Two weeks ago, I wrote a post on "The Fall of Orban's 'Illiberal Democracy.'" I argued that the decline of freedom in Hungary under Victor Orban's rule has brought declining Christianity, declining families, declining population, and a declining economy. I predicted that the Hungarian voters would give Peter Magyar and his Tisza party a victory over Orban and his Fidesz party.
You might expect, therefore, that I would now be cheering for that electoral victory that occurred yesterday. But I have decided that I can give it one or two cheers but not three cheers. I can give it one or two cheers because the voters have voted against the corruption and economic decline in Hungary produced by Orban's "illiberal democracy" over the past 16 years. But I cannot give it three cheers until I see that this will bring about a restoration of liberal democracy in Hungary.
Over 77 percent of the registered voters cast ballots in this election, which is the highest turnout in a Hungarian election since the collapse of communism in 1989. Magyar's opposition party is projected to win more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Ironically, this is a result of Orban's Fidesz party's alteration of the Constitution to ensure that the one party with the highest vote total gets a huge majority of Parliamentary seats even though they've won less than a majority of the votes. Fidesz party leaders had always assumed that the opposition parties would split the opposition votes so that Fidesz would have the most votes.
This illustrates how precarious the power is in a "competitive authoritarian" system: even when the ruling party has manipulated the electoral system in its favor, it can still be defeated if the opposition is united behind a popular coalition, which is what happened yesterday.
The popularity of that coalition led by Magyar came from the widespread public resentment against the corruption and economic decline produced by the Fidesz government. An article in the New York Times explains this by focusing on one provincial town in Hungary--Keszthely, which is located on Lake Balaton, a popular vacation spot. For generations of Hungarians, it was popular because of its free public beaches and cheap camp sites. But during the rule of Orban and Fidesz, the family, friends, and cronies of Orban have taken over the shoreline of Lake Balaton to build luxury hotels and apartment buildings. Rich oligarchs have also siphoned off the money for public projects in Keszthely funded by the European Union. As Magyar and his supporters have said: "They have stolen everything."
This has made Hungary the most corrupt government in the European Union. And to use the terms suggested by Stephen Balch, "corruption" here corresponds to the rule of takers who steal the wealth created by the makers. For almost 5,000 years, most governments were dominated by takers (kings, princes, nobles, and priests) who expropriated the property of the great mass of people. Modern liberal constitutionalism created the first regimes that were "Made Safe for Making" by enforcing a rule of law that protected private property from the depredations of the takers. An "illiberal state" like that favored by Orban returns state power to the takers--to Orban's family, friends, and cronies who can amass wealth and power at the expense of the people.
But we can't be sure that Orban's loss of power will necessarily mean a full return to liberal democracy. There are three reasons for that. First, we should remember that Magyar was a Fidesz loyalist for over 20 years. So we have to worry that to satisfy his own ambition for power, that he might continue Orban's legacy of illiberal democracy. After all, if he did that, he would be following the pattern of Orban himself, who began his political career as a liberal anti-communist before turning towards right-wing authoritarianism as the best way to achieve power.
A second reason for worry is that Orban conceded his defeat just a few hours after the polls closed, which suggests the possibility that he has decided that allowing Magyar to come to power in a time of economic crisis might prepare the way for Orban to regain power in a few years if Magyar fails to quickly turn the country around.
A third reason for worry is that Orban has filled the government, the courts, the media, and other institutions with Fidesz loyalists, who will resist any attempt to restore liberal democracy. To overcome that resistance, Magyar might be tempted to set aside the rule of law in firing those Orban loyalists and replacing them with his own loyalists. In other words, he might face a dilemma in deciding whether he has to use illiberal means to restore liberal institutions.
That points to the fundamental problem here that applies not only to Hungary but also to the United States. Once a liberal democracy has passed through a period of illiberal abuses of power, it becomes hard to cleanse the regime of those illiberal practices. Once Trump is gone, how realistic is it to expect the next president to give up the authoritarian power that Trump has exercised?
That's the most troubling question for those of us who hope for a renewal of liberal democracy after an era of illiberal executive power.
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