Thursday, February 22, 2018

The Darwinian Meaning of Life in a Liberal Society: Sean Carroll and Owen Flanagan

Many people assume that the biggest problem with Darwinian science is that it denies that life has any meaning or purpose. After all, to find meaning--to see our lives as part of some cosmic drama--don't we have to look to some religious or transcendent vision of the world that goes beyond the materialism of Darwinian science? If human beings are just an insignificant speck in a vast cosmos that is indifferent to human life, if we are just animals produced by a natural evolutionary process that doesn't care for or about us, and if, like all other animals, we live for only a moment on one planet and then die, how can human life--how can my life--matter? Unlike other animals, it's not enough for us that we exist, we need some reason for our existence. Otherwise, what's the point?

Human beings used to believe that their Earth was the center of the universe, then they learned from science that the Earth is only one planet revolving around the Sun, then they learned that the Solar System is a tiny part of a vast galaxy of stars, then they learned that the Milky Way galaxy is just one of at least a hundred billion galaxies, and now in the past twenty years, astronomers have discovered that there are at least a trillion galaxies in the observable universe, each one having at least a hundred billion stars, and including many thousands of planets, many of which are similar to the Earth.


Human beings used to believe that the universe is not much older than 6,000 years, and that it all began as the creation of a God who loves and cares for human beings.  Now, they have learned from science that the universe is at least 14 billion years old, starting at the Big Bang, that fully human life began only a few hundred thousand years ago, and that in the remote future, all life must be extinguished, because all of the stars will exhaust their nuclear fuel, they will fall into black holes, and even these black holes will eventually evaporate into a mess of elementary particles in a dark and empty universe.  It is possible that this universe is only one of many universes in a multiverse that must forever be beyond human observation or comprehension.


Friedrich Nietzsche saw the nihilistic consequences of this modern scientific knowledge of the human place in the cosmos:


"In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever beasts invented knowledge.  That was the haughtiest and most mendacious minute of 'world history'--yet only a minute.  After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star grew cold, and the clever beasts had to die."



In the vastness of cosmic space and time, and in the apparent indifference of the cosmos to our evanescent existence, how can our human lives really matter?


Sean Carroll (a physicist at Caltech) and Owen Flanagan (a philosopher of science at Duke University) believe that we can indeed find meaning for our lives in a Darwinian cosmology of nature without any supernatural purposes.  In Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2007) and Carroll's The Big Picture (2016), they argue that Darwinian naturalism--with its fundamental conclusion that we are animals in a purely material world--allows us to find a natural meaning to our lives without any resort to supernatural mystification.

Eight years ago, I wrote a post on Flanagan's book, and I will incorporate some of the material from that post into this post.

Throughout much of human history in many parts of the world, people making the argument that Carroll and Flanagan make--that there is no religious or transcendent support for human morality and politics--would have been persecuted, perhaps even killed.  Such persecution made it necessary and desirable for philosophers and scientists advancing such ideas to engage in esoteric writing to hide their subversive ideas from public view.  This was Leo Strauss's point in "Persecution and the Art of Writing," claiming that this showed the natural and unavoidable conflict between the moral, religious, and political life of most human beings as based on traditional opinions and the philosophic or scientific life of those few human beings devoted to the pursuit of true knowledge rather than mere opinion.

But as Arthur Melzer has indicated in his book on esoteric writing, the triumph of modern liberalism, beginning from around the year 1800, has promoted freedom of thought and speech in largely open societies that has made esoteric writing in many parts of the world today unnecessary and undesirable, which seems to have refuted Strauss's claim that such freedom in a liberal society is a dangerous delusion.  I have written about this here, here, here, and here.

Remarkably, Carroll and Flanagan say nothing about this, because they simply take it for granted that they live in a liberal society that allows them to freely challenge traditional beliefs about the moral and religious cosmology of transcendence without fear of violent persecution.  And contrary to what Strauss argued, they assume that the free discussion of the scientific truth about the place of human beings in a purely natural material world without any supernatural design does not dissolve the social order or render human life meaningless, and therefore their teaching scientific naturalism is not harmful in any way that would justify their being punished by violent censorship. 

If this is true, does this show the success of the liberal Enlightenment in a way that refutes Strauss?  And if so, does this show that Nietzsche was right--in his middle writings--in thinking that he could embrace Darwinian science and liberal Enlightenment without nihilistic consequences?  Or do we see--as many recent critics of liberalism have said--that ultimately liberalism must fail in trying to establish an open society in which human beings can find meaning for their lives without any legal enforcement of a political theology that denies modern scientific naturalism?  Or can we see that human beings in liberal societies find meaning for their lives in civil society--in their family life and in voluntary associations--without any need for a coercive enforcement of morality and religion by an illiberal government?

Flanagan suggests that meaning is "a matter of whether and how things add up in the greater scheme of things" (xi). The "space of meaning" is a "platonic space" in that we find meaning by living for "the true," "the good," and "the beautiful." And yet he insists that we can understand "the true," "the good," and the "the beautiful" as natural categories of human experience rather than as Platonic Forms existing as immaterial and eternal principles of the Cosmos. We seek what is good through ethics or politics. We seek what is beautiful through art and music. We seek what is true through science or philosophy.

These various human pursuits correspond to what I identify as the 20 natural human desires.  Carroll observes that desires are built into us by evolution, and it's those desires that make us care about ourselves and others (421).  So even if the cosmos does not care about us, we care 
about ourselves and our fellow human beings, and it's this human caring that makes human life meaningful.


Our human search for meaning is part of our pursuit of human happiness or flourishing. Flanagan agrees with Aristotle on this, and he regards Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as an empirical science of "eudaimonics" that has been confirmed and deepened by modern natural science. Although there is no transcendent Idea of the Good--no objective standard of the Good woven into the fabric of the Cosmos or created by a Cosmic God--we can reach intersubjective agreement on standards of the human good by seeing that some ways of living are better than others in satisfying our natural human needs and desires. In such a naturalistic view of morality, there are no categorical imperatives strictly speaking, but there are hypothetical imperatives that are constrained by our human nature as very clever social mammals. If you want to live a happy human life, then you have to have those moral and intellectual virtues necessary for such a life.

But while there are certain generic goods that are human universals because they conform to the stable propensities of our human nature, the diversity and contingency of human cultures and human individuals create variability as to what is good for particular individuals in particular circumstances. There is no single good or kind of life that is best for all people in all situations. But there is a range of goods and kinds of life that are worth seeking. Our lives have meaning when we and those who know us well can judge that we have lived good lives. (That's why I think newspaper obituaries can be so fascinating, because they allow us to look back over a whole life and judge whether or how it was a happy or flourishing life.) We can understand this human happiness as suited to our nature as smart social mammals without any need for believing in supernatural or transcendental norms.

Of course, those who do believe in supernatural or transcendental realities offer many arguments for why a purely naturalistic view of human life makes it impossible for us to find any meaning in things. There are at least nine arguments, which have to do with (1) reductionism, (2) cosmic teleology, (3) individuality, (4) free will, (5) consciousness, (6) First Cause, (7) death, (8) spirituality, and (9) political theology.


(1) Reductionism.

Carroll admits that modern science is very limited in its knowledge.  But despite our ignorance, we do know that the fundamental reality of everything in the universe is particles and forces, and "the vast majority of life is gravity and electromagnetism pushing around electrons and nuclei" (177), which is what Carroll (following Frank Wilczek) calls "the Core Theory," which explains the substances and processes that we experience in everyday life.

But if everything is ultimately reducible to elementary particles and forces, does this mean that everything else is illusory?  So the world of ordinary experience--the world of tables, chairs, rocks, dogs, and my wife--are only illusions of my mind?  Such reductionism seems to deny that the world that matters to us has any meaning.

Carroll and Flanagan reject this strong reductionism, however, because they defend the idea of emergence--that there are emergent realities of higher levels of complexity that cannot be completely reduced to the lower levels of simplicity.  I have often defended this idea of complexity, and I have used some of the same examples that they use.


For instance, we are all familiar with how water passes through emergent phase transitions. Depending on temperature and pressure, water can be a frozen solid, a liquid, or a gas.  The macroscopic descriptions of the solid, liquid, and gaseous forms of water are emergent realities.  But the microscopic description--molecules of hydrogen and oxygen--remain the same.  The macroscopic properties change from one phase to the other.  The solidity of frozen water and the wetness of liquid water are real, and this does not change when we learn that water is ultimately reducible to molecules of hydrogen and oxygen.


Carroll observes that this illustrates how the way we talk about water changes as it passes through different phases.  We don't speak of pouring ice or chipping liquid water.  There are different ways of talking about the natural world that correspond to different domains of experience.


