The May 8th issue of The Weekly Standard has a review of Darwinian Conservatism by James Seaton, a professor of English at Michigan State University.
I am grateful to Seaton for his accurate summary and general praise of the book. For such a review to be published in a conservative journal such as The Weekly Standard suggests that some conservatives are open to my arguments.
Seaton makes the point that conservatives are opposed not so much to science as to "scientism." He defines "scientism" as "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)." In M. D. Aeschliman's article on "Science and Scientism" in American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia (ISI Books, 2006), "scientism" is identified with a reductionistic materialism that denies human purposefulness, freedom, and rationality.
In Darwinian Conservatism, I respond to this conservative fear of "scientism" in the chapter on "Emergence." I argue that a Darwinian conservatism can recognize the special capacities of the human soul as manifesting the emergent complexity of life, in which higher levels of organization produce mental abilities that cannot be found at lower levels. The emergence of novelty is manifested throughout the evolution of the universe. As we pass through levels of complexity, we find new properties at higher levels that are not fully reducible to the lower levels.
This idea of emergence denies strong reductionism, because it denies that the higher levels of organization can be completely reduced to the lower levels. But the idea of emergence also denies dualism, because it denies any radical separation of matter and mind.
We can see the emergent evolution of the soul in the brain that sustains human freedom and reason. The evolution of the primate brain shows a trend towards increasing size and complexity of the neocortex, which allows for greater behavioral flexibility in primates. This trend reaches its peak in the human brain. In human evolution, the growth in the size and complexity of the frontal lobes passed over a critical threshold allowing human beings to use words and images to compare alternative courses of action through mental trial and error. Consequently, human beings show emergent mental capacities for freedom of thought and choice that are uniquely human, although they have arisen from an evolutionary trend seen in other animals.
Since the soul emerges as an activity of the brain, the soul is not an immaterial or disembodied spirit. Research in neuroscience shows that the soul depends on the brain, because brain damage or disability produces mental disorders. And yet a normally functioning brain allows the human soul to exercise a freedom of thought and choice that no other animal has.
In this way, a Darwinian conservatism can reject the "scientism" of strong reductionism and affirm the unique freedom of human beings for deliberate thought and action as arising from the emergent evolution of the soul.
Saturday, April 29, 2006
Thursday, March 23, 2006
Darwinian Conservatism and Natural Law: A Reply to J. Budziszewski
Many conservatives regard natural law as the moral ground of their conservatism. Against moral relativism or subjectivism, they believe that there are some natural standards of right and wrong, good and bad, which are universal because they are rooted in human nature. Some conservatives look to the medieval tradition of natural law defended by Thomas Aquinas. Others look to the Aristotelian tradition of natural right defended by Leo Strauss.
In developing my Darwinian conservatism, I agree with this conservative reliance on natural law or natural right. But I argue that this ethical naturalism can be defended as grounded in the natural desires of the human species as shaped by natural selection in evolutionary history. In an article in Social Philosophy and Policy (Winter 2001), I elaborated this idea under the title "Thomistic Natural Law as Darwinian Natural Right."
But some of the conservative proponents of natural law regard my position as preposterous. For example, J. Budziszewski has attacked me in a paper entitled "The Rivalry of Naturalism and Natural Law." The paper was first published in Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, edited by William Dembski (ISI Books, 2004). Recently, the paper has been published again in another book edited by Dembski (with a Foreword by Senator Rick Santorum)--Darwin's Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design Movement (Inter-Varsity Press, 2006). Both books are part of the "intelligent design" movement, and Budziszewski's paper shows how important it is for the proponents of "intelligent design" to reject Darwinian conservatism.
Budziszewski makes many points worth discussing. But his main idea is that for "natural law," one must "regard nature as the design of a supernatural intelligence." By contrast, for "naturalism," one must "regard nature (in a physical or material sense) as all there is." What I defend, he argues, is not "natural law" but "naturalism." And he criticizes me for my "determined attempt to make natural law safe for atheists."
First of all, I should stress that I have never defended atheism. On the contrary, in all of my writings--including Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism--I have argued that religious belief--particularly, Biblical religion--is both morally healthy and intellectually respectable. The religious appeal to God as the uncaused cause of nature cannot be refuted by reason. All natural explanations of the world--including Darwinian science--must assume that ultimately the order of nature is the final ground of explanation. But there is no way to deny the possibility that nature itself is the contingent product of nature's God.
And yet in our moral experience, we can appeal to a natural moral sense that does not depend upon religious belief, although religious belief can often reinforce that moral sense. When Thomas Aquinas defends the natural law as distinct from the divine law, he explains that natural law as "that which nature has taught all animals," because it is rooted in the "natural inclinations" or "natural instincts" of human beings and other animals. The divine law of the Bible can reinforce the natural moral law. But that natural law can stand on its own natural ground, and thus it can be known even to atheists. Darwinian science confirms this by explaining how this natural law could have evolved naturally to become what Darwin recognized as the natural moral sense implanted in human beings.
Budziszewski rejects this, because he believes that Thomistic natural law depends upon belief in God as the supernatural designer of nature. But if this were so, then there would be no distinction between divine law and natural law. This would deny the whole point of natural law reasoning, which is that human beings can agree on certain natural moral principles even when they cannot agree about religion. This has been a fundamental idea for conservatives who believe in religious liberty. We can tolerate religious diversity as long as we are confident that we share a natural moral sense that does not depend upon religious doctrines.
In criticizing my position, Budziszewski contradicts what he said in his book Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law (1997). In that book, he wrote that natural law is "a standard for believers and unbelievers alike," and that's why it is "especially pertinent to politics," because it provides a moral standard that all human beings can know because it is "written on the heart" (p. 11).
Far from absolutely depending upon the divine law of the Bible, our natural moral sense allows us to correct the moral mistakes in the Bible. For example, Budziszewski says that recognizing "the wrong of deliberately taking innocent human life" is part of the natural law. And yet, according to the Bible (Genesis 22), Abraham showed his faith in God by being willing to obey God's commandment to murder his son Isaac. Christians such as Kierkegaard have seen this Biblical story as teaching us "the suspension of the ethical" in our faith in God. We must obey God's commands even when they seem unethical. But most people see this Biblical teaching as wrong, because we recognize the wrongness of killing innocent children, and thus our natural moral sense corrects the Bible.
Another example would be the wrongness of slavery, which Budziszewski says is part of natural law. Darwin and others could condemn slavery as contrary to our natural moral sense. And yet in every Biblical passage where slavery is specifically mentioned, it is endorsed. Saint Paul taught slaves to obey their masters (Ephesians 6:5). In the debate over slavery in the United States, the slaveholders in the South quoted the Bible in their defense. As Eugene Genovese indicates in his book The Mind of the Master, the Southern slaveholders had a much better Biblical case for their position than did the abolitionists. The largest Protestant denomination in the United States--The Southern Baptist Convention--was formed to defend the Biblical basis of slavery. So, here again, we can correct the Bible because we can see that slavery violates our natural moral sense.
As I argue in Darwinian Conservatism, conservatives see traditional religious belief as important for supporting traditional morality. But they can also recognize the moral mistakes in religious beliefs that violate our natural moral sense.
In developing my Darwinian conservatism, I agree with this conservative reliance on natural law or natural right. But I argue that this ethical naturalism can be defended as grounded in the natural desires of the human species as shaped by natural selection in evolutionary history. In an article in Social Philosophy and Policy (Winter 2001), I elaborated this idea under the title "Thomistic Natural Law as Darwinian Natural Right."
But some of the conservative proponents of natural law regard my position as preposterous. For example, J. Budziszewski has attacked me in a paper entitled "The Rivalry of Naturalism and Natural Law." The paper was first published in Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, edited by William Dembski (ISI Books, 2004). Recently, the paper has been published again in another book edited by Dembski (with a Foreword by Senator Rick Santorum)--Darwin's Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design Movement (Inter-Varsity Press, 2006). Both books are part of the "intelligent design" movement, and Budziszewski's paper shows how important it is for the proponents of "intelligent design" to reject Darwinian conservatism.
Budziszewski makes many points worth discussing. But his main idea is that for "natural law," one must "regard nature as the design of a supernatural intelligence." By contrast, for "naturalism," one must "regard nature (in a physical or material sense) as all there is." What I defend, he argues, is not "natural law" but "naturalism." And he criticizes me for my "determined attempt to make natural law safe for atheists."
First of all, I should stress that I have never defended atheism. On the contrary, in all of my writings--including Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism--I have argued that religious belief--particularly, Biblical religion--is both morally healthy and intellectually respectable. The religious appeal to God as the uncaused cause of nature cannot be refuted by reason. All natural explanations of the world--including Darwinian science--must assume that ultimately the order of nature is the final ground of explanation. But there is no way to deny the possibility that nature itself is the contingent product of nature's God.
And yet in our moral experience, we can appeal to a natural moral sense that does not depend upon religious belief, although religious belief can often reinforce that moral sense. When Thomas Aquinas defends the natural law as distinct from the divine law, he explains that natural law as "that which nature has taught all animals," because it is rooted in the "natural inclinations" or "natural instincts" of human beings and other animals. The divine law of the Bible can reinforce the natural moral law. But that natural law can stand on its own natural ground, and thus it can be known even to atheists. Darwinian science confirms this by explaining how this natural law could have evolved naturally to become what Darwin recognized as the natural moral sense implanted in human beings.
Budziszewski rejects this, because he believes that Thomistic natural law depends upon belief in God as the supernatural designer of nature. But if this were so, then there would be no distinction between divine law and natural law. This would deny the whole point of natural law reasoning, which is that human beings can agree on certain natural moral principles even when they cannot agree about religion. This has been a fundamental idea for conservatives who believe in religious liberty. We can tolerate religious diversity as long as we are confident that we share a natural moral sense that does not depend upon religious doctrines.
In criticizing my position, Budziszewski contradicts what he said in his book Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law (1997). In that book, he wrote that natural law is "a standard for believers and unbelievers alike," and that's why it is "especially pertinent to politics," because it provides a moral standard that all human beings can know because it is "written on the heart" (p. 11).
Far from absolutely depending upon the divine law of the Bible, our natural moral sense allows us to correct the moral mistakes in the Bible. For example, Budziszewski says that recognizing "the wrong of deliberately taking innocent human life" is part of the natural law. And yet, according to the Bible (Genesis 22), Abraham showed his faith in God by being willing to obey God's commandment to murder his son Isaac. Christians such as Kierkegaard have seen this Biblical story as teaching us "the suspension of the ethical" in our faith in God. We must obey God's commands even when they seem unethical. But most people see this Biblical teaching as wrong, because we recognize the wrongness of killing innocent children, and thus our natural moral sense corrects the Bible.
Another example would be the wrongness of slavery, which Budziszewski says is part of natural law. Darwin and others could condemn slavery as contrary to our natural moral sense. And yet in every Biblical passage where slavery is specifically mentioned, it is endorsed. Saint Paul taught slaves to obey their masters (Ephesians 6:5). In the debate over slavery in the United States, the slaveholders in the South quoted the Bible in their defense. As Eugene Genovese indicates in his book The Mind of the Master, the Southern slaveholders had a much better Biblical case for their position than did the abolitionists. The largest Protestant denomination in the United States--The Southern Baptist Convention--was formed to defend the Biblical basis of slavery. So, here again, we can correct the Bible because we can see that slavery violates our natural moral sense.
As I argue in Darwinian Conservatism, conservatives see traditional religious belief as important for supporting traditional morality. But they can also recognize the moral mistakes in religious beliefs that violate our natural moral sense.
Monday, March 13, 2006
ISI's Encyclopedia of American Conservatism
The Intercollegiate Studies Institute has just published AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA. I have posted the following review on the Amazon.com website:
No other book provides such a rich survey of the intellectual history of American conservatism. With almost 1,000 pages of entries written by some of the most prominent American conservatives (such as Russell Kirk, M. E. Bradford, and Murray Rothbard), this is now the one book that must be studied if one wants to understand American conservatism.
This comes at a good time, because American conservatives are wondering about the future of conservatism in America. The current debate over whether George Bush and his neoconservative supporters have betrayed the conservative movement manifests this new period of conservative self-examination. This book will help conservatives to reconsider their complex history and their possible future.
My judgment might be biased because I was involved in the original launching of this project by Greg Wolfe in 1990. I have five articles in the book--on "Intelligent Design Theory," "The Scopes Trial," "Social Darwinism," "Sociobiology," and "Herbert Spencer." My articles reflect a desire to persuade conservatives that Darwinian science supports conservative social thought. But that is a minority view in this book. The more common conservative scorn for modern science is stated in M. D. Aeschliman's article on "Science and Scientism."
The one weakness in this book is that it does not really cover the full history of the American conservative movement. It stresses the intellectual or academic side of conservatism as dominated by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute and NATIONAL REVIEW. It gives no attention to the most populist elements of the conservative movement in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, there is not a single reference to Billy James Hargis, to John Stormer's book NONE DARE CALL IT TREASON, or J. Evett Haley's book A TEXAN LOOKS AT LYNDON. Hargis was a Christian conservative who once broadcast his radio program in the 1960s on over 200 radio stations. Hargis's book A COMMUNIST AMERICA, MUST IT BE? was widely distributed. The books by Stormer and Haley sold millions of copies in 1964, during the Goldwater presidential campaign against LBJ. People like Hargis, Stormer, and Haley were far more popular than William Buckley or Russell Kirk in the 1960s.
I understand, however, that the editors of this encyclopedia want to make the history of American conservatism intellectually respectable by concentrating on the more purely academic levels of the movement.
In any case, no one can think seriously about the intellectual history of American conservatism without reading this book. And in helping us to understand the past history of conservatism, this book can also help us to foresee the future promise of conservatism in America and around the world.
No other book provides such a rich survey of the intellectual history of American conservatism. With almost 1,000 pages of entries written by some of the most prominent American conservatives (such as Russell Kirk, M. E. Bradford, and Murray Rothbard), this is now the one book that must be studied if one wants to understand American conservatism.
This comes at a good time, because American conservatives are wondering about the future of conservatism in America. The current debate over whether George Bush and his neoconservative supporters have betrayed the conservative movement manifests this new period of conservative self-examination. This book will help conservatives to reconsider their complex history and their possible future.
My judgment might be biased because I was involved in the original launching of this project by Greg Wolfe in 1990. I have five articles in the book--on "Intelligent Design Theory," "The Scopes Trial," "Social Darwinism," "Sociobiology," and "Herbert Spencer." My articles reflect a desire to persuade conservatives that Darwinian science supports conservative social thought. But that is a minority view in this book. The more common conservative scorn for modern science is stated in M. D. Aeschliman's article on "Science and Scientism."
The one weakness in this book is that it does not really cover the full history of the American conservative movement. It stresses the intellectual or academic side of conservatism as dominated by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute and NATIONAL REVIEW. It gives no attention to the most populist elements of the conservative movement in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, there is not a single reference to Billy James Hargis, to John Stormer's book NONE DARE CALL IT TREASON, or J. Evett Haley's book A TEXAN LOOKS AT LYNDON. Hargis was a Christian conservative who once broadcast his radio program in the 1960s on over 200 radio stations. Hargis's book A COMMUNIST AMERICA, MUST IT BE? was widely distributed. The books by Stormer and Haley sold millions of copies in 1964, during the Goldwater presidential campaign against LBJ. People like Hargis, Stormer, and Haley were far more popular than William Buckley or Russell Kirk in the 1960s.
I understand, however, that the editors of this encyclopedia want to make the history of American conservatism intellectually respectable by concentrating on the more purely academic levels of the movement.
In any case, no one can think seriously about the intellectual history of American conservatism without reading this book. And in helping us to understand the past history of conservatism, this book can also help us to foresee the future promise of conservatism in America and around the world.
