as stated in the Bible (both Old and New Testament) commanded that subjects must obey their Kings.  He quoted one Biblical verse--Ecclesiastes 8:4: "Where the word of a king is, there is power: and who may say unto him, What doest thou?"

The second reason was that the laws of England included the maxim that "the King can do no wrong," and therefore he was above the law.

The third reason for rejecting the authority of the High Court of Justice was that the House of Commons had no authority to erect a court of judgment.  Moreover, the King noted that most of the MPs in the House of Commons had been excluded from sitting in that body, and that the House of Lords had not approved the establishment of the High Court.

The fourth reason was that any claim that the people of England had authorized this court was clearly wrong because there was no evidence that the majority of the people had in fact consented to this.

The King's fifth argument was that he was speaking not just for his own right to rule but also for the true liberty of his subjects, which was secured by his government.

His sixth argument was that he had taken up arms against Parliament to defend the fundamental laws of the kingdom against those who were trying to deny the traditional powers of the King.

Finally, the King concluded by insisting that if he were to submit to the pretended authority of the High Court, this would violate "the trust which I have from God for the welfare and liberty of my people."

Notice that while the King invoked the laws of God and the laws of England as favoring his authority, he said nothing about natural law.  And notice that as scriptural authority for God's law commanding obedience to kings, the King cited only one verse in Ecclesiastes, while remaining silent about those Biblical passages where God warns the people of Israel about the evils of kingly tyranny (for example, in I Samuel 8).

Notice also that while the King invoked the "trust" that he had "from God," he said nothing about having a "trust" with the people, thus implying that the King was accountable to God but not to the people.

By contrast, John Bradshawe's speech at the end of the trial before pronouncing the sentence of death on the king included a declaration of the King's contractual trust with the people:

For there is a contract and bargain made between the king and his people, and the oath is taken for the performance, and certainly, Sir, the bond is reciprocal, for as you are their liege Lord, so they are you liege subjects . . . the one tie, the one bond, is the bond of protection that is due from the subject.  Sir, if this bond be once broken, farewell sovereignty! (Robertson 2005: 185).

This looks like what would later be called the idea of a "social contract" in political philosophy: the people agree to obey rulers to secure their rights and liberties, but whenever any government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to overthrow such government and establish a new government most likely to effect their safety and happiness (the Declaration of Independence).

Charles I was executed on January 30, 1649.  One week later, Cooke published his pamphlet King Charles, His Case, or, An Appeal to All Rational Men Concerning His Trial at the High Court of Justice.  This was his preemptive response to what he foresaw would be the royalist propaganda effort to turn Charles into a martyr for divine right monarchy.  And, in fact, on the same day there appeared Eikon Basilike--which came to be called The King's Book--a book about the devotions and sufferings of the holy martyr Charles I, whose sufferings were identified with the sufferings of Christ, their executions taking place after a trial with no legal authority, attended by soldiers and officials who insulted and reviled the holy figure.  Eikon Basilike became one of the bestselling books of the seventeenth century, and it warmed the hearts and minds of many ordinary English people with the supernatural magic of the Stuarts as the divinely appointed upholder of the Anglican faith--a popular sentiment that would eventually support the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660.

To counter this kind of Royalist propaganda, Cooke had to show how the execution of Charles was justified because he had criminally violated the laws against tyranny and murder.  This means that "the king is not above the Law, but the Law above the King" (6).  It's Lex Rex not Rex Lex.

But where is this Law to be found?  Cooke identified three kinds of law--the positive law of England, the law of God, and the law of nature (27).  

The positive law was ambiguous, even self-contradictory, about the legality of absolute monarchy.  On the one hand, Cooke could cite cases where the common law put legal limits on the King's power.  On the other hand, he could not deny that it was a maxim in English law that "the King can do no wrong" (25).

This forced Cooke to appeal to the law of God in the Bible as the higher law.  He thought that God's disapproval of kings ruling tyrannically unconstrained by law was clearly indicated in 1 Samuel 8.  Samuel had been ruling as a judge over Israel.  When he was old, he made his sons judges.  But when they took bribes that perverted their judgment, the elders of Israel came to Samuel and complained that the sons were not good judges.  The elders asked Samuel to "make us a king to judge us like all the nations."  This displeased Samuel.  He prayed to God for guidance.  God told him to listen to the people "for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them."  God advised Samuel to warn the people about "the manner of the king that shall reign over them."

Samuel spoke to the elders:

This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots.  And he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots.  And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers.  And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants.  And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers, and to his servants.  And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work.  He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants.  And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which yet shall have chosen you; and the LORD will not hear you in that day (1 Samuel 8:11-18).

And yet the elders refused to heed Samuel's warning, and they continued to ask for a king "that we may be like all the nations."  So God said to Samuel: "Hearken unto their voice, and make them a king."  God then led Samuel to Saul, the best young man among the children of Israel, and God had Samuel anoint Saul as God's choice for king.  "And Samuel said to all the people, See ye him whom the LORD hath chosen, that there is none like him among all the people?  And all the people shouted, and said, God save the king" (1 Samuel 10:24).

Cooke said that 1 Samuel 8 was "a copy and pattern of an absolute tyrant, and absolute slaves, where the people have no more than the tyrant will afford them: The Holy Spirit in that chapter does not insinuate what a good king ought to do, but what a wicked king would presume to do" (8).  This showed that "for a king to rule by lust and not by law, is a creature that was never of God's making, not of God's approbation, but his permission."

"Samuel was a good judge, and there was nothing could be objected against him, therefore God was displeased at their inordinate desire of a king; and it seems to me that the Lord declares his dislike of all such kings as the heathens were, that is, kings with an unlimited power, that are not tied to laws; for he gave them a king in his wrath. . . . God permits this, he approves it not" (9).