This  illustrates what Carroll calls poetic naturalism (19-20).

Naturalism can be stated in three propositions:


1. There is only one world, the natural world.

2. The world evolves according to unbroken patterns, the laws of nature.


3. The only reliable way of learning about the world is by observing it.


The poetic aspect of naturalism has to do with the different ways we talk about nature, or the different theories, which can also be stated in three propositions:


1. There are many ways of talking about the world.


2. All good ways of talking must be consistent with one another and with the world.


3. Our purposes in the moment determine the best way of talking.


So, for example, we can talk about the air around us in our room as composed at the microscopic level of individual atoms and molecules--mostly nitrogen and oxygen; or we can talk about the macroscopic fluid properties of the air.  Both ways of talking are true at their appropriate levels of reality.  This illustrates the different emergent levels of air in our room.


Similarly, we can talk about how people might be moving around that room as motivated by their beliefs and desires about how they should behave, which is the level of morality, aesthetics, and meaning.  These people might be conversing, or fighting, or dancing.  To explain what they are doing, we need the languages of psychology, ethics, or aesthetics.  Explaining this at the microscopic level of atoms and molecules is not appropriate because it does not usefully make this behavior comprehensible.


So, even though the microscopic level of elementary particles and forces is the fundamental reality of naturalism, the higher macroscopic levels are just as real, and they require different ways of talking.  It's at those higher levels, that the meaning of human life emerges.



(2) Cosmic teleology.

If the natural cosmos does not serve any supernatural purpose, then it might seem pointless, which might seem to make the human lives within that cosmos meaningless.  Strauss and others seem to say this when they argue that the idea of natural right or natural law loses its meaning if it cannot be grounded in the purposefulness of nature, because modern science has denied any teleological conception of the cosmos.

But I agree with Carroll and Flanagan that the naturalistic denial of cosmic teleology is consistent with the affirmation of the immanent teleology of life.  All living beings have evolved natural ends or purposes.  And that is certainly true for human beings in their natural desires for survival and well-being, which constitute the ground for the natural teleology of human life.



(3) Individuality.

Science generally and Darwinian science in particular are often criticized as too impersonal. This was one of Peter Lawler's favorite arguments against my position. Science--like every form of abstract thought--explains things through types or kinds. So Darwinian science explains the general traits of each species of life, but it cannot explain the uniqueness of each individual. But if the search for human meaning is the search for the meaning of each human life in its personal uniqueness, then we might think that to find such meaning, we need a religion with a personal God who knows and cares for me as the person that I am, and for all other persons as they are in themselves.  It's all about ME, Peter insisted.

Flanagan responds by saying that it is usually not the job of science to offer "thick descriptions" of individual instances of things, because like every form of abstract thought, science explains things through conceptual generalization. Art and literature are better at capturing the personal reality of life as it's actually lived by individual human beings in all of its rich concrete complexity.

I would say that biology teaches us that every living being is unique in its individuality as a product of genetic uniqueness and the uniqueness of its life history. And although it is generally true that science abstracts from individual cases, it is possible in some areas of biological study to strive for the "thick descriptions" of individual cases. This is true, for example, in medical case studies and in natural history. Oliver Sacks' "clinical stories" capture the personal drama of particular people struggling with neurological disorders. Jane Goodall's Chimpanzees of Gombe is a social history of a particular community of chimpanzees with vivid life histories of the unique individuals in the group.


I have written a series of posts on the biological study of "animal personalities" in the unique cultural and political histories of animal groups.

(4) Free will.

Darwinian science is often accused of a biological determinism that denies the free will required for the moral dignity of human beings as beings capable of being held responsible for their moral choices. And sometimes Darwinian scientists like Robert Sapolsky have even argued that biological determinism means that legal systems are unscientific in holding people morally responsible for their behavior.  Religious believers often argue that the human capacity for free will manifests a freedom from natural causality that must be the work of an immaterial mind or soul that is supernatural.

Flanagan rightly responds to this argument just as I do in Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism by indicating how human freedom of choice is compatible with natural causality, as long as one rejects the idea of free will as uncaused cause. For Aristotle, voluntary action requires that the agent know what he is doing and act from his own reasons and desires without external compulsion. That his reasons and desires have more distant causes--his innate temperament, his social circumstances, and so on--does not deny the freedom of his choice. Thus, the agent can be the immediate cause of action while still being subject to the wider causal order of nature. By contrast, the idea of free will as uncaused cause could apply only to God as a completely self-subsisting being or unmoved mover. The Aristotelian understanding of voluntary and deliberate choice does not require any supernatural uncaused cause. And it's the Aristotelian understanding that is compatible with Darwinian science and with legal conceptions of moral responsibility.


Carroll does not bring up Aristotle, but Carroll does endorse David Hume's compatibilism.

(5) Consciousness.

Scientists have a hard time explaining consciousness. Both Flanagan and Carroll admit that no one has explained consciousness, which remains one of the deep mysteries of science. Almost no one doubts the reality of consciousness, because we all have direct access to our personal consciousness. But this subjective experience of consciousness is not directly observable as is everything in our objective experience.

Determining the objective traits of apples is a matter of direct, public observation. But my inward conscious experience of the "redness" of this apple before me--the "personal feel" of redness--is not open to public study. Although we might observe the neuronal patterns in my brain correlated with my conscious awareness of "redness," but still my conscious awareness would be directly available only to me. So it's not clear how, or even whether, my brain's activity fully explains my mind's conscious experience. The religious believer might say that this introspective experience of consciousness can only be explained as the activity of an immaterial mind or soul that transcends the material brain, because consciousness belongs to a supernatural realm of experience beyond natural material causality.

Many philosophers and neuroscientists identify this as the "hard problem of consciousness," and they see it as an unresolvable mystery that creates an explanatory gap between explaining the material brain and explaining the immaterial mind. Flanagan agrees that there is now an explanatory gap between subjective self-conscious awareness and the neural events in the brain correlated with that awareness. But he believes that embracing the idea of "subjective realism" should allow us to continue research on the neural basis of subjective experience until the gap is closed. "Subjective realism says that the relevant objective state of affairs in a sentient creature properly hooked up to itself produces certain subjective feels in, for, and to that creature" (29). "Conscious mental events are essentially Janus-faced and uniquely so. They have first-person subjective feel and they are realized in objective states of affairs" (27). We should see, then, that "mental events are neural events but that their essence cannot be captured completely in neural terms" (29).

But instead of solving the problem--the explanatory gap between brain and mind--Flanagan's talk about the "Janus-faced" character of subjective experience in which mental events "cannot be captured completely in neural terms" seems to just restate the problem. Religious believers can enter at this point to insist that the human mind can only be explained as a divine spark, because the human mind has been created in the image of the Divine Mind.

To defend Flanagan's naturalistic account of the mind/brain as a unity against the religious idea of the dualism of immaterial mind and material brain, I suggest that the religious argument here shows at least two fallacies (as many philosophers have noted). First, there's the Fallacy of Arguing from Ignorance. Flanagan correctly concedes that neuroscience cannot now fully explain human consciousness, but this is often the case with emergent phenomena in science, in which traits arise from complex interactions of simpler elements that cannot be found in the elements themselves. Water is wet even though the elements of water are not wet. Emergent phenomena are often so mysterious that it is hard to explain exactly how they arise, and that is certainly true of the mystery of how mind emerges at a certain level of size and complexity in the primate brain. But we can hope for better understanding of this with progress in neuroscience. And, in any case, to infer that our presently incomplete knowledge proves that there must be divine intervention at work here is a fallacious inference from ignorance.

Second, there's the Fallacy of Explaining a Mystery with Another Mystery. How the mind emerges from the brain is now a mystery. But to say that God's creation of the mind explains this mystery only adds a new mystery--how exactly does such a miracle occur? Replacing one mystery with an even deeper mystery is no explanation at all.

(6) First Cause.

Another big mystery is how to explain the ultimate causes of the natural universe and natural laws. Why is there something rather than nothing? Flanagan admits that science cannot answer this question, which creates an opening for positing God as the First Cause (190).  We can say that it all began with the Big Bang, but both Flanagan and Carroll admit that no scientist can explain the Big Bang.

Flanagan even concedes that human beings might benefit from a satisfying story about God as Creator, and he allows this as long as it is not asserted as a literally true story. He notes that Plato's Timaeus suggests something like this (190-91): a myth about how a good demiurge might have created the world, but a myth that is understood as a satisfying story that is not literally true.