Wednesday, March 08, 2006
Transhumanism and the Future of Human Nature
"Transhumanism" has become a popular term for the idea that technological enhancements of humans, animals, and machines will create a superhuman species of beings. Transhumanists believe that advances in genetic engineering, robotics, computer science, pscyhopharmacology, and nanotechnology will improve the physical and mental capacities of human beings to produce a new stage of evolutionary history. A new species of beings far superior to Homo sapiens might evolve from such technologies. Some of the best statements of transhumanism come from Nick Bostrum, James Hughes, and others in the World Transhumanist Association.
As I indicated in my chapter on biotechnology in Darwinian Conservatism, I am skeptical about transhumanism for two reasons. (I am now working on a new book that will elaborate my case against transhumanism.) My first reason is that transhumanism suffers from a Nietzschean utopianism that lacks common sense, because it ignores the ways in which the technologies for altering human traits are limited in both their technical means and their moral ends. My second reason is that I favor a stance of libertarian conservatism in response to technological changes that would allow improvement in human life but without the transcendence of human nature expected by the transhumanists.
The technology for enhancing human powers will be limited in its technical means, because complex behavioral traits arise from the intricate interplay of many genes interacting with developmental contingencies and unique life histories to form brains that constantly change as they respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Consequently, precise technological manipulation of human nature to enhance desirable traits while avoiding undesirable side effects will be very difficult if not impossible.
Consider, for example, the matter of human intelligence. One of the central assertions of the transhumanists is that we will soon create "superintelligent" beings that will be as intellectually superior to humans as humans are today to chimpanzees. Notice the extraordinary claims implicit in such an assertion--that we know what "intelligence" is in all of its complexity, that we can reduce intelligence to material causes that can be technically manipulated in precise ways, and that we can use this technical power to increase intelligence beyond anything ever achieved by living beings.
If we ask transhumanists to justify these claims, we get vague assertions about what might happen in the future. For instance, James Hughes, in his book Citizen Cyborg, says this about the future of computer intelligence: "Since computers powerful enough to model human brains should be common in thirty years, those computer models may then be able to run software simulations of our brains and bodies. Presumably these backups of our minds, if switched on, would be self-aware and have an independent existence. This is the scenario known as 'uploading.'"
No one knows how to fully model human brains or how to replicate such models in computers. No one knows how brains and bodies could be simulated in computer software. No one knows how computer software could become self-aware. And yet Hughes can imagine a "scenario" in which all of this ignorance is dispelled based on what he thinks "should" or "may" or "presumably" will happen in thirty years!
Now, of course, there are ways that we can use biomedical technology to protect against mental disabilities. For example, we could completely eliminate the mental retardation from Down syndrome through genetic screening of embryos or other means so that parents could be sure that they would not have children born with an extra 21st chromosome. But although this would be an improvement in human life, it would not transcend human nature by moving us towards "posthuman" beings with superhuman intelligence.
When transhumanists like Hughes predict the coming of "posthuman" humans as the fulfillment of what they think "should" happen, they are expressing not scientific or philosophic reasoning from observable experience but a religious longing for transcendence. Hughes is a Buddhist, and he foresees that the transhuman future will fulfill his Buddhist vision of a "society of enlightened beings as an infinite net, laced with pearls and gems, each enlightened mind a multicolored twinkle that is reflected in every other jewel." Like Friedrich Nietzsche, the transhumanists profess an atheistic materialism, and yet they still yearn for religious transcendence, which drives them to project fantasies of "overmen" and "posthumans" who have escaped the limitations of human nature to enter a heavenly realm of pure thought and immortal bliss.
The transhumanists also ignore how the technology of human enhancement will likely be limited in its moral ends. Human beings act to satisfy their natural desires. The use of technology to enhance human life will be driven by these natural desires. Transhumanists implicitly assume the enduring power of these desires. But if that is the case, then it is hard to see how human nature is going to be abolished if the natural desires endure.
For example, Hughes speaks about "the human needs and desires these technologies will be asked to serve," which include the desires for long, healthy lives, for intelligence and happiness, and the desires for parents to care for the physical and mental flourishing of their children. (All of these desires are included in my list of "twenty natural desires" in Darwinian Conservatism.) But if human beings are always going to be moved by the same natural desires, how does this take us into "posthuman" existence?
If we were really going to enter the "posthuman" realm, we would have to create beings who lacked the natural desires of human beings and who felt no concern for human life as moved by such desires. Such creatures might be superintelligent. But they would also be superpsychopathic predators who would feel no guilt or shame in enslaving or exterminating human beings.
The transhumanists respond to this prospect by explaining that we will have to be careful to instill in these posthuman beings what Nick Bostrum calls "human-friendly values." Hughes explains that we will have to instill by technological devices "sociability and empathy for all sentient beings." For example, we might require the installation of "morality chips." Hughes is not troubled by the naive expectation that we can develop "morality chips" to control the posthumans without any harmful side-effects.
Even if we could solve the technical problems in reducing morality to a mere matter of mechanical engineering, we might still wonder why Hughes and the other transhumanists want to preserve human morality if their goal is an absolutely posthuman life. If human morality as rooted in the natural human desires is at the core of human nature, then posthumanity would require the abolition of that morality. If the posthumans are going to be moved by the same natural desires and moral emotions that have always moved human beings, then it would seem that human nature has survived.
As an alternative to the transhumanist stance, I would defend a libertarian conservatism rooted in human nature. I would argue for leaving people free to exercise individual choice in developing and using new technologies to meet human needs and desires. This would allow people to learn by trial and error what is desirable and what is not in the use of such technologies.
Some legal regulation of choice might be required to promote the minimal safety and efficacy of the new technologies and to protect people against force and fraud. But within such a modest regulatory regime, people would have freedom of choice.
The moral standard here would be that a technology is good if it promotes the flourishing of our human nature by satisfying our natural desires. We can best conform to that standard by allowing people free choice in satisfying their desires. Although there will be great diversity in the choices people make, there will be some enduring patterns in their choices that reflect the universality of natural human desires. For example, we can assume that the natural desire for parental care will generally motivate parents to use technology in ways that promote the happiness of their children.
My stance is close to the position taken by Ron Baily in his book Liberation Biology. But I depart from Bailey when he moves towards a transhumanist libertarianism that assumes that somehow human nature will be superseded by a new, superior form of life.
I welcome the prospect of technological changes in the human condition that will improve the physical and mental functions of life. But rather than expecting the emergence of a transhuman form of life, I foresee that human nature will not only endure but prevail.
As I indicated in my chapter on biotechnology in Darwinian Conservatism, I am skeptical about transhumanism for two reasons. (I am now working on a new book that will elaborate my case against transhumanism.) My first reason is that transhumanism suffers from a Nietzschean utopianism that lacks common sense, because it ignores the ways in which the technologies for altering human traits are limited in both their technical means and their moral ends. My second reason is that I favor a stance of libertarian conservatism in response to technological changes that would allow improvement in human life but without the transcendence of human nature expected by the transhumanists.
The technology for enhancing human powers will be limited in its technical means, because complex behavioral traits arise from the intricate interplay of many genes interacting with developmental contingencies and unique life histories to form brains that constantly change as they respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Consequently, precise technological manipulation of human nature to enhance desirable traits while avoiding undesirable side effects will be very difficult if not impossible.
Consider, for example, the matter of human intelligence. One of the central assertions of the transhumanists is that we will soon create "superintelligent" beings that will be as intellectually superior to humans as humans are today to chimpanzees. Notice the extraordinary claims implicit in such an assertion--that we know what "intelligence" is in all of its complexity, that we can reduce intelligence to material causes that can be technically manipulated in precise ways, and that we can use this technical power to increase intelligence beyond anything ever achieved by living beings.
If we ask transhumanists to justify these claims, we get vague assertions about what might happen in the future. For instance, James Hughes, in his book Citizen Cyborg, says this about the future of computer intelligence: "Since computers powerful enough to model human brains should be common in thirty years, those computer models may then be able to run software simulations of our brains and bodies. Presumably these backups of our minds, if switched on, would be self-aware and have an independent existence. This is the scenario known as 'uploading.'"
No one knows how to fully model human brains or how to replicate such models in computers. No one knows how brains and bodies could be simulated in computer software. No one knows how computer software could become self-aware. And yet Hughes can imagine a "scenario" in which all of this ignorance is dispelled based on what he thinks "should" or "may" or "presumably" will happen in thirty years!
Now, of course, there are ways that we can use biomedical technology to protect against mental disabilities. For example, we could completely eliminate the mental retardation from Down syndrome through genetic screening of embryos or other means so that parents could be sure that they would not have children born with an extra 21st chromosome. But although this would be an improvement in human life, it would not transcend human nature by moving us towards "posthuman" beings with superhuman intelligence.
When transhumanists like Hughes predict the coming of "posthuman" humans as the fulfillment of what they think "should" happen, they are expressing not scientific or philosophic reasoning from observable experience but a religious longing for transcendence. Hughes is a Buddhist, and he foresees that the transhuman future will fulfill his Buddhist vision of a "society of enlightened beings as an infinite net, laced with pearls and gems, each enlightened mind a multicolored twinkle that is reflected in every other jewel." Like Friedrich Nietzsche, the transhumanists profess an atheistic materialism, and yet they still yearn for religious transcendence, which drives them to project fantasies of "overmen" and "posthumans" who have escaped the limitations of human nature to enter a heavenly realm of pure thought and immortal bliss.
The transhumanists also ignore how the technology of human enhancement will likely be limited in its moral ends. Human beings act to satisfy their natural desires. The use of technology to enhance human life will be driven by these natural desires. Transhumanists implicitly assume the enduring power of these desires. But if that is the case, then it is hard to see how human nature is going to be abolished if the natural desires endure.
For example, Hughes speaks about "the human needs and desires these technologies will be asked to serve," which include the desires for long, healthy lives, for intelligence and happiness, and the desires for parents to care for the physical and mental flourishing of their children. (All of these desires are included in my list of "twenty natural desires" in Darwinian Conservatism.) But if human beings are always going to be moved by the same natural desires, how does this take us into "posthuman" existence?
If we were really going to enter the "posthuman" realm, we would have to create beings who lacked the natural desires of human beings and who felt no concern for human life as moved by such desires. Such creatures might be superintelligent. But they would also be superpsychopathic predators who would feel no guilt or shame in enslaving or exterminating human beings.
The transhumanists respond to this prospect by explaining that we will have to be careful to instill in these posthuman beings what Nick Bostrum calls "human-friendly values." Hughes explains that we will have to instill by technological devices "sociability and empathy for all sentient beings." For example, we might require the installation of "morality chips." Hughes is not troubled by the naive expectation that we can develop "morality chips" to control the posthumans without any harmful side-effects.
Even if we could solve the technical problems in reducing morality to a mere matter of mechanical engineering, we might still wonder why Hughes and the other transhumanists want to preserve human morality if their goal is an absolutely posthuman life. If human morality as rooted in the natural human desires is at the core of human nature, then posthumanity would require the abolition of that morality. If the posthumans are going to be moved by the same natural desires and moral emotions that have always moved human beings, then it would seem that human nature has survived.
As an alternative to the transhumanist stance, I would defend a libertarian conservatism rooted in human nature. I would argue for leaving people free to exercise individual choice in developing and using new technologies to meet human needs and desires. This would allow people to learn by trial and error what is desirable and what is not in the use of such technologies.
Some legal regulation of choice might be required to promote the minimal safety and efficacy of the new technologies and to protect people against force and fraud. But within such a modest regulatory regime, people would have freedom of choice.
The moral standard here would be that a technology is good if it promotes the flourishing of our human nature by satisfying our natural desires. We can best conform to that standard by allowing people free choice in satisfying their desires. Although there will be great diversity in the choices people make, there will be some enduring patterns in their choices that reflect the universality of natural human desires. For example, we can assume that the natural desire for parental care will generally motivate parents to use technology in ways that promote the happiness of their children.
My stance is close to the position taken by Ron Baily in his book Liberation Biology. But I depart from Bailey when he moves towards a transhumanist libertarianism that assumes that somehow human nature will be superseded by a new, superior form of life.
I welcome the prospect of technological changes in the human condition that will improve the physical and mental functions of life. But rather than expecting the emergence of a transhuman form of life, I foresee that human nature will not only endure but prevail.
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Leo Strauss, Darwinian Natural Right, and the Platonic Roots of Intelligent Design Theory
As I indicate in Darwinian Conservatism, the arguments for "intelligent design theory" as an alternative to Darwinian evolution were first stated in Book 10 of Plato's Laws. Leo Strauss's book on Plato's Laws raises questions about intelligent design in Plato's political theology. Those questions suggest the possibility that there might be a natural moral sense in at least some people that does not depend on the cosmic teleology of Plato's intelligent design theology. And if so, that suggests the possibility of justifying natural right as rooted in a moral sense of human nature shaped by natural evolution, which would not require an intelligent design theology.
In Plato's dialogue, the Athenian character warns against those natural philosophers who teach that the ultimate elements in the universe and the heavenly bodies were brought into being not by divine intelligence or art but by natural necessity and chance. These natural philosophers teach that the gods and the moral laws attributed to the gods are human inventions. This scientific naturalism appeared to subvert the religious order by teaching atheism. It appeared to subvert the moral order by teaching moral relativism. And it appeared to subvert the political order by depriving the laws of their religious and moral sanction. Plato's Athenian character responds to this threat by developing the reasoning for the intelligent design position as based on four kinds of arguments: a scientific argument, a religious argument, a moral argument, and a political argument.
His scientific argument is that the complex, functional order of the cosmos shows an intentional design by an intelligent agent that cannot be explained through the unintelligent causes of random contingency and natural necessity. His religious argument is that this intelligent designer must be a disembodied intelligence, which is God. His moral argument is that this divine designer is a moral lawgiver who supports human morality. His political argument is that to protect the political order against scientific atheism and immorality, lawgivers must promote the teaching of intelligent design as the alternative to scientific naturalism. Two thousand years later, William Jennings Bryan developed these same four arguments for intelligent design as superior to Darwinian naturalism. Recent intelligent design proponents such as Phillip Johnson, Michael Behe, and Bill Dembski have elaborated these same four arguments.
What's Strauss's position? Often it seems that Strauss and his students agree with Plato's intelligent design theology. They argue that natural right--as the alternative to moral relativism and nihilism--depends upon a cosmic teleology in which the cosmos has been intelligently designed to aim at certain ends that set the standards for natural right. And yet it sometimes seems that Strauss and his students regard this intelligent design teleology as only a "noble lie."
The latter is suggested by Strauss's book on the Laws. Strauss says that this is Plato's "only political work" and his "most pious work" (pp. 1-2). In Book 10, the Athenian character lays out the different classes of those guilty of impiety--those who deny the intelligent design theology--and indicates how they will be punished. Strauss notes that some of the atheists "have a character by nature good, hate the bad men, and through loathing injustice do not do wrong" (p. 155). Strauss then goes on to raise questions: "what happens to the atheist who is a just man and does not ridicule others because they sacrifice and pray and who to this extent is a dissembler? . . . One could say that he will become guilty if he frankly expresses his unbelief--but what if he expresses it only to sensible friends? Can one imagine Socrates denouncing him to the authorities?" (p. 156)
Does this imply that Socratic philosophers with "a character by nature good" could be good even without believing in the cosmic teleology of intelligent design theology? But if many people cannot be good without believing in the intelligent design theology, would the Socratic philosophers be obligated to dissemble by not openly declaring their atheism?
Why not then say that religion and intelligent design theology might be useful to reinforce morality, even though morality might be rooted in a natural moral sense for those without religous belief? Could that natural moral sense be a product of the natural evolution of the human species? That was Darwin's position, and I see no reason why it could not be adopted by conservatives as a sensible account of morality and religious belief. Conservatives could defend this as Darwinian natural right.