Cooke inferred from this that all people have a right to rebel against monarchic tyranny: "all people that live at the beck and nod of tyrannical men, may and ought to free themselves from that tyranny, if, and when they can; for such tyrants that so domineer with a rod of iron do not govern by God's permissive hand of approbation or benediction, but by the permissive hand of Providence, suffering them to scourge the people, for ends best known to himself, until he open a way for the people to work out their own enfranchisements" (10).

But notice that even if 1 Samuel 8 suggests that God dislikes "kings with an unlimited power, that are not tied to laws," this chapter does not say that the people have the right to disobey or overthrow a tyrannical king.  Royalist writers like Robert Filmer saw this chapter as a description of "the unlimited jurisdiction of kings" that showed

that the scope of Samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king, even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient.  For, by telling them what a king would do, he instructs them what a subject must suffer, yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury, but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it.  So that in this point it is all one whether Samuel describe a king or a tyrant, for patient obedience is due to both.  No remedy in the text against tyrants, but crying and praying unto God in that day (Filmer 1991:35-36).

The royalists stressed the point that God chose Saul as the king of Israel and had him anointed, so that even when Saul was trying to kill David, and David had the chance to have him killed in self-defense, David refused: "Destroy him not: for who can stretch forth his hand against the LORD's anointed, and be guiltless?" (1 Samuel 26:9).  What this means, the royalists argued, is that a tyrannical king can be rightly punished by God but not by the king's subjects.

But even if there is no clear Biblical statement of a law of God that allows people to resist a tyrannical king, and even if there is no clear positive law of England allowing this, it is still possible to appeal to some law of nature that might allow this.  Cooke said that this law was "connatural with every man, and innate in his judgment and reason"--an innate judgment of what is required for the preservation of human life and self-defense:

That if a king become a tyrant, he shall die for it, is so naturally implied; we do not use to make laws which are for the preservation of nature, that a man should eat, and drink, and buy himself cloths, and enjoy other natural comforts; no kingdom ever made any laws for it: And as we are to defend ourselves naturally, without any written law, from hunger and cold, so from outward violence; therefore if a king would destroy a people, 'tis absurd and ridiculous to ask by what law he is to die.  And this law of nature is the law of God written in the fleshly tables of men's hearts, that like the eldest sister, hath a prerogative right of power before any positive law whatsoever; and this law of nature is an indubitable legislative authority of itself that hath a suspensive power over all human laws (23).

He identified this natural law with "the unanimous consent of all rational men in the world, written in every man's heart."  This appeal to "all rational men" was to reason's unbiased or impartial judgment--to "all understanding men in the world, that suffer their judgments to be swayed by Reason, and not biased by private interest."  So natural law consists of impartial rules of reason for settling conflicts without any bias favoring one individual or group over others.  Therefore, the king cannot be exempt from these moral rules of law: "the king is not above the law, but the law above the king" (6).

Among those who justified the trial of Charles, the most commonly cited law of nature was the law of murder in Genesis 9:6--"whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."  They noted the impartiality of this rule: anyone who murders someone shall be punished with execution, and therefore even a king who murders someone--as Charles did in the Civil Wars--shall be executed.  The impartiality of natural law means that the king cannot be above the law (Robertson 2005: 161).


LOCKE ON LEX REX

Although John Locke never explicitly mentioned the trial and execution of Charles, he did repeat (in the Two Treatises of Government) all of the main arguments for why kingly tyranny violated natural law.  His starting point was his claim that human nature was formed in the state of nature, where all men are free, equal, and independent, so that no man has the right to rule over another without that other man's consent (ST, 95).  And that state of nature is governed by a law of nature: "Reason, which is that Law, teaches . . . that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (ST, 6).  The execution of that law in the state of nature is put into every man's hands, who has "the executive power of the law of nature"--the natural right to punish those who violate that law (ST, 7).  One of the fundamental manifestations of that natural power to punish is the power to kill a murderer, which is grounded in "that great Law of Nature, Who so sheddeth Man's Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed," which is "writ in the Hearts of Mankind" (ST, 11).

In the foraging societies in Locke's state of nature, the laws of nature are moral rules for choosing sides in conflicts by impartial rules of action, which are enforced by the weak teaming up to compel the strong by their coordinated punishment of wrongdoers.  People obey these natural laws only as long as most people see them as beneficial for themselves.  So, in the case of murder, most people conclude that protection against murder is more valuable for them than the freedom to murder. 

And yet it is hard to achieve the impartial enforcement of these laws of nature in the state of nature because every person is judge in his own case, and consequently judgments are often distorted by personal bias, which can create endless conflicts.  When people leave the state of nature and establish a civil society with a formal government that makes, enforces, and judges the standing laws, this can provide an impartial rule of law for the fair settlement of disputes between any two individuals.  

But Locke warned that this impartial rule of law was violated in an absolute monarchy insofar as the king with absolute power is above the law, which means that anyone who has been injured by the king has no appeal to any legal authority that can punish the king.  In civil society, no man can be exempted from the laws.  Lex Rex--the law is king.  And therefore, if the king is above the laws, then he is still in the state of nature, and every man has the natural right to punish him for violating the law of nature (ST, 90-94).

Locke declared: "Wherever Law ends, Tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to another's harm" (ST, 202).  Any officer of government who acts without legal authority in using force to invade the rights of another may be rightly opposed as we would a thief and a robber who attacks us in the street or tries to break into our house.  "For the exceeding the Bounds of Authority is no more a Right in a great, than a petty Officer; no more justifiable in a King, than a Constable."