This is what I have identified as the conundrum of ultimate explanation. We can keep asking, Why? But ultimately we must reach the final ground of explanation that cannot itself be explained--the causal order that is its own cause. Some of us will be satisfied to say this ultimate ground is Nature. But others will want to say that the cause of Nature is God. Who or what caused God? The religious believer might say that God is self-caused. But if we are going to allow for a self-caused ultimate ground, why can't that be Nature? Invoking God to explain Nature is once again employing the Fallacy of Explaining One Mystery with Another Mystery. In facing up to such profound mysteries, we face up to the limits of human reason, perhaps the sort of limits we might expect of an animal mind that was not evolutionarily adapted for explaining why there is something rather than nothing.

(7) Death

If we're animals, then we're going to die. Many human beings don't want to believe that they are animals because they don't want to believe that they are going to die and never live again. They don't want to believe this because they think that death without rebirth would make life meaningless. Whatever we pursue in life that is good, true, or beautiful will be lost when we die. So for many religious believers some religious doctrine of human rebirth with eternal rewards and punishments is the necessary condition for meaning.

Aristotle is clear in stating that to wish for immortality is to wish for the impossible. But he does not seem to think that this makes the human pursuit of happiness meaningless.

Flanagan's response to this problem of death echoes that of Lucretius:

"I recently heard a wise Buddhist friend say that 'death is the ultimate absurdity, you lose everything you care about.' This, it seems to me, is not true. Furthermore, it is not a particularly Buddhist way (even for a secular Buddhist) to see things. Here is a better way: If you live well, then when you die you lose nothing you care about. Why? Because you are no longer there. You are just gone. That which is gone has nothing to lose. That which was once something, but is now nothing, cannot suffer any loss. But assuming the world and the people in it, including the loved ones remain, then your good karmic effects continue on. This is something to be proud of and happy about while alive. Your goodness, your presence, your worth are why the living feel your loss, and are sad, possibly very sad. But you are not sad, you neither suffer nor experience any loss because you are gone. Nothing absurd has occurred. True, dying could be miserable, but your own death is nothing to worry about" (203-204).


As I have indicated in a previous post, Darwin showed his understanding of death in his poignant response to the death of his daughter Annie at age ten.  He loved Annie as his beautiful child.  He could understand her death as coming from her losing struggle for life in the war of nature with tuberculosis.  he could cherish his memories of her vibrant personality, as carefully preserved in his memorial essay about her, but without any expectation of being reunited with her in an afterlife.

I have written a long series of posts on life, death, living forever, Heaven, and Hell here, here, and here.

(8) Spirituality

Flanagan includes "spirituality" as one of the "spaces of meaning." After all, if finding meaning and purpose in life comes from making sense of things and attaching oneself to something larger than oneself, then the experience of spirituality--of being in contact with the transcendent, cosmic source of all being--would seem to essential to a meaningful life. And, in fact, psychologists who study what people around the world want to make them happy often report that "transcendence" is a universal human longing.

But how can a Darwinian naturalist recognize the importance of such spirituality for human beings, if this requires religious belief in a supernatural realm beyond the natural world? Flanagan's answer is to look for spiritual traditions that do not require belief in the supernatural, which would therefore be compatible with Darwinian science. He wants religion to be tamed so that it can be a "strong cat without claws" (183). In particular, he looks to Buddhism, and especially the Tibetan Buddhism of the Dalai Lama.

One reason for this move is that Buddhism is non-theistic. The classic teachings of Buddhism do not include any doctrines about God or gods. In fact, some people suspect that the Buddha was actually an atheist. This makes Buddhism attractive to atheists like Flanagan who want to have religious feelings without believing in religious doctrines about divinity.

But even if it is true that there is no theistic teaching in the classic texts of Buddhism, observation of how Buddhism is actually practiced around the world suggests that many, maybe most, Buddhists believe in divinities of some sort and perhaps in the Buddha as a god.

Another reason for Flanagan's move towards Buddhism is that he is attracted by the Dalai Lama's respect for modern science. In The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality (2005), the Dalai Lama writes: "My confidence in venturing into science lies in my basic belief that as in science, so in Buddhism, understanding the nature of reality is pursued by means of critical investigation: if scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims" (2-3).

One remarkable example of the convergence of neuroscience and Buddhist spirituality is that some neuroscientists have discovered that the effects of Buddhist meditation can be seen in the brain, particularly in the activation of the left pre-frontal cortex, which is associated with having a positive mood. Here, then, Flanagan argues, is an example of how science can explain and confirm the natural basis of spirituality: meditation techniques can exploit the neuroplasticity of the brain to induce mental states of equanimity, euphoria, or ecstasy.

But then we must wonder whether psychic states of spirituality can be separated from religious beliefs in the supernatural. After all, a core belief of Buddhism is karmic rebirth--the belief that at death, we pass into a cycle of rebirths in which our bad conduct is punished and our good conduct is rewarded.

This idea of karmic rebirth has had a powerful appeal to the human mind. It originated in ancient India and then passed into the ancient Greek thought of Pythagoras and Plato and then into the Abrahamic religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Flanagan argues, however, that belief in rebirth is not really required for Buddhism. To me, his argument here seems remarkably weak. He doesn't even mention the fact that the status of the Dalai Lama depends on the belief that he as the 14th Dalai Lama is the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama.

Another attraction of Buddhism for Flanagan is Buddhist ethics, and especially the ethics of universal love and compassion. But he is remarkably uncritical in his acceptance of Buddhist ethics. He notes that Buddhist ethics has no place for courage, spiritedness, and greatness of soul, as does Aristotle. Isn't this a problem? How can we eliminate human suffering--as Buddhism teaches we must--if we lack the courageous spiritedness for attacking injustice and tyranny? Remarkably, Flanagan does not even mention the Chinese atrocities against the Tibetan Buddhists or the Dalai Lama's traditional position as a political ruler. Nor does Flanagan mention the atrocities carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which would raise the question of why the Buddhists in Cambodia did not overthrow this bloody tyranny.

Flanagan's attempt to naturalize spirituality is unpersuasive, at least to me, because he relies so heavily on an implausible and uncritical interpretation of Buddhism as the best expression of naturalistic spirituality.

My answer to the problem is to say that spirituality is rooted in two natural desires. The natural desire for religious understanding will express itself in religious believers as a spiritual experience of awe before the supernatural mysteries of the universe. The natural desire for intellectual understanding will express itself in scientists or philosophers as a spiritual experience of wonder before the natural order of things. The religious believers will be grateful that they are the objects of divine care and love. The scientists and philosophers will be grateful that they happen to live in a world with a deeply intelligible order that is open to investigation by the human mind.

(9) Political theology.  
In the past, Flanagan and Carroll could have been legally punished for the crime of writing blasphemous books.  Even today, in some parts of the world, they could be punished for violating laws against blasphemy.  According to the Mosaic law (Leviticus 24:16) adopted in colonial Massachusetts and other American colonies, blasphemy was a capital crime.  This reflects the ancient idea that social order depends on religious beliefs in a moral cosmology, and that an atheistic natural science that denies such beliefs must be severely punished by law.  One can see this, for example, in the teaching of the Athenian Stranger in Plato's Laws, which is cited by people like Strauss in arguing that every well-ordered society must be a closed society. 

As indicated in my posts on Tom West's account of the American founding (here and here), he claims that the American Founders agreed on the need for legally enforcing religious belief and practice, which would include punishing blasphemous speech and writing.  After all, doesn't the Declaration of Independence appeal to a theological cosmology affirming belief in God as Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge of human conduct? 


But as I indicated in my response to West, this ignores the fact that during the founding period, America moved towards a liberal policy of separating church and state based on the arguments of those like Roger Williams who insisted on a separation between the realms of "civil things" and "spiritual things."  In a liberal social order, moral virtue and religious belief will be enforced in families and voluntary associations; but there will be no legal coercion in matters of morality and religion except to enforce the equal liberty of all from force and fraud. 


This explains why the anti-blasphemy laws were not enforced in the early days of the American Republic.  For example, Tom Paine's attack on Biblical Christianity in The Age of Reason did not lead to any punishment for blasphemy. 


Similarly, Darwin's books have never been censored as blasphemous.  Darwin himself denied that his theory of evolution was necessarily atheistic.  Theists, atheists, and agnostics should be free to debate the moral and religious implications of evolutionary science without any fear that such debate threatens the social order. 


Thus it is that scientific atheists like Flanagan and Carroll can debate theists over whether theism is compatible with modern science.  And in a largely open society, such freedom of speech and thought need not be subversive of the good order of society. 


In such a liberal social order, esoteric writing is neither necessary or desirable, because theists, atheists, and agnostics can find meaning for their lives without fearing any harm to social order from the freedom of speech and thought for philosophers and scientists.