In Plato's dialogue, the Athenian character warns against those natural philosophers who teach that the ultimate elements in the universe and the heavenly bodies were brought into being not by divine intelligence or art but by natural necessity and chance. These natural philosophers teach that the gods and the moral laws attributed to the gods are human inventions. This scientific naturalism appeared to subvert the religious order by teaching atheism. It appeared to subvert the moral order by teaching moral relativism. And it appeared to subvert the political order by depriving the laws of their religious and moral sanction. Plato's Athenian character responds to this threat by developing the reasoning for the intelligent design position as based on four kinds of arguments: a scientific argument, a religious argument, a moral argument, and a political argument.
His scientific argument is that the complex, functional order of the cosmos shows an intentional design by an intelligent agent that cannot be explained through the unintelligent causes of random contingency and natural necessity. His religious argument is that this intelligent designer must be a disembodied intelligence, which is God. His moral argument is that this divine designer is a moral lawgiver who supports human morality. His political argument is that to protect the political order against scientific atheism and immorality, lawgivers must promote the teaching of intelligent design as the alternative to scientific naturalism. Two thousand years later, William Jennings Bryan developed these same four arguments for intelligent design as superior to Darwinian naturalism. Recent intelligent design proponents such as Phillip Johnson, Michael Behe, and Bill Dembski have elaborated these same four arguments.
What's Strauss's position? Often it seems that Strauss and his students agree with Plato's intelligent design theology. They argue that natural right--as the alternative to moral relativism and nihilism--depends upon a cosmic teleology in which the cosmos has been intelligently designed to aim at certain ends that set the standards for natural right. And yet it sometimes seems that Strauss and his students regard this intelligent design teleology as only a "noble lie."
The latter is suggested by Strauss's book on the Laws. Strauss says that this is Plato's "only political work" and his "most pious work" (pp. 1-2). In Book 10, the Athenian character lays out the different classes of those guilty of impiety--those who deny the intelligent design theology--and indicates how they will be punished. Strauss notes that some of the atheists "have a character by nature good, hate the bad men, and through loathing injustice do not do wrong" (p. 155). Strauss then goes on to raise questions: "what happens to the atheist who is a just man and does not ridicule others because they sacrifice and pray and who to this extent is a dissembler? . . . One could say that he will become guilty if he frankly expresses his unbelief--but what if he expresses it only to sensible friends? Can one imagine Socrates denouncing him to the authorities?" (p. 156)
Does this imply that Socratic philosophers with "a character by nature good" could be good even without believing in the cosmic teleology of intelligent design theology? But if many people cannot be good without believing in the intelligent design theology, would the Socratic philosophers be obligated to dissemble by not openly declaring their atheism?
Why not then say that religion and intelligent design theology might be useful to reinforce morality, even though morality might be rooted in a natural moral sense for those without religous belief? Could that natural moral sense be a product of the natural evolution of the human species? That was Darwin's position, and I see no reason why it could not be adopted by conservatives as a sensible account of morality and religious belief. Conservatives could defend this as Darwinian natural right.
A Review of Richard Weikart's FROM DARWIN TO HITLER
In Darwinian Conservatism, I have a long section criticizing Richard Weikart's book From Darwin to Hitler, which argues that Darwin's ideas prepared the way for Hitler and Nazism. I have also summarized some of my criticisms on this blog.
The Journal of Modern History(March 2006) has just published a review of Weikart's book by Ann Taylor Allen, a professor of history at the University of Louisville. Unfortunately, the review is not available online except to subscribers. (I am grateful to Ed Babinski of Furman University for bringing this review to my attention.)
Weikart's book was financed by the Discovery Institute as part of their "wedge strategy" for attacking Darwinian science as morally corrupting in its atheism. The book is now commonly cited by proponents of creationism and intelligent design as scholarly proof that there is a direct line of influence "from Darwin to Hitler." But as I have shown, Weikart doesn't actually show any direct connection between Darwin and Hitler. In fact, Weikart has responded to my criticisms by admitting that the title of his book is misleading, since he cannot show any direct link between Darwin's ideas and Hitler's Nazism.
Professor Allen confirms my criticisms. She agrees with me that Weikart's talk about "Darwinism" is not based on any careful reading of Darwin himself but on vague ideas by a variety of people who presented themselves as "Darwinian," although their thinking was not directly shaped by Darwin's ideas. She also agrees that some of the fundamental elements of Nazism--such as anti-Semitism--clearly cannot be attributed to Darwinism.
Weikart insists that the traditional "Judeo-Christian ethic" was opposed to Hitler and Nazism, but he ignores the importance of Christian anti-Semitism in Germany (beginning with Martin Luther) in shaping the cultural roots of Nazism.
Allen concludes her review:
"This picture of the Holocaust as the outcome of a 'culture war' between religion and science leads to serious distortions on both sides. The 'Judeo-Christian' worldview is unproblematically associated here with many beliefs--such as opposition to birth control, legalized abortion, and assisted suicide--that many believing Christians and Jews would reject. And 'Darwinism' is equated with a hodgepodge of ideas about race, politics, and social issues. If all these ideas were to fall into well-deserved obsolescence, this would in no way detract from the validity of Darwin's contributions to modern biological science. Neither religion nor science is well served by this oversimplified view of their complex history."
Recognizing Hitler's tyranny for what it is requires a natural moral sense. Darwinian science supports that moral sense by explaining how it expresses the evolved desires of the human animal. Such a moral sense as rooted in human biological nature is a crucial part of Darwinian conservatism.
Posts on related themes can be found here and here.
The Journal of Modern History(March 2006) has just published a review of Weikart's book by Ann Taylor Allen, a professor of history at the University of Louisville. Unfortunately, the review is not available online except to subscribers. (I am grateful to Ed Babinski of Furman University for bringing this review to my attention.)
Weikart's book was financed by the Discovery Institute as part of their "wedge strategy" for attacking Darwinian science as morally corrupting in its atheism. The book is now commonly cited by proponents of creationism and intelligent design as scholarly proof that there is a direct line of influence "from Darwin to Hitler." But as I have shown, Weikart doesn't actually show any direct connection between Darwin and Hitler. In fact, Weikart has responded to my criticisms by admitting that the title of his book is misleading, since he cannot show any direct link between Darwin's ideas and Hitler's Nazism.
Professor Allen confirms my criticisms. She agrees with me that Weikart's talk about "Darwinism" is not based on any careful reading of Darwin himself but on vague ideas by a variety of people who presented themselves as "Darwinian," although their thinking was not directly shaped by Darwin's ideas. She also agrees that some of the fundamental elements of Nazism--such as anti-Semitism--clearly cannot be attributed to Darwinism.
Weikart insists that the traditional "Judeo-Christian ethic" was opposed to Hitler and Nazism, but he ignores the importance of Christian anti-Semitism in Germany (beginning with Martin Luther) in shaping the cultural roots of Nazism.
Allen concludes her review:
"This picture of the Holocaust as the outcome of a 'culture war' between religion and science leads to serious distortions on both sides. The 'Judeo-Christian' worldview is unproblematically associated here with many beliefs--such as opposition to birth control, legalized abortion, and assisted suicide--that many believing Christians and Jews would reject. And 'Darwinism' is equated with a hodgepodge of ideas about race, politics, and social issues. If all these ideas were to fall into well-deserved obsolescence, this would in no way detract from the validity of Darwin's contributions to modern biological science. Neither religion nor science is well served by this oversimplified view of their complex history."
Recognizing Hitler's tyranny for what it is requires a natural moral sense. Darwinian science supports that moral sense by explaining how it expresses the evolved desires of the human animal. Such a moral sense as rooted in human biological nature is a crucial part of Darwinian conservatism.
Posts on related themes can be found here and here.
Monday, February 20, 2006
Fukuyama, The Iraq War, and Darwinian Conservatism
In my book Darwinian Conservatism, I say very little about international relations and foreign policy. Francis Fukuyama's article in The New York Times Magazine(February 19)on neoconservatism and the Iraq war indicates to me the kind of foreign policy that would be supported by Darwinian conservatism. Although Fukuyama would not identify himself as a Darwinian conservative, Carson Holloway does identify him--along with James Q. Wilson and me--as a Darwinian conservative, and thus an object of his attack.
Fukuyama announces in this article that he can no longer consider himself a neoconservative, because he disagrees with the neoconservative foreign policy that supported the American invasion of Iraq. He agrees with the neoconservatives that American foreign policy should advance the ideals of democratic liberty. But he does not think that the unilateral and preemptive use of force in Iraq is a good means to achieve that end. More generally, he accuses the neoconservatives of discarding what he thought was originally fundamental to the neoconservative position--a realistic suspicion that grand social engineering can work without undesirable and unintended side effects. In Iraq, American forces are attempting to impose a new democratic regime as a massive project in social engineering, and Fukuyama regards this as naively utopian.
I agree with Fukuyama, and I think his major points conform to my arguments for Darwinian conservatism on at least four points.
First, I agree with Fukuyama's "end of history" argument insofar as this means that liberal democratic capitalism has a universal appeal to human beings because it satisfies the 20 natural desires that constitute the motivational core of human nature. I also agree, however, with Fukuyama's claim that the Bush neoconservatives are mistaken in thinking that the "end of history" is best achieved by preemptive wars of democratic imperialism. Rather, this will be achieved only gradually over a long period of time as people around the world are attracted by the success of the Western liberal democratic regimes.
Second, I agree with Fukuyama that the "end of history" does not mean the end of war or conflict. One of the 20 natural desires is the desire for war to defend one's society against others. The tendency to in-group/out-group behavior is so deep that there is no reason to think that the "end of history" will bring perpetual peace.
Third, I agree with Fukuyama that social order arises not just from a universal human nature but also from cultural traditions and deliberate choices. Consequently, the 20 natural desires of human beings will be diversely expressed in different societies based on the local traditions and choices of each society. So although liberal democratic capitalism should have a universal appeal because it fosters the satisfaction of natural human desires, we should expect that the particular social orders around the world will develop in unique ways to express the traditions and choices of each people. The Darwinian emergence of social order is a complex interaction between natural selection, cultural selection, and deliberate choice. So if an Islamic democracy does emerge in Iraq, it will do so through a long period of social evolution and particular choices that cannot be planned out according to some rational design given them by Americans.
Finally, I agree with Fukuyama's fundamental point that the democratic imperialism of the neoconservatives is utopian, because it ignores human imperfectibility. To assume that we can design liberal democratic regimes for every society and enforce our designs by force assumes more knowledge and virtue than human beings have. When George Bush proclaims--as he did in his Second Inaugural Address--that American foreign policy will have "the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world," he adopts a utopian idealism that is contrary to the conservative principle of the imperfectibility of human nature. In that Second Inaugural, Bush did go on to say that freedom cannot be imposed by force of arms because freedom must be chosen by every people, who will adopt institutions that "reflect customs and traditions very different from our own." But that prudent stance is denied by the democratic imperialism that Bush and the neoconservatives have adopted in Iraq.
Fukuyama announces in this article that he can no longer consider himself a neoconservative, because he disagrees with the neoconservative foreign policy that supported the American invasion of Iraq. He agrees with the neoconservatives that American foreign policy should advance the ideals of democratic liberty. But he does not think that the unilateral and preemptive use of force in Iraq is a good means to achieve that end. More generally, he accuses the neoconservatives of discarding what he thought was originally fundamental to the neoconservative position--a realistic suspicion that grand social engineering can work without undesirable and unintended side effects. In Iraq, American forces are attempting to impose a new democratic regime as a massive project in social engineering, and Fukuyama regards this as naively utopian.
I agree with Fukuyama, and I think his major points conform to my arguments for Darwinian conservatism on at least four points.
First, I agree with Fukuyama's "end of history" argument insofar as this means that liberal democratic capitalism has a universal appeal to human beings because it satisfies the 20 natural desires that constitute the motivational core of human nature. I also agree, however, with Fukuyama's claim that the Bush neoconservatives are mistaken in thinking that the "end of history" is best achieved by preemptive wars of democratic imperialism. Rather, this will be achieved only gradually over a long period of time as people around the world are attracted by the success of the Western liberal democratic regimes.
Second, I agree with Fukuyama that the "end of history" does not mean the end of war or conflict. One of the 20 natural desires is the desire for war to defend one's society against others. The tendency to in-group/out-group behavior is so deep that there is no reason to think that the "end of history" will bring perpetual peace.
Third, I agree with Fukuyama that social order arises not just from a universal human nature but also from cultural traditions and deliberate choices. Consequently, the 20 natural desires of human beings will be diversely expressed in different societies based on the local traditions and choices of each society. So although liberal democratic capitalism should have a universal appeal because it fosters the satisfaction of natural human desires, we should expect that the particular social orders around the world will develop in unique ways to express the traditions and choices of each people. The Darwinian emergence of social order is a complex interaction between natural selection, cultural selection, and deliberate choice. So if an Islamic democracy does emerge in Iraq, it will do so through a long period of social evolution and particular choices that cannot be planned out according to some rational design given them by Americans.
Finally, I agree with Fukuyama's fundamental point that the democratic imperialism of the neoconservatives is utopian, because it ignores human imperfectibility. To assume that we can design liberal democratic regimes for every society and enforce our designs by force assumes more knowledge and virtue than human beings have. When George Bush proclaims--as he did in his Second Inaugural Address--that American foreign policy will have "the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world," he adopts a utopian idealism that is contrary to the conservative principle of the imperfectibility of human nature. In that Second Inaugural, Bush did go on to say that freedom cannot be imposed by force of arms because freedom must be chosen by every people, who will adopt institutions that "reflect customs and traditions very different from our own." But that prudent stance is denied by the democratic imperialism that Bush and the neoconservatives have adopted in Iraq.
Thursday, February 16, 2006
Darwinian Libertarianism: A Reply to David Gordon
David Gordon has written a review of Darwinian Conservatism for The Mises Review (the winter 2005 issue), which is published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Unfortunately, this issue is not yet available at the website for the Mises Institute.
Gordon praises the book as "valuable" and "provocative," and he urges his readers to read it. As a libertarian, he is pleased that I defend libertarian principles of private property and limited government. He generally agrees with my argument that leftist programs tend to go against human nature.
But he also suggests some possible objections to my position. The first objection is that Darwinism does not add much to what we already know about human nature. "Did we not know, long before Darwin, that human beings have a nature? Must we appeal to speculations about the behavior of baboons and chimpanzees to justify our acceptance of obvious truths?"
In response, I would stress that my Darwinian conservatism provides support for the natural-law libertarianism of Murray Rothbard. As far back as 1983, I began talking with Rothbard, and he was enthusiastic about my idea that Darwinian science could sustain an ethics of natural law. In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard rooted his libertarian ethics in "the natural laws of the human organism" (1982, p. 32). In Economic Thought Before Adam Smith, Rothbard explained: "Natural law sees ethics as living-entity- (or species-) relative. What is good for cabbages will differ from what is good for rabbits, which in turn will differ from what is good or bad for man. The ethic for each species will differ according to their respective natures" (p. 4). He elaborated his ethics of liberty as founded in the natural inclinations of the human animal. Darwinian conservatism provides a biological account of those natural inclinations and of how they sustain a natural moral sense.
Human nature and natural inclinations as the ground of ethics might be "obvious" to Gordon. But Rothbard indicated that intellectuals commonly reject the idea of human nature and of ethics as rooted in natural inclinations. So it seems important to me to show how Darwinian science confirms Rothbard's natural-law libertarianism.
Gordon's second objection is that appealing to human nature in arguments against the statist left are not very useful if the limits of human nature are so broad that leftist programs cannot be rejected as absolutely impossible. But of course the same point could be made about any libertarian argument. When libertarians like Mises and Hayek argue against socialism, they cannot show that socialism is absolutely impossible. But they can show that the human costs of socialism are high because it denies the imperfectibility of human nature. Darwinian conservatism reinforces that argument by indicating how that limited human nature arises from human biology.