And when tyranny makes the people utterly miserable, they have a right to overthrow that tyrannical government and institute new government to secure their life, liberty, and property.  Even if tyrannical rulers claim to rule by divine right, that will not be enough to forestall revolution when the people feel oppressed: "cry up their Governours, as much as you will for Sons of Jupiter, let them be Sacred and Divine, descended or authoriz'd from Heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen.  The People generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them" (ST, 224).

Nevertheless, Locke observed that the people are very slow and reluctant to give up the forms of government to which they have become accustomed, even when the rulers have made great mistakes.  "This slowness and aversion in the People to quit their old Constitutions, has, in the many Revolutions which have been seen in this Kingdom, in this and former Ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old Legislative of King, Lords and Commons" (ST, 223).

Here Locke was probably reminding his readers of the events of 1649-1660.  After the execution of the King in 1649, Parliament passed laws abolishing the office of King and the House of Lords and then declaring England to be a Republic under the rule of the Council of State and the House of Commons (the Rump Parliament).  In 1653, Oliver Cromwell led the army in dissolving Parliament and then establishing an Instrument of Government that installed Cromwell as Lord Protector for life ruling with a protectorate Parliament.  In effect, Cromwell became a military dictator.  In 1657, Cromwell was offered the crown of a king, but he refused.  In 1658, Cromwell died, and his son Richard became Lord Protector, but he was forced to resign in 1659.  

Finally, in 1660, General George Monck took control of the armies in England and conspired with Charles II to restore the Stuart monarchy.  A Convention Parliament dominated by royalist MPs opened in April.  In May, Charles II was proclaimed King of England.  In October, dozens of the "regicides"--men who had participated in the trial and execution of Charles I--were tried, convicted, and executed.  This included John Cooke, who was drawn, quartered, and disemboweled. 

Thus it was that the people were brought back to their old governmental forms of King, Lords, Commons, and Anglican Bishops.


Since this post is way too long, I will have to finish it in the next post.


Wednesday, October 13, 2021

The Evolution of Democracy is Natural But Not Inevitable: Locke and Sagard on the Huron in the State of Nature

To explain the history of democracy, it is often said that it was invented in ancient Athens.  After it died out in ancient Greece and Rome, democracy vanished from Europe for over a thousand years.  It then reemerged in early modern Europe, in some of the Italian city republics and in England.  In England and the United States, it eventually evolved into the modern form of democracy with competitive elections and universal suffrage.  This modern democracy then spread around the world. 

In The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today (2020), David Stasavage denies this story by arguing that democracy did not need to be invented by Europeans because it has arisen naturally in human societies throughout the world over thousands of years.  This became clear, Stasavage observes, when Europeans first explored the Americas and discovered that some of the native Americans were living in democratic political systems.  For example, in North America, the French saw that the Huron Confederacy was ruled by a system of councils with broad popular participation.  In Mesoamerica, the Spanish discovered that the people of Tlaxcala were ruled by what looked like a democratic republic that had resisted conquest by the Aztec Empire.

The Huron and Tlaxcala illustrate how democracy has evolved naturally throughout history around the world: whenever the circumstances are such that those trying to rule over a society are compelled to seek the consent of the people they govern, then democratic practices are likely to arise.  Stasavage admits, however, that this is not inevitable, because whenever the circumstances are such that rulers can govern a society through a state bureaucracy without the direct consent of the people, then autocratic institutions are likely to arise.  In the Americas, the Aztec and Inca Empires were illustrations of such autocracy.  So autocracy is also natural but not inevitable.

Stasavage thinks that all governments depend either directly or indirectly on the consent of the governed.  But that consent can be either the express consent of the people through some kind of popular council or assembly in a democracy, or it can be the tacit consent of the people to an autocracy by their not revolting against it. 

In contrast to the early forms of democracy that have arisen in many regions of the world throughout history, Stasavage contends that modern democracy--with representatives chosen in competitive elections with universal suffrage--is a European invention that arose from the particular historical circumstances of modern Europe that led eventually to modern democracy in England and the United States.

I find most of Stasavage's reasoning persuasive.  And yet I would put more emphasis than he does on two points--that democracy first arose among our earliest hunter-gatherer ancestors, and that the political ideas of thinkers like John Locke have been crucial for the history of democracy.


DEMOCRACY IN HUNTER-GATHERER BANDS

In only one sentence (p. 34), Stasavage mentions the possibility that some form of democracy appeared among early hunter-gatherer societies.  In fact, that would explain why democracy is natural for human societies, because it arose in our earliest evolutionary history in Paleolithic hunter-gatherer bands, so that it is part of our genetically evolved human nature.

This might seem odd if we identify foraging bands as anarchistic societies, because being "stateless societies" (as anthropologists call them), they seem to lack any governmental rule at all.  But as I have argued in a previous post, if "anarchy" is taken in its literal sense of "no rule" or "no governance," then foraging societies are not anarchic, because they do have some form of governance, even if the governance is informal, fluctuating, and decentralized.  Pure anarchy is a fiction, because no human society can endure as a social order without some governance.

Some anarchist theorists have implicitly conceded this point.  For example, the best history of anarchist thinkers and movements is Peter Marshall's Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (2010).  Anarchists begin by distinguishing between society and the state, he indicates, and then they argue that a society can be a self-regulating order of governance without a state.  He writes: "Pure anarchy probably never existed.  Stateless societies and peasant societies employ sanctions of approval and disapproval, the offer of reciprocity, and the threat of its withdrawal, as instruments of social control.  But modern anthropology confirms that in organic or 'primitive' societies, there is a limited concentration of force.  If authority exists, it is delegated and rarely imposed, and in many societies no relation of command and obedience is in force" (12).