Monday, February 19, 2018

Atheist, Theist, or Agnostic? Sean Carroll's Failure to Resolve the Theism/Naturalism Debate

With his mastery of modern natural science and his deep understanding of the theistic arguments for the existence of God, Sean Carroll--a theoretical physicist at Caltech who has debated theists like William Lane Craig--would seem to be in the best position to resolve the debate between theism and naturalism.  In his best-selling book The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (Dutton, 2016), he tries and fails to do this.  He fails because of his intellectual honesty--he explains both sides of the debate so clearly that his readers can see that Carroll's arguments for atheistic naturalism cannot completely refute the arguments for theistic supernaturalism. 

He also fails to draw the right conclusion from this--that Charles Darwin was correct in seeing that modern evolutionary science can be plausibly seen as compatible with either theism or atheism, so that a man like Darwin, who sees the good arguments on both sides, can reasonably choose to be neither a theist nor an atheist but an agnostic.

Earlier this month, I posted my assessment of the debates between Carroll, Craig, and Lawrence Krauss over the cosmological arguments for theism and naturalism.  Here is a video of Carroll lecturing about some of what he says in The Big Picture, although he does not include here his reasoning about morality and religion.


A crucial claim for Carroll's position is that scientific reasoning and all forms of empirical reasoning can be understood as Bayesian reasoning (named after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, who developed a theory of probability in the 18th century).  Bayesian reasoning is a way of calculating our degrees of belief in cases of ignorance or uncertainty.  We must start with some initial degree of belief about what propositions are plausible, which statisticians call a prior credence.  So we might start with some intuitive feeling that God's existence is very likely or very unlikely.  We must then make predictions about what outcomes are likely to happen if our idea is true.  If those predictions often come true, then we can increase our credence in the idea.  If those predictions often don't come true, then we must lower our credence in the idea. 

We must also see that evidence favoring one alternative disfavors the other alternative.  So any evidence that raises the likelihood of God existing must lower the likelihood that God does not exist.  So, in principle, as we gather more evidence and alter the likelihoods of alternative propositions being true, we should move towards agreement.

Oddly, however, even as Carroll applies this Bayesian procedure to the debate between naturalists and theists, he admits that it doesn't work:

"Remember that there are two parts to Bayesian reasoning coming up with prior credences before any evidence is in, and then figuring out the likelihood of obtaining various kinds of information under the competing ideas.  When it comes to God, both of these steps are enormously problematic.  But we don't have any choice" (145).

The first step is problematic, because both sides in this debate start with biases that are so strong--either a preference for theism or a preference for atheism--that it's difficult for either side to be open to evidence contradicting their position.

The second step is also problematic, because God is "a notoriously slippery notion," and therefore theism is so badly defined that it does not make clear predictions about what we should expect to be likely in the world if God exists (145, 148).  So, for example, if God is all-powerful, all-good, and all-benevolent, then we might predict that evil would not exist, or that good people would always prosper, and bad people would suffer.  If so, then the existence of evil in the world would lower the likelihood of God's existence.  But, of course, theists can always respond by arguing that God has good reasons to allow evil in the world, perhaps because he wants to allow humans free will, which includes the freedom to make bad choices.

If God exists, we might predict that He would reveal His existence to human beings, and so the fact that human beings think about God should count as some evidence for His existence.  And, indeed, Christian theologians like John Calvin have said that human beings have an intuitive sense of the divine.  But then atheists can argue that human beliefs about the divine in different religious traditions are so contradictory that this should be seen as evidence that there is no divine revelation of God's existence.

Carroll says that the fine-tuning of the universe is "the best argument we have for God's existence" (303).  If God exists, and if this God cares for human beings, then we might predict that He would design a universe that would be precisely tuned for human life, and therefore the fine-tuning of the universe would seem to increase the likelihood of God's existence. 

But, then, as we saw in the previous post on Carroll's debate with Craig, Carroll can argue that the evidence does not show a universe precisely tuned for human life: throughout most of the history of the universe, there has been no human life; and even now, human life seems to be confined to one tiny spot in the universe.  Moreover, we can anticipate that in the remote future, all life will disappear, and the universe will become a dark and empty expanse of entropic disorder.  This looks like evidence for a universe that has not been fine-tuned by God for human life, which makes God's existence unlikely.

The theist can argue that an observable universe with a hundred billion galaxies is exactly what one might predict if God exists.  But the naturalist would object that this is not the cosmology of the Bible, and that no theist predicted a universe with a hundred billion galaxies until this was discovered in the 20th century by astronomers with modern telescopes.

Strangely, then, even as he insists that Bayesian reasoning is the only way to rationally adjudicate the debate over theism and atheism, Carroll admits that it really doesn't work.

To me, this suggests that Darwin's position is more reasonable than Carroll's.  As I have indicated in a previous post, Darwin's religious views, as stated in his Autobiography and in his correspondence, can be summarized as five points:

(1) It is possible to affirm both theism and evolution--to be a theistic evolutionist--and people like Charles Kingsley and Asa Gray show this. 

(2) Darwin thinks his views of this issue should be of no special concern for others, because each person must make up his own mind based on his personal weighing of the pertinent arguments and evidence.

(3) Darwin finds this issue so mentally challenging that he fluctuates in his thinking, and he cannot come to any final conclusion.

(4) In all of that fluctuation, Darwin has never seen any good reasons to be an atheist, in the sense of denying the existence of God.

(5) And yet, Darwin has seen good reasons, especially in his later years of life, to be an agnostic, in the sense of being in such a state of ignorance that human reason is incapable of providing sufficient rational grounds to justify either the belief that God exists or the belief that God does not exist.

Despite Carroll's claim that the astounding increase in our scientific understanding of nature over the past one hundred years has strengthened the case for atheistic naturalism, I see nothing in Carroll's book that refutes Darwin's claim that human beings remain in such a state of ignorance that they cannot resolve the debate over theism and atheism, and that it is therefore reasonable to be an agnostic.

Tuesday, February 13, 2018

Illiberal Conservatism in France: An Interview with "L'Incorrect"

I am some times asked why I identify Darwinian conservatism as a liberal conservatism, or as a fusion of classical liberalism and traditionalist conservatism.  My explanation is that I want to distinguish liberal conservatism from the illiberal conservatism of authoritarian conservatives like Joseph de Maistre.

I was reminded of this a few days ago when I was interviewed by a journalist with the new French magazine L'Incorrect, which began publishing last fall.  L'Incorrect is a conservative magazine designed to "develop the virtues of the multiple houses of the right" in France, according to its editor Jacques de Guillebon, in his opening editorial statement. 

Many of the people working with this magazine have some connection with Marion Marechal-Le Pen, who is the granddaughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founding leader of the French National Front, a far right party, and the niece of Marine Le Pen, the recent presidential contender of the National Front.  In 2007, at age 22, Marechal-Le Pen became the youngest person ever to be elected to the French Parliament. 

Although last spring she announced her retirement from politics, she continues to be influential as a leader of a new conservative movement in France that seems close to the Trump movement in the United States.  Steve Bannon identified her as a "rising star" in French politics.

Marechal-Le Pen has been arguing for a coalition joining the National Front and some or all of the Republicans.  The Republicans are a center-right or liberal conservative party that was formed in 2015 by renaming the Union for a Popular Movement party, which had been founded in 2002 under the leadership of Jacques Chirac, the former President of France.

This suggests to me that if L'Incorrect is associated with Marechal-Le Pen's position, then the magazine should be identified with a liberal conservatism.  But my interviewer--Benjamin Demeslay--identified the French conservative tradition with the "anti-liberal tropism" of Joseph de Maistre and Charles Maurras.  I responded to this by criticizing the illiberal conservatism of Maistre and suggesting that French conservatives like Marechal-Le Pen are actually far more liberal than they realize, and certainly they don't embrace the absolutist authoritarianism of Maistre that provided the intellectual seeds for fascism.

L'Incorrect has published a short version of my comments.  Here I provide the full text--seven questions (in italics) and my answers:


1. You defend a "Darwinian conservatism" against "metaphysical conservatism". These expressions are enough to surprise the French reader. The French conservative tradition remains strongly impregnated by Catholicism, a certain counter-revolutionary and anti-liberal tropism (from Joseph de Maistre to Charles Maurras), even a mistrust of "the Technique" (the essays of the Christian Jacques Ellul or the last Heidegger). English conservatism, heir to Edmund Burke, is now attracting renewed interest, with the translation of the philosopher Roger Scruton. There is nothing comparable to your conservatism in France. How would you define it?

