Does the New Testament Teach Classical Liberalism?

The second half of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (Parts 3 and 4) is devoted to the interpretation of the Bible.  For many readers today, this seems odd, because giving so much attention to biblical theology seems out of place in a treatise of political philosophy.  When the Leviathan is used as a text in undergraduate political science classes, it's common for the teacher not to assign any reading from the second half of the book.  Some editions of the Leviathan reprint only the first half of the book.  But having just completed another reading of the whole of the Leviathan in my graduate seminar on Hobbes, I am reminded of how important the interpretation of the Bible has been for the history of political philosophy, and particularly for the history of liberal political philosophy.

A new book that has helped me to see this is Politicizing the Bible: The Roots of Historical Criticism and the Secularization of Scripture, 1300-1700 by Scott Hahn and Benjamin Wiker (Crossroad Publishing Company, 2013).  Hahn and Wiker show how the "historical-critical method" in the scholarly study of the Bible arose in the 19th century as the culmination of a political interpretation of the Bible that began with Marsilius of Padua and continued with Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke.  The purpose of that political interpretation of the Bible was to secularize politics and privatize religious belief so that the aim of politics would be securing the peace and security of the body rather than the salvation of the soul.  (Hahn has summarized the argument of his book in a YouTube video lecture.)

Hahn and Wiker repeatedly quote a remark by Jon Levenson that "historical criticism is the form of biblical studies that corresponds to the classical liberal political ideal," and they say that Levenson "has hit the bull's-eye" (7-9, 11, 296, 364, 388).  Their book is an elaborate argument to demonstrate this claim--that the historical-critical method for studying the Bible was developed to advance classical liberal politics.  That's their explicit argument.  Their implicit argument is that this liberal bias requires a distorted interpretation of the Bible.

I am persuaded by their explicit argument but not by their implicit argument.  I agree with them that some of the early modern political philosophers initiated a tradition of Biblical interpretation that would support classical liberalism by radically separating Church and State, doing this in such a way as to promote the liberal principles of political secularism, religious liberty, and the privatization of religious life.  I don't agree, however, with their implied claim that this liberal interpretation of the Bible is clearly contrary to the true teaching of the Bible (see, for example, 11, 364, 445, 484).  I would argue that the secularization of politics through the liberal principles of religious toleration and privatization of religious belief is largely a product of New Testament Christianity.  In other words, the liberal reading of the Bible is a plausible reading.  Indeed, it's so plausible that most Christians today--including the Catholic Church--have embraced this liberal interpretation of the Bible.  I suspect that even Hahn and Wiker ultimately accept Biblical liberalism.

It might seem odd, however, to put Hobbes in the tradition of Biblical liberalism.  After all, much of what Hobbes says about church-state relations seems illiberal in that he argues for the absolute power of the political sovereign over an established church, which includes the right of the sovereign to interpret the Bible, so that the sovereign acts as the "supreme pastor," who "ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of souls" (ch. 33, 254-55 [268-69]; ch. 36, 283-85 [298-300]; ch. 39, 306 [321-22]; ch. 43, 355-56 [372-73], 379 [396]).

And yet one should notice that Hobbes's illiberal argument for the political regulation of an established church is based on his interpretation of the Hebrew theocratic state in the Old Testament, and as he moves into the New Testament, he begins to move towards a separation of church and state.  Critical for Hobbes's political interpretation of the New Testament is the declaration of Jesus that "my kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36) and that Christ's kingdom will not begin until his second coming.  During the first three centuries of Christianity, the Christian churches were voluntary organizations that enforced doctrinal orthodoxy through the threat of excommunication from the church but without any coercive force or violent persecution of heretics or infidels.  Hobbes concludes that among the early Christians, "there was then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine, and persuading" (ch. 42, 348 [365]).  The political enforcement of church authority did not arise until the conversion of the Emperor Constantine in 312 AD (ch. 42, 322 [338], 342-44 [359-61]).

By the time he reaches the end of Leviathan, Hobbes is ready to endorse the position of the Independents in Parliament, who wanted no politically enforced church at all and free toleration of religious diversity.  "And so we are reduced to the Independency of the primitive Christians, to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best," and if this promotes religious peace, it is "perhaps the best" (ch. 47, 456 [479-80]).

Thus does Hobbes move towards complete religious toleration and the privatization of religious belief as rooted in the New Testament as the best way to secure peace.  In effect, Hobbes adopts the interpretation of the Bible advanced by Roger Williams, who argued that while the Old Testament teaches theocratic enforcement of religious belief, the New Testament teaches religious toleration.  As I have argued in a previous post, Williams was right in interpreting the New Testament as supporting a classical liberal conception of religious toleration and liberty.

We should realize, however, that Hobbes was right in arguing that no matter how much religious liberty might be allowed, even in a state that practices toleration, the sovereign must have the ultimate power to rule against religious doctrines that promote violence, and in that way the sovereign is still the "supreme pastor." 

Consider, for example, what happened after the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001.  When it was discovered that the terrorists were members of al-Qaida, who believed they were obeying the teaching of the Koran in commanding holy war against infidels, this provoked a political debate over whether Islam was a threat to the peace of the world, which would make it impossible to tolerate Islam in a liberal regime that must suppress religious violence. 

In his speech to a Joint Session of Congress, nine days after the terrorist attack, George Bush had to offer his own authoritative interpretation of the Koran.  He said that the terrorists "practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam."  He declared that the teachings of Islam "are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah." 

Bush is a Christian who interprets the New Testament as teaching that religious belief is a voluntary activity of private individuals that can be properly protected from coercive persecution.  But any religious belief that promotes unjustified violence cannot be tolerated by any government that aims to secure peace and liberty.  Consequently, Bush believes that government can rightly interpret religious doctrines to protect the peace while generally tolerating religious beliefs and practices that are non-violent.

This is the Christian understanding of liberal toleration that emerged in the English Civil War and in the writings of Roger Williams.  It was later elaborated by Spinoza, Locke, and others.

Do Hahn and Wiker agree with this interpretation of the Bible as supporting liberal toleration?  They are strangely evasive about this.  They generally present the liberal interpretation of the Bible as driven by a liberal bias that is not really true to the Biblical text.  But then they sometimes speak of liberal toleration as something that "may appear quite ordinary to us," as if they endorse it (446).  Moreover, they often concede that the liberal interpretation of the Bible was an understandable reaction against the brutal violence and moral corruption of the Catholic Church in its exercise of authority over politics (15, 390-91).  And yet they never explicitly concede that the liberal reading of the Bible is plausible.

Hahn and Wiker claim to be following the recommendation of then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, who called for "a criticism of criticism" in Biblical interpretation (8).  But they are oddly silent about the statements of Pope Benedict XVI that support the liberal interpretation of the Bible, particularly the liberal argument that the violent persecution and brutality of the Old Testament must be seen as morally inferior to the peaceful toleration and love of the New Testament.

In his Apostolic Exhortation Verbum Domini (November 11, 2010), Benedict XVI indicated that the Old Testament had "dark passages" containing "violence and immorality" (sec. 42).  We must remember, he advised, that "biblical revelation is deeply rooted in history."  He explained: "Revelation is suited to the cultural and moral level of distant times and thus describes facts and customs, such as cheating and trickery, and acts of violence and massacre, without explicitly denouncing the immorality of such things."  Notice the implication here that "the cultural and moral level" of the Old Testament was lower than that of the New Testament, because the God of the Old Testament did not explicitly denounce the immorality of the unjust violence perpetrated by the Hebrew people.

Moreover, Hahn and Wiker are silent about the actions of both John Paul II and Benedict XVI in asking forgiveness for the history of religious violence condoned by the Catholic Church.

They are also silent about how the Catholic Church endorsed liberal toleration as rooted in the New Testament in the "Declaration of Religious Liberty" (1965) at Vatican II.

Would Hahn and Wiker agree with these moves of the Catholic Church towards liberal toleration?  Hahn seems to agree with this in his book Reasons to Believe: How to Understand, Explain, and Defend the Catholic Faith (Doubleday, 2007).  Throughout this book, he uses persuasion to try to convert his readers to Catholicism, but he never suggests that violent persecution or coercion would ever be justified by the Catholic Church.  He writes: "We cannot impose orthodox conclusions on our unbelieving friends.  To borrow words from Benjamin Franklin: The mind changed against the will is of the same opinion still.  God endowed every human being with freedom, and we are always free to choose unbelief" (39).  So here he seems to accept Franklin's argument for toleration and conversion only through peaceful persuasion.

And yet I can't be completely sure about this, however, because of what Hahn says about papal infallibility.  He says that although the popes have made some mistakes, they are infallible in matters of Christian faith and morals.  "God has never permitted even the scoundrels to teach error in matters of faith and morals" (130).

This is disturbing.  Does he really mean to say that all the popes who authorized the persecution of heretics--for example,  Innocent IV in his Bull Ad Extirpanda--were infallible?  If so, then were John Paul II and Benedict XVI fallible in asking forgiveness for such religious violence?  Does Hahn agree with Thomas Aquinas that the Church can even authorize the execution of heretics (ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 3)?