If the minimal requirement for a democracy is having the people of a society actively consenting to their governance, then a stateless society of a foraging band in which the people employ "sanctions of approval and disapproval" to control their leaders so that there is "no relation of command and obedience" would seem to be democratic.

I have written about how John Locke saw this in the state of nature in America from his reading of Jose de Acosta's report in his Natural and Moral History of the Indies.  In the Second Treatise (par. 102), Locke quoted Acosta's claim that in America there were many societies with "no government at all" and "no kings," but with "captains" or "chiefs" that the people chose to lead them when they needed leadership in war or peace.  

It seems confusing or even self-contradictory to say that while there was "no government at all," the people chose those who governed them.  But there's no contradiction if we understand "no government" to mean no centralized bureaucratic state in a hunter-gatherer society that does have some governance by leaders chosen by the people and a system of customary laws enforced by public approval and disapproval.

This is the first of three levels in the history of government that Acosta saw in America.  Acosta assumed that the first settlers in America who crossed over from Asia to North America lived in hunter-gatherer societies (Acosta 380-81).

The second stage came later in history when some groups lived in "free associations or communities, where the people are governed by the advice of many, and are like councils.  In time of war, these elect a captain who is obeyed by a whole tribe or province.  In time of peace, each town or group of folk rules itself, and each has some prominent men whom the mass of the people respect; and at most some of these join together on matters that seem important to them to see what they ought to do" (359).

Acosta's third stage is that of autocratic monarchy or empire--like that of the Incas or the rule of Montezuma in Mexico.  Originally, this was a "moderate rule" that is the best, in which the kings and nobles acknowledged that their subjects were "equal by nature and inferior only in the sense that they have less obligation to care for the public good."  But later this monarchic rule became tyrannical as the rulers treated their subjects as beasts and treated themselves as gods (346, 359, 402).

In some passages of his book, Acosta combines the first two stages and suggests that even the most primitive hunter-gatherers had some informal leadership by which prominent people could mediate disputes and lead them in war, but always constrained by the informal consent or resistance of the community.  The one passage quoted by Locke is an example of this, as though Locke figured out that even primitive foragers would have some episodic and informal structure of rule in which some individuals would have more influence than others, although excessive dominance would be checked by popular resistance.

In other words, politics is constant in all human societies, in that some individuals will be politically ambitious in seeking the support of others in becoming leaders, and there will be political rivalry in the competition for positions of leadership.  The many other individuals who do not wish to rule will defer to those who lead them, but they will also resist oppressive dominance by their leaders.  Human beings really are political animals by nature.

Acosta's three levels of political order corresponds at least roughly to what some modern political anthropologists have identified as a four-leveled typology of preindustrial political systems: band, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Flannery and Marcus 2012; Service 1971; Lewellen 2003:15-41).  In bands and tribes, political power is decentralized and egalitarian.  In chiefdoms and states, political power is centralized and inegalitarian.  In bands, people live by hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants.  In tribes, people continue hunting and gathering, but they are also horticulturalists who engage in some small-scale farming of domesticated plants and pastoralists who herd some domesticated animals.

Locke identified both bands and tribes as societies in the state of nature, because people in these societies are naturally free and equal in that all adult individuals are free from any coercive subordination to anyone else.  They live by customary rules of good conduct, and each individual has the right to enforce those rules by punishing those who violate them.  No adult individual feels compelled to take orders from anyone else, although people will voluntarily consent to informal and situational leaders.


DEMOCRACY IN HORTICULTURAL TRIBES

One of Locke's sources for information about tribal societies in America was Gabriel Sagard's Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons, which was first published in French in 1632.  Locke bought this book during his stay in France, 1675 to 1679.  His notes on the book date from 1679, when he had returned to England, in the midst of the Exclusion Crisis.  Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, was leading those members of Parliament who wanted to exclude James, the Duke of York, from inheriting the throne from his brother King Charles II, because James was a Catholic; and Shaftesbury's group feared that a Catholic king of England would promote the royal absolutism of the French Catholic monarchy.  Locke was associated with Shaftesbury and his group, which would become the Whig party.  Their opponents would become the Tory party.  According to Peter Laslett, Locke began writing his Two Treatises on Government in 1679, in response to the Exclusion Crisis, although it would not be published until after the Revolution of 1688.

In Locke's notebook, his notes on Sagard are under the heading Immitanda, indicating that Locke regarded Huron society as worthy of being imitated.  And, indeed, much of what Locke says about the state of nature as the original condition of humanity was shaped by his reading of Sagard (Talbot 2010: 27-44).

In 1610, the French exploring Canada began to visit the four confederated Iroquoian-speaking tribes they called the Huron, who called themselves the Wendat.  The French found their settlements scattered across a peninsula located between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe northwest of Lake Ontario.  Some of these settlements had as many as 2,000 people.  The total population for about twenty settlements was about 30,000.  The larger settlements were surrounded by palisades to protect them from attack, because the Huron Confederacy was often at war with the Iroquois Confederacy of five tribes settled south of Lake Ontario.  The Huron were a horticultural society based primarily on the cultivation of corn, but also beans and squash.  The women did most of the farming work.  The adult men brought in other food from hunting, gathering, and fishing.  The men were also warriors who took pride in their courageous fighting against the Iroquois.  The men also engaged in extensive trading networks.  Political alliances were built around trading relations.

The French descriptions of Huron culture are found mostly in three sources.  The first was Samuel de Champlain's account of his visit to the Huron between may 1615 and May 1616.  Champlain was an explorer, a soldier, a cartographer, and a trader who worked for trading companies involved in the valuable fur trade.  He supervised the development of the French colony along the Saint Lawrence River.  