Metaphysical conservatism views human social order as grounded in a transcendent realm of cosmic design.  Evolutionary conservatism is empiricist in viewing human social order as grounded in common human experience as shaped by human nature, human custom, and human judgment.  Both forms of conservative thought can be found in Edmund Burke.  
In the United States, Russell Kirk spoke for metaphysical conservatism when he appealed to the conservative belief in “the state as a divinely ordained moral essence.”  Friedrich Hayek spoke for evolutionary conservatism when he appealed to the classical liberal idea that social order could emerge through the evolution of spontaneous orders in a free society.  My claim is that a Darwinian evolutionary science of human nature and human culture supports Hayek’s side.
          In taking Hayek’s side in this debate, I am defending a liberal conservatism that is a fusion of what Americans identify as classical liberalism and traditionalist conservatism.  Actually, even Kirk is a liberal conservative insofar as he rejects the illiberal conservatism of Joseph de Maistre.  (A brief statement of my reasoning here is my article on “Darwinian Conservatism Versus Metaphysical Conservatism” in the Fall 2010 issue of The Intercollegiate Review.)
          Although you identify the French conservative tradition with the Catholic “illiberal tropism” of Maistre, I doubt that French conservatives really agree with Maistre’s illiberal conservatism.  Do French conservatives agree with Maistre’s claim that all stable government requires belief in its absolute divine authority as enforced by the execution of heretics who deny religious orthodoxy?  Do French conservatives agree with Maistre’s defense of the violent persecution of heretics in the Spanish Inquisition as necessary to protect Spain from the disorder of Protestantism?  Do French conservatives agree with Maistre’s argument that all social order depends on the terror of punishment by “the executioner”?  I doubt it.
          In fact, Maistre’s theocratic authoritarianism would support radical Islam in its enforcement of Sharia.  But don’t French conservatives—like Marion Marechal-Le Pen-- reject this as contrary to French culture? If so, then they are showing their liberal conservatism in opposition to the illiberal conservatism of radical Islam and Maistre.
          You identify the French conservative tradition with Catholic Christianity, and I know that conservatives like Marechal-Le Pen have stressed the “Christian roots” of French culture.  But isn’t it true, according to some surveys, that most of the French people identify themselves as non-religious or even atheistic?  
By contrast, most Americans identify themselves as deeply religious.  Surely, this arises from the American liberal tradition of religious liberty and religious life in voluntary associations free from governmental coercion; so that a liberal idea has a conservative effect in promoting a religious cultural tradition in civil society without state enforcement.
You mention Roger Scruton as a Burkean conservative now being read in France, Scruton is an example of a metaphysical conservative who thinks a religious attitude is essential for a healthy moral order, and therefore that traditional religious experience needs to be defended against a Darwinian science that claims to explain the place of human beings in the natural world without any reference to a transcendent realm beyond nature.  And yet--like many other metaphysical conservatives--Scruton does not believe in the literal truth of Christianity or any other religion.  He wants to have a sense of the sacred that comes from religious emotions, but without the need to believe any religious doctrines.  
We know that God is dead, Scruton suggests, but we also know that human beings need to satisfy their religious longings for transcendence and redemption through religious art and ritual.  That's the truth that Scruton sees in Richard Wagner's Ring cycle.  To me, this atheistic religiosity is incoherent self-deception.


2. French conservatives are currently facing a "progressive" offensive: same-sex marriage, medically assisted procreation "for all", surrogacy, etc. Conservative resistance largely comes from Catholic circles. You are an advocate of "natural rights". How do you reconcile them with Darwin's legacy? Your project of a "biological ethics of human nature" is audacious.

My project of a “biological ethics of human nature” argues that there are at least twenty natural desires inherent in our evolved human nature, and that, if the good is the desirable, we can judge social orders by how well they allow human beings to satisfy those natural desires.  
So, for example, I think we have evolved natural desires for sexual mating, conjugal bonding, and parental care.  For most human beings, therefore, marriage and parenting are crucial to their human flourishing.  For Thomas Aquinas’s natural law teaching, marriage is natural insofar as it satisfies the natural desires for conjugal bonding and parental care.  
Is it possible that same-sex marriage could satisfy these two natural desires?  If so, then Darwinian conservatives would allow same-sex marriage as part of a free society.  There is an empirical question here.  Whether same-sex marriage satisfies or frustrates these natural desires—whether children are harmed by same-sex parenting—will have to be decided by our experience with same-sex marriage.
In any case, I assume that most conservatives today would not favor capital punishment for homosexuals, which was common not so long ago in Europe and North America.  Why the change?  Is it because we have discovered that homosexuality need not be harmful to the social order, and so it need not be punished as a capital crime?  Can we say then that illiberal Islamic conservatives are wrong in persecuting homosexuals?


3. Scientific data are generally absent from the debates in France. While ethnic statistics are "of course" banned in our country, even official immigration statistics are under dispute. The observation is often the same for economic problems. How would you describe the relationship of American intellectuals, and your own relationship, to science?

          To a large degree, the utopian Left is hostile to the science of human nature, because that science seems to put restraints on the malleability of human beings by social engineering.  So, for example, the Left rejects any scientific evidence that there are natural differences on average between men and women, because the Left dreams of achieving an androgynous society.
          Darwinian conservatives respect science as confirming our common experience that there really is a human nature, that that human nature constrains but does not determine human culture, and that human nature and human culture jointly constrain but do not determine our individual identities.
          Darwinian conservatives see this science as supporting the conservative view that the best social order is one of ordered liberty rooted in natural desires, customary traditions, and prudential judgments.
          Darwinian conservatives argue that human freedom is good, because when human beings are free from coercion, they will voluntarily cooperate in the evolution of social orders that are more successful in satisfying the twenty natural human desires than any planned order using coercive power to achieve its goals.  Consequently, social orders with more human freedom will be more adaptive in securing human well-being and happiness than are those social orders with less human freedom.
          These are empirical claims that require empirical confirmation by the scientific measurement of freedom and its consequences.  And, indeed, this can now be done using the annual Human Freedom Index published by the Fraser Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation for Freedom.  This is a comprehensive index of human freedom that combines economic freedom and personal freedom using 79 distinct indicators for 159 countries for 2015.  
          Here are the top ten countries: Switzerland (1), Hong Kong (2), New Zealand (3), Ireland (4), Australia (5), Finland (6), Norway (7), Denmark (8), Netherlands (9), and United Kingdom (tied at 9th).  The United States is at 17th, and France is at 33rd.  The bottom four are Iran (154), Egypt (155), Venezuela (158), and Syria (159).  This allows for an empirical science in measuring the correlation of human freedom with human happiness and of the lack of human freedom with human misery.


4. In France, the conservatives have for several years defended an idea inherited from the communist Antonio Gramsci: the "metapolitical" or cultural action would precede the political victory. What do you think of this strategy? Do intellectual debates really affect the cultural and political life of your country? Their themes are little known to us.
          In the United States, there are many avenues for promoting the intellectual investigation of the principles of traditionalist conservatism and classical liberalism.  The three most important avenues are private educational foundations, think tanks, and higher education.  Educational foundations—for example, Liberty Fund and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute—sponsor hundreds of conferences every year and publishing programs that influence cultural and political life.  Think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Cato Institute promote the discussion of conservative and libertarian ideas.  And despite the pressures of “political correctness,” higher education does allow for some open discussion of these ideas.
          A good illustration of how intellectual and cultural activity in America has promoted Darwinian conservatism is the remarkable success of evolutionary psychology over the past 40 years.  In 1975, the publication of Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology provoked an intense outcry from the Left—insisting that any biological explanation of human behavior was strictly prohibited.  But now evolutionary psychology—as taught by people like Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Steve Pinker, Jonathan Haidt, Matt Ridley, and others—has had immense influence in psychology, anthropology, history, and the social sciences generally.  Now, even some leftists like Peter Singer defend a “Darwinian Left” that accepts limits on leftist social engineering from evolved human nature!
          This has implications for social policy.  For example, it has now become generally accepted that the evolutionary psychologists are right in arguing that evolved natural differences between males and females make young men (on average) more inclined to violence and social disorder than are women.  This confirms the conservative insight that every society has the problem of civilizing young men through good parenting and marriage.  (This and other Darwinian ideas are evident in James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein’s Crime and Human Nature.)

5. There are many transdisciplinary studies in the United States (psychology, biology, sociology and political philosophy). I think of Charles Murray's book Coming Apart, which analyzes the ghettoisation of American society on the basis of cognitive abilities and educational level, and the new "class racism" of some progressives. In France, these themes emerge timidly, but separately. For example, with the works of the geographer Christophe Guilluy on French Fractures; or the recent work of Dr. Laurent Alexandre on The war of intelligences. What do you think of these analyzes, and do you judge them influential?