I have elaborated some of these points in previous posts here, here, here, here, and here.

Debating Darwinian Liberalism: Dilley's Syllogism

How many evil consequences of Darwinian science can you imagine? 

Until recently, I could imagine quite a few.  But now that I have read an essay by Bruce Gordon, I can think of hundreds of evils coming from Darwinism.  I don't have room here for Gordon's complete list.  So I'll give you a short sample.  According to Gordon, the "cultural poison of Darwinian philosophy" leads to the following:  hedonism, narcissism, totalitarianism, eco-terrorism, fetal farming, state-enforced active euthanasia, Marxism, fascism, nihilism, "hollow men," "ceding national sovereignty to effete international bureaucracies," multiculturalism, affirmative action, "central government planning of all aspects of life," "cultural guilt and self-loathing," and "a Hegelian religion of the state as the immanent unfolding of the Absolute Spirit."  The final outcome of all this is "that the noonday sun of Western strength is spent and will fade into the twilight of an ignoble dissolution . . . our hope must fade, and night descend" (175-83). 

Wow.  If you're like me, you had never imagined that so much evil stuff could come from the idea of Darwinian evolution.

So how exactly does Darwinian science bring the descent of human civilization into a night without hope and rule by "effete international bureaucracies"?  To answer that question, you'll need to read the book in which Gordon's essay appears--Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism: Theories in Tension, edited by Stephen Dilley and newly published by Lexington Books. 

Most of this book is a criticism of my argument that Darwinian evolutionary science supports classical liberalism.  Of the thirteen contributors to the book, eleven criticize my position, one supports one part of my position, and one generally supports my position.  Here are the eleven critics: Stephen Dilley, Benjamin Wiker, Peter Augustine Lawler, Jay Richards, Angus Menuge, John G. West, Logan Paul Gage, Bruce Gordon, Richard Weikart, Roger Masters, and Michael White.  Shawn Klein agrees with me only partially. Timothy Sandefur is the one hero who generally (but maybe not totally) agrees with me.

This post is the first in a series of posts in which I will respond to this book.  I begin with the argument that seems to be embraced by the first nine critics in the above list, and I will call the argument Dilley's Syllogism, because it's stated by Dilley in his introductory chapter.

Although Dilley does not state it in exactly this way, his argument seems to be this:

Classical (Lockean) liberalism is founded on Christianity.

Darwinism denies Christianity.

Therefore, Darwinism denies classical (Lockean) liberalism.

Consequently, the nine critics are proponents of what they call "Christian classical liberalism" or "theistic classical liberalism" (19, 23,158-59).  They also identify this with the liberal political thought of the American founders, and so they defend "the rich theistic classical liberalism embodied in the American founding" (159).  I have inserted "Lockean" into the syllogism because the first nine critics generally appeal to John Locke as "the quintessential classical liberal" (198), although they also often identify Adam Smith as a paradigmatic classical liberal (9-10, 13-14, 158).

The nine critics say that they are attacking "Darwinian conservatism," which "integrates a Darwinian conception of human nature with the essentials of classical liberalism, drawing on the work of Locke, Smith, Hayek, and others" (10).  They identify the most prominent proponents of Darwinian conservatism as me, Thomas Sowell, Robert McShea, James Q. Wilson, Michael Shermer, and Francis Fukuyama.  Most of their attacks, however, are directed at me.

The nine critics don't explain clearly what they mean by Christianity or how exactly specific doctrines of Christianity lead to classical liberalism.  They sometimes refer to the "God of the Bible," the "biblical worldview," or "Judeo-Christian orthodoxy," which suggests they are embracing both the Old Testament and the New Testament, both Judaism and Christianity (19-20, 26, 154, 158-60, 171, 189, 193, 198).  Does this exclude Islam?  Gordon argues that the "Christian worldview" in its purity excludes "Islamic religious identity" (196).

The only doctrinal teaching of the Judeo-Christian tradition that they mention is the idea of imago Dei: "In very broad strokes, this interpretation emphasizes both the dignity of human beings--as creatures fashioned in the imago Dei--and their depravity, having been subject to Adam's Fall" (11).  It is the equal dignity of all human beings as created in God's image that they see as the foundation of classical liberalism, and so if Darwinism denies this imago Dei doctrine by teaching that human beings were "created from animals," Darwinism thereby denies classical liberalism (198) and promotes all the evils listed by Gordon that are bringing about the complete collapse of Western civilization. 

This summarizes the famous "Wedge Document" of the Discovery Institute in Seattle, which laid out the plan for attacking Darwinian evolution and advancing "intelligent design theory" as a way of saving Western culture from the corrosion of scientific materialism.  Most of these nine critics have been associated with the Discovery Institute.

Although the nine critics generally agree that Christianity dictates the classical liberalism of Locke, they sometimes contradict themselves on this point.  For example, Benjamin Wiker refers to Locke as a Deist and implies that Locke appealed to Christianity only for the sake of persuading "the less enlightened" (44).  Wiker also identifies Hobbes as the true "father of modern liberalism" and explains: "In Hobbes we see the shift from morality rooted in natural law as defined by God and embedded in a teleological view of nature in which human moral goodness is defined by the perfection of our God-given nature, to morality entirely rooted in this-worldly passion and self-preservation embedded in an entirely non-teleological view of nature and human nature."  Moreover, he indicates, "this seems a great anticipation of, and hence entirely compatible with, Darwin's account of the evolution of morality" (45-46). 

In his book Moral Darwinism, Wiker argues that Locke was a Epicurean materialist who promoted a science of hedonism that would later be fulfilled by Darwin.  He also argues that insofar as Locke's ideas crept into the American founding, they became the seeds of moral corruption in American political life.  Oddly, Wiker doesn't mention this in his contribution to Dilley's book.

Do the nine critics really agree on Dilley's Syllogism?  I am not sure.  But I will assume that they do, because this gives me a coherent line of reasoning to which I can respond in my forthcoming posts.

Although I disagree with the nine critics in many ways, I agree with some of their points.  Peter Lawler and I are not far apart.  And I will indicate my agreement with Jay Richards, who shows that I have been wrong in suggesting that it's inconsistent to affirm free markets and deny Darwinian evolution.

Dilley's book should be read alongside Darwinian Conservatism: A Disputed Question, edited by Ken Blanchard (2009).  This book reprints the text of Darwinian Conservatism, followed by critical responses from eight authors, including three of the authors in Dilley's book (Lawler, West, and Sandefur).  This book concludes with a response from me and a good essay by Ken Blanchard on the Aristotelian character of Darwinian conservatism ("Natural Right and Natural Selection").

The Lockean Liberalism of King Charles III's New Testament Christian Monarchy

The St. Edward's Crown of the British monarch was made for the coronation of Charles II in 1661, after the previous crown was melted down in 1649, following the execution of Charles I.  It is made of solid gold and set with precious stones.  It is surmounted with the Cross of Jesus.

The coronation of Charles III and his wife, Camilla, as king and queen of the United Kingdom will take place Saturday, May 6, at Westminster Abbey.  It will begin at 11:00 am London time and 6:00 am Eastern time in the U.S.  This will be the 40th royal coronation at Westminster Abbey since that of William the Conqueror in 1066.

That Charles has chosen the name Charles III evokes the unsettled history of the monarchy under Charles I, who was beheaded by English revolutionaries, and Charles II, who restored the monarchy in 1660, after the interregnum (1649-1660), and tried to restore a Filmerian divine right absolute monarchy.  This name might also suggest that King Charles III will correct the mistakes made by Charles I and Charles II by moving away from the absolutist Christian monarchy of the Stuart dynasty to the classical liberal Christian monarchy of the House of Windsor.  That will be made clear by the coronation designed by Charles, which combines traditional symbols of the coronation that go back as far as the Coronation Rite of King Edgar in 973 with the new symbolism of monarchy in a liberal social order.  

The best source of information about the coronation is the official website.  The "Authorised Coronation Liturgy with Commentary" is particularly helpful, and I will be citing that document.  

Ian Bradley has an essay on the religious significance of the coronation.  Bradley is the author of the newly published book God Save the King: The Sacred Nature of Monarchy.

I have written about the evolutionary rise and fall of monarchy by symbolic cultural group selection, and about the silly arguments from Alt-Right theorists like Curtis Yarvin for restoring a Filmerian absolute monarchy as the best regime.  I have also argued that the New Testament teaches Lockean classical liberalism.  Now we will see in this coronation the ritual symbolism of a New Testament Christian monarchy.