The second source was Sagard.  He was a lay brother of the Recollects, who were a branch of the Franciscan order.  He went to Canada from Paris to promote missionary work among the Huron.  Before leaving he studied the Huron language, and he later published an important dictionary of the Huron language.  He arrived in Huron country in August of 1623 and stayed there until May of 1624.  At this time, he saw Huron society at its peak of development.  Beginning in 1634, the Huron were decimated by epidemic diseases passed to them by the French--particularly the smallpox and measles.  Over two-thirds of the Huron people died.  Then in 1649, the Huron were devastated by an invasion of Iroquois warriors fighting with firearms acquired from trading with the Dutch colonists.  Those of the Huron who survived were forced to abandon their villages and leave their native territory.  So Sagard's reports are a valuable record of what Huron society looked like before this collapse.

The third source for studies of the Huron is the Jesuit Relations.  The Relations were annual reports published in Paris by the Jesuits to chronicle their activities among the Huron from 1634 to 1650.  They were filled with detailed descriptions of Huron life and culture.

Anthropologist Elizabeth Tooker has paraphrased much of what was written in these three sources in writing her Ethnology of the Huron Indians, 1615-1649 (1964).

In taking notes on Sagard's book, Locke was relying on some of the best anthropological ethnography available to him.  Anthropologist Bruce Trigger is one of the leading scholars today of Huron history, and he has praised the work of Sagard and the other French observers of the Huron in the first half of the seventeenth century.  He notes that they saw the Huron before the extensive contact with the Europeans had altered their way of life.  "Unlike most modern anthropologists, these visitors did not find themselves living among groups who had long been influenced by Europeans and who were under the surveillance and control of a colonial administration that had altered their way of life to accord with European standards of propriety" (Trigger 2002:1).

The archaeological evidence for the earliest human occupation of southern Ontario suggests that the first humans there were foragers who lived by hunting, gathering, and fishing (Trigger 2000:105-176).  Fluted spear points associated with mammoth and mastodon hunting have been dated between 11,000 and 8,000 B.C.  Later, the principal game animals were deer, moose, and caribou.  Around 500 A.D., corn was introduced, and slowly horticulture became more important.  This confirms Acosta's insight that the first human societies in the Americas were hunter-gatherer bands, long before horticultural tribes.

Locke's notes on Sagard (found in Oxford University's Lovelace Collection of Locke's Papers) have never been published.  But Ann Talbot has published some extracts from these notes in her book (Talbot 2010:27-44).

By comparing Locke's notes, Sagard's book, and Locke's Two Treatises and Letters on Toleration, one can see at least nine elements of Locke's account of the state of nature that he could have taken from Sagard:  (1) the law of nature, (2) the state of war, (3) natural punishment, (4) rulers by consent, (5) council governance, (6) religious toleration, (7) marriage and divorce by voluntary contract, (8) property, and (9) egalitarian hierarchy.

(1) The law of nature.  Sagard noted how hospitable the Huron were in their treatment of the Franciscans, freely sharing their lodging and food.  "For they hold it proper to help wayfarers and to receive among them with politeness anyone who is not an enemy, and much more so those of their own nation" (1968:88).  When the Franciscans decided that they needed to build a church to facilitate their mission of teaching Christianity, the Huron helped to build it.  When one young man complained that he did not want to do such work for those who were not his relatives, he was reproved for being so unfriendly.  Sagard observed how remarkable they were in showing themselves "so full of human kindness" in helping in the building of the church (1968:78).

Locke's notes show how impressed he was by this description of the friendly sociability of the Huron.  He noted that they were "merry and even tempered grave and serious but not sullen nor melancholy."  They were "lovers of order."  They "quarrel not with their neighbors."  They were "friendly, liberal, and charitable to all strangers as well as acquaintances except enemies."

In this way, the Huron showed Locke how people in a state of nature without any centralized governmental rule over them could live sociably together according to customary rules of good conduct.  In his Second Treatise, Locke concluded that this showed how the state of nature "has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions" (par. 6).  In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke said that the American Indians were "strict Observers of the Rules of Equity and of the Law of Nature" (Goldie ed., 40). 

If there is such a law of nature in the state of nature, then Thomas Hobbes is wrong in asserting that the state of nature must always become a state of war--a war of each against all--because as Locke says, the state of nature can be "a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation" (par. 19).

(2)  The state of war.  Notice, however, that the Huron were friendly with everyone "except enemies."  Sagard described their frequent wars with the Iroquois and other tribes.  Usually they went to war to avenge the killing of someone by an enemy.  The young men were eager to go to war so that they could win the glory from fighting courageously.  When they defeated an enemy, they took prisoners and brought them back to their villages where they were tortured in the most brutal ways.  They did their best to prolong the torture over many days.  

Sagard saw warfare among the Huron as rooted in their culture of blood revenge and feuding:

"There is scarcely any nation that is not at war and dissension with some other, not for the purpose of possessing their territory and conquering their country, but solely to exterminate them if possible and to take revenge for some slight wrong or unpleasantness, which is seldom a great matter.  But their misgovernment and the want of police, which leaves their wicked fellow-citizens unpunished, is the cause of all this evil. . . . And thus it happens most frequently that for the fault of one man alone two entire tribes make war very cruelly upon one another, and are always in continual dread of being surprised the one by the other" (1968:163-164).

So among the Huron, the state of nature often became a state of war, just as Hobbes warned.  Consequently, it seems that Locke in the Second Treatise must concede this point to Hobbes: "To avoid this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to Heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders) is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature" (par. 21).