          One illustration of how interdisciplinary studies might support Darwinian conservatism is the special meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in the Galapagos Islands in June of 2013, for which the theme was “Evolution, the Human Sciences, and Liberty.”  Participants included economists, psychologists, biologists, anthropologists, philosophers, physicists, political scientists, and theologians.  I presented a paper on Darwinian conservatism.  The general theme was how evolutionary science might support classical liberal and traditionalist conservative views of liberty and social cooperation.  This shows the interdisciplinary influence of Darwinian evolutionary ideas among classical liberals and conservatives.
          Charles Murray was at this conference, and he indicated that he agreed with everything I had to say.  Smart guy!  In fact, he is, in some ways, the epitome of a Darwinian conservative.  He is a libertarian or classical liberal who is also a Burkean conservative in his respect for the importance of traditional institutions in shaping the moral and intellectual virtues that sustain social order and liberty.  He sees all of this as rooted in the evolved human nature that can be explained by evolutionary science.

6. The question of "political identities" seems to have become obsessive in the United States. We think of the alt-right, or the defenders of positive discrimination, ... Of course, our two countries are profoundly different: France is of universalist and post-colonial culture, but identity and populism becomes more important. Our societies are experiencing major demographic upheavals, which announce political upheavals. What would be the conservative answer to these problems?
          The United States is also “universalist” in being founded on the universal principles affirmed in the Declaration of Independence.  Within that universalist identity, the United States also shows the cultural pluralism of diverse voluntary associations (so admired by Alexis de Tocqueville) and regional diversity across the states in a federal political system. 
          The United States is in general a deeply religious nation, but it has never had an established church at the national level.  The Constitution of 1787 was free of any religious establishment, and it declared “no religious test” for public office.  Some of the states had established churches for a few decades, but by 1830 they were abolished.  Now there is religious diversity across the states.  According to some surveys, Utah and the Southern states show weekly church attendance at 40% to 51% of the population, while the New England states show lower rates of 17% to 20%.
          This is what a Darwinian conservative would expect to happen in a free society: the evolved natural desire for religious understanding will lead to religious belief and practice, although there will be individual variation, and some individuals will live healthy, satisfying lives without religious devotion.
          In such a free society, people find their social identity in their families, their neighborhoods, their friendships, their churches, their clubs, and in many other voluntary associations.  That’s the way our evolved nature as social animals is must fully expressed.
          The alt-right is mistaken in suggesting that American culture depends on white racial or ethnic identity.  Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution says anything about racial or ethnic identity.  Of course, the United States has suffered from racial and ethnic conflicts, but despite that, American society has become remarkably peaceful in its multiracial and multiethnic pluralism.  I say that as someone who grew up in the American South, saw the violence of racial segregation, and then saw the amazing cultural transformation as the South became racially integrated.  Human beings have evolved propensities to tribalism, but they also have evolved propensities to cooperate for mutual benefit.


7. You take a critical look at Donald Trump in your articles. In France, his presidency continues to feed some hopes in conservative circles. We talk about its good economic results, even its action against "cultural Marxism". Others see the Trump Presidency as the "swan song" of genuine conservatism. What is your point of view?

           Look, let’s agree on the obvious truth before us—Donald Trump is a vulgar man, who has no moral or intellectual virtues.  Conservatives should agree that statesmanship requires good character, and therefore Trump’s bad character makes it impossible for him to lead in the enforcement of any good policies.  He is a silly narcissist who becomes resentful when he suspects people don’t love him as much as he loves himself.  He is a childish man who cannot control his childish impulses.  Consequently, his White House is, and must always be, utterly chaotic.
          Do the French conservatives deny this?  Do they believe that a man without moral or intellectual virtues can be a statesman?

Monday, February 12, 2018

The Birthday of Charles Darwin and Abraham Lincoln

Charles Darwin and Abraham Lincoln were born on February 12th, 1809. 

I have written many posts on the similarities in their thinking.  Links to those posts can be found here.

Friday, February 09, 2018

A Universe From Nothing? Craig, Carroll, and Krauss on the Cosmology of Theism and Naturalism

In the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the entry on "Nothingness" starts by asking, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and immediately answering, "Well, why not?"

In a previous post, I have suggested that that might well be the best response to this question, because the existence of the universe is a brute fact that cannot and need not be explained, and the idea of absolute "nothing" that comes from the Christian theological idea of creation ex nihilo is not rationally comprehensible since it is beyond our natural experience of the world.

But some people insist that the existence of the universe needs to be explained, and particularly if the universe had a beginning in the Big Bang, then there must be a transcendent cause for the universe coming into being.  And that transcendent cause must be a powerful disembodied mind--God.  In this way, the modern cosmologists who believe that the universe began in the Big Bang might seem to be supporting a crucial premise for the cosmological argument for the existence of God. 

Moreover, many modern cosmologists accept the anthropic principle--that the universe has been fine-tuned to provide the conditions for the emergence of human life--and thus they seem to be endorsing a premise for the teleological argument for the existence of God, as the intelligent designer of a universe that is purposefully designed to be habitable for human beings.

That's the claim of William Lane Craig and other Christian apologists who think modern science does indeed support some of the premises for some of the classic arguments for the existence of God.  As I have indicated in some previous posts (here, here, and here), some modern scientists--Owen Gingerich, for example--agree with Craig about this.  But most do not.  Sean Carroll and Lawrence Krauss are two cosmologists who have debated Craig and argued that modern science supports naturalism rather than theism.  Here are two videos of these debates:





A transcript of the Craig/Carroll debate along with other papers on the debate has been published in God and Cosmology: William Lane Craig and Sean Carroll in Dialogue, edited by Robert Stewart (Fortress Press, 2016).  Carroll has elaborated his arguments in his wonderful book The Big Picture: On the Origin of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (Dutton, 2016).  Krauss has laid out his reasoning for a purely naturalistic account of origins in A Universe From Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing (Free Press, 2012), with an Afterword by Richard Dawkins.

Here is Craig's syllogism for the Cosmological Argument:

1. If the universe began to exist, then there is a transcendent cause which brought the universe into existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, there is a transcendent cause which brought the universe into existence.

Craig claims that (1)  is "obviously true," because no one believes that things just "pop into existence" without a cause, and if the whole universe came into existence at some point in time, the cause must have been transcendent--namely, a divine First Cause.

The controversial premise, he says, is (2).  Previously, traditional proponents of the Cosmological Argument have made logical arguments for why the universe could not be eternal and so must have an absolute beginning in time.  But now, beginning in the 20th century, we have scientific empirical evidence from astrophysical cosmology supporting the theory of the Big Bang--most importantly, evidence for the expansion of the universe and evidence from the second law of thermodynamics that the universe has moved from an original state of low entropy to high entropy.

Craig says that the scientific support for premise (2) coming from Big Bang cosmology is "religiously neutral," but when the empirical truth of premise (2) is combined with the metaphysical truth of premise (1), the logical conclusion supports the existence of a transcendent cause of the universe that must be God.

There are, however, good reasons to doubt that those two premises are really scientific statements rather than affirmations of religious faith.

Premise (1) is not "obviously true," because while we all have experience of how natural causes work within the universe to bring things into existence, we do not have experience with how transcendent causes work outside the universe to bring the universe itself into existence. 

Carroll makes this argument, and Craig refuses to answer it.  Craig just repeats how silly it sounds to say that things "just pop into existence" without a cause.  But as Carroll observes, the language of "popping" implies a context within which cause and effect relationships make sense.  So we can sensibly ask why the chicken crossed the road, because we have a contextual understanding of what roads are, what might be on the other side of a road, what might motivate chickens to cross a road, etc.  We have a context here of things interacting within a universe governed by natural laws.

But if we try to ask why the universe exists, we have no context outside the universe that would make it possible for us to seek a causal explanation.  Indeed, to even talk about transcendent causes implies that our natural experience of causality inside the universe has no application here.  Thus, Craig is employing the sophistical technique of equivocation: if it's silly within our natural experience of the universe to say that things can just "pop into existence," then it is also silly standing outside our natural universe to say that our universe could have come into existence without a cause.  This is a fallacious inference, because our ordinary experience of causality within the context of the universe does not necessarily apply outside that context.

As Carroll says, our natural experience of causality is in the context of time, so that things happen now because of things that happened in the past.  But if the beginning of the universe in the Big Bang was the beginning of time, then there is no context of time for that beginning--there is no "before" the beginning.  So while "popping into existence" sounds silly, "there was a first moment of time" does not sound so silly.