The most striking feature of the coronation ceremony is how it manifests the sacred nature of monarchic authority as invested with the sanctity of Biblical religion.  But there's an inherent tension in this appeal to Biblical religion for political authority, because the Old Testament and the New Testament offer contradictory teachings about the divine authority of political rule.  The Old Testament in its account of how God chose the rulers of the people of Israel to enforce obedience to the Mosaic law favors theocracy, in which religious authorities coercively enforce Judaism and punish those outside the Jewish faith.  This has allowed many Christians to invoke the Old Testament as supporting a Christian theocracy, in which Christian kings rule by divine right to coercively enforce the Christian faith and punish heretics, infidels, and atheists.  By contrast, the New Testament suggests a separation of church and state, so that those in the church cannot coercively enforce their faith, and there is no legal establishment of religion.  This has allowed some Christians to invoke the New Testament as supporting religious liberty and toleration, so that churches become voluntary associations that cannot use legal coercion to enforce their faith.

In the debate over the divine right of kings in 17th century England, Christians like Robert Filmer embraced the theocratic tradition of the Old Testament to justify the absolute power of the Stuart monarchs as the "defenders of the faith"--that is, the faith of the Church of England--against those who did not share that faith.  On the other side of the debate, Christians like Roger Williams and John Locke interpreted the New Testament as denying this theocratic denial of religious liberty.  That's what I mean when I say that the New Testament teaches Lockean liberalism.

Now, in the Coronation Liturgy for King Charles III--as designed by Charles himself--we can see a subtle interweaving of Old Testament and New Testament traditions that reconciles the conflicts between them by favoring the Lockean liberalism of the New Testament.

Let's start at the beginning of the planned coronation.  At the head of the coronation procession into Westminster Abbey will be "faith leaders and representatives from the Jewish, Sunni and Shia Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, Bahai and Zoroastrian communities" (2).  They will be followed by the procession of ecumenical leaders of the Christian faith, which will include not just the Anglican Church, but also the Greek Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and other Christian churches in Great Britain.  This has never happened in any previous coronation of the British monarch.

A crucial part of every coronation has been identifying the monarch as the "Defender of the Faith," which means defender of the Church of England as opposed to all other faiths, whether Christian or non-Christian.  In the 16th century, "Defender of the Faith" was the title given by Pope Leo X to King Henry VIII for his defense of Catholicism.  But then when Henry broke with Rome to form his own English Church, he held onto the title with the idea that he would be defending the Anglicanism of the Church of England against Catholics and Christian dissenters.

Charles has had a life-long fascination with all faiths.  And in 1994, he said that as heir to the throne, he saw himself as less "defender of the faith" and more as "defender of faith"--of all the religious faiths.  He said, "People have fought to the death over these things, which seems to me a peculiar waste of people's energy, when we're all actually aiming for the same ultimate goal."  Although Charles' mother--Elizabeth II--was a devout Anglican Christian, she agreed with him about this.  She once said, "The concept of our established Church is occasionally misunderstood and, I believe, commonly underappreciated.  Its role is not to defend Anglicanism to the exclusion of other religions.  Instead, the Church has a duty to protect the free practice of all faiths in this country."  She also said that "gently and assuredly, the Church of England hs created an environment for other faith communities and indeed people of no faith to live freely" (7).  In a reception at Buckingham Palace days after his mother's funeral, Charles said that his mother was right about this, and that his Anglican faith committed him to "the common good of freedom."  That's what I mean by the Lockean liberalism of his New Testament Christian monarchy.  Actually, Charles has gone beyond Locke in arguing for defending the freedom of Catholics and atheists.

Early in the coronation as planned by Charles, he will be presented with the Bible as the guide for his rule (6).  Then, the Archbishop of Canterbury will administer the Coronation Oath by declaring: "Your Majesty, the Church established by law, whose settlement you will swear to maintain, is committed to the true profession of the Gospel, and, in so doing, will seek to foster an environment in which people of all faiths and beliefs may live freely.  The Coronation Oath has stood for centuries and is enshrined in law" (7).  (Here "beliefs" seem to include atheism.)

Notice that he invokes the Gospel of the New Testament and interprets it as ensuring that "people of all faiths and beliefs may live freely," which departs from the Mosaic theocracy of the Old Testament.

After taking the Oath, Charles will recite a private prayer, which concludes: "Grant that I may be a blessing to all they children, of every faith and conviction, that together we may discover the ways of gentleness and be led into the paths of peace, through Jesus Christ our Lord.  Amen" (9).  To keep religious peace, Charles will secure freedom for "every faith and conviction."  (Here "conviction"--as distinguished from "faith"--suggests atheism.)

Not long after this, the Prime Minister--Rishi Sunak--will read from the New Testament book of Colossians (11).  This is remarkable because Sunak is Hindu, and yet he can be comfortable reading a New Testament passage.

Later in the coronation, there will be a thanksgiving for the Holy Coronation Oil and then the anointing of Charles with that oil.  Here we can see the Archbishop of Canterbury invoking a subtle combination of Old Testament and New Testament ideas in the anointing of the king with oil: "Blessed art thou, Sovereign God, upholding with thy grace all who are called to thy service.  Thy prophets of old anointed priests and kings to serve in thy name, and in the fullness of time thine only Son was anointed by the Holy Spirit to be the Christ, the Savior and Servant of all.  By the power of the same Spirit, bless and sanctify this oil" (15).

The Archbishop's prayer recalls how the kings of Israel (like Saul and Solomon) were anointed with consecrated olive oil in the Old Testament (1 Kings 1:32, 38-40; 1 Samuel 2:10, 10:1).  But then he immediately reminds us that Jesus in the New Testament was anointed by the Holy Spirit (Acts 10:38).  In Greek, the word Christ means "anointed," and the Hebrew word for this is "Messiah."

As John Locke pointed out in his Letter Concerning Toleration, while the kings of Israel were anointed to rule over an "absolute theocracy," Jesus was anointed to rule over his followers by the persuasiveness of his preaching, and he never attempted to establish a Christian theocracy.  Moreover, the New Testament makes clear that the first Christian churches were voluntary associations that exercised no theocratic rule.  Locke explained:

"The Commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute Theocracy; nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that Commonwealth and the Church. . . . But there is absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian Commonwealth.  There are, indeed, many Cities and Kingdoms thaqt have embraced the Faith of Christ; but they have retained their ancient Form of Government; with which the Law of Christ hath not at all meddled.  He, indeed, hath taught men how, by Faith and good Works, they may attain Eternal Life.  But he instituted no Commonwealth.  He prescribed unto his Followers no new and peculiar Form of Government; Nor put he the Sword into any Magistrate's Hand, with Commission to make use of it in forcing men to forsake their former Religion, and receive his" (Hackett edition, 44-45; Liberty Fund edition, 42).

The coronation of Charles will indicate how his kingship will follow the model of Christ's persuasive kingship rather than the theocratic kingship of ancient Israel.  At the beginning of the coronation, Charles will be greeted by a Chapel Royal chorister: "Your Majesty, as children of the Kingdom of God, we welcome you in the name of the King of Kings."  Charles will respond: "In his name, and after his example, I come not to be served but to serve" (3).

Here Charles will echo the words of Jesus when he warned his followers not to strive for authoritative rule over others:  "You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them.  Not so with you.  Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be your slave--just as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many" (Matt. 20:25-28).

It seems that Charles will be intimating here that he is a king who has no coercive authority over his people, particularly in matters of religious belief.  At most, he can only exercise the sort of persuasive authority that comes through Christian preaching, and for that he needs the persuasive symbolism of being anointed with Coronation Holy Oil.  

Rendering that oil holy required a special preparation (15).  It was from olives from groves on the Mount of Olives at the Russian Orthodox Monastery of Mary Magdalene, which is the burial place of Charles' paternal grandmother, Princess Alice of Greece, who was a Greek Orthodox believer.  The Mount of Olives, outside Jerusalem, is a holy place for Jews, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Protestants.  The olives were pressed just outside Bethlehem.  The oil was then perfumed with essential oils--sesame, rose, jasmine, cinnamon, neroli, benzoin, amber, and orange blossom.  The oil was then consecrated by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, His Beatitude Patriarch Theophilos III, and the Anglican Archbishop in Jerusalem, the Most Reverend Dr. Hosam Naoum.  Thus, this oil has an ecumenical holiness that comes from symbolic links to all the major Biblical religious traditions.

The actual anointing of Charles will be the only part of the coronation that will be hidden from both the audience in Westminster Abbey and the television cameras.  An Anointing Screen, specially designed and woven for this purpose will be arranged around the Coronation Chair.  Behind the screen, the Archbishop of Canterbury will anoint the King's hands, breast, and head (16).  Hiding this from view gives an air of mystery to this most sacred moment of the coronation.

As the King is being anointed, the Choir of Westminister Abbey will sing Georg Frederick Handel's "Zadok the Priest" anthem.  The text of this anthem has always been part of the English Coronation Rite.  But it was made famous when Handel set it to music for the coronation of George II in 1727.  Here's the text, which is based on the anointing of King Solomon in 1 Kings 1:32-35:

"Zadok the priest

"and Nathan the prophet

"anointed Solomon king.

"And all the people rejoiced and said:

"God save the King!

"Long live the King!

"May the King live forever!