Gordon's third objection arises from his acceptance of the fact-value distinction and his belief that rooting morality in natural moral emotions cannot explain "moral obligation." Like Adam Smith, David Hume, and Charles Darwin, I believe that morality is ultimately grounded in moral emotions or sentiments. Our feeling of obligation--that we ought or ought not to do something--really is a feeling or emotion, and our morality ultimately depends upon those moral emotions of the human mind as shaped by natural evolution to be part of human nature. That's why I agree with Rothbard that what is good is relative to each species. If human nature were radically different from what it is, human morality would be different.
By contrast, Gordon believes that "moral obligation" requires a "direct perception of something" that is beyond the natural world. My only response to that is to ask him to explain and defend the idea that there is another world beyond the natural world, that moral norms are found in that other world, and that those transcendent moral norms somehow enter our natural world. He might then have to defend Kant's appeal to the "noumental" world of the "moral ought" beyond the observable world of nature. Such a radically dualistic metaphysics makes no sense to me. And I am not persuaded that a transcendentalist libertarianism would be superior to Rothbard's naturalistic libertarianism.
Gordon praises the book as "valuable" and "provocative," and he urges his readers to read it. As a libertarian, he is pleased that I defend libertarian principles of private property and limited government. He generally agrees with my argument that leftist programs tend to go against human nature.
But he also suggests some possible objections to my position. The first objection is that Darwinism does not add much to what we already know about human nature. "Did we not know, long before Darwin, that human beings have a nature? Must we appeal to speculations about the behavior of baboons and chimpanzees to justify our acceptance of obvious truths?"
In response, I would stress that my Darwinian conservatism provides support for the natural-law libertarianism of Murray Rothbard. As far back as 1983, I began talking with Rothbard, and he was enthusiastic about my idea that Darwinian science could sustain an ethics of natural law. In The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard rooted his libertarian ethics in "the natural laws of the human organism" (1982, p. 32). In Economic Thought Before Adam Smith, Rothbard explained: "Natural law sees ethics as living-entity- (or species-) relative. What is good for cabbages will differ from what is good for rabbits, which in turn will differ from what is good or bad for man. The ethic for each species will differ according to their respective natures" (p. 4). He elaborated his ethics of liberty as founded in the natural inclinations of the human animal. Darwinian conservatism provides a biological account of those natural inclinations and of how they sustain a natural moral sense.
Human nature and natural inclinations as the ground of ethics might be "obvious" to Gordon. But Rothbard indicated that intellectuals commonly reject the idea of human nature and of ethics as rooted in natural inclinations. So it seems important to me to show how Darwinian science confirms Rothbard's natural-law libertarianism.
Gordon's second objection is that appealing to human nature in arguments against the statist left are not very useful if the limits of human nature are so broad that leftist programs cannot be rejected as absolutely impossible. But of course the same point could be made about any libertarian argument. When libertarians like Mises and Hayek argue against socialism, they cannot show that socialism is absolutely impossible. But they can show that the human costs of socialism are high because it denies the imperfectibility of human nature. Darwinian conservatism reinforces that argument by indicating how that limited human nature arises from human biology.
Gordon's third objection arises from his acceptance of the fact-value distinction and his belief that rooting morality in natural moral emotions cannot explain "moral obligation." Like Adam Smith, David Hume, and Charles Darwin, I believe that morality is ultimately grounded in moral emotions or sentiments. Our feeling of obligation--that we ought or ought not to do something--really is a feeling or emotion, and our morality ultimately depends upon those moral emotions of the human mind as shaped by natural evolution to be part of human nature. That's why I agree with Rothbard that what is good is relative to each species. If human nature were radically different from what it is, human morality would be different.
By contrast, Gordon believes that "moral obligation" requires a "direct perception of something" that is beyond the natural world. My only response to that is to ask him to explain and defend the idea that there is another world beyond the natural world, that moral norms are found in that other world, and that those transcendent moral norms somehow enter our natural world. He might then have to defend Kant's appeal to the "noumental" world of the "moral ought" beyond the observable world of nature. Such a radically dualistic metaphysics makes no sense to me. And I am not persuaded that a transcendentalist libertarianism would be superior to Rothbard's naturalistic libertarianism.
Wednesday, February 08, 2006
Abraham Lincoln and Charles Darwin
On February 12, 1809, Abraham Lincoln was born in Hardin County, Kentucky; and Charles Darwin was born in Shrewsbury, England.
The coincidence of their being born on the same day might lead us to think about other points of similarity in their lives.
William Herndon was Lincoln's friend and law partner, and he wrote one of the best biographies of Lincoln. He says that he gave Lincoln a copy of Robert Chambers' book Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which was first published in 1844. Chambers set forth a theory of evolution that Darwin later acknowledged as a forerunner of his theory. Chambers' book created a great controversy, because many people saw it as denying the role of God as Creator of the universe. According to Herndon, Lincoln was persuaded to adopt this new theory of evolution, because it confirmed his belief that everything in the universe must occur by natural causes. So it seems that Lincoln and Darwin were in agreement in their scientific naturalism and evolutionary views.
Because of their reliance on scientific explanation, both Lincoln and Darwin were accused by some people of promoting atheism by denying the doctrine of Creation. According to Herndon, Lincoln as a young man wrote a book against Christianity arguing that the Bible was not divinely inspired and that Jesus was not the son of God. He was warned by his friends that it was dangerous to make such arguments in public.
In 1846, Lincoln was running for election to Congress, and he had to answer the charge that he was an "infidel." In his written response, he acknowledged that he had never been a member of any Christian church. But he insisted that he had never openly promoted disrespect for Christianity. He conceded that he had defended--in private with a few friends--the "doctrine of necessity" that the human mind is determined by causal necessity beyond its control. But he thought some Christian denominations defended the same doctrine. Moreover, he wrote: "I do not think I could myself be brought to support a man for office, whom I knew to be an open enemy of, and scoffer at, religion. Leaving the higher matter of eternal consequences, between him and his Maker, I still do not think any man has the right thus to insult the feelings, and injure the morals, of the community in which he may live."
Lincoln often spoke as if God as Creator must be the First Cause of the universe, and he also commonly invoked the Bible as a source of moral teaching. And yet he also appealed to a natural "moral sense" inherent in human nature, which suggested a natural morality that did not depend on biblical doctrine.
One manifest expression of the "moral sense," according to Lincoln, was the moral feeling against slavery. To reinforce this moral feeling that slavery was unjust, Lincoln would quote the scriptural doctrine of human beings as created in God's image and the scriptural teaching of the golden rule. He did this despite the fact that the pro-slavery Christians in the American South quoted the specific passages on slavery in the Bible as supporting slavery.
On all of these points, Darwin took similar positions. Although he began life as an orthodox Christian, he eventually reached a point of being a skeptic or agnostic. He was particularly disturbed by the unmerited suffering of human beings--such as his child Annie, who died when she was 10 years old--as casting doubt on the existence of an all-good God. And yet he acknowledged that the First Cause of the universe was a mystery pointing to the existence of God. In his published writings, he regularly acknowledged that evolution might depend ultimately on the laws that the Creator had impressed on matter.
Darwin also agreed with Lincoln in seeing morality as rooted in a natural "moral sense." Although this natural morality could stand on its own, it could also be reinforced by biblical morality. Like Lincoln, Darwin saw the Bible's teaching of the golden rule as confirming the ultimate principle of natural morality.
Darwin was also a fervent critic of slavery as contrary to the natural moral sense. Against the scientific racists who argued that the human races were actually separate species, Darwin laid out the evidence for the universal traits shared by all human races as members of the same species.
On all of these points, Lincoln and Darwin support what I have defended in Darwinian Conservatism. We can explain the natural order of the universe as a product of natural evolutionary causes. But if we ask about the First Causes of Nature itself, we face a mystery that points to God as Creator. There is a natural moral sense that allows us to make moral judgments independently of any religious beliefs. And yet Biblical religion can reinforce natural morality by appeal to God as the moral lawgiver. Moreover, religion generally can have beneficial social effects because it helps people to cooperate more effectively by promoting social trust among the believers.
On all of these points, conservatives should see Darwinian science as confirming their principles of ordered liberty as rooted in traditional morality and religious belief. Many religious conservatives object to what they assume is the atheistic teaching of Darwinism, and that's why many of them support "scientific creationism" or "intelligent design theory" as alternatives to Darwinian science. But this ignores the possible compatibility of evolution and religion. In fact, as I argue in my book, there are many theistic evolutionists. And there is no clear evidence that Darwinism has converted people to atheism. (A good survey of the effects of evolution on religious belief can be found in a lecture by Ronald Numbers.)
These are some of the topics we might ponder as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln and Charles Darwin.
The coincidence of their being born on the same day might lead us to think about other points of similarity in their lives.
William Herndon was Lincoln's friend and law partner, and he wrote one of the best biographies of Lincoln. He says that he gave Lincoln a copy of Robert Chambers' book Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which was first published in 1844. Chambers set forth a theory of evolution that Darwin later acknowledged as a forerunner of his theory. Chambers' book created a great controversy, because many people saw it as denying the role of God as Creator of the universe. According to Herndon, Lincoln was persuaded to adopt this new theory of evolution, because it confirmed his belief that everything in the universe must occur by natural causes. So it seems that Lincoln and Darwin were in agreement in their scientific naturalism and evolutionary views.
Because of their reliance on scientific explanation, both Lincoln and Darwin were accused by some people of promoting atheism by denying the doctrine of Creation. According to Herndon, Lincoln as a young man wrote a book against Christianity arguing that the Bible was not divinely inspired and that Jesus was not the son of God. He was warned by his friends that it was dangerous to make such arguments in public.
In 1846, Lincoln was running for election to Congress, and he had to answer the charge that he was an "infidel." In his written response, he acknowledged that he had never been a member of any Christian church. But he insisted that he had never openly promoted disrespect for Christianity. He conceded that he had defended--in private with a few friends--the "doctrine of necessity" that the human mind is determined by causal necessity beyond its control. But he thought some Christian denominations defended the same doctrine. Moreover, he wrote: "I do not think I could myself be brought to support a man for office, whom I knew to be an open enemy of, and scoffer at, religion. Leaving the higher matter of eternal consequences, between him and his Maker, I still do not think any man has the right thus to insult the feelings, and injure the morals, of the community in which he may live."
Lincoln often spoke as if God as Creator must be the First Cause of the universe, and he also commonly invoked the Bible as a source of moral teaching. And yet he also appealed to a natural "moral sense" inherent in human nature, which suggested a natural morality that did not depend on biblical doctrine.
One manifest expression of the "moral sense," according to Lincoln, was the moral feeling against slavery. To reinforce this moral feeling that slavery was unjust, Lincoln would quote the scriptural doctrine of human beings as created in God's image and the scriptural teaching of the golden rule. He did this despite the fact that the pro-slavery Christians in the American South quoted the specific passages on slavery in the Bible as supporting slavery.
On all of these points, Darwin took similar positions. Although he began life as an orthodox Christian, he eventually reached a point of being a skeptic or agnostic. He was particularly disturbed by the unmerited suffering of human beings--such as his child Annie, who died when she was 10 years old--as casting doubt on the existence of an all-good God. And yet he acknowledged that the First Cause of the universe was a mystery pointing to the existence of God. In his published writings, he regularly acknowledged that evolution might depend ultimately on the laws that the Creator had impressed on matter.
Darwin also agreed with Lincoln in seeing morality as rooted in a natural "moral sense." Although this natural morality could stand on its own, it could also be reinforced by biblical morality. Like Lincoln, Darwin saw the Bible's teaching of the golden rule as confirming the ultimate principle of natural morality.
Darwin was also a fervent critic of slavery as contrary to the natural moral sense. Against the scientific racists who argued that the human races were actually separate species, Darwin laid out the evidence for the universal traits shared by all human races as members of the same species.
On all of these points, Lincoln and Darwin support what I have defended in Darwinian Conservatism. We can explain the natural order of the universe as a product of natural evolutionary causes. But if we ask about the First Causes of Nature itself, we face a mystery that points to God as Creator. There is a natural moral sense that allows us to make moral judgments independently of any religious beliefs. And yet Biblical religion can reinforce natural morality by appeal to God as the moral lawgiver. Moreover, religion generally can have beneficial social effects because it helps people to cooperate more effectively by promoting social trust among the believers.
On all of these points, conservatives should see Darwinian science as confirming their principles of ordered liberty as rooted in traditional morality and religious belief. Many religious conservatives object to what they assume is the atheistic teaching of Darwinism, and that's why many of them support "scientific creationism" or "intelligent design theory" as alternatives to Darwinian science. But this ignores the possible compatibility of evolution and religion. In fact, as I argue in my book, there are many theistic evolutionists. And there is no clear evidence that Darwinism has converted people to atheism. (A good survey of the effects of evolution on religious belief can be found in a lecture by Ronald Numbers.)
These are some of the topics we might ponder as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln and Charles Darwin.
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Leo Strauss, Charles Darwin, and Natural Right
Those influenced by Leo Strauss cannot agree on how to solve what he identified as the fundamental problem of natural right. The problem is that the ancient Aristotelian idea of natural right seems to depend on a teleological conception of the universe that has been refuted by modern natural science.
I have argued--in Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism--that a Darwinian natural science can support an Aristotelian conception of natural right. But many, if not most, of those under Strauss's influence would reject this position, because they believe that Darwinism must deny the fundamental premises of natural right in denying the uniqueness of human beings as set apart from the rest of animal nature and in denying the cosmic teleology that sustains human purposefulness.
In the Introduction to Natural Right and History, Strauss claimed that the most serious problem for the ancient Greek idea of natural right is that it seems to have been refuted by modern natural science. Natural right in its classic form requires a teleological view of nature, because reason can discern what is by nature good for human beings only if they have a natural end. Strauss thought Aristotle had the clearest view of this dependence of natural right on natural teleology. Modern natural science, however, seems to deny natural teleology by explaining natural phenomena as determined by mechanical causes that act without ends or purposes. This creates a dilemma. If the science of man is to be a part of a nonteleological science of nature, then human action must be explained by reduction to physical impusles, which seems inadequate to explain human ends. The only alternative appears to be "a fundamental, typically modern, dualism of a nonteleological natural science and a teleological science of man," but this rejects the comprehensive naturalism of the premodern exponents of natural right such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Neither reductionism nor dualism is fully satisfactory.
Strauss concluded: "The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved." "Needless to say," Strauss then added, "the present lectures cannot deal with this problem," because the lectures published as Natural Right and History are "limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences."
The two unsatisfactory alternatives identified by Strauss are what I would call "reductionist monism" and "transcendentalist dualism." According to reductionist monism, everything should be ultimately reducible to physical mechanism. But this cannot adequately explain the evident purposefulness of human thought and action. According to transcendentalist dualism, human beings are uniquely free as spiritual beings to transcend the nonteleological realm of natural causes. But this typically modern dualism denies us the comprehensive science that we need to make the whole intelligible as a whole. Strauss sometimes spoke of a "dualism of the sciences: the sciences of nature and the sciences of man as man" as a "convenient practical solution." But he regarded this as only "provisionally indispensable," because he thought the final goal should be a "comprehensive science."
As an escape from this dilemma that would move towards a "comprehensive science," my conception of "Darwinian natural right" rests on what I would call "emergentist naturalism." Unlike the transcendentalist dualist, I recognize the continuity of nature and the integration of human beings within the natural order. Unlike the reductionist monist, I recognize the irreducible complexity of nature in which novel properties emerge at higher levels of organization that cannot be reduced to lower levels, so that the uniqueness of human beings comes from the emergent properties that distinguish the human species--most notably, the size and complexity of the frontal lobes of the human brain as a product of primate evolution. I have elaborated this point in Darwinian Conservatism in the chapter on "emergence."
Strauss recognized that the ultimate source of the modern dualistic separation of nature and culture is Hobbes., Despite the monism of Hobbes's materialism, his political teaching presupposes a dualistic opposition between animal nature and human will or reason: in creating political order, human beings use their rational will to transcend and conquer nature. This Hobbesian dualism was explicitly developed by Kant, who originally formulated the modern concept of culture as that uniquely human realm of artifice in which human beings escape their natural animality to express their rational humanity as the only beings who have a "supersensible faculty" for moral freedom. Through culture, human beings free themselves from the laws of nature.
