A Confucian Constitution for China?

Jiang Qing and Daniel A. Bell have an article in The New York Times arguing for "A Confucian Constitution for China." 

In the summer and fall of 2010, I wrote a long series of posts on Confucianism, Darwinism, and liberalism, which included an assessment of Daniel Bell's argument for a "left Confucianism" that would support a new Confucian constitution for China.  I pointed out some serious contradictions in Bell's proposals.  And I see nothing in this new statement that resolves those contradictions.

On the one hand, Bell argues that Marxist socialism has lost all legitimacy in China.  On the other hand, he defends political Confucianism as the fulfilment of Marxist socialism.

On the one hand, Bell argues that Confucian ethics needs to be enforced by governmental coercion.  On the other hand, he recognizes that the history of Maoist attempts to coercively enforce moral transformation shows that such coercion is destructive.

In the fall of 2010, I lectured at Peking University in Beijing on "The Dao of Confucianism and Darwinism."  I argued that China needs a new Confucianism supported by Darwinian liberalism to replace Marxist socialism.  Some scholars of Confucianism have noted a liberal tradition in Confucianism, a tradition of suspicion of coercive power as corrupting and of reliance on moral persuasion arising through the natural and voluntary associations of society.  I have argued for cultivating this liberal tradition of Confucianism.

By contrast, Bell has rejected liberal Confucianism for two reasons.  First, he claims that liberalism is a Western idea, and therefore it's not suitable for China.  Second, he claims that while Confucianism is a comprehensive way of life, liberalism is "mainly a political philosophy rather than an all-embracing ethical philosophy."

On the first point, rejecting liberalism as a Western idea is strange, because Bell is arguing for a fusion of Confucianism with Marxist socialism, which is a very Western idea.

On the second point, saying that liberalism cannot support "an all-embracing ethical philosophy" is false.  Adam Smith was an important liberal thinker, and his Theory of Moral Sentiments sets forth "an all-embracing ethical philosophy."  But Smith explains how moral order arises through the natural and voluntary associations of social life that shape moral character by cultivating the moral sentiments.  Darwin then explained how this view of morality could be rooted in an evolved moral sense.  Thus, liberals can see the importance of a moral tradition like Confucianism that arises from moral persuasion in civil society rather than legal coercion by government.

Moreover, the natural morality cultivated by liberalism provides a shared moral framework that does not depend upon belief in any transcendent sacred authority that would provoke religious disputes. 

Bell is not clear about this point.  In some of his previous writing, Bell has rejected Jiang's proposal for making Confucianism a state religion with "sacred sources from Heaven."  Bell has argued--rightly, I think--that Confucius was evasive or silent about metaphysical or supernatural conceptions of "Heaven" or the afterlife, because his primary concern was for human life on earth.  This supports my claim that Confucianism shares with Darwinism a "humanistic" conception of moral order as arising not from cosmic sources--God, Nature, or Reason--but from human sources--human nature, human tradition, and human judgments.

But now, in this new article in the Times, Bell endorses Jiang's appeal to the "sacred legitimacy" that would be represented in a "House of Exemplary Persons."  This clearly contradicts Bell's earlier position.

Furthermore, this new article does not show any of Bell's earlier scepticism about Jiang's naive utopianism in assuming that the best government is the rule by the wise intellectuals over the irrational masses.  Previously, Bell has said that Jiang "underestimates the political intelligence of ordinary people and overestimates that of intellectuals."  But now Bell seems to agree with Jiang that we can trust the wise few to rule with knowledge and virtue over the unwise many.  By contrast, liberalism assumes that all political rulers will be imperfect in their knowledge and virtue, and that power tends to corrupt even the wisest rulers.  One would think that this liberal assumption has been confirmed by the pervasive corruption among China's political rulers.  And yet, Jiang and Bell ignore all this in proposing a new Chinese Constitution in which "a House of Exemplary Persons that represents sacred legitimacy" has an exclusive veto over the other two Houses of government.

Jiang and Bell do concede the need for the other two Houses to have some check on the power of the House of Exemplary Persons.  But it's not clear how this would work.  And if the House of Exemplary Persons really would have "sacred legitimacy," why would it need to be checked?

Elaboration of these points can be found in some previous posts, particularly here, here.. here., here, and here.