"Alleluia!  Amen!"

                                                            Handel's "Zadok the Priest"

I have written about how Handel used his Biblical music (like the Messiah) to refute Deism and defend religious orthodoxy.  Does this anthem serve the same purpose by using the power of his music to support the Biblical teaching about the divine authority of rulers?

The anointing of King Charles is followed by the presentation of the regalia--the Spurs, the Sword, the Bracelets, the Robe Royal, the Stole Royal, the Orb, the Ring, the Glove, the Sceptre, and the Rod--each of which has some distinctive symbolic meaning.

Finally, the King will be crowned with the Crown of St. Edward, and all in the Abbey will shout "God save the King!"  There will be a musical fanfare, a Gun Salute, and the Abbey bells will ring for two minutes (25).

Then, for the first time in the history of coronations, the Blessing of the King will come not just from the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, but also from a Catholic archbishop, a Greek Orthodox archbishop, and from representatives of other Christian churches in Great Britain.  Such an ecumenical affirmation would have been impossible in previous coronations, even as late as the 1953 coronation of Elizabeth (26).

After the King has been enthroned, there will be oaths of allegiance.  The first will be from the "Homage of the Church of England" expressed by the  Archbishop of Canterbury.  The second will be the "Homage of Royal Blood" coming from William, the Prince of Wales: "I, William, Prince of Wales, pledge my loyalty to you and faith and truth I will bear unto you, as your liege man of life and limb.  So help me God."  This will be the most painful moment for Prince Harry--a reminder that he is far down the line of succession, and that William is most likely to be the next King.

Remarkably, this will be followed by "The Homage of the People," which is another novel move that has never been done in a coronation:

"Archbishop of Canterbury:

"I call upon all persons of goodwill of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and of the other Realms and the Territories to make their homage, in heart and voice, to their undoubted King, defender of all."

"All who so desire, in the Abbey, and elsewhere, say together:

"All:

"I swear that I will pay true allegiance to Your Majesty, and to your heirs and successors acording to law.  So help me God.

"A fanfare is played (28)."

In all previous coronations, the Homage has been pledged by the hereditary peerage in order of degree.  But now the Homage of Peers has been replaced by the Homage of the People.  Notice that this is voluntary--"all who so desire."  So, here the King explicitly recognizes that whatever persuasive authority he has over the people must come from their voluntary consent.  And to win that consent, he must convince them that he really is God's Anointed One.

Next, the King's wife--Camilla--will be crowned as the Queen Consort, and she will be anointed by the Archbishop, but without a screen, suggesting that the anointing of a consort is not as sacred as the anointing of the King (29).

Following this, there will be other ceremonies, songs, and prayers.  

After the singing of the national anthem ("God Save the King"), the King will march in procession out of the Abbey.  At the end of the procession, he will be greeted by representatives of five non-Christian faith communities:  Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, and Buddhist.  They will deliver their greeting in unison: "Your Majesty, as neighbors in faith, we acknowledge the value of public service.  We unite with people of all faiths and beliefs in thanksgiving, and in service with you for the common good" (41).

As with so much else in this coronation, this has never been done in any previous coronation.  This ending matches the beginning with the procession of faith leaders and representatives of faith communities (2).

Finally, the King goes to the Gold State Coach, which will take him back to Buckingham Palace.

                                                                  The Gold State Coach

Will it work?  

When the people are asked for their homage, will millions of people across Great Britain and the Commonwealth swear their allegiance "in heart and voice" to the King?  Will they willingly accept a monarchy that claims only a persuasive authority and not a coercive theocratic authority, and therefore a monarchy that poses no threat to the personal, political, or religious liberty of the people?  Or will they laugh or smirk as they think about how foolish Charles is to think all this religious mumbo-jumbo will persuade them that Charles is their divinely anointed King?

Great Britain is one of the most secularized societies in the world.  Some surveys report that most people identify themselves as having no religious belief.  Only a small minority of the people participate at least once a week in some kind of religious worship service.  So, we have to wonder whether the King truly believes that his appeal to the sacred character of the British monarchy will work.

Debating Darwinian Liberalism (4): How Christianity Supports Liberal Tolerance

The first premise of Dilley's Syllogism is: "Classical (Lockean) liberalism is founded on Christianity."

We must wonder about what kind of Christianity would support classical (Lockean) liberalism.  Through much of the history of Christianity--beginning with the Constantinian regime of the Roman Empire--Christians have insisted on a confessional state in which legal coercion is used to enforce Christian doctrines, and unbelievers, heretics, and apostates are punished by the state.  Presumably, this is not the kind of Christianity that Dilley has in mind, because this would be an illiberal Christianity.  As Roger Masters indicates in his contribution to Dilley's book, the Lockean teaching of religious tolerance was crucial for the emergence of liberalism as a way of pacifying religious warfare and avoiding legally enforced persecution.

Clearly, the kind of Christianity that Dilley has in mind is a liberal Christianity that would teach liberal tolerance.  He indicates this when he quotes approvingly from an article by Richard John Neuhaus on "The Liberalism of John Paul II."  In that article, Neuhaus praises the Catholic liberalism of John Courtney Murray and Pope John Paul II.  "We affirm not a confessional state but a confessional society," Neuhaus declares, because religious belief is a voluntary choice of individuals living in civil society, and thus religious groups can promote their beliefs through persuasion but not through coercion.  The coercive power of the state is to be used only to enforce the civil peace.  As Neuhaus indicates, John Paul recognized that the Catholic Church had had a history of violating religious liberty and tolerance by using coercive violence to enforce religious belief, and John Paul declared that he and all Catholics should ask forgiveness for this history of religious violence.  Previously, the Church had argued that persecution was biblically authorized, but liberal Catholics like Murray and John Paul argued that such legally coercive persecution was contrary to the New Testament.

As I have argued in a previous post, this liberal Christianity embraced by Dilley, Murray, John Paul, and Neuhaus is the New Testament Christianity of Roger Williams.  More clearly than any other Christian author in the Reformation, Williams saw that legal toleration to protect the liberty of conscience was a return to the original position of New Testament Christianity as opposed to the Mosaic regime of theocracy and persecution in the Old Testament.  He argued for a "wall of separation" between church and state, in which the state would be restricted to enforcing "civil peace."  This promoted a liberal policy of legal toleration of both religious and moral pluralism.

The Christian classical liberal in the tradition of Williams will reject the legal moralism of some evangelical Christians and some Catholics (like Robert George, for example) who assume that any good regime must legally coerce people into virtue.  They will reject this because it cannot work, because it denies human liberty, and because it contradicts the New Testament.

I must wonder, however, whether my nine critics in Dilley's book can fully embrace the liberal Christianity of Williams.  If they believe that social order is impossible when people do not believe in orthodox Christianity, wouldn't that suggest the necessity for a "confessional state" in which a specified orthodoxy is enforced coercively by law?  Wouldn't that suggest that the only healthy social order is a theocracy, in which heretics, apostates, and blasphemers (such as the Darwinians) are persecuted as threats to the social order?

By contrast, Darwin's evolutionary account in The Descent of Man of the emergence of moral and religious beliefs shows how the moral order of civil society can arise without any coercive enforcement of religious beliefs by the state.

Moreover, as I have indicated in my previous post, Darwin's principle of dual causality allows for the possibility of believing in original divine action through "primary causes," while recognizing the regularity of the evolutionary process working through the "secondary causes" of the observable order of nature.

I have written previously about how the position of Roger Williams has been adopted by the most recent popes.

Lewis's Lockean Liberalism

Dyer and Watson point out that Lewis saw Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity as one of the best expressions of the classical natural-law tradition.  John Locke appealed to Hooker in explaining how the law of nature arises in the state of nature.  Dyer and Watson see this link between Lewis, Hooker, and Locke as supporting their conclusion that Lewis's understanding of the natural law of individual rights and limited government shows a natural law Lockean liberalism.  Although Lewis never explicitly acknowledged Locke as an influence on his political thinking, we know that Lewis read Locke, and much of what Lewis said about politics looks very Lockean.

So, for example, in Mere Christianity Lewis identifies securing individual liberty in private life as the primary aim of government:

"The State exists simply to promote and to protect the ordinary happiness of human beings in this life.  A husband and wife chatting over a fire, a couple of friends having a game of darts in a pub, a man reading a book in his own room or digging his own garden--that is what the State is there for. And unless they are helping to increase and prolong and protect such moments, all the laws, parliaments, armies, courts, police, economics, etc., are simply a waste of time." (169)

 Notice that the State's concern here is with human happiness "in this life"--not in the next life.  A government that would be directed to eternal salvation would be a theocracy, and Lewis said that "theocracy is the worst of al governments," because any government that would pretend to have the power of salvation would be tyrannical.

Lewis thought that government did not need to promote Christianity in order to provide a common morality for society, Dyer and Watson explain, because "Lewis believed that God had imprinted His moral law on every human heart, whether or not that person had come to faith in Jesus Christ" (93).  Consequently, Lewis accepted the Lockean argument for the toleration of all religious.