To overcome the intellectual crisis created by this Hobbesian-Kantian dualism, Strauss hoped for a comprehensive science of nature that would reconcile modern natural science and Aristotelian natural right. But he was resigned to accepting a dualism between nature and humanity until his hope for a comprehensive science could be fulfilled.
One reason for why Strauss found dualism unsatisfactory is that it was one of the fundamental themes in Martin Heidegger's philosophic endorsement of Nazism. Arguing against "biologism," which treats human beings as rational animals rooted in the natural world, Heidegger believed that National Socialism would vindicate the spiritual freedom of the German people as "world-building" historical beings who transcend their natural animality. This dichotomy between the freedom of human history and the determinism of animal nature supported Heidegger's historicist nihilism as unconstrained by natural right.
In contrast to such dualistic separation between humanity and nature, I argue for the sort of comprehensive science that Strauss sought as manifested in a scientific naturalism rooted in Darwinian evolution. In such a science, morality could be studied scientifically as an expression of natural moral sentiments, which are natural in the sense that normal human beings in normal circumstances are born with natural propensities to learn the moral emotions necessary for living as social animals. And yet the specific content of moral rules will vary according to individual temperament and social circumstances. Judging what is right for particular people in particular situations will require practical judgment or prudence. This way of understanding the science of morality as part of a comprehensive science of nature would seem to come close to what Strauss sought.
Unfortunately, such serious topics raised by Strauss have been obscured recently by the silly journalistic commentary on the political influence of Strauss in American government. Now there is even some reporting about the Straussians
invading Canada! The opponents of the Straussian conspiracy in Canada are led by Shadia Drury, who once told a friend of mine that I was the only "reasonable" Straussian. Hmm . . .
I have written a series of posts on teleology. The links can be found here.
I have argued--in Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism--that a Darwinian natural science can support an Aristotelian conception of natural right. But many, if not most, of those under Strauss's influence would reject this position, because they believe that Darwinism must deny the fundamental premises of natural right in denying the uniqueness of human beings as set apart from the rest of animal nature and in denying the cosmic teleology that sustains human purposefulness.
In the Introduction to Natural Right and History, Strauss claimed that the most serious problem for the ancient Greek idea of natural right is that it seems to have been refuted by modern natural science. Natural right in its classic form requires a teleological view of nature, because reason can discern what is by nature good for human beings only if they have a natural end. Strauss thought Aristotle had the clearest view of this dependence of natural right on natural teleology. Modern natural science, however, seems to deny natural teleology by explaining natural phenomena as determined by mechanical causes that act without ends or purposes. This creates a dilemma. If the science of man is to be a part of a nonteleological science of nature, then human action must be explained by reduction to physical impusles, which seems inadequate to explain human ends. The only alternative appears to be "a fundamental, typically modern, dualism of a nonteleological natural science and a teleological science of man," but this rejects the comprehensive naturalism of the premodern exponents of natural right such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Neither reductionism nor dualism is fully satisfactory.
Strauss concluded: "The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved." "Needless to say," Strauss then added, "the present lectures cannot deal with this problem," because the lectures published as Natural Right and History are "limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences."
The two unsatisfactory alternatives identified by Strauss are what I would call "reductionist monism" and "transcendentalist dualism." According to reductionist monism, everything should be ultimately reducible to physical mechanism. But this cannot adequately explain the evident purposefulness of human thought and action. According to transcendentalist dualism, human beings are uniquely free as spiritual beings to transcend the nonteleological realm of natural causes. But this typically modern dualism denies us the comprehensive science that we need to make the whole intelligible as a whole. Strauss sometimes spoke of a "dualism of the sciences: the sciences of nature and the sciences of man as man" as a "convenient practical solution." But he regarded this as only "provisionally indispensable," because he thought the final goal should be a "comprehensive science."
As an escape from this dilemma that would move towards a "comprehensive science," my conception of "Darwinian natural right" rests on what I would call "emergentist naturalism." Unlike the transcendentalist dualist, I recognize the continuity of nature and the integration of human beings within the natural order. Unlike the reductionist monist, I recognize the irreducible complexity of nature in which novel properties emerge at higher levels of organization that cannot be reduced to lower levels, so that the uniqueness of human beings comes from the emergent properties that distinguish the human species--most notably, the size and complexity of the frontal lobes of the human brain as a product of primate evolution. I have elaborated this point in Darwinian Conservatism in the chapter on "emergence."
Strauss recognized that the ultimate source of the modern dualistic separation of nature and culture is Hobbes., Despite the monism of Hobbes's materialism, his political teaching presupposes a dualistic opposition between animal nature and human will or reason: in creating political order, human beings use their rational will to transcend and conquer nature. This Hobbesian dualism was explicitly developed by Kant, who originally formulated the modern concept of culture as that uniquely human realm of artifice in which human beings escape their natural animality to express their rational humanity as the only beings who have a "supersensible faculty" for moral freedom. Through culture, human beings free themselves from the laws of nature.
To overcome the intellectual crisis created by this Hobbesian-Kantian dualism, Strauss hoped for a comprehensive science of nature that would reconcile modern natural science and Aristotelian natural right. But he was resigned to accepting a dualism between nature and humanity until his hope for a comprehensive science could be fulfilled.
One reason for why Strauss found dualism unsatisfactory is that it was one of the fundamental themes in Martin Heidegger's philosophic endorsement of Nazism. Arguing against "biologism," which treats human beings as rational animals rooted in the natural world, Heidegger believed that National Socialism would vindicate the spiritual freedom of the German people as "world-building" historical beings who transcend their natural animality. This dichotomy between the freedom of human history and the determinism of animal nature supported Heidegger's historicist nihilism as unconstrained by natural right.
In contrast to such dualistic separation between humanity and nature, I argue for the sort of comprehensive science that Strauss sought as manifested in a scientific naturalism rooted in Darwinian evolution. In such a science, morality could be studied scientifically as an expression of natural moral sentiments, which are natural in the sense that normal human beings in normal circumstances are born with natural propensities to learn the moral emotions necessary for living as social animals. And yet the specific content of moral rules will vary according to individual temperament and social circumstances. Judging what is right for particular people in particular situations will require practical judgment or prudence. This way of understanding the science of morality as part of a comprehensive science of nature would seem to come close to what Strauss sought.
Unfortunately, such serious topics raised by Strauss have been obscured recently by the silly journalistic commentary on the political influence of Strauss in American government. Now there is even some reporting about the Straussians
invading Canada! The opponents of the Straussian conspiracy in Canada are led by Shadia Drury, who once told a friend of mine that I was the only "reasonable" Straussian. Hmm . . .
I have written a series of posts on teleology. The links can be found here.
Friday, January 27, 2006
The Dangers of Democracy
The landslide victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections exposes the mistake of the Bush administration in promoting democracy as the solution to problems in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Darwinian conservatives are committed not to pure democracy but to limited government. A Darwinian view of imperfect human nature suggests that no one is to be trusted with unchecked power, even when that power has been conferred by popular election. To secure ordered liberty, we need a system of balanced government under the rule of law based on the principle of countervailing power so that power checks power.
By contrast, Bush and the neoconservatives have adopted a utopian view of democracy based on popular sovereignty as the solution to the world's problems. But what happens when a majority of the people elect Islamic terrorists as their rulers? If pure democracy is our only standard for good government, we cannot object. But if limited and balanced government is our standard, then we can condemn pure democracy when it does not prescribe that power is to be limited and balanced.
The foolishness of embracing pure democracy through majoritarian rule is also evident in the neoconservative advocacy of presidential leadership acting outside the rule of law to exercise "wise discretion" in response to emergencies. To assume that a popularly elected president should be free to act outside the law for what he judges to be the public good is to assume a utopian view of human nature that ignores the corrupting effects of giving unchecked power to ambitious rulers.
Darwinian conservatives are committed not to pure democracy but to limited government. A Darwinian view of imperfect human nature suggests that no one is to be trusted with unchecked power, even when that power has been conferred by popular election. To secure ordered liberty, we need a system of balanced government under the rule of law based on the principle of countervailing power so that power checks power.
By contrast, Bush and the neoconservatives have adopted a utopian view of democracy based on popular sovereignty as the solution to the world's problems. But what happens when a majority of the people elect Islamic terrorists as their rulers? If pure democracy is our only standard for good government, we cannot object. But if limited and balanced government is our standard, then we can condemn pure democracy when it does not prescribe that power is to be limited and balanced.
The foolishness of embracing pure democracy through majoritarian rule is also evident in the neoconservative advocacy of presidential leadership acting outside the rule of law to exercise "wise discretion" in response to emergencies. To assume that a popularly elected president should be free to act outside the law for what he judges to be the public good is to assume a utopian view of human nature that ignores the corrupting effects of giving unchecked power to ambitious rulers.
Saturday, January 21, 2006
Stephen Barr's "The Miracle of Evolution"
In Darwinian Conservatism, I argue that there is no necessary conflict between biblical religion and Darwinian evolution. Darwin employed the metaphor of God as speaking through two books--the Bible as His word and nature as His works--which was commonly used by Christians to justify the scientific study of nature as compatible with reverence for the revelation of Scripture.
All explanation depends ultimately on some ground that cannot itself be explained. Natural science ultimately relies on the laws of nature to explain the observable world of ordinary human experience. But if we ask why nature is lawful in this way, the naturalist has no answer except to say, that's just the way it is! The biblical believer will appeal to God as the Creator of nature. But if we ask why God is the way He is, the believer has no answer except to say, that's just the way He is. We must ultimately rely either on an uncaused nature or on an uncaused God. Even if Darwinian naturalism could explain the emergence of all life through natural evolutionary causes, that would still leave open the possibility that God as Creator of nature chose to work His will through such natural causes.
In the February issue of FIRST THINGS, physicist Stephen Barr has an article with the title "The Miracle of Evolution." Barr agrees with me that Darwinian evolution does not necessarily deny biblical religion. This is significant because generally the people at FIRST THINGS--a leading journal of the religious conservatives--have agreed with the proponents of "intelligent design theory" in assuming that Darwinian evolution must be atheistic. Oddly enough, such conservatives agree with atheists like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett on this point. But Barr points out that the declarations of atheists like Dawkins and Dennett express a philosophical commitment to atheism that has no necessary grounding in natural science.
In his last paragraph, Barr writes:
"If biology remains only biology, it is not to be feared. Much of the fear that does exist is rooted in the notion that God is in competition with nature, so that the more we attribute to one the less we can attribute to the other. That is false. The greater the powers and potentialities in nature, the more magnificent must be nature's far-sighted Author, that God whose 'ways are unsearchable' and who 'reaches from end to end ordering all things mightily.' Richard Dawkins famously called the universe 'a blind watchmaker.' If it is, it is a miracle enough for anyone; for it is incomparably greater to design a watchmaker than a watch. We need not pit evolution against design, if we recognize that evolution is part of God's design."
All explanation depends ultimately on some ground that cannot itself be explained. Natural science ultimately relies on the laws of nature to explain the observable world of ordinary human experience. But if we ask why nature is lawful in this way, the naturalist has no answer except to say, that's just the way it is! The biblical believer will appeal to God as the Creator of nature. But if we ask why God is the way He is, the believer has no answer except to say, that's just the way He is. We must ultimately rely either on an uncaused nature or on an uncaused God. Even if Darwinian naturalism could explain the emergence of all life through natural evolutionary causes, that would still leave open the possibility that God as Creator of nature chose to work His will through such natural causes.
In the February issue of FIRST THINGS, physicist Stephen Barr has an article with the title "The Miracle of Evolution." Barr agrees with me that Darwinian evolution does not necessarily deny biblical religion. This is significant because generally the people at FIRST THINGS--a leading journal of the religious conservatives--have agreed with the proponents of "intelligent design theory" in assuming that Darwinian evolution must be atheistic. Oddly enough, such conservatives agree with atheists like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett on this point. But Barr points out that the declarations of atheists like Dawkins and Dennett express a philosophical commitment to atheism that has no necessary grounding in natural science.
In his last paragraph, Barr writes:
"If biology remains only biology, it is not to be feared. Much of the fear that does exist is rooted in the notion that God is in competition with nature, so that the more we attribute to one the less we can attribute to the other. That is false. The greater the powers and potentialities in nature, the more magnificent must be nature's far-sighted Author, that God whose 'ways are unsearchable' and who 'reaches from end to end ordering all things mightily.' Richard Dawkins famously called the universe 'a blind watchmaker.' If it is, it is a miracle enough for anyone; for it is incomparably greater to design a watchmaker than a watch. We need not pit evolution against design, if we recognize that evolution is part of God's design."
Thursday, January 19, 2006
Harvey Mansfield's Machiavellian Presidency
Conservatives believe that ordered liberty requires limited government with a balance of powers under the rule of law. In Darwinian Conservatism, I argue that a Darwinian view of human nature supports this principle of balancing power. In every human society, there is a dominance hierarchy in which an ambitious few seek to dominate the many, while the many resist tyrannical dominance by the few. A representative government with a balance of powers allows those with political ambition to seek public office, while preventing them from becoming despotic. This satisfies the evolved desire of the ruling few to dominate while also satisfying the evolved desire of the subordinate many to be free from despotic dominance.
The United States Constitution shows this system of balance based on countervailing powers in which ambition counteracts ambition. But what happens when in times of war or emergency, it seems necessary for the president to act at his own discretion to do whatever is required to meet the urgent demands of the moment? In such circumstances, must the discretionary power of the president prevail over the rule of law?
The Constitution's answer is that in such cases, the president does have extraordinary power to exercise discretionary judgment outside the normal laws. But still, the Congress and the courts provide a check on the president to prevent him from abusing his emergency powers. The president has discretionary power, but it is confined and structured by the constitutional system of balanced powers.
Recently, it has been revealed that President Bush has secretly authorized spying on American citizens in violation of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which dictates that such spying must be approved by a secret court of judges. In a recent issue of The Weekly Standard, Harvey Mansfield has defended the constitutionality of Bush's action as an exercise of the discretionary power of the President to act outside the rule of law in time of emergency.
I agree with Mansfield that the Constitution combines law and discretion. But I disagree with his implied suggestion that the emergency powers of the President cannot properly be checked by the Congress. To appeal, as Mansfield does, to the "wise discretion" of the President as free from congressional checks is to deny the principle of balanced government.
Mansfield writes:
"Separation of powers was a republican invention of the 17th century, but the Framers improved it when they strengthened the executive. They enabled the executive to act independently of the legislature and not merely serve as its agent in executing the laws. In the current dispute over executive surveillance of possible terrorists, those arguing that the executive should be subject to checks and balances are wrong to say or imply that the president may be checked in the sense of stopped. The president can be held accountable and made responsible, but if he could be stopped, the Constitution would lack any sure means of emergency action. Emergency action of this kind may be illegal but it is not unconstitutional; or, since the Constitution is a law, it is not illegal under the Constitution."
I would ask, how or by whom is the president "held accountable and made responsible"? Doesn't the Constitution provide that the accountability and responsibility of the president is enforced by the Congress? Only by this congressional check on presidential power in emergencies can the principle of balanced government be secured.
Mansfield cites The Federalist as arguing for an energetic executive that introduces monarchic efficiency into republican government. But Mansfield does not cite the arguments of The Federalist as to how the powers of the president differ from those of the British King, because the president's powers are checked by the Congress. In all of those cases where the abuse of the executive authority is most to be feared, The Federalist explains, the president will be "subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body." The most dramatic example of such a legislative check on the executive is the power of impeachment.
Unfortunately, in recent history, the Congress has often been reluctant to exercise their constitutional powers for checking presidential discretion. While looking to the federal courts to restrain the president, members of Congress have failed to employ vigorously their own powers for stopping the president when he acts illegally.