Here we see what William Batz (1974:667-68) has called an "anthropological ambiguity" in Locke's historical anthropology.  On the one hand, Locke says that the state of nature was not a state of war, as Hobbes claimed, but rather a state of peace.  On the other hand, Locke says that the state of nature could easily become a state of war, and that's why people consented to leaving the state of nature and establishing government to pacify social life.  This is why scholarly commentators on Locke have debated whether or not Locke was ultimately a Hobbesian.  

The reason for this confusion is that the anthropological reports about native American peoples available to Locke disagreed about whether these people in America were peaceful or bellicose.  They were peaceful insofar as they could live by customary rules of cooperation within each society, and they could even enforce rules for peaceful trading between different societies.  But they also engaged in homicidal violence both within and between their societies.

This anthropological ambiguity continues today in the intense debate among anthropologists about the evolution of human warfare.  The Hobbesian anthropologists argue that our evolutionary ancestors living in stateless societies--bands or tribes--were often at war, and that the establishment of bureaucratic states had a pacifying effect on human life.  The Rousseauian anthropologists argue, on the contrary, that our prehistoric ancestors were peaceful, and that warfare was a cultural invention that arose after the emergence of settled agrarian societies and bureaucratic states.

Often the anthropologists assume that the debate is between two alternatives, represented by Hobbes and Rousseau, and they ignore Locke as taking a third position.  Consequently, I have argued, they fail to see that the evidence supports the conclusion that Hobbes was partly right about the state of nature, Rousseau was mostly wrong, and Locke was mostly right.  

The evidence shows that Hobbes was right about the state of nature being a state of war, and therefore Rousseau was wrong.  But the evidence also shows that Hobbes was wrong in claiming that life in the state of nature was a perpetual war with no peaceful cooperation.  In fact, people in foraging bands and horticultural tribes  have lived in communities with norms of peaceful cooperation that included intertribal cooperation such as networks of trade.  And they sometimes had long periods without intertribal war.

Locke was right to see that the state of nature is a state of peace that easily becomes a state of war: establishing government can therefore have a pacifying effect through the rule of law to settle disputes that easily become violent feuds in the state of nature.

Some of my previous posts on this can be found herehereherehere., and here.

(3)  Natural punishment.  The persistence of war in Huron society arises from each individual having the right to seek revenge against any perceived wrongdoer.  This is what Locke in the Second Treatise called "the Executive Power of the Law of Nature"--that "every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature."  Locke concedes that this must seem a "very strange Doctrine to some Men," And yet he argues that the law of nature, like all other laws governing human conduct, would be "in vain" if there were no one with the power to execute that law, which must include the power to execute any murderer (pars. 7-8, 11).

Paradoxically, this natural right to punish that enforces social peace under the law of nature also provokes social conflict when the right to take revenge creates unremitting feuding.  Here we see the "inconveniences of the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every Man's being Judge in his own Case," and we can see why people sought a remedy for these inconveniences by having each individual give up his executive power of the law of nature and resigned it to a governmental order with the power to make, enforce, and adjudicate standing laws of justice.  Here is how centralized political power originates by popular consent to leave the state of nature (pars. 87-89).

Nevertheless, if a monarch is unrestrained by law in exercising arbitrary, absolute power to oppress the people, he has thereby put himself into a state of nature in relation to his people, and they can reclaim their natural right to punish him as they would anyone who aggressively attacks them (pars. 91-93).

It should also be noted that in the state of nature, the natural right to punish has two levels: there is a natural right to punish with physical force those who inflict physical harm on others, and the people must give up this right to public institutions with the establishment of government and civil law; but there is also a natural right to punish with social disapproval those who have engaged in blameworthy conduct, and this right is retained by the people even after the establishment of government and civil law.  This second kind of natural punishment is called the "law of reputation" in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  I have written about this in an earlier post.  Sagard saw this in the Huron because they were generally motivated to win social approval and to avoid social disapproval, and that's how the customary norms of their society were enforced.

(4) Rulers by consent.  In his reading of Sagard's book, Locke saw how a tribal people in a state of nature could establish government by their consent in selecting their rulers.  In his notes on the book, Locke observed that "their kings are successive only when they are heirs to their father's virtues and are obeyed rather by persuasion than by force," and that the Huron "choose for officers those who upon trial they find fit" (Talbot 2010:36).

In his notes on Sagard's History of Canada, Locke wrote under the heading Politia: "The kings of Canada are elective, but the sons never fail to succeed their fathers when they are heirs to their virtues, otherwise not, and their kings are rather obeyed by consent and persuasion, than by force and compulsion, the public good being the measure of their authority.  Sagard, p. 418.  And this seems to be the state of regal authority in its original at least in all this part of the world" (Locke 1997:274).

The reports from Sagard and others about how the American Indians selected their rulers influenced what Locke said in the Second Treatise about the beginning of political societies in the state of nature.  He claimed that the American Indians "by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set Rulers over themselves.  So that their Politick Societies all began from a voluntary Union, and the mutual agreement of Men freely acting in the choice of their Governors, and forms of Government" (par. 102).

Locke identified the need for military leadership in war with other societies as the primary reason for people in the state of nature consenting to rulers.  

"Since then those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another; they could not but have greater Apprehensions of others, than of one another: And therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves under a Frame of Government, which might best serve to that end; and chuse the wisest and bravest Man to conduct them in their Wars, and lead them out against their Enemies, and in this chiefly be their Ruler" (par. 107).

"Thus we see, that the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe, . . . are little more than Generals of their Armies; and though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council.  Though the War it self, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the King's sole Authority" (par. 108).

(5) Council governance.   In saying that matters of war and peace were decided "in the People, or in a Council," Locke was reporting what he had learned from Sagard about how the Huron confederacy was ruled by chiefs with the consent of popular councils (Sagard 1968:148-166).  The accuracy of Sagard's description of the Huron council system has been confirmed by Bruce Trigger (2002:80-96).