One good illustration of how the Lockean moral law arises naturally in the human mind is in Lewis's essay "Delinquents in the Snow."  He tells the story of how some young hooligans had been caught stealing and vandalizing Lewis's home, and how they had not been properly punished by the legal system.  He complained that "according to the classical political theory of this country," we "surrendered our right of self-protection to the State on the condition that the State would protect us" (98-99).  But if the State does not protect our natural rights, including the right to property, the natural right to protect ourselves and our property reverts to the individual.  This is what Locke called the natural "executive power of the state of nature."  This natural right to protect oneself, one's property, and one's family from attack arises naturally in the human mind without any need for a Christian faith that such a natural law is divinely ordained.

Although Locke denied that government needed to inculcate virtue, Dyer and Watson observe, "his Thoughts on Education is all about inculcating virtue" (90).  So that even without the legal enforcement of virtue, which would threaten individual liberty, Locke assumed that the education of children in their families, their churches, and the wider society would shape the moral and intellectual virtues. Lewis agreed.  In fact, his fantasy writing for children--such as the Chronicles of Narnia--was intended to contribute to the moral education of children supervised by parents rather than the State.

So, as a Lockean liberal, Lewis denies that Christian citizens have any right to use their political power to coercively impose their Christian morality on their political community.  Dyer and Watson think this is particularly clear in the way Lewis speaks about  homosexuality, religious education in schools, and divorce law.

First, Lewis shows his Lockean liberalism in what he says about homosexuality.  Although Lewis was clear about homosexuality being a sin, he saw no justification for the State punishing that sin as a crime.  In a letter, he observed: "Of course, many acts which are sins against God are also injuries to our fellow-citizens, and must on that account, but only on that account, be made crimes.  But of all the sins in the world, I should have thought homosexuality was the one that least concerns the State.  We hear too much of the State. Government is at its best a necessary evil. Let's keep it in its place."

As Dyer and Watson suggest, Lewis's view of homosexuality was probably influenced by his life-long friendship with Arthur Greeves, who was homosexual.

In the passage just quoted, Lewis seems to assume John Stuart Mill's harm principle--that the only justification for limiting anyone's individual liberty is to prevent harm to others. While this seems to be a uniquely modern principle, it can be found in the premodern natural law tradition.  As Dyer and Watson indicate (113), it's stated by Thomas Aquinas: "Human law is framed for the mass of men, the majority of whom are not virtuous. Therefore, human law does not prohibit every vice from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more serious ones from which the majority can abstain, and especially those that harm others and which must be prohibited for human society to survive, such as homicide, theft, and the like" (Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 96, a. 2).

Lewis also showed his Lockean liberalism in which he said about the place of religion in public education.  He saw England as becoming increasingly secularized, and if most of the public school teachers are not Christian, we cannot expect them to teach Christianity.  Christians should raise their children as Christians and send them to Christian schools, without expecting the public schools to inculcate Christianity in the children.

A third illustration of Lewis's Lockean liberalism is in what he said about marriage and divorce.  Since Christianity teaches that marriage is for life, Lewis observed in Mere Christianity, divorce is not normally allowed. But he saw no justification for legally enforcing this Christian condemnation of divorce.

". . . I should like to distinguish two things which are very often confused.  The Christian conception of marriage is one: the other is the quite different question--how far Christians, if they are voters or Members of Parliament, ought to try to force their views of marriage on the rest of the community by embodying them in the divorce laws. A great many people seem to think that if you are a Christian yourself, you should try to make divorce difficult for every one. I do not think that. At least I know I should be very angry if the Mohammedans tried to prevent the rest of us from drinking wine. My own view is that the Churches should frankly recognize that the majority of the  British people are not Christians and, therefore, cannot be expected to live Christian lives. There ought to be two distinct kinds of marriage: one governed by the State with rules enforced on all citizens, the other governed by the Church with rules enforced by her on her own members. This distinction ought to be quite sharp, so that a man knows which couples are married in a Christian sense and which are not." (101-102)

If we bring together what Lewis says here about marriage and what he says about homosexuality, we might infer that Lewis could have supported the legalization of same-sex marriage, with the understanding that the rules of marriage enforced by the State will differ from the rules enforced by the Church.  In fact, I have argued that a Lockean natural law argument can be made for legalizing same-sex marriage (here, here, here, here, here, and here).

Dyer and Watson recognize that interpreting Lewis in this way as a Lockean liberal who denies the right of government to legally enforce Christian morality will "leave many of Lewis' devoted readers unsatisfied" (137), because it shows that "Lewis parts ways with many traditionalists and evangelicals" (112), who scorn Lockean classical liberalism.

Occasionally, Dyer and Watson try to appease the Christian traditionalists and evangelicals, but in doing that Dyer and Watson end up contradicting themselves.  For example, in trying to make Lewis's liberalism compatible with Robert George's "perfectionism" in his book Making Men Moral, they write: "How did Lewis conceive of a government's role in making men and women moral? If perfectionism means the willingness of a government to promote and inculcate a conception of the good, as George uses the term, then Lewis can be called a perfectionist.  If perfectionism requires a specific theory as to how a government should do this, then Lewis is not a perfectionist. He was entirely skeptical that government can enforce or even inculcate a conception of the good at all. This skepticism raises an enormous problem" (121-22). 

Isn't this contradictory?  On the one hand, Lewis supports "the willingness of a government to promote and inculcate a conception of the good." On the other hand, Lewis was "entirely skeptical that government can enforce or even inculcate a conception of the good at all." 

There is, however, a better rhetorical strategy for persuading Christian traditionalists and evangelicals to accept Lewis's Lockean liberalism: it can be argued that the New Testament supports such Lockean liberalism.  Locke's Letter on Toleration is full of quotations from the New Testament.  And long before Locke wrote this, Roger Williams argued that while the Old Testament taught theocracy, the New Testament taught religious toleration and a separation of church and state.  Williams even argued that atheists had to be legally tolerated.  With the possible exception of the book of Revelation, the New Testament presents the first Christians as viewing their churches as purely voluntary associations, and they see no need to legally enforce Christian morality.  And thus the New Testament teaches liberalism.  (I have written about this here, here, here, here, and here.)

In only one passage in their book, do Dyer and Watson implicitly point to this:

". . . Despite the profoundly different political situations of first-century Christians and Christians in the modern West, Lewis often treated the question of Christian politics in a way that nonetheless echoed St. Paul's advice to the early church in Rome. 'If it is possible,' Paul admonished, 'as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone.'  The practical challenge for Christians, wrote Lewis along similar lines, lies in discoverying how to 'live as innocently as we can with unbelieving fellow-subjects under unbelieving rulers who will never be perfectly wise and good and who will sometimes be very wicked and very foolish.'" (111)

Remarkably, Dyer and Watson do not elaborate this thought in their book, which might have been used to persuade Christians that in adopting Lockean liberalism, Lewis was returning to the original teaching of the New Testament.

Roger Williams Was Right: The Biblical Basis of Legal Toleration

The secularization of politics through the liberal policy of legal toleration is largely a product of Christianity.  Liberal secularism has arisen as an unintended order of the cultural evolution of Christianity.

The crucial step in Christianity's secularization of politics was the move from the Old Testament to the New Testament.  The Mosaic political regime in the Old Testament became a theocracy that enforced its moral and religious law through persecution.  By contrast, the Christian churches in the New Testament were voluntary groups that enforced moral and religious conformity among their members without legal coercion.

After the conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine in 311, Christianity eventually became the exclusive religion of the empire, and this allowed the Christian Church to use legal coercion against pagans and heretics, which included the execution of heretics.  The Catholic Church developed a theory of persecution that prevailed in the Middle Ages.

As a consequence of the Protestant Reformation, Protestants argued against the Catholic persecution of Protestants as heretics.  But once the Protestants gained political power, they persecuted Catholics, and the different Protestant churches persecuted one another.  This conflict provoked a debate over the possibility of a legal toleration that would allow for the peaceful coexistence of the differing religious traditions.  Eventually, this led to the development of the modern liberal doctrine of religious liberty. 

More clearly than any other Christian author in the Reformation, Roger Williams saw that legal toleration to protect the liberty of conscience was a return to the original position of New Testament Christianity as opposed to the Mosaic regime of persecution in the Old Testament.  For, as he declared in The Bloody Tenant of Persecution in 1644, "Persecutors seldom plead Christ but Moses for their author" (BT, 58).

Williams was one of those very few people in the Reformation who argued against persecution not only when he was its victim, but also when he had the power to become a persecutor.  He was expelled from the Massachusetts Bay Colony for condemning the Puritan rule there as a Mosaic theocracy that was contrary to the New Testament, and for arguing that the American Puritan settlers should pay for the land that they had stolen from the American Indians.  He then settled in what would become Rhode Island, established amicable relations with the Indians there, and founded a political community that extended legal toleration to all religions, although Williams was vigorous in trying to persuade those he regarded as pagans, blasphemers, and heretics to correct their moral and theological errors.  The radical character of Williams's argument was widely recognized: shortly after its publication, The Bloody Tenant was burned by order of the British House of Commons.

Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration was published forty-five years after Williams's Bloody Tenent, and the range of Locke's toleration fell short of Williams's.  Williams argued for tolerating all pagans, Jews, Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics.  But Locke refused to extend toleration to Catholics and atheists.    

Some scholars assume that when Williams speaks of tolerating "Antichristians," this must mean atheists.  But clearly for Williams, "Antichristians" refers to Catholics or "papists"--those who are "false Christians" submitting to the Pope as the Antichrist (BT, 134, 179).  

But it's significant that Williams never specifically states that atheists subvert social order, as Locke does.  Also, Williams does say that liberty of conscience should be extended even to "such as know no Church estate, nor God, nor Christ" (BT, 282).  Those who know no God must be atheists or agnostics.  So at least in this one passage, it seems that Williams would extend liberty of conscience even to atheists.

Consequently, Thomas Jefferson's broad view of toleration as including Catholics and atheists is closer to Williams' view than to Locke's.  In some private notes for himself that were not published in his lifetime, Jefferson noticed that Locke refused to tolerate Catholics and atheists, but then Jefferson wrote "where he stopped short we may go on" (1904-5, 2:267).

Moreover, that Williams's legal toleration would protect atheists as well as believers is suggested by his radical separation--or what he called "wall of separation"--between church and state.  He interprets Romans 13 as teaching that the civil magistrates have authority only of a "civil nature" for "the good and peace of their civil state," while the Kingdom of Christ has authority of a "spiritual and of a Soul-nature" (BT, 108-109).  Civil magistrates have charge of "the bodies and goods of the subject," while the spiritual officers of Christ's church have charge of "their souls and soul safety" (BT, 127).  The "civil sword" for "defense of persons, estates, families, liberties of a city" does not extend to "spiritual and soul-causes" (BT, 160).  There are "diverse sorts of goodness," and "civil or moral goodness" is distinguished from "spiritual goodness" (BT, 245-46, 331-34). 

If government is restricted to securing "civil peace" or "a civil way of union," then every church can exist like any voluntary group that has no authority to use legal coercion (BT, 72-73).  Like any voluntary group, a church can follow the pattern of the churches in the New Testament that used excommunication as the ultimate punishment for those who departed from the orthodox beliefs and conduct of the church (see, for example, I Corinthians 5:13).  But "excommunication is not persecution" (BT, 91, 116, 192).

Williams argued that Constantine and the good Roman emperors did more harm to Christianity through their persecution of heretics and pagans than did Nero in his persecutions of the Christians (BT, 184).  In adopting legal toleration, Christians can return to the true teachings of Christ and the early Christians, who refused to imitate Moses in setting up a national church.

Although Locke's toleration is not a radical as Williams's, Locke does see as well as Williams the contrast between the Old Testament and the New Testament.  Like Williams, Locke relies on the New Testament to support his argument for toleration.  In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke cites the Bible at least 18 times, and only 5 of these are references to the Old Testament.  He observes that while the Jewish commonwealth in the Old Testament was an "absolute theocracy," "there is no Christian commonwealth" in the New Testament (42, 189).

Williams and Locke were able to support their argument for toleration with a plausible reading of the New Testament.  By contrast, it's hard to support any argument for persecution as compatible with the New Testament. 

One example of this is the parable of the tares and the wheat (Matt. 13:24-30).  Jesus compares the kingdom of Heaven to a man who sows good seed in his field, but then his enemy sows tares (weeds) among the wheat.  When they sprout, the wheat and the weeds are mixed together, and the man's servants offer to pull up the weeds.  But the man says that this should not be done, because any rooting up of the weeds will likely root up some wheat as well.  So he allows the plants to grow together until the harvest, when the reapers will gather together the weeds to be burned, and gather the wheat into the barn. 

While the interpretation of parables is often difficult, Jesus explains this parable to his disciples:

"The one who sowed the good seed is the Son of Man.  The field is the world, and the good seed stands for the people of the kingdom.  The weeds are the people of the evil one, and the enemy who sows them is the devil.  The harvest is the end of the age, and the harvesters are angels.  As the weeds are pulled up and burned in the fire, so it will be at the end of the age.  The Son of Man will send out his angels, and they will weed out of his kingdom everything that causes sin and all who do evil.  They will throw them into the blazing furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.  Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Matt. 13:37-43).

The meaning here seems reasonably clear: in this life, it is hard to separate true Christians from those who are not, but at the day of judgment in the afterlife, the true Christians will be rewarded with eternal life, and the unsaved will be eternally punished in Hell.  This was the interpretation Williams used to support legal toleration:  the unbelievers and the false Christians must be left alone and not persecuted, because at the time of harvest at the Last Judgment, they will be recognized by God and condemned to eternal punishment (BT, 112-13).

Augustine, however, developed a twisted interpretation of this parable to support persecution.  When the weeds are clearly identifiable as different from the wheat, he asserted, persecutors have a Christian duty to uproot the weeds without disturbing the wheat.  This perverse reading of the parable of the tares was adopted by the medieval Catholic Church to support its theory of persecution.  John Calvin and the Calvinists (like the Massachusetts Bay Puritans) used this same interpretation to justify persecuting those they regarded as heretics and unbelievers.

Notice that Williams's reading of the New Testament allows him to combine legal toleration and moral and theological absolutism.  Often the critics of toleration complain that it rests upon moral and theological relativism--that toleration assumes that there are no absolute standards of right and wrong.  But with Williams, this is not true.  He was morally and theologically intolerant, even as he argued for legal tolerance.  He was sure that the New Testament provided absolute standards of right and wrong rooted in divine truth, and he was sure that the errors of his opponents would be punished by God in the afterlife.  But while in this life, he would try to expose these errors through persuasion, he had no moral or religious right to use coercion to suppress the liberty of conscience of those who disagreed with him.  This must be so, because freedom of thought is the precondition for Christian virtue.  There is no moral or theological virtue in being coerced into a hypocritical profession of belief.

This indicates the classical liberal or libertarian character of New Testament Christianity as manifested in Williams's writings.  This line of reasoning is elaborated in a remarkable book by Andy Olree, The Choice Principle: The Biblical Case for Legal Toleration.  Olree writes primarily for evangelical Christians, trying to persuade them that Williams was right about the New Testament teaching toleration, and that such toleration really is compatible with a Christian belief in the absolute moral and theological truth of the New Testament, as long as one understands that the New Testament teaching about freedom of choice supplants the Old Testament teaching about theocracy and persecution.

In defending "legal toleration," Olree expands the argument for religious toleration into a general argument for the legal toleration of both religious and moral pluralism.  Thus, Olree argues against the "legal moralism" of many evangelicals and of Catholics like Robert George who assume that any good regime must legally coerce people into virtue, by outlawing immoral behavior, which Olree rejects because it cannot work, because it promotes a denial of human liberty, and because it contradicts the teaching of the New Testament.

In arguing for a combination of liberty and virtue--liberty as secured by government and virtue as cultivated in the natural and voluntary associations of civil society--Olree takes a position that is similar to the Christian libertarianism of Frank Meyer and the Aristotelian liberalism of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl.  They all argue that, far from being contradictory, political liberty protects the freedom of choice that is the precondition for moral virtue.

A commonly cited New Testament passage to support persecution and legal moralism is the teaching of Romans 13 that rulers are God's servants "to execute wrath on the wrongdoer."  One of the best parts of Olree's book is his interpretation of this teaching (84-88, 106-10, 113-15, 120-24, 146-47).  The primary question here is the meaning of "wrongdoing."  Olree argues that both the historical context and the textual context suggest that the "wrongdoing" that is rightly punished by government refers only to actions of people that directly harm or victimize others.

First, the historical context for this scriptural passage is that Nero is the Roman Emperor.  During Nero's time, Roman law was used to support pagan worship, which was sinful to the Christians, and it allowed for sinful activities such as prostitution, homosexuality, and abortion.  So, clearly Paul was not interpreting "wrongdoing" as all conduct that would be sinful according to the Bible.

Second, the textual context is that immediately prior to Romans 13--at the end of Romans 12--Paul condemns vigilante vengeance ("Do not repay evil for evil," because vengeance belongs to God).  Thus, by implication, Olree concludes, the rulers seen as God's servants in punishing wrongdoers in Romans 13 are exercising collective vengeance as a legal substitute for individual vengeance, so that the "wrongdoing" being punished by government is any wrong that would so harm or victimize people that they would naturally want to take vengeance.  Such "wrongdoing" would be acts of force or fraud that victimize others rather than personal sins.

John Locke explains this by saying that while in the state of nature, everyone has "the executive power of the law of nature" to punish wrongdoers, once they have consented to a government, they have delegated this power to the government.