To assume that we can trust the "wise discretion" of the President, unchecked by the Congress, is to assume a utopian view of human nature that denies the insight of Darwinian conservatism that political rule tends to become tyrannical when it is not limited by a system of balancing powers.
The United States Constitution shows this system of balance based on countervailing powers in which ambition counteracts ambition. But what happens when in times of war or emergency, it seems necessary for the president to act at his own discretion to do whatever is required to meet the urgent demands of the moment? In such circumstances, must the discretionary power of the president prevail over the rule of law?
The Constitution's answer is that in such cases, the president does have extraordinary power to exercise discretionary judgment outside the normal laws. But still, the Congress and the courts provide a check on the president to prevent him from abusing his emergency powers. The president has discretionary power, but it is confined and structured by the constitutional system of balanced powers.
Recently, it has been revealed that President Bush has secretly authorized spying on American citizens in violation of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which dictates that such spying must be approved by a secret court of judges. In a recent issue of The Weekly Standard, Harvey Mansfield has defended the constitutionality of Bush's action as an exercise of the discretionary power of the President to act outside the rule of law in time of emergency.
I agree with Mansfield that the Constitution combines law and discretion. But I disagree with his implied suggestion that the emergency powers of the President cannot properly be checked by the Congress. To appeal, as Mansfield does, to the "wise discretion" of the President as free from congressional checks is to deny the principle of balanced government.
Mansfield writes:
"Separation of powers was a republican invention of the 17th century, but the Framers improved it when they strengthened the executive. They enabled the executive to act independently of the legislature and not merely serve as its agent in executing the laws. In the current dispute over executive surveillance of possible terrorists, those arguing that the executive should be subject to checks and balances are wrong to say or imply that the president may be checked in the sense of stopped. The president can be held accountable and made responsible, but if he could be stopped, the Constitution would lack any sure means of emergency action. Emergency action of this kind may be illegal but it is not unconstitutional; or, since the Constitution is a law, it is not illegal under the Constitution."
I would ask, how or by whom is the president "held accountable and made responsible"? Doesn't the Constitution provide that the accountability and responsibility of the president is enforced by the Congress? Only by this congressional check on presidential power in emergencies can the principle of balanced government be secured.
Mansfield cites The Federalist as arguing for an energetic executive that introduces monarchic efficiency into republican government. But Mansfield does not cite the arguments of The Federalist as to how the powers of the president differ from those of the British King, because the president's powers are checked by the Congress. In all of those cases where the abuse of the executive authority is most to be feared, The Federalist explains, the president will be "subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body." The most dramatic example of such a legislative check on the executive is the power of impeachment.
Unfortunately, in recent history, the Congress has often been reluctant to exercise their constitutional powers for checking presidential discretion. While looking to the federal courts to restrain the president, members of Congress have failed to employ vigorously their own powers for stopping the president when he acts illegally.
To assume that we can trust the "wise discretion" of the President, unchecked by the Congress, is to assume a utopian view of human nature that denies the insight of Darwinian conservatism that political rule tends to become tyrannical when it is not limited by a system of balancing powers.
Monday, January 09, 2006
Religion, Morality, and Darwinism: A Response to Carson Holloway
One of the most thoughtful attacks on Darwinian conservatism has just been published by Spence Publishing--Carson Holloway's THE RIGHT DARWIN?--EVOLUTION, RELIGION, AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY. Holloway is now a professor of political science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Ever since he was a Ph.D. student in my classes at Northern Illinois University, we have been carrying on a vigorous but friendly debate over these issues.
Although I have not yet read the final published book, I have read the manuscript for the book. My comments will be based on the manuscript.
Holloway argues that Darwinian conservatism is both illusory and dangerous. The Darwinian conservatives are people like Francis Fukuyama, James Q. Wilson, and me--conservatives who think that a Darwinian view of human nature supports a conservative understanding of social and political order.
One of Holloway's main ideas is that a Darwinian account of morality as rooted in human nature cannot sustain morality, because morality is impossible without religion, and Darwianian science denies religious belief. In developing his reasoning, he relies heavily on Alexis de Tocqueville as a democratic conservative who saw the importance of religion for moral order.
First of all, I emphasize that I speak in my book of religious understanding as one of the 20 natural desires that constitute human nature as shaped by Darwinian evolution. Most conservatives believe that religion generally supports morality and social order generally. Even those conservatives who are skeptical about religious doctrines--Friedrich Hayek, for example--support religious traditions as socially beneficial. I agree with this. And yet I deny that morality is utterly impossible without religious belief, because I think that morality rests ultimately on moral sentiments in human nature, which motivate human beings regardless of whether they have any religious belief. Religion doesn't create morality. Rather, religion reflects and reinforces a natural morality rooted in human nature that exists prior to religion. Both religious conservatives and skeptical conservatives should agree on this. (I have a chapter on religion in DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM.)
When Holloway says that morality necessarily depends on religion, what does he mean by "religion"? Any religion? Would Holloway agree with conservatives like Edmund Burke and Russell Kirk who quote pagan philosophers like Cicero on the virtues of religious belief, and thus imply that pagan religion is as good as any other?
Or does a morally healthy religion depend on specific doctrines that supply the necessary and sufficient support for morality? Sometimes Holloway speaks of "revealed religion." What does this mean? Does this include more than biblical religion? This would seem so, because he associates Aristotle with "revealed religion." But it's hard to see how Aristotle's account of religion depends on "revelation."
Is it necessary to distinguish "true religion," which provides the necessary support for morality, and "false religion," which does not? Or is Holloway implying that even a "false religion" supports morality? If so, how so?
Would any of the biblical religions--Judaism, Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant), Mormonism, and Islam--provide the necessary support for morality? Sometimes Holloway appeals to Christianity. Does this mean that Judaism and Islam do not support morality? Sometimes he speaks of "Catholic Christianity." Is this meant to imply that Protestant Christianity is not as reliable?
Since Holloway does not specify the doctrinal content of religion, I wonder if he is implying that doctrinal content is not important for supporting morality. As I read Tocqueville, he is applying to America Rousseau's idea of "civil religion," in which the only required doctrines are the existence of a providential God who enforces a moral law by punishing the bad and rewarding the good. Is this the doctrinal content of the morally healthy religion?
I don't see much evidence that Tocqueville himself was an orthodox believer. In his letter to Madame Swetchine (February 26, 1857), he describes his loss of faith at age 16. He does, however, suggest that he held onto some vague notions of God and an afterlife, suggesting some kind of Deism. Is this enough for the kind of religion that Holloway has in mind? Does it make any difference whether Tocqueville himself was a sincere religious believer?
How would Holloway's view of the moral necessity of religion differ from David Sloan Wilson's Darwinian (and Durkheimian) account of the social utility of religion in binding people into cooperative communities? Would Holloway say that the only religion with social utility is the one with true doctrines--namely, Christianity?
Holloway repeatedly asserts that religion supports some very specific moral positions--such as condemning slavery. But he never cites any specific religious texts to show how they necessarily support the moral positions that he favors. The case of slavery and "universalism" illustrates the problem. He assumes that religion necessitates a "universal" morality that would deny the morality of slavery. But many religious traditions have allowed slavery, and the Bible never condemns slavery or calls for its abolition. On the contrary, in the American debate over slavery, Christian defenders of slavery were able to cite specific biblical passages in both the Old Testament and the New Testament supporting slavery. Opponents of slavery had to argue that general doctrines such as the creation of human beings in God's image implicitly denied the justice of slavery. But they could never cite any specific passage of the Bible for their position. Here's a clear case of where the moral teaching of the Bible depends on our coming to it with a prior moral understanding that we then read into the Bible.
Moreover, the "universalism" of the Bible is in doubt. I don't see a universal morality in the Old Testament. Moses ordering the slaughter of the innocent Mideanite women and children, for example, manifests a xenophobia that runs through much of the Old Testament.
Now, of course, the New Testament does seem more inclined to a universal humanitarianism. But the Book of Revelation teaches that at the end of history the saints will destroy the Antichrist and the unbelievers in bloody battle. The bloodiness of this vision has been dramatized throughout the history of Christianity. (See, for example, Tim LaHaye's popular LEFT BEHIND novels.)
Holloway speaks of the moral universalism required for opposing Nazism. Is there any evidence that those who rescued Jews in World War II were all moved by religious belief? My impression is that religious belief was not decisive for the rescuers. And, of course, there is a continuing controversy over whether the Christian churches in Europe did enough to oppose Hitler. The German Lutheran Church was inclined to interpret the 13th Chapter of Romans as dictating obedience to the authorities. Martin Luther himself was brutal in his expression of anti-Semitism. How would Holloway explain cases like this? Would he say that the true doctrines of biblical religion always require universal love, and therefore any behavior by a biblical believer that violates universal love is based on a misinterpretation of biblical doctrine?
Holloway refers to President Bill Clinton's moral lapses with Monica Lewinsky. But Holloway fails to acknowledge that Clinton met regularly with ministers, prayed for foregiveness, and (he said)was forgiven by Jesus. Holloway might accuse him of being insincere, but the point is that a "civil religion" cannot distinguish between sincere and insincere professions of faith.
In his chapter on the family, Holloway seems to say that marriage and the family cannot be sustained based on nature alone, in contrast to Thomas Aquinas's distinction between marriage as a natural bond and marriage as a supernatural sacrament. But it seems to me, as I argue in my book, that familial bonding satisfies natural desires that will be universally expressed regardless of religious beliefs. In fact, entire civilizations that have had little or no religious belief--such as Confucian China--have nevertheless promoted familial bonds and duties.
The idea that morality has no natural ground and that it would disappear if people did not obey the commands of God implies a kind of nihilism. If God does not exist, then everything is permitted.
I don't agree. Morality is rooted in human nature--in moral sentiments and moral reasoning deeply embedded in the evolved nature of the human animal. Religion can reinforce that morality. And conservatives should always respect religious traditions that sustain morality. But Darwinian conservatives will see that morality can stand on its own natural ground, even without religious support.
Although I have not yet read the final published book, I have read the manuscript for the book. My comments will be based on the manuscript.
Holloway argues that Darwinian conservatism is both illusory and dangerous. The Darwinian conservatives are people like Francis Fukuyama, James Q. Wilson, and me--conservatives who think that a Darwinian view of human nature supports a conservative understanding of social and political order.
One of Holloway's main ideas is that a Darwinian account of morality as rooted in human nature cannot sustain morality, because morality is impossible without religion, and Darwianian science denies religious belief. In developing his reasoning, he relies heavily on Alexis de Tocqueville as a democratic conservative who saw the importance of religion for moral order.
First of all, I emphasize that I speak in my book of religious understanding as one of the 20 natural desires that constitute human nature as shaped by Darwinian evolution. Most conservatives believe that religion generally supports morality and social order generally. Even those conservatives who are skeptical about religious doctrines--Friedrich Hayek, for example--support religious traditions as socially beneficial. I agree with this. And yet I deny that morality is utterly impossible without religious belief, because I think that morality rests ultimately on moral sentiments in human nature, which motivate human beings regardless of whether they have any religious belief. Religion doesn't create morality. Rather, religion reflects and reinforces a natural morality rooted in human nature that exists prior to religion. Both religious conservatives and skeptical conservatives should agree on this. (I have a chapter on religion in DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM.)
When Holloway says that morality necessarily depends on religion, what does he mean by "religion"? Any religion? Would Holloway agree with conservatives like Edmund Burke and Russell Kirk who quote pagan philosophers like Cicero on the virtues of religious belief, and thus imply that pagan religion is as good as any other?
Or does a morally healthy religion depend on specific doctrines that supply the necessary and sufficient support for morality? Sometimes Holloway speaks of "revealed religion." What does this mean? Does this include more than biblical religion? This would seem so, because he associates Aristotle with "revealed religion." But it's hard to see how Aristotle's account of religion depends on "revelation."
Is it necessary to distinguish "true religion," which provides the necessary support for morality, and "false religion," which does not? Or is Holloway implying that even a "false religion" supports morality? If so, how so?
Would any of the biblical religions--Judaism, Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant), Mormonism, and Islam--provide the necessary support for morality? Sometimes Holloway appeals to Christianity. Does this mean that Judaism and Islam do not support morality? Sometimes he speaks of "Catholic Christianity." Is this meant to imply that Protestant Christianity is not as reliable?
Since Holloway does not specify the doctrinal content of religion, I wonder if he is implying that doctrinal content is not important for supporting morality. As I read Tocqueville, he is applying to America Rousseau's idea of "civil religion," in which the only required doctrines are the existence of a providential God who enforces a moral law by punishing the bad and rewarding the good. Is this the doctrinal content of the morally healthy religion?
I don't see much evidence that Tocqueville himself was an orthodox believer. In his letter to Madame Swetchine (February 26, 1857), he describes his loss of faith at age 16. He does, however, suggest that he held onto some vague notions of God and an afterlife, suggesting some kind of Deism. Is this enough for the kind of religion that Holloway has in mind? Does it make any difference whether Tocqueville himself was a sincere religious believer?
How would Holloway's view of the moral necessity of religion differ from David Sloan Wilson's Darwinian (and Durkheimian) account of the social utility of religion in binding people into cooperative communities? Would Holloway say that the only religion with social utility is the one with true doctrines--namely, Christianity?
Holloway repeatedly asserts that religion supports some very specific moral positions--such as condemning slavery. But he never cites any specific religious texts to show how they necessarily support the moral positions that he favors. The case of slavery and "universalism" illustrates the problem. He assumes that religion necessitates a "universal" morality that would deny the morality of slavery. But many religious traditions have allowed slavery, and the Bible never condemns slavery or calls for its abolition. On the contrary, in the American debate over slavery, Christian defenders of slavery were able to cite specific biblical passages in both the Old Testament and the New Testament supporting slavery. Opponents of slavery had to argue that general doctrines such as the creation of human beings in God's image implicitly denied the justice of slavery. But they could never cite any specific passage of the Bible for their position. Here's a clear case of where the moral teaching of the Bible depends on our coming to it with a prior moral understanding that we then read into the Bible.
Moreover, the "universalism" of the Bible is in doubt. I don't see a universal morality in the Old Testament. Moses ordering the slaughter of the innocent Mideanite women and children, for example, manifests a xenophobia that runs through much of the Old Testament.
Now, of course, the New Testament does seem more inclined to a universal humanitarianism. But the Book of Revelation teaches that at the end of history the saints will destroy the Antichrist and the unbelievers in bloody battle. The bloodiness of this vision has been dramatized throughout the history of Christianity. (See, for example, Tim LaHaye's popular LEFT BEHIND novels.)
Holloway speaks of the moral universalism required for opposing Nazism. Is there any evidence that those who rescued Jews in World War II were all moved by religious belief? My impression is that religious belief was not decisive for the rescuers. And, of course, there is a continuing controversy over whether the Christian churches in Europe did enough to oppose Hitler. The German Lutheran Church was inclined to interpret the 13th Chapter of Romans as dictating obedience to the authorities. Martin Luther himself was brutal in his expression of anti-Semitism. How would Holloway explain cases like this? Would he say that the true doctrines of biblical religion always require universal love, and therefore any behavior by a biblical believer that violates universal love is based on a misinterpretation of biblical doctrine?
Holloway refers to President Bill Clinton's moral lapses with Monica Lewinsky. But Holloway fails to acknowledge that Clinton met regularly with ministers, prayed for foregiveness, and (he said)was forgiven by Jesus. Holloway might accuse him of being insincere, but the point is that a "civil religion" cannot distinguish between sincere and insincere professions of faith.
In his chapter on the family, Holloway seems to say that marriage and the family cannot be sustained based on nature alone, in contrast to Thomas Aquinas's distinction between marriage as a natural bond and marriage as a supernatural sacrament. But it seems to me, as I argue in my book, that familial bonding satisfies natural desires that will be universally expressed regardless of religious beliefs. In fact, entire civilizations that have had little or no religious belief--such as Confucian China--have nevertheless promoted familial bonds and duties.