Consequently, while the "principle of sufficient reason"--that for everything there must be a causal explanation--might hold true for our ordinary experience of how things work within the universe, this principle does not necessarily apply to what things are like outside the universe, because none of us has ever stood "outside the universe" to see if the principle of sufficient reason holds true there.  Standing "outside the universe"--experiencing the transcendent--is a matter of religious imagination that is beyond our empirical experience of the world and thus beyond empirical science.

Therefore, premise (1) of Craig's syllogism might be a statement of religious faith, but it is not a statement of scientific truth.

The same can be said about premise (2).  As with Craig's premise (1), there is an implied equivocation in his premise (2).  "The universe began to exist."  What exactly is being stated here?  There are two possibilities.  The universe began to exist out of nothing.  Or the universe began to exist out of something. 

Craig's argument requires that he equivocate between these two different statements.  The universe began to exist out of nothing is the Christian theological doctrine of creation ex nihilo.  But, then, this would deny Craig's claim that this premise is "religiously neutral."  In fact, that the universe began to exist out of nothing is not a scientific statement at all, because there is no human observational experience of absolute "nothing" that would make the study of "nothing" part of empirical science. 

By contrast, the claim that the universe began to exist out of something can be a scientific statement, because there is human observational experience of how things can originate out of something.

Both Christian apologists like Craig and atheistic cosmologists like Krauss fail to acknowledge this point.  Both sides refuse to admit that origin from something and creation from nothing are utterly different.

The title for Krauss's book A Universe From Nothing is wrong.  The proper title would be A Universe From Something.  Krauss proposes a model of how the universe could have evolved from a multiverse by the laws of relativistic quantum theories out of the empty space of quantum vacuum states into the universe as we observe it today.  Aha, there you are, he proclaims, a universe from nothing without any need to posit a divine creator!  But notice that there is no absolute "nothing" here.  He assumes at the origin of the universe the reality of the laws of quantum mechanics and of quantum vacuum states.   That's not nothing!  That's something! 

In a way, he even admits this when he writes: "to be fair, to make any scientific progress in calculating possibilities, we generally assume that certain properties, like quantum mechanics, permeate all possibilities.  I have no idea if this notion can be usefully dispensed with, or at least I don't know of any productive work in this regard" (176-77). 

So where are the laws of quantum mechanics supposed to have come from?  He has no idea.  And if our universe came out of the multiverse, where did the multiverse and the laws governing it come from?  He has no idea.  He can explain how the universe might have come from something, but not how it might have come from nothing.

In his lectures, Krauss likes to tell the story of how the first cosmologist to propose a Big Bang theory of the universe was a Jesuit priest--Georges Lemaitre--and how, when Pope Pius XIII in 1951 pointed to Lemaitre's Big Bang theory as scientific evidence for divine creation of the universe from nothing, Lemaitre criticized the Pope for failing to see how this scientific theory had nothing to do with the Christian doctrine of creation. 

But what Krauss doesn't say is that Lemaitre explained that the theory of the Big Bang is not a theory of how the universe could arise "out of nothing," but rather it is a theory of how the universe could arise from what Lemaitre called a "primeval atom," or from a hyper-dense sphere of cold matter, disintegrating through radioactivity into an expanding universe, or from what some people called "the cosmic egg."  Lemaitre thus separated the scientific theory of the universe's origin from something and the religious doctrine of the universe's creation from nothing.  Here Lemaitre was in agreement with St. Thomas Aquinas, who declared that "It is by faith alone do we hold and not by any demonstration that can be proved, that the world did not always exist. . . . that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science" (Summa Theologica, I, q. 46, a. 2).

Krauss says nothing about this, because he wants to claim that his scientific theory of origin is actually an explanation of "a universe from nothing," which Lemaitre denied as a scientific claim.  (My understanding of Lemaitre's position depends greatly on John Farrell's book The Day Without Yesterday: Lemaitre, Einstein, and the Birth of Modern Cosmology [2005].  Farrell has kindly confirmed in an email message that my interpretation is correct.)

Oddly, Craig makes exactly the same mistake as Krauss, because Craig repeats the Pope's claim that Big Bang theory confirms the scientific truth of creation from nothing, without answering Lemaitre's objections.

But, then, what about  Craig's Teleological Argument?  Here is how he frames it:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

By "fine-tuning of the universe," Craig is referring to certain fundamental constants and quantities, such as the gravitational constant and the amount of entropy in the early universe, that apparently must be exactly as they are for a universe hospitable to life to emerge.

In his response to Craig, Carroll admits that this teleological argument from fine-tuning is "the best argument that theists have when it comes to cosmology" (47).  Nevertheless, he offers five reasons why theism is not a solution to the purported fine-tuning problem:

1. Fine-tuning for life is dubious at best.

2. God doesn't need to fine-tune anything. He's God.

3. Fine-tunings may be only apparent.

4. The multiverse is an obvious naturalistic explanation for fine-tuning.

5. Theism fails as an explanation for purported cosmological fine-tuning, because theism is so badly defined that it does not make precise falsifiable predictions about how God has fine-tuned the universe.

As I indicated in my post on Owen Gingerich (here), the evidence of cosmological fine-tuning does not clearly show a fine-tuning for human life.  If we look at the entire history of the cosmos, we see that during the first 10 billion years, there was no life, during the first 13 billion years, there was no human-like intelligent life, and in the remote future, as the Sun and the other stars burn out, the universe will become dark, cold, and dead.  So we could conclude that the universe has been fine-tuned for an eternity of mindless death, and so from the point of view of the universe, we are utterly insignificant.

It does not follow from this, however, that if the universe does not care about or for us, our lives have no meaning.  As Carroll argues, and I agree, even if our lives have no cosmic meaning, they still have human meaning for us.  The universe doesn't care.  But we care about ourselves and others.  Showing how this supports a naturalistic account of human morality and politics will be the subject of my next post.

Tuesday, January 30, 2018

Trump's "Defiance Disorder": Howard Kurtz Confirms Michael Wolff's Story

In my previous post on Michael Wolff's book Fire and Fury, I argued that his account of the chaos in the White House shows how Trump's bad character--his lack of any moral or intellectual virtues--has made it impossible for his people in the White House to execute any coherent public policy agenda.

But Trump's defenders have denounced Wolff's book as complete falsehood.  Stephen Miller has said that the book is a "grotesque work of fiction." 

If that is true, then we might expect that Howard Kurtz's just published book--Media Madness: Donald Trump, the Press, and the War Over the Truth--would contradict the story told by Wolff, because Kurtz wants to show that Trump has been unfairly treated by mainline media journalists who want to destroy him.  Remarkably, however, Kurtz's book largely confirms Wolff's story.

According to Wolff, Trump's staff say that working for Trump is like trying to manage an impulsive, temperamental child prone to outbursts of explosive rage and erratic behavior.  That's what I mean by Trump's bad character. 

Kurtz identifies the same problem when he says that Trump's staff label him as showing "defiance disorder" (Kurtz, 42-43, 55, 81, 131, 225-26). Children with "oppositional defiance disorder" refuse to follow any rules of good behavior.  They are angry and resentful of others.  They blame others for their own mistakes.  They frequently lose their temper.  They are spiteful in seeking revenge and easily annoyed.  This supports much of what Wolff claims about Trump's character.

Many of the stories told by Wolff are repeated by Kurtz in almost the same words--for example, the stories surrounding the meeting in Trump Tower with the Russians in June 2016 (Kurtz, 200-201;Wolff, 255), Trump's interview with the New York Times (Kurtz, 208; Wolff, 277-78), and Trump's claim that the white supremacist marchers in Charlottesville were "very fine people" (Kurtz, 225-27; Wolff, 294-96).  If Wolff's book were a "grotesque work of fiction," it would be surprising for Kurtz to write almost exactly the same fiction.

Wolff depicts Trump's propensity for lying, and Kurtz also identifies Trump's "falsehoods and exaggerations" (Kurtz, 4-5, 53-54, 202, 207, 218-19, 234, 253).  So even as Kurtz criticizes the mainstream press for unfairly attacking Trump for his frequent lying, Kurtz admits that Trump really is a shameless liar.

Although Kurtz does point to many cases of an unfair media bias against Trump, Kurtz admits that most of the reporting that Trump has dismissed as "fake news" was actually true, and Trump was being deceptive.

For example, Kurtz identifies Trump's accusation that President Obama had wiretapped Trump's campaign as "an explosive charge with absolutely no evidence" (81).  And when Trump said the reports about Don Jr. meeting the Russians in Trump Tower were "fraudulent reporting," Kurtz observes: "This rang a bit hollow, for it was hardly fraudulent to report information confirmed by his son" (202).