Olree applies this libertarian reading of the New Testament to the legal and moral debates over suicide, homosexuality, drug addiction, redistributive taxation, prostitution, and abortion.  In each case, he argues for the "choice principle"--that law rightly secures individual choice or autonomy except in those cases where individuals have imposed some direct harm--by force or fraud--on others.  In the case of abortion, he takes no clear position, except to argue that whether we should legally prohibit abortion as murder turns on the question of whether human life begins before birth, which he takes to be a question that the Bible does not answer.

The plausibility of this libertarian reading of the New Testament as supporting legal toleration and religious liberty was dramatically manifested in the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church, particularly in the Declaration of Religious Freedom approved in 1965.  Under the influence of liberal Catholics such as John Courtney Murray, the Vatican Council declared that "the human person has a right to religious freedom."  In section 12, the Council stated:

"In faithfulness therefore to the truth of the Gospel, the Church is following the way of Christ and the apostles when she recognizes and gives support to the principle of religious freedom as befitting the dignity of man and as being in accord with divine revelation.  Throughout the ages the Church has kept safe and handed on the doctrine received from the Master and from the apostles.  In the life of the People of God, as it has made its pilgrim way through the vicissitudes of human history, there has at times appeared a way of acting that was hardly in accord with the spirit of the Gospel or even opposed to it.  Nevertheless, the doctrine of the Church that no one is to be coerced into faith has always stood firm."
 

Is the Catholic Church confessing here that its earlier doctrine of persecution was contrary to the New Testament--"a way of acting that was hardly in accord with the spirit of the Gospel or even opposed to it"?  Does this concede that Roger Williams was right about the New Testament supporting toleration and liberty, while the medieval Church and the Protestants who supported persecution were wrong?

Do we see a continuation in this movement of the Catholic Church towards Christian libertarianism in that Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI have asked forgiveness for the Church's history of supporting the violence of persecution?

Some of these points are elaborated in other posts here, here, here, here, and here.

REFERENCES

Thomas Jefferson, Works of Thomas Jefferson, 12 volumes, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-5.

John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010)

Andy G. Olree, The Choice Principle: The Biblical Case for Legal Toleration (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006)

Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, in The Complete Writings of Roger Williams, ed. Samuel L. Caldwell (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), vol. 3.

The Evolution of Christian Schools in a Liberal Society

On this blog, I have defended a Darwinian classical liberalism in which social order arises best through a largely spontaneous evolution in which individuals are free to pursue the satisfaction of their natural desires.  Adam Smith described this as the "natural system of liberty," which allows "every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice."  Smith's "liberal plan" came to be identified in the 19th century as "liberalism."  Today, Gary Johnson and others in the Libertarian Party might say that this tradition of classical liberalism is best identified as libertarianism.

But to speak of a largely spontaneous order points to the need for some organizational planning.  Classical liberals recognize the need for limited government to carry out the three duties of government identified by Smith--military defense against foreign attacks, the administration of justice to protect individuals from force and fraud, and providing for those public goods that cannot be provided by any individual or small group of individuals. 

One of the most important public goods is the education of the young, which includes their moral, religious, and intellectual education.  For most of human history, the education of children was provided totally by their parents; and only the children of wealthy and high ranking families could receive any advanced education.  But Smith believed that a modern commercial society required some publicly financed education of the common people, so that they could at least read, write, and account.

In Scotland, the Presbyterian Church stressed the importance of learning to read so that one could read the Bible for oneself rather than being dependent on the interpretation of priests.  The Schools Act of 1696 mandated parish schools in Scotland with teachers partly but not wholly paid by public expenditure.  Scotland came to have one of the highest rates of literacy in the world.  Smith argued for extending this system to all of England.  But while some public funding might be necessary, he thought that privately supported education with voluntary contributions was generally better than totally public education.

Smith saw that most of the education of common people was religious instruction through the churches.  Against the tradition of publicly established churches, Smith argued for a free market of religious sects competing for believers to satisfy the religious longings of human beings, which would promote a "pure and rational religion."  Religious toleration would prevail, so that religious groups would be free to form as voluntary associations without any power to coercively enforce their beliefs and practices on those who disagreed with them.  Smith and other classical liberals thus adopted the religious toleration policy defended early in the 17th century by Roger Williams as conforming to the religious liberty that he saw in the New Testament Christian churches, and as opposed to the Catholic and Protestant traditions of coercively enforced religious conformity.

I see this as a naturally evolved and largely spontaneous order of religious belief and practice.  Parents have an evolved natural desire to care for their children by generating them, feeding them, and educating them.  Proponents of natural law (like Thomas Aquinas and John Locke) recognize this a law of nature rooted in natural human inclinations.  Moreover, if human beings have a naturally evolved desire for religious understanding, as I have argued, then we can expect that an important part of the parental rearing of their children will be the religious instruction of their children.  This can be done totally through parental homeschooling or through schooling outside the home--in synagogues, churches, or mosques, in private schools, or in public schools.

We see this liberal system for educating the young in the United States.  Most children are educated in public schools that do not mandate any religious instruction.  But parents are free to either homeschool their children or send them to private schools.  And much of this homeschooling and private schooling includes religious instruction.  This is a distinctively liberal system because parents are free to supervise the religious instruction of their children as they wish, so long as they are not abusing their children or coercively imposing their religious beliefs and practices on others.

Some Christian parents who pay for sending their children to private Christian schools complain that it is unjust that they are compelled to pay taxes for the public schools.  In a completely free market of education, schools would freely compete for students and tuition.  A educational voucher system favored by libertarians like Gary Johnson moves towards a free market in education in that some or all of the school financing from taxation would go directly to parents who could freely choose which school (public or private) would receive the money.

Among the Christian schools, there is free competition for students and tuition, with different schools appealing to different consumers of Christian education.  As Smith foresaw, this free market in religious instruction allows for the greatest satisfaction of the diverse religious longings of parents and children.

One example of this is well expressed in Deborah Byker-Benson's new book--Graciously Unapologetic: A Renewed Way to be in Christian Schools (Grand Rapids, MI: Credo House, 2016).  Deb is the Superintendent of Parkview Christian Academy in Yorkville, Illinois.  When she arrived at Parkview in 2013, the school was on the brink of financial collapse because of administrative mismanagement and declining enrollment.  Over the past three years, she has improved the financial management of the school, and enrollment has jumped from 208 in 2013 to 325 today.  But she would say that this economic improvement has depended upon a spiritual improvement.  (I have heard about much of this directly from Deb, because she's my sister-in-law.)

Many Christian schools are facing serious challenges to their existence.  Many have closed their doors.  The leaders of such Christian schools facing such problems want to find practical solutions.  But Deb's argument is that they cannot rightly decide what to do if they have not first decided who to be, because the practical management of a Christian school cannot succeed without first having a clear vision of its spiritual mission.  The practical problems for Christian schools are only the symptoms of the deeper spiritual illness.

In the first half of her book, Deb presents a "renewed way of being Christ-like" for Christian schools.  In the second half, she shows how this renewed way of being is manifested in the practical policies of a Christian school.

She presents her new way of being Christ-like as based on "a more Biblically consistent Christian school model," which is summarized as "teaching Christ in all content and process."  The most obvious problem here is that the Bible (Old Testament and New Testament) says nothing specific about Christian schools, although it does say a lot about spiritual teaching coming through families, synagogues, and churches.  Because of this absence of any clear Biblical teaching about Christian schools, Christians disagree about what might count as a "Biblically consistent Christian school model."

In the United States, the great majority of students in Christian schools are in Catholic schools.  Deb says nothing about these Catholic schools, but her silence might suggest to many readers that she believes that only Protestant schools can be truly Christian schools.  If so, then many readers might want some argumentation for this conclusion.

Deb might argue that the Lutheran and Calvinist Reformers were right in claiming that the Catholic traditions stray too far from the Bible to count as Biblical Christianity, and thus a Catholic school cannot satisfy a "Biblically consistent Christian school model."  But what she says about the voluntariness of Christian education implies that Catholic schools should be tolerated as an expression of religious liberty, and thus she would disagree with the Reformers who advocated persecution of Catholics.

Thus, Deb's position seems to assume a Biblical liberalism, in which the Bible is interpreted as Roger Williams interpreted it--as supporting equal liberty for all religious beliefs and practices that do not require religious coercion.  She relies on many Biblical verses, but the most prominent is Acts 2:39.  After the Day of Pentecost, Peter speaks to the Christians: "The promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call."  Deb interprets this to mean that the Christian community includes not only the Christians and their children but also non-believers who might join their community. 

Although nothing is said here about Christian schools, she reads this as implying that Christian schools should be open to enrolling students whose parents are not Christians.  Most Christian schools see themselves as bringing together three Christian institutions--the Christian home, the Christian church, and the Christian school.  Consistent with this model, the admission of students to a Christian school requires proof that the students belong to a family that is a member of a recognized Christian church.  Deb argues that Acts 2:39 supports the conclusion that a Christian school should be open to those who are "afar off" or "sojourners," who are not Christians but are attracted to the Christian school.  This is likely to be the most controversial part of Deb's argument for the members of the Christian school movement.  As she indicates, many Christian parents are adamant that one of the main reasons for sending their children to a Christian school is to protect them from the "bad" kids from the "bad" families that are not Christian.