The idea that morality has no natural ground and that it would disappear if people did not obey the commands of God implies a kind of nihilism. If God does not exist, then everything is permitted.
I don't agree. Morality is rooted in human nature--in moral sentiments and moral reasoning deeply embedded in the evolved nature of the human animal. Religion can reinforce that morality. And conservatives should always respect religious traditions that sustain morality. But Darwinian conservatives will see that morality can stand on its own natural ground, even without religious support.
Wednesday, December 28, 2005
Jeffrey Hart on American Conservatism
The WALL STREET JOURNAL has published an article by Jeffrey Hart on American conservatism entitled "The Burke Habit". Although he does not mention Darwinian biology, Hart's account of conservatism and of how Bush's Republican Party departs from true conservatism agrees fundamentally with my argument in DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM.
Hart stresses that conservatism is based on a realist understanding of human nature as imperfectible, in contrast to the Left's utopian vision of human nature as perfectible. Conservatives reject both the "hard utopianism" of Marxist socialism and the "soft utopianism" of liberalism.
The Bush Republicans are not true conservatives, Hart observes, because they embrace a "Hard Wilsonianism" that is utopian in its vision of the fundamental goodness of mankind. They believe, as George W. Bush declared in 2003, that "the human heart desires the same good things everywhere on earth." I agree.
I also agree with Hart that the Bush Republicans are utopian in their devotion to an absolute ban on abortion based on their appeal to an abstract "right to life" that extends even to embryos.
The insight of "Darwinian conservatism" is seeing how Darwinian science supports the conservative realist understanding of human nature as imperfect against the utopian vision of human perfectibility. This brings together Burke and Darwin.
Hart stresses that conservatism is based on a realist understanding of human nature as imperfectible, in contrast to the Left's utopian vision of human nature as perfectible. Conservatives reject both the "hard utopianism" of Marxist socialism and the "soft utopianism" of liberalism.
The Bush Republicans are not true conservatives, Hart observes, because they embrace a "Hard Wilsonianism" that is utopian in its vision of the fundamental goodness of mankind. They believe, as George W. Bush declared in 2003, that "the human heart desires the same good things everywhere on earth." I agree.
I also agree with Hart that the Bush Republicans are utopian in their devotion to an absolute ban on abortion based on their appeal to an abstract "right to life" that extends even to embryos.
The insight of "Darwinian conservatism" is seeing how Darwinian science supports the conservative realist understanding of human nature as imperfect against the utopian vision of human perfectibility. This brings together Burke and Darwin.
Tuesday, December 13, 2005
The Fear of Teaching Darwin
INSIDE HIGHER ED has a piece by me on "The Fear of Teaching Darwin". I comment on some of the recent controversies in the United States over the teaching of evolution in both the high schools and the universities, and I lay out my proposal for "teaching the controversy by teaching Darwin."
The transcript of the federal court trial in Dover, Pennsylvania, over the teaching of intelligent design is now available online. Lehigh University biologist Michael Behe was one of the main expert witnesses for teaching intelligent design. In his testimony on October 18, he mentioned my book DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM. He quoted it as an example of how one could see Darwinian evolution as having political implications. My pride at being mentioned in this trial was countered by his mistake when he gave the title and confused it with my book DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT! Oh well, I'll take what I can get.
The transcript of the federal court trial in Dover, Pennsylvania, over the teaching of intelligent design is now available online. Lehigh University biologist Michael Behe was one of the main expert witnesses for teaching intelligent design. In his testimony on October 18, he mentioned my book DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM. He quoted it as an example of how one could see Darwinian evolution as having political implications. My pride at being mentioned in this trial was countered by his mistake when he gave the title and confused it with my book DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT! Oh well, I'll take what I can get.
Saturday, November 19, 2005
The Darwinian Conservatism of Transcendent Morality: A Reply to Bob Cheeks
Bob Cheekshas written a review of Darwinian Conservatismfor the IntellectualConservative.com website. He begins:
"Dr. Larry Arnhart, professor of political science at Northern Illinois University, is on a mission to save conservatives from the curse of ignorance that afflicts those who have adamantly refused to yield to the revealed wisdom of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. It is Arnhart's salvific purpose then to act as a modern John the Baptist and proclaim the inerrancy of 'Darwinian conservatism' that will allow conservatives to embrace 'modern science' and not be mocked as Luddites, and (God forbid)fundamentalists."
Hey, I think he's being sarcastic!
Cheeks goes on to make the criticism that I would expect from many conservatives--that a Darwinian science of human nature cannot be truly conservative because it denies the "transcendent moral worldview" that supports conservative moraltiy and politics. He refers to Thomas Aquinas and Richard Weaver as affirming this "higher, transcendent morality" of conservatism.
But if Aquinas was right to defend a "natural law" as rooted in the "instincts" or "natural inclinations" of human beings, and if he was right to distinguish this "natural law" from the "divine law" of Revelation, then why shouldn't a Darwinian biological science of human nature help us to understand that natural moral law?
After all, Darwin believed that the enduring principles of traditional morality were ultimately rooted in a natural "moral sense" of the human animal. Darwin also saw that this traditional morality was often supported by religious beliefs.
As I indicate in my book, conservatives like Edmund Burke have insisted that "religion is the basis of civil society," and that "man is by his constitution a religious animal." But as is clear from Burke's praise for ancient Greek and Roman religions, he affirms the practical truth of religion without presuming to decide the theological truth of any particular religious tradition. Isn't that the proper attitude towards religion for the conservative?
Weaver argued that every healthy culture rests on a "myth" that is a product of the human "imagination." The traditional "image" of man as created in God's image is an example of such a "myth." But the truth of this "myth" is poetic rather than factual, and its practical truth comes from is success in sustaining the traditional order of a culture.
The Darwinian explanation of religion as a means by which human beings bind themselves into cooperative communities would seem to be perfectly consistent with the conservative stance of Burke and Weaver. From this perspective, the Darwinian conservative can affirm the practical utility of any religious tradition that sustains the good order of civil society.
Does Cheeks disagree with this? Does he think that to be a conservative one must affirm the doctrinal truths of Christianity? Can Catholic conservatives and Protestant conservatives agree on these doctrinal truths? Does this exclude Jewish conservatives? Muslims? Presumably, it would exclude skeptics and atheists. If so, then skeptical conservatives like Michael Oakeshott and Friedrich Hayek are not really conservatives.
Wouldn't it be more sensible to say that conservatives must respect the practical truth of any religion that supports social order, regardless of whether we can agree on the metaphysical truth of that religion?
"Dr. Larry Arnhart, professor of political science at Northern Illinois University, is on a mission to save conservatives from the curse of ignorance that afflicts those who have adamantly refused to yield to the revealed wisdom of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. It is Arnhart's salvific purpose then to act as a modern John the Baptist and proclaim the inerrancy of 'Darwinian conservatism' that will allow conservatives to embrace 'modern science' and not be mocked as Luddites, and (God forbid)fundamentalists."
Hey, I think he's being sarcastic!
Cheeks goes on to make the criticism that I would expect from many conservatives--that a Darwinian science of human nature cannot be truly conservative because it denies the "transcendent moral worldview" that supports conservative moraltiy and politics. He refers to Thomas Aquinas and Richard Weaver as affirming this "higher, transcendent morality" of conservatism.
But if Aquinas was right to defend a "natural law" as rooted in the "instincts" or "natural inclinations" of human beings, and if he was right to distinguish this "natural law" from the "divine law" of Revelation, then why shouldn't a Darwinian biological science of human nature help us to understand that natural moral law?
After all, Darwin believed that the enduring principles of traditional morality were ultimately rooted in a natural "moral sense" of the human animal. Darwin also saw that this traditional morality was often supported by religious beliefs.
As I indicate in my book, conservatives like Edmund Burke have insisted that "religion is the basis of civil society," and that "man is by his constitution a religious animal." But as is clear from Burke's praise for ancient Greek and Roman religions, he affirms the practical truth of religion without presuming to decide the theological truth of any particular religious tradition. Isn't that the proper attitude towards religion for the conservative?
Weaver argued that every healthy culture rests on a "myth" that is a product of the human "imagination." The traditional "image" of man as created in God's image is an example of such a "myth." But the truth of this "myth" is poetic rather than factual, and its practical truth comes from is success in sustaining the traditional order of a culture.
The Darwinian explanation of religion as a means by which human beings bind themselves into cooperative communities would seem to be perfectly consistent with the conservative stance of Burke and Weaver. From this perspective, the Darwinian conservative can affirm the practical utility of any religious tradition that sustains the good order of civil society.
Does Cheeks disagree with this? Does he think that to be a conservative one must affirm the doctrinal truths of Christianity? Can Catholic conservatives and Protestant conservatives agree on these doctrinal truths? Does this exclude Jewish conservatives? Muslims? Presumably, it would exclude skeptics and atheists. If so, then skeptical conservatives like Michael Oakeshott and Friedrich Hayek are not really conservatives.
Wouldn't it be more sensible to say that conservatives must respect the practical truth of any religion that supports social order, regardless of whether we can agree on the metaphysical truth of that religion?
Thursday, November 17, 2005
From Darwin to Hitler to Dover
Michael Behe is one of the leading proponents of "intelligent design theory." He is particularly important for the ID movement because he is a real biologist who teaches biology at Lehigh University. Proponents of ID can cite Behe's book Darwin's Black Box as evidence that some biologists object to Darwinian evolution on scientific grounds.
Behe was the leading "expert witness" for ID at the recent federal court case on the teaching of ID and creationism in the public schools of Dover, Pennsylvania. Although much of his testimony was on the scientific debate over Darwinism, he also made it clear that Darwinian theory was unlike other scientific theories because of the moral and political implications of Darwinism. In his testimony on October 18, Behe argued that Darwinism was rightly perceived by many people as having political implications. To illustrate his point, he quoted from my book Darwinian Conservatism my claim that "Darwinian biology sustains conservative social thought by showing how the human capacity for spontaneous order arises from social instincts and a moral sense shaped by natural selection in human evolutionary history." He also made references to others--such as Daniel Dennett--who see Darwinism as a "universal acid" that denies the traditional religious grounds for morality.
Although he did not explicitly say so, Behe's talk about the moral and political implications of Darwinism evokes the fundamental fear of Darwinian science as promoting a morally corrupting atheistic materialism. A big part of my book is the attempt to dispel this fear by showing how Darwinian biology actually supports traditional morality as rooted in a natural moral sense.
The fear of Darwinian immorality is evident in Richard Weikart's book From Darwin to Hitler, which was subsidized by the Discovery Institute, the leading conservative think-tank supporting ID. Weikart argues that Darwinian biology supported a tradition of German social Darwinism that led to Hitler's Nazism. Against Weikart, I suggest in my book that he has not shown a direct path "from Darwin to Hitler."
In response to my critique, Weikart has charged that I have distorted the argument of his book. I say that his book does not show a direct line "from Darwin to Hitler," because he does not show that Darwin actually supported the ideas that Hitler expressed. But now Weikart says that the title of his book does not convey his true argument. He says to me "I don't argue the kind of straightforward 'Darwin to Hitler' thesis' that you claim." Rather, he insists that he stated clearly in his book "that Darwinism does not lead inevitably, or of logical necessity, to Nazism."
If that really is his position, then I have no disagreement with him. But my complaint is that the folks at the Discovery Institute cite Weikart's book as showing that there really is a direct line "from Darwin to Hitler," and they use this as an argument for why Darwinian science is morally corrupting, as opposed to the morally healthy teaching of ID.
As I argue in my book, what really motivates the proponents of ID is not so much the scientific arguments over Darwinian theory as the moral arguments concerning the moral implications of Darwinism. Darwin himself believed that his theory supported traditional morality. Supporters of ID deny this because they cannot believe that morality can be rooted in evolved human nature.
Behe was the leading "expert witness" for ID at the recent federal court case on the teaching of ID and creationism in the public schools of Dover, Pennsylvania. Although much of his testimony was on the scientific debate over Darwinism, he also made it clear that Darwinian theory was unlike other scientific theories because of the moral and political implications of Darwinism. In his testimony on October 18, Behe argued that Darwinism was rightly perceived by many people as having political implications. To illustrate his point, he quoted from my book Darwinian Conservatism my claim that "Darwinian biology sustains conservative social thought by showing how the human capacity for spontaneous order arises from social instincts and a moral sense shaped by natural selection in human evolutionary history." He also made references to others--such as Daniel Dennett--who see Darwinism as a "universal acid" that denies the traditional religious grounds for morality.
Although he did not explicitly say so, Behe's talk about the moral and political implications of Darwinism evokes the fundamental fear of Darwinian science as promoting a morally corrupting atheistic materialism. A big part of my book is the attempt to dispel this fear by showing how Darwinian biology actually supports traditional morality as rooted in a natural moral sense.
The fear of Darwinian immorality is evident in Richard Weikart's book From Darwin to Hitler, which was subsidized by the Discovery Institute, the leading conservative think-tank supporting ID. Weikart argues that Darwinian biology supported a tradition of German social Darwinism that led to Hitler's Nazism. Against Weikart, I suggest in my book that he has not shown a direct path "from Darwin to Hitler."
In response to my critique, Weikart has charged that I have distorted the argument of his book. I say that his book does not show a direct line "from Darwin to Hitler," because he does not show that Darwin actually supported the ideas that Hitler expressed. But now Weikart says that the title of his book does not convey his true argument. He says to me "I don't argue the kind of straightforward 'Darwin to Hitler' thesis' that you claim." Rather, he insists that he stated clearly in his book "that Darwinism does not lead inevitably, or of logical necessity, to Nazism."
If that really is his position, then I have no disagreement with him. But my complaint is that the folks at the Discovery Institute cite Weikart's book as showing that there really is a direct line "from Darwin to Hitler," and they use this as an argument for why Darwinian science is morally corrupting, as opposed to the morally healthy teaching of ID.
As I argue in my book, what really motivates the proponents of ID is not so much the scientific arguments over Darwinian theory as the moral arguments concerning the moral implications of Darwinism. Darwin himself believed that his theory supported traditional morality. Supporters of ID deny this because they cannot believe that morality can be rooted in evolved human nature.
Friday, October 14, 2005
The Chimpanzee Politics of the Miers Nomination
Conservative resistance to President Bush's nomination of Harriet Miers to the U.S. Supreme Court shows that conservatives are returning to their traditional principles of limited government and resisting the seductions of presidential democracy. In doing that, they reaffirm a realist view of human nature that is fundamental to what I have called "Darwinian conservatism."
Traditionally, conservatives believe that ordered liberty requires limited government with a balance of powers under the rule of law. Leftists favor a pure democracy founded on popular sovereignty, and so they are suspicious of any system of checks and balances that limits the will of the people. Conservatives reject pure democracy unconstrained by a balance of powers, because they believe that the natural desire for status and distinction will always create political rivalry among leaders and factions motivated by the passions of ambition and avarice. Because of their realist view of human nature as imperfect, conservatives believe that any person with power is inclined to abuse it to achieve dominance over others, and therefore the only way to prevent the abuse of power is to structure things so that power checks power. Because leftists have a utopian view of human nature as perfectible, they believe that power will not be abused in a true democracy where the people are sovereign.
Darwinian science supports the conservative principle of balancing power by sustaining the realist view of human imperfectibility. Comparing the social behavior of human beings with that of other closely related animals suggests that political rivalry and the need to constrain such rivalry through a balance of power is manifest in chimpanzees and other political animals.
Frans de Waal is famous for his studies of "chimpanzee politics." From many years of observing chimp social behavior, he sees a natural drive for dominance expressed in the "alpha male" of every chimp society. But he also sees a natural drive of subordinates to resist the exploitation of the dominant male. He suggests that chimps avoid despotism by a "balance of power" in which the power of some is checked by the power of others. This drive for dominance checked by opposing power is so similar to human politics that Newt Gingrich has often recommended de Waal's book CHIMPANZEE POLITICS as one of the best books for understanding the political life of Washington, D.C.