This Huron government by councils was organized at four levels: the clan segment, the village, the tribe, and the confederacy.  In each of the twenty villages (communities of up to 2,000 people), each clan segment had two chiefs, one for peace and one for war.  The civil chiefs managed the day-to-day affairs of the clan segment.  The war chiefs were prominent only in times of war.  The chiefs were influential, but they had no power to command anyone to obey their orders without the individual consent of every person subject to the order.  Sagard observed that "a chief has no absolute authority among them, although they pay him respect, and the tribe is led by entreaty, advice, and example rather than by commands" (1968:148).

The chiefships were hereditary in particular lineages, but there was no rule to decide which individual within a particular lineage would inherit the office.  A new chief was selected by the members of the lineage, with the older women of the lineage having the most influence.  They selected the person with the best qualifications for the office.  Chiefs who did not perform their duties well and who therefore became objects of public criticism could be dismissed at any time by the women of the lineage.

The primary duty of a chief was to announce the decisions reached through a process of discussion leading to consensus among all the adult men and women of his group.  Chiefs could not make decisions on their own.  Rather, they acted only as discussion leaders helping their groups to reach agreement, in which every individual had to consent.  Each clan segment was autonomous in making decisions for its group.  Above the level of the clan segment, the Huron had a system of representation in which chiefs represented their clan segments.

The civil chiefs of the clan segments met in a village council, along with the old men of the village.  This village council met frequently, often daily.  Although no chief was superior in rank to any other, one of the civil chiefs was recognized as the head chief or spokesman for the village.  The council met in the house of the head chief.  The head chief announced the topics to be discussed, and then everyone in the meeting expressed their opinions.  Proposals were changed until there was a consensus.  The head chief then announced the council's decision.  Everything that concerned the village as a whole was discussed in these council meetings.  All legal disputes between people in different clan lineages were adjudicated by the village council.

Occasionally, there were general meetings attended by all of the men of the village who were twenty-five years old and older.  No women or young men attended.  But the opinions of the women, particularly the older women, were conveyed through the men that attended.

Each of the four Huron tribes had a tribal council made up of the chiefs of the clan segments from the villages of the tribe.  One of these chiefs was designated as principal chief for the tribe based on his inherited lineage.  The people of each tribe saw themselves as a collection of clan segments, and so each clan segment managed its own affairs, and the chief of the clan segment was independent of the other chiefs.

Any chief could call for a tribal council meeting to deliberate about matters that concerned the entire tribe.  They would meet in the house of the principal tribal chief.  And as with the lower level councils, topics would be discussed until a consensus was reached.

Finally, there was a council for the entire Huron confederacy of four tribes.  This confederacy council was made up of all the civil chiefs who sat on the four tribal councils, who represented all of the Huron clan segments.  The confederacy council met once a year in the spring, and the meeting could last several weeks.  They deliberated about matters concerning the whole confederacy.  Special meetings could be called by any confederacy chief to deal with any problem involving the entire confederacy.

This council system of government for the Huron Confederacy was very similar to the government of the Iroquois Confederacy that united five Iroquoian tribes in northeast North America.  Some scholars have seen evidence that some of the American Founding Fathers--particularly, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams--saw the Iroquois Confederacy as a model for how to organize a federal republic with popular representation (Grinde and Johansen 1991).  Other scholars have argued that the evidence for this is not clear.  

Arguing against Bruce Johansen's claims about Iroquois influence on the Founders, Elisabeth Tooker objected: "The most glaring deficiency in Johansen's discussion . . . is one he himself admits to: a failure to consider the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, most importantly John Locke . . . . If he had done so, he might have realized that the image he holds of the Indian is a legacy from them.  If his account of Franklin's and Jefferson's ideas is correct, so also were theirs--like Johansen, they saw the Indian through Locke's eyes, not through Indian eyes" (1990:294).  Maybe so, but Locke's eyes were looking at the American Indians as presented in traveler's books like Sagard's.  She asserts that "ideas such as 'the state of nature,' 'natural law,' and 'natural rights' are like so many other ideas we hold, Western philosophical ideas, not empirical findings" (1990:296).  But this ignores the fact that Locke really did believe these ideas were "empirical findings" from the study of the Huron and other American Indian societies.

Stasavage has added to these empirical findings by showing that the council governance practiced by the Huron has been widespread in human societies throughout history.  Using data from the Standard Cross Cultural Sample of 186 societies that were representative of the best described societies for specific geographic areas, Stasavage found that for most of these societies there was some council governance, either at the local level or at the level of a central authority (Stasavage 2020; Ahmed and Stasavage 2020).  He also found, however, that autocratic political executives could sometimes develop rule by bureaucracy as a substitute for shared rule with a council.

(6) Religious tolerance.  From his study of the travel literature about the American Indians, Locke concluded that societies in the state of nature show religious tolerance.  He might have found support for this in Sagard's book, because Sagard reports that the Huron were remarkably friendly to the Franciscans, allowing them to freely teach Christianity in the attempt to convert the Huron and turn them away from their native animistic and shamanistic religious beliefs.

In his Letters on Toleration, Locke pointed to the American Indians as showing how people could "live together in Society, make one People of one Language under one Chieftain, who shall have no other Power but to command them in time of War against their common enemies, without any municipal Laws, Judges, or any Person with Superiority established amongst them, but ended all their private Differences, if any arose, by the extemporary Determination of their Neighbors, or of Arbitrators chosen by the Parties";  and in such a society the rulers had no power to use public force to compel people to profess belief in any religion. This should show us that "the Care of Souls does not belong to the Magistrate" (Locke 2010:26, 70).