To defend her Biblical model of the Christian school as including non-Christian "sojourners," Deb must show that such a school can teach Christ in content and process by enforcing five Biblical boundaries.  The first is the exclusion of non-believers from any leadership in the Christian school.  The teachers, the administrators, and other staff members must all be professing Christians.  The second boundary is the exclusion of non-believers from the Sacraments--the Lord's Supper and Baptism.  Except for these two points of exclusion, the non-believers in the school are treated the same as the believers.

The third Biblical boundary is the prohibition against any open opposition to Biblical faith.  Although the students and parents in the school do not have to openly profess the Christian faith, they must not openly oppose it in the school.  Those who are openly oppositional will either choose to leave the school, or the students will be expelled from the school.

The fourth Biblical boundary is that all the benefits of living in the Christian community of the school are to be shared with the non-believing members of the school.  After all, that's why some non-believers have chosen to enroll their children in Christian schools--they want their children to enjoy the Christ-like loving care and instruction that only a Christian school can provide.

The final Biblical boundary is that both believers and non-believers in the Christian school will bear both the protection and the consequence of Biblical law.  That law enforced in school will protect everyone from the injustice that is prohibited by Biblical law.  But that also means that those who violate that law will be punished.  For example, Deb quotes from Leviticus 24:16, which teaches that "him that blasphemes the name of the Lord, he will be put to death for sure, and all the congregation will have to stone him.  The same for the sojourner (ger) and him that is born in the land; when he blasphemes the name of the Lord, he will be put to death."

And yet, while she does not explicitly say so, Deb surely would not endorse punishing blasphemers with death.  Why not?  Because New Testament Christian liberalism teaches us that the theocratic law of the Old Testament violates the religious liberty and toleration taught by the New Testament?  That's the argument of Roger Williams and other proponents of Christian liberalism, which is implicit in Deb's conception of a Biblically based Christian School.

The terms of that Christian liberalism are made clear in the second part of Deb's book, where she shows the practical procedures and norms that follow from her Biblical vision of the Christ-like way of being.  The organizational practice of a Christian school enforcing its Biblical worldview depends on requiring all families to read and sign every year an Admissions Statement that would look like this:

ADMISSION POLICY STATEMENT

Christian School X (CSX) was founded and is governed by those who believe that children of believers must be educated according to God’s Word, the Bible.  This community of believers welcomes enrollment to any who desire to attend for other reasons, provided that the personal choice to enroll follows an understanding of what will be taught, and accompanies an agreement to follow the guidelines set forth in the Parent Student Handbook, as expressed in this Admissions Statement, and in accordance with the Statement of Faith.  Each enrollee of this community is welcomed in Christian love through a reflection of both the Grace and Truth of Jesus Christ (John 1:14).  All families must read and sign this admission statement yearly, indicating understanding of, and willingness to submit to, the teachings as stated below:

 

1. CSX is committed by faith to be governed by, led by, and educated through spiritually mature, Christian believers as board members, administrators, teachers, and support staff.

 

2. CSX is committed by faith to the interpretation of all subject material in light of a Biblical worldview.  In broad summary:  a Sovereign Creator and Law Giver, the Fall of man, and Redemption in Jesus Christ alone.

 

3.  CSX is committed by faith to teach, wherever it is developmentally appropriate, and in connection with subject material and all community life, that the moral law of God is the only right standard of living.  This includes but is not limited to:

 

a.   A Biblical definition of love as: acts and interactions that demonstrate, at all times, that each human being is of infinite value simply because they were each created in the image of God.  This is true even in light of the fact that each human being is corrupted by the fall into sin.  This prohibits CSX from teaching or interacting, by action or word as if uncontrolled anger, hitting, bullying, ridicule, sarcasm with intent to hurt or demean, isolation, control for the sake of control, etc. is acceptable in God’s eyes. This list is not exhaustive.

b.    A Biblical definition of sexual purity as: human sexuality that is limited to the intimate physical union between one woman and one man, bound in marriage by a vow.  This prohibits CSX from teaching or interacting, by action or word, as if pre-marital, extra-marital, and same-gender sexual unions; pornography of any kind; bestiality; polygamy; heterosexual co-habitation without marriage; excessive or inappropriate public displays of affection; excessive or dominating immodesty and/or indecency is acceptable in God’s eyes.  This also prohibits participants in the CSX community from engaging in Public Displays of Affection (PDA), whether hetero- or homo- sexual that suggest, promote, or display intimate physical union.  This list is not exhaustive.

c.     A Biblical definition of human life as the immediate result of conception, and having infinite value.  This prohibits CSX from teaching or interacting, by action or word, as if abortion is acceptable in God’s eyes.  In connection with this, CSX will proactively teach, when developmentally appropriate, sexual purity within the confines of marriage and seek to train students in an understanding of the vast and deep responsibility associated with sexual intercourse and the pro-creation of human life.

d.   A Biblical definition of integrity as: interactions that demonstrate, at all times, an understanding of, and response to, God’s ownership and distribution of all things whether in public or in private.  This prohibits CSX from teaching or interacting, by action or word that cheating, lying, stealing, sneaking, manipulation, rebellion, etc. is acceptable in God’s eyes.  This list is not exhaustive.

e.  A Biblical definition of human identity that is rooted in the ‘awesome and wonderful’ work of God in the intentional formation of each human in the womb (Psalm 139:14) and the unique position of humans above all other creatures as image-bearers of God (Genesis 1:27).  This definition of identity prohibits CSX from teaching or interacting, by action or word, as if attempts to alter the fundamental structure or representation of the human body are God-honoring choices.  This includes gender changes, cross-dressing, structural changes such as snake-tongues and horns, excessive tattooing, and body mutilation.  This list in not exhaustive.

f.  A Biblical definition of order as mutually responsible agreement to a set of guidelines that reflect the order and design of God’s creation.  This order ensures the progress of the whole child toward the peak of his or her potential.  The guidelines for order at CSX are outlined in the Parent-Student Handbook for the academic, behavioral, emotional and spiritual growth of students at CSX.

g.   In summary, the mission of CSX requires that Biblical truths, held in faith by the founding, governing, and teaching participants of CSX, be taught and integrated into all learning as the final and absolute authority on all matters of faith and life.

I, the undersigned, have read, understood and agreed to submit my child(ren) to Biblical teaching at CSX without seeking to promote or pressure any members of this community with any personal beliefs, lifestyles, or opinions that undermine or adversely influence the faith beliefs as….

a)     outlined above in this Admissions Statement;

b)     found in the Parent-Student Handbook;

c)     and in the Statement of Faith. 

Should I become dissatisfied with the faith-based teaching at CSX, or find myself no longer able to engage in mutually responsible agreement, I commit to peacefully seek an educational institution whose foundation and beliefs are not in conflict with my own beliefs and understand that failure to do so will result in expulsion.  (End policy statement.)

This illustrates how Christian liberalism can enforce the orthodox beliefs and practices of New Testament Christianity without violating the religious liberty and toleration required for a free society.  One must reject the theocracy taught by the Old Testament as superseded by the individual liberty of the New Testament, where the first Christians are shown as forming churches based on voluntary membership, which could properly expel those who refused to abide by the church's articles of faith, but there was no coercive violence in this.  What Adam Smith proposed as a free marketplace of religious sects was the practice of the early Christians.  It was not until Constantine established Christianity as the religion of Rome that Christians sought the coercive enforcement by law of Christian beliefs and practices.  Liberal Christians have sought to return to that original New Testament understanding of the separation of church and state.

Consider, for example, clause 3 (b) of the Admission Policy Statement on "sexual purity."  Human sexuality is understood as "limited to the intimate physical union between one woman and one man, bound in marriage by a vow," which prohibits "same-gender sexual unions." 

When Deb turns to a series of anecdotal case studies, her first is the story of a lesbian couple who applied at Parkview for the admission of their son, who had been conceived by artificial insemination.  As part of the admission process, they were told that they and their son would be welcomed into the school with Christian love, but that the school would teach the students that their way of life is wrong, and that this would be expressed respectfully and not in a demeaning way, but it would be clearly taught without apology.  They were also told that any attempt to challenge this teaching in the school would result in a severing of the relationship.  They agreed to this.  Their son enjoyed three years of successful schooling.  They finally withdrew their child only for financial reasons.

Here is a clear illustration of Christian liberalism.  Christians can fervently affirm the beliefs and practices of Biblical Christianity, and they can organize their lives--in their homes, their churches, and their schools--to manifest this Christian way of being.  But they can do this without demeaning the lives of those individuals who disagree, without violating religious liberty and toleration, and yet still firmly and clearly affirming their faith. 

Christian liberals can thus be graciously unapologetic.

Some of my points here have been elaborated in other posts here, here, here., here, and here.