In the American conservative tradition, the importance of the balance of power was elaborated by John Adams. He insisted that inherent in human nature was the desire of ambitious people to become dominant. And although such a desire could motivate the ambitious few to heroic leadership, he argued that to prevent despotism, there needed to be a system of countervailing powers by which the ambition of some would be checked by the ambition of others. He warned that the inclination of the French revolutionaries (and their sympathizers in the U.S. like Thomas Jefferson) to give all power to a democratic majority would tend to favor the despotic rule of a Caesaristic leader. Napoleon's rise to Emperor of France by majority consent of the citizens confirmed Adams' prediction.
Conservatives have generally been on the side of Adams and balanced government. But in recent decades, they have been seduced by presidential democracy--by the idea that a President elected directly by the people has a popular mandate to use the virtually unlimited powers of executive prerogative--particularly, in national emergencies--for the public good. A clear manifestation of this disposition has been the willingness of conservative constitutionalists to allow the President to wage war without the congressional declaration of war required by the U.S. Constitution.
In recent years, a Congress controlled by the Republican Party has generally bowed to the leadership of George W. Bush, and thus they have failed to assert the traditional conservative principle of balancing powers.
But now with the Miers nomination, many conservatives both inside and outside the U.S. Senate are challenging the claim of the President that he should be able to appoint a long-time friend to the Supreme Court whose primary qualification seems to be adulation of George Bush. This shows a healthy conservative recognition of the dangers that come from concentrated power and ambition and the need to reassert the constitutional scheme of checks and balances.
The British have faced a similar problem as the British Prime Minister has increasingly come to resemble the American president, with unchecked authority derived from popular plebiscites. And unlike the U.S., Great Britain does not have a written constitution to which they can appeal to assert the constitutional checks on the prerogative powers of the Prime Minister.
The fundamental insight of conservative constitutionalism is that because power-seeking is rooted in evolved human nature, the power of one person or group can only be controlled by the power of another. Among chimpanzees as well as human beings, liberty requires a system of limited government based on countervailing powers.
Chapter 5 of DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM is devoted to this Darwinian understanding of limited government.
Traditionally, conservatives believe that ordered liberty requires limited government with a balance of powers under the rule of law. Leftists favor a pure democracy founded on popular sovereignty, and so they are suspicious of any system of checks and balances that limits the will of the people. Conservatives reject pure democracy unconstrained by a balance of powers, because they believe that the natural desire for status and distinction will always create political rivalry among leaders and factions motivated by the passions of ambition and avarice. Because of their realist view of human nature as imperfect, conservatives believe that any person with power is inclined to abuse it to achieve dominance over others, and therefore the only way to prevent the abuse of power is to structure things so that power checks power. Because leftists have a utopian view of human nature as perfectible, they believe that power will not be abused in a true democracy where the people are sovereign.
Darwinian science supports the conservative principle of balancing power by sustaining the realist view of human imperfectibility. Comparing the social behavior of human beings with that of other closely related animals suggests that political rivalry and the need to constrain such rivalry through a balance of power is manifest in chimpanzees and other political animals.
Frans de Waal is famous for his studies of "chimpanzee politics." From many years of observing chimp social behavior, he sees a natural drive for dominance expressed in the "alpha male" of every chimp society. But he also sees a natural drive of subordinates to resist the exploitation of the dominant male. He suggests that chimps avoid despotism by a "balance of power" in which the power of some is checked by the power of others. This drive for dominance checked by opposing power is so similar to human politics that Newt Gingrich has often recommended de Waal's book CHIMPANZEE POLITICS as one of the best books for understanding the political life of Washington, D.C.
In the American conservative tradition, the importance of the balance of power was elaborated by John Adams. He insisted that inherent in human nature was the desire of ambitious people to become dominant. And although such a desire could motivate the ambitious few to heroic leadership, he argued that to prevent despotism, there needed to be a system of countervailing powers by which the ambition of some would be checked by the ambition of others. He warned that the inclination of the French revolutionaries (and their sympathizers in the U.S. like Thomas Jefferson) to give all power to a democratic majority would tend to favor the despotic rule of a Caesaristic leader. Napoleon's rise to Emperor of France by majority consent of the citizens confirmed Adams' prediction.
Conservatives have generally been on the side of Adams and balanced government. But in recent decades, they have been seduced by presidential democracy--by the idea that a President elected directly by the people has a popular mandate to use the virtually unlimited powers of executive prerogative--particularly, in national emergencies--for the public good. A clear manifestation of this disposition has been the willingness of conservative constitutionalists to allow the President to wage war without the congressional declaration of war required by the U.S. Constitution.
In recent years, a Congress controlled by the Republican Party has generally bowed to the leadership of George W. Bush, and thus they have failed to assert the traditional conservative principle of balancing powers.
But now with the Miers nomination, many conservatives both inside and outside the U.S. Senate are challenging the claim of the President that he should be able to appoint a long-time friend to the Supreme Court whose primary qualification seems to be adulation of George Bush. This shows a healthy conservative recognition of the dangers that come from concentrated power and ambition and the need to reassert the constitutional scheme of checks and balances.
The British have faced a similar problem as the British Prime Minister has increasingly come to resemble the American president, with unchecked authority derived from popular plebiscites. And unlike the U.S., Great Britain does not have a written constitution to which they can appeal to assert the constitutional checks on the prerogative powers of the Prime Minister.
The fundamental insight of conservative constitutionalism is that because power-seeking is rooted in evolved human nature, the power of one person or group can only be controlled by the power of another. Among chimpanzees as well as human beings, liberty requires a system of limited government based on countervailing powers.
Chapter 5 of DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM is devoted to this Darwinian understanding of limited government.
Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Teaching the Controversy by Teaching Darwin
One manifestation of the conservatives' suspicion of Darwinian science is that many of them--particularly in the U.S.--tend to oppose the teaching of Darwinian evolution in public school biology classes unless "intelligent design theory" is also taught.
Yesterday, a U.S. federal court in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, began taking testimony in a dispute over the teaching of "intelligent design" in public school science classes as an alternative to Darwinian evolutionary science. The school board in Dover, Pennsylvania, wants to require that "intelligent design" be introduced into ninth grade biology classes. Some parents have filed a suit claiming that this violates the First Amendment to the Constitution by promoting "an establishment of religion." Defenders of "intelligent design theory" claim that it is a truly scientific theory that does not depend upon religious belief.
This case could eventually be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which would continue an endless debate over the public school teaching of evolution that began eighty years ago in the famous "Scopes trial" in Tennessee in 1925.
This debate has reached an impasse. I have a proposal for breaking this impasse, a proposal that I briefly lay out in my book Darwinian Conservatism.
Proponents of intelligent design at the Discovery Institute (a conservative think-tank in Seattle) have adopted the argument of "teaching the controvery." Why not teach the theory of evolution by natural selection along with intelligent design theory, so that students are fully informed about all sides of this debate?
Opponents respond by saying in effect, "What controversy?" There is no real scientific controversy over the theory of evolution. The supporters of intelligent design theory are moved not by scientific motives but by religious motives. And after all, intelligent design theory is not really a scientific theory, because it appeals to supernatural causes beyond natural experience and the scientific method.
Here's my proposal. Let's "teach the controversy" by teaching Darwin. We could have high school students read selections from Darwin's ORIGIN OF SPECIES and DESCENT OF MAN, along with some modern textbook in evolutionary theory such as Mark Ridley's book EVOLUTION (Blackwell Science).
Surely, the proponents of evolution couldn't object to having students read Charles Darwin. And yet this could also satisfy the proponents of intelligent design, because Darwin himself presents intelligent design theory as the major alternative to his theory.
In the ORIGIN OF SPECIES, Darwin frames the fundamental issue as a controversy between two theories--"the theory of special creation" and the "theory of natural selection." He indicates that until recently "most naturalists"--including himself--have accepted the "theory of special creation," which says that each species has been independently created by an Intelligent Designer. But Darwin thinks that now we have a better theory--a "theory of natural selection," which says that although the primary laws of nature may have been created by an Intelligent Designer, those general laws allow for the natural evolution of species by natural selection without need for special interventions by the Designer to design each species and each complex organic mechanism.
Darwin indicates that neither theory can be conclusively demonstrated. But we can at least judge one theory as more probable if it can explain "large classes of facts" more intelligibly than the other theory. For example, if the "theory of natural selection" can explain the geographic distribution of species between the Galapagos Islands and the South American mainland and do this more persuasively than any alternative explanation based on the "theory of special cration," then we can judge the evolutionary theory to be more probable.
Darwin acknowledges that there are many "difficulties" with his theory, and they turn out to be the very difficulties that are commonly stressed by proponents of IDT. But while Darwin admits that these difficulties are so severe as to be "staggering," he tries to answer these difficulties, while arguing that the theory of special creation has its own difficulties.
The prominence that Darwin gives to the theory of special creation as the alternative to his theory explains why Philip Appleman, the editor of the Norton Critical Edition of Darwin's writings, decided to include in the 3rd edition selected writings from Philip Johnson and Michael Behe--two proponents of IDT. Appleman recognizes that the debate over IDT continues the debate seen by Darwin himself.
Of course, the evidence and arguments for evolutionary theory have deepened since Darwin wrote. After all, Darwin didn't even understand the genetic mechanisms underlying evolution. So it would be good to have high school students read some modern survey of evolutionary science. But here again they could see the same fundamental controversy presented by Darwin.
Mark Ridley is a biological anthropologist at Emory University. His book EVOLUTION is one of the leading introductory textbooks in evolutionary theory. When he surveys the "evidence for evolution," he suggests that we need to distinguish "three possible theories of the history of life"--evolution, transformism, and creationism. According to the theory of evolution, all species have evolved from a common ancestory, and they change through time. According to the theory of transformism, species have separated origins, but they change over time. According to the theory of creation, species have separate origins, and they do not change.
Ridley argues that the evidence supports the theory of evolution as superior to the other theories. Students who would read this could thus see the controversy between evolution and special creation and judge for themselves whether Darwin, Ridley, and others are right in arguing for the superiority of evolutionary theory.
Recently, I presented my compromise proposal on a panel at the convention of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences in Washington, D.C. Chris Mooney, the author of THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, was on the panel. He complained that it would not be right to allow high school students to think through these issues for themselves, because only scientific "experts" could judge the evidence for evolution. As far as he was concerned, the purpose of high school science education was to tell students what the "experts" believed, and any proposal to open up the classroom to real debate was actually part of the war on science coming from the Religious Right and George Bush.
In my book, I give my reasons why I think that the arguments for IDT as a substitute for Darwinian science are weak, and why conservatives need to see Darwin as their friend and not their enemy. But, still, I see nothing wrong with allowing students to debate these issues for themselves, which might actually teach them how to weigh scientific arguments over issues with deep moral, political, and religious implications. Shouldn't that be the purpose of public education in a free republic?
Yesterday, a U.S. federal court in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, began taking testimony in a dispute over the teaching of "intelligent design" in public school science classes as an alternative to Darwinian evolutionary science. The school board in Dover, Pennsylvania, wants to require that "intelligent design" be introduced into ninth grade biology classes. Some parents have filed a suit claiming that this violates the First Amendment to the Constitution by promoting "an establishment of religion." Defenders of "intelligent design theory" claim that it is a truly scientific theory that does not depend upon religious belief.
This case could eventually be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which would continue an endless debate over the public school teaching of evolution that began eighty years ago in the famous "Scopes trial" in Tennessee in 1925.
This debate has reached an impasse. I have a proposal for breaking this impasse, a proposal that I briefly lay out in my book Darwinian Conservatism.
Proponents of intelligent design at the Discovery Institute (a conservative think-tank in Seattle) have adopted the argument of "teaching the controvery." Why not teach the theory of evolution by natural selection along with intelligent design theory, so that students are fully informed about all sides of this debate?
Opponents respond by saying in effect, "What controversy?" There is no real scientific controversy over the theory of evolution. The supporters of intelligent design theory are moved not by scientific motives but by religious motives. And after all, intelligent design theory is not really a scientific theory, because it appeals to supernatural causes beyond natural experience and the scientific method.
Here's my proposal. Let's "teach the controversy" by teaching Darwin. We could have high school students read selections from Darwin's ORIGIN OF SPECIES and DESCENT OF MAN, along with some modern textbook in evolutionary theory such as Mark Ridley's book EVOLUTION (Blackwell Science).
Surely, the proponents of evolution couldn't object to having students read Charles Darwin. And yet this could also satisfy the proponents of intelligent design, because Darwin himself presents intelligent design theory as the major alternative to his theory.
In the ORIGIN OF SPECIES, Darwin frames the fundamental issue as a controversy between two theories--"the theory of special creation" and the "theory of natural selection." He indicates that until recently "most naturalists"--including himself--have accepted the "theory of special creation," which says that each species has been independently created by an Intelligent Designer. But Darwin thinks that now we have a better theory--a "theory of natural selection," which says that although the primary laws of nature may have been created by an Intelligent Designer, those general laws allow for the natural evolution of species by natural selection without need for special interventions by the Designer to design each species and each complex organic mechanism.
Darwin indicates that neither theory can be conclusively demonstrated. But we can at least judge one theory as more probable if it can explain "large classes of facts" more intelligibly than the other theory. For example, if the "theory of natural selection" can explain the geographic distribution of species between the Galapagos Islands and the South American mainland and do this more persuasively than any alternative explanation based on the "theory of special cration," then we can judge the evolutionary theory to be more probable.
Darwin acknowledges that there are many "difficulties" with his theory, and they turn out to be the very difficulties that are commonly stressed by proponents of IDT. But while Darwin admits that these difficulties are so severe as to be "staggering," he tries to answer these difficulties, while arguing that the theory of special creation has its own difficulties.
The prominence that Darwin gives to the theory of special creation as the alternative to his theory explains why Philip Appleman, the editor of the Norton Critical Edition of Darwin's writings, decided to include in the 3rd edition selected writings from Philip Johnson and Michael Behe--two proponents of IDT. Appleman recognizes that the debate over IDT continues the debate seen by Darwin himself.
Of course, the evidence and arguments for evolutionary theory have deepened since Darwin wrote. After all, Darwin didn't even understand the genetic mechanisms underlying evolution. So it would be good to have high school students read some modern survey of evolutionary science. But here again they could see the same fundamental controversy presented by Darwin.
Mark Ridley is a biological anthropologist at Emory University. His book EVOLUTION is one of the leading introductory textbooks in evolutionary theory. When he surveys the "evidence for evolution," he suggests that we need to distinguish "three possible theories of the history of life"--evolution, transformism, and creationism. According to the theory of evolution, all species have evolved from a common ancestory, and they change through time. According to the theory of transformism, species have separated origins, but they change over time. According to the theory of creation, species have separate origins, and they do not change.
Ridley argues that the evidence supports the theory of evolution as superior to the other theories. Students who would read this could thus see the controversy between evolution and special creation and judge for themselves whether Darwin, Ridley, and others are right in arguing for the superiority of evolutionary theory.
Recently, I presented my compromise proposal on a panel at the convention of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences in Washington, D.C. Chris Mooney, the author of THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, was on the panel. He complained that it would not be right to allow high school students to think through these issues for themselves, because only scientific "experts" could judge the evidence for evolution. As far as he was concerned, the purpose of high school science education was to tell students what the "experts" believed, and any proposal to open up the classroom to real debate was actually part of the war on science coming from the Religious Right and George Bush.
In my book, I give my reasons why I think that the arguments for IDT as a substitute for Darwinian science are weak, and why conservatives need to see Darwin as their friend and not their enemy. But, still, I see nothing wrong with allowing students to debate these issues for themselves, which might actually teach them how to weigh scientific arguments over issues with deep moral, political, and religious implications. Shouldn't that be the purpose of public education in a free republic?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)