I have written previously about the evolution of religious liberty in the state of nature.

(7)  Marriage and divorce by voluntary contract.  In the Second Treatise, attacking the idea that paternal power is the absolute right of a father, Locked asked:  "And what will become of this Paternal Power in that part of the World where one Woman hath more than one Husband at a time?  Or in those parts of America where when the Husband and Wife part, which happens frequently, the Children are all left to the Mother, follow her, and are wholly under her Care and Provision?" (par. 65).

Sagard was probably one of Locke's sources for this.  Sagard reported:  "If in the course of time husband and wife like to separate for any reason whatsoever, or have no children, they are free to part. . . . Hence it often happens that some woman spends her youth in this fashion, having had more than a dozen or fifteen husbands, all of whom nevertheless are not the only men to enjoy the woman, how much married they be; for after nightfall the young women and girls run about from one lodge to another, as do the young men for their part on the same quest, possessing them wherever it seems good to them, yet without any violence, leaving all to the wishes of the woman.  The husband will do the like to his neighbor's wife and the wife to her neighbor, no jealousy intervening on that account, and no shame, disgrace, or dishonor being incurred" (Sagard 1968:124-25).

Sagard also indicated, however, that if a couple had children, divorce was rare except for some important reason.  And if the parents did divorce, the children were usually divided up, the daughters going to the mother, the sons to the father, although this was not always the rule.

This supported Locke's claim that marriage was a voluntary compact that could be terminated by consent of the spouses, as long as they provided for the procreation and education of their children (par. 81).

It should also be noted that women had great influence in Huron society, because it was matrilineal (inheritance passed through the female line) and matrilocal (husbands joined the wife's family).

(8) Property.  In his chapter on property in the Second Treatise, Locke referred to the American Indians ten times (par. 26, 30, 36-37, 41, 43, 46, 48-49).  Most of what he said followed what Sagard had written about property among the Huron.

The foraging Indian claims property in his food by appropriating it to himself through his labor.  "The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his Life" (par. 26).  "Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one" (par. 30).

The horticultural Indian claims property in the food he has grown, but his farming of the land is not intensive, and so he does not produce much surplus.  And so the Indians are "rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life," and "a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England" (par. 41).

The American Indians had trade networks based on exchange through bartering.  But their commercial activity was limited by their not having invented money (par. 46-49).

(9)  Egalitarian hierarchy.  Locke could see in Huron society evidence for natural human equality, because the Huron asserted the equal right of every individual to be free from coercive dominance by others.  But he also saw that the Huron were not really equal in all respects, because some people had higher social status than others.  Locke had to admit that even the most egalitarian societies in the state of nature show some inequality.  Even if absolute equality is not attainable in any society, Locke suggested, we might expect to see in a free society like the Huron an egalitarian hierarchy.

Locke indicated that in the Second Treatise:

"Though I have said above, Chap. II, That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man" (par. 54).

This could be a description of the Huron.  Age makes a difference, because adults have higher rank than children, and older men and women generally have the highest rank.  Birth makes a difference, because men born into certain clan segments have a greater chance of becoming a chief.  Virtue and merit are also important, because those selected for the office of chief must be judged to have the talents and traits of character required for being a good chief; and war chiefs must be judged to be courageous and wise in their military leadership.  Alliance, benefits, and gratitude are all factors that influence social ranking, so that chiefs are respected only as long as they are generous in giving away much of their wealth to others.  Sex differences are important, because the offices of government are held only by men, and yet women (particularly, in a matrilineal and matrilocal society) have great influence over social life.

In all of these ways, Huron society is hierarchical, in the sense that some people have greater power or status than others.  But then anthropologists have long recognized that all human societies are hierarchical in some manner, even those hunter-gatherer bands that are often identified as the most egalitarian of societies (Flanagan 1989).  As I have indicated in a previous post, all mammalian societies have some form of leadership.

Nevertheless, the Huron can still be understood as having an egalitarian hierarchy, in which their many forms of inequality are compatible with their equality in their natural freedom, so that no individual is forced against his will to obey anyone else.  Huron chiefs have no authority to force their will on anyone.  The chiefs can only announce the decisions that have been consented to by their followers.  Chiefs who become too arrogant in asserting their dominance over others will be criticized, ridiculed, or even deposed.  This is what Chris Boehm has called a "reverse-dominance hierarchy" (1999): although rulers might want to be dominant, and their followers might often defer to them, tyrannically dominant behavior will provoke resistance from those being exploited; and the ultimate punishment of the tyrant is execution.

In an egalitarian society, equality does not mean absolute equality of wealth and status; but it does mean equality in individual autonomy, so that no one can use greater wealth or status to gain power over another (Gardner 1991; Kelly 2013:243-48; Woodburn 1982).  People in egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies have told anthropologists that "we are all headmen," and each person is "headman over himself" (Lee 1979:348).  Similarly, Locke said that in the state of nature, every person must recognize all others as his equal--"all being Kings as much as he" (ST, 123).

Previously, I have written about how it is now possible to calculate the Gini coefficients for inequality in human societies over the past 10,000 years.  The reputation of hunter-gatherers for being egalitarian is warranted because they have some inequality, but it is lower than herding and farming societies.  And among modern nation-states, those that have Lockean liberal social orders have lower inequality than in the illiberal societies.  The United States has a slightly lower Gini number than the small-scale herding and farming societies.  And the Nordic capitalist welfare-states have Gini numbers about the same as the hunter-gatherer societies.  

This suggests that modern Lockean liberal social orders can approximate the equal liberty of human beings in the state of nature.  As I have argued previously (here and here), there is inequality in a liberal order but it is a "good inequality."


REFERENCES

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