Wolff's depiction of chaos in the White House arising from factional infighting with everyone leaking to the press to subvert their opponents is also confirmed by Kurtz, who concludes: "What emerged was a portrait of a dysfunctional operation, which happened to jibe with the media's predominant view that Trump knew next to nothing about running a government" (33).

Kurtz agrees that Trump is a "reality show president" acting in "The Trump Show" (138-40).

Kurtz defends his "neutral approach" to journalism: "I don't like either party. I believe even the best politicians can be self-serving hypocrites. My brand has always been fairness. I've been a reporter and columnist for the Washington Post and Newsweek.  I've been an anchor at both CNN and Fox.  I've got plenty of opinions, but I don't take political sides" (11).

Despite his journalistic neutrality and his criticism of anti-Trump journalists for their unfair bias, Kurtz's book confirms most of what Wolff's book claims about Trump's bad character and the chaos it has created in the White House and in American politics generally.

As outraged as Trump and the White House have been by Wolff's book, they should worry much more about Kurtz's book.

This should also cause the pro-Trump Claremont Straussians to reconsider their claim that Trump's bad character does not matter.  Surely, statesmanship requires good character in the statesman.

Sunday, January 28, 2018

Measuring the Evolution of Freedom: The Human Freedom Index 2017

Classical liberals argue that human freedom is good, because when human beings are free from coercion, they will voluntarily cooperate in the evolution of spontaneous orders that are more successful in satisfying human desires than any planned order using coercive power to achieve its goals.  Consequently, social orders with more human freedom will be more adaptive in securing human survival and well-being than are those social orders with less human freedom.

These are empirical claims about the evolution of human nature, human history, and human progress that require empirical confirmation by the measurement of freedom and its consequences.

Since 1995, classical liberals at the Fraser Institute (a Canadian think tank) have published an annual Economic Freedom of the World that ranks the countries of the world according to their levels of economic freedom.  Beginning in 2012, the Fraser Institute has cooperated with the Cato Institute and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation for Freedom to produce an annual Human Freedom Index that ranks countries according to a comprehensive index of human freedom that combines economic freedom and personal freedom.  This week the third edition of this work has been issued--The Human Freedom Index 2017.

A few points stand out in this new report.  Global freedom has declined slightly compared to last year's report and compared to 2008.  Switzerland is ranked first for the first time since the rankings began.  Hong Kong has fallen from first place for the first time.  The U.S.'s 17th ranking is an improvement from its previous ranking of 24th.

As is characteristic of classical liberals, the authors of this report define freedom in a negative way as the absence of coercive constraint.  They use 79 distinct indicators of freedom in the following 12 categories:

PERSONAL FREEDOM

(A) Legal Protection and Security
(1) Rule of Law
(2) Security and Safety

(B) Specific Personal Freedoms
(3) Movement
(4) Religion
(5) Association, Assembly, and Civil Society
(6) Expression and Information
(7) Identity and Relationships



ECONOMIC FREEDOM

(8) Size of Government
(9) Legal System and Property Rights
(10) Access to Sound Money
(11) Freedom to Trade Internationally
(12) Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business

The most recent Human Freedom Index (HFI) covers 159 countries for 2015, the most recent year for which sufficient data are available.  The data are not collected by the authors but come from the most credible sources (for example, the World Justice Project, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and Freedom House).

For each of the 79 indicators, countries are scored on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents the highest level of freedom.  The scores for each of the 12 categories are averaged.  For personal freedom, the two categories under "Legal Protection and Security" and the five categories under "Specific Personal Freedoms" are averaged; and then the average of these two is the score for personal freedom.  The score for economic freedom is the average of the five categories under economic freedom. The final score for freedom in general is the average of these two scores, so that personal freedom and economic freedom are weighted equally.

The top 10 countries, with two tied at 9th place, are as follows--with the Personal Freedom (PF) and Economic Freedom (EF) rankings in parentheses:

1. Switzerland (PF: 6, EF: 4)
2. Hong Kong (PF: 26, EF: 1)
3. New Zealand (PF: 9, EF: 3)
4. Ireland (PF: 13, EF: 5)
5. Australia (PF: 11, EF: 9)
6. Finland (PF: 2, EF: 17)
7. Norway (PF: 1, EF: 25)
8. Denmark (PF: 5, EF: 15)
9. Netherlands (PF: 4, EF: 19)
9. United Kingdom (PF: 16, EF: 6)

Some other countries rank as follows: Canada (11), Sweden (13), Germany (16), the United States (17), Japan (27), France (33), Russia (126), China (130).  The bottom four are Iran (154), Egypt (155), Venezuela (158), and Syria (159).

And since Trump recently pointed to Norway as the one country where he wanted increased immigration to the U.S., it should be noted that Norway is 7th on the overall freedom index and number 1 on the personal freedom index

The regions of the world with the highest levels of freedom are Western Europe, Northern Europe, North America (Canada and U.S.), and Australia/New Zealand.  The regions with the lowest levels are in the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.

The HFI can be used to study how freedom contributes to human well-being.  For example, the highest levels of human freedom are strongly correlated with wealth (higher per capita income) and democracy (except for Hong Kong).  The correlation with wealth is what we would expect from Smithian economic theory: the gains from specialization, exchange, and productive efficiency associated with economic freedom should tend to generate higher levels of income and growth rates.

In November and December of 2016, I wrote a series of posts on "The Empirical Data for Human Progress through the Liberal Enlightenment," which concluded with a post (here) on the previous edition of the Human Freedom Index. 

In that post, I reflected on 10 questions that came to mind as I read this report:

(1) Is it reasonable to measure only negative liberty? 

(2) In measuring freedom, should we attempt to measure restrictions on freedom designed to enhance freedom? 

(3) Does freedom include democracy? 

(4) In measuring freedom, should we identify not only official or governmental restraints on freedom, but also unofficial or social restraints? 

(5) Does measuring freedom require personal judgment?

(6) In measuring freedom, how do we weigh the various indicators? 

(7) Does the freedom of parental rights violate the freedom of children? 

(8) Does the Human Freedom Index show the success of the Nordic social democracies as capitalist welfare states? 

(9) Does the Human Freedom Index show that human freedom generally promotes human well-being or flourishing?

(10) Is human freedom and its connection to human happiness rooted in human evolution?

Ian Vasquez--the lead author of the Human Freedom Index--wrote a response to my post, which I posted.

Other than the changes in the rankings, the one new point in the latest report is the conclusion that overall levels of freedom have fallen since 2008, and this fall continued between 2014 and 2015.  This might seem to deny my argument for "human progress through the liberal enlightenment," because it might be interpreted as showing a decline in liberalism around the world and a rise of illiberal social practices, including populist authoritarianism.

My response, however, is to point out that the decline in this measurement of freedom reported here is so slight as to be hardly noticeable.

Vasquez and Porcnik report:
"On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom, the average human freedom rating for 159 countries in 2015 was 6.93.  Among countries included in this report, the level of freedom decreased slightly (-0.05) compared with 2014, with 61 countries increasing their ratings and 97 decreasing.  Since 2008, the level of global freedom has also decreased slightly (-0.12), with about half of the countries in the index increasing their ratings and half decreasing" (p. 5).
In the previous report (in 2016), Vasquez and Porcnik said that the average human freedom rating had remained "about the same" since 2008 (p. 5).  What they now call a "slight decrease" looks like "about the same" to me. 

Moreover, in the new report, they say that if one compares only the 141 countries for which data are available from 2008 to 2015--the HFI surveys 18 more countries in 2015 than in 2008--the average human freedom rating decreased only by 0.05, with personal freedom falling from 7.36 to 7.20 and economic freedom increasing from 6.74 to 6.81.  Also, some 68 countries increased their overall freedom ratings from 2008 to 2015, while 69 countries decreased their freedom.

Well, if freedom is increasing slightly in about half the countries while decreasing slightly in about half the countries, I don't see that as showing any discernable decline.

If there has been any slight decline in freedom scores since 2008, it seems to have arisen mostly from three regions--Eastern Europe (-0.52 change in score), Middle East & North Africa (-0.46), and Central Asia (-0.29)--as opposed to Western Europe (0.09 increase), Northern Europe (-0.06 decrease), and North America (-0.09 decrease) (p. 27).

The overall pattern is clear: the Human Freedom Index shows clear empirical evidence for the triumph of liberalism in the progress of freedom around the world, which refutes all the recent talk about the supposed decline or failure of liberalism.