In some previous posts, I have indicated how the debate over Darwinian conservatism reveals the conflict between metaphysical conservatism and evolutionary conservatism. Metaphysical conservatism is transcendentalist in viewing social order as grounded in a transcendent realm of cosmic design. Evolutionary conservatism is empiricist in viewing human social order as grounded in common human experience as shaped by human nature, human custom, and human judgment.
In the history of modern conservatism, this split was manifested in the metaphysical conservatism of Russell Kirk and the evolutionary conservatism of Friedrich Hayek. For Kirk, the first canon of conservative thought was belief in "a transcendent moral order" set by divine design, and thus Darwinian science was scorned insofar as it seemed to subvert belief in this transcendent order. Since Hayek was a religious and metaphysical skeptic, he disagreed with Kirk about this. In fact, this was one of the reasons why Hayek did not even want to be called a "conservative" rather than a "liberal" in the classical sense.
Hayek elaborated his view of Burkean liberalism as belonging to a British empiricist evolutionary tradition contrasted with a French rationalistic design tradition. In the evolutionary tradition of Hume, Smith, and Burke, Hayek explained, "it was shown that an evident order which was not the product of a designing human intelligence need not therefore be ascribed to the design of a higher, supernatural intelligence, but that there was a third possibility--the emergence of order as the result of adaptive evolution." He then suggested that Darwin's theory of biological evolution was derived from the theories of social evolution developed by the Scottish philosophers.
That both Kirk and Hayek saw themselves in the intellectual tradition of Burke suggests that the tension between them might be found in Burke. In fact, Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution--the founding text of modern conservatism--shows this tension between the metaphysical conservatism of religious belief and the evolutionary conservatism of skeptical naturalism. Burke does seem to have a metaphysical conception of transcendent moral order in which human society is bound up with the order of the universe. Burke writes of "the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place." Here we see the metaphysics of Burke--a religious metaphysics in which the moral and political order of human society is situated within a cosmic order designed by God to conform to His eternal purposes.
But much of the argument of Burke's Reflections works against such a metaphysical view of morality as dependent on the cosmic structure of the universe. Burke wrote his Reflections as a reply to the Reverend Richard Price, who was a Christian Platonist. Arguing against the moral naturalism of Hume and the Scottish moral sense philosophers, Price rejected the idea that morality was rooted in moral sentiments, and he contended instead that moral knowledge was a rational activity of the mind grasping the eternal and immutable metaphysical truths of God's nature.
Burke rejected Price's appeal to the metaphysical abstractions of the "rights of man." "In proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false." Earlier in his life, Burke had expressed his skepticism about metaphysical causes in his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. He had explained that in looking for the "efficient cause" of sublimity and beauty, he did not pretend to explain the "ultimate cause," because he was pursuing a purely empirical inquiry into sense experience. "That great chain of causes, which linking one to another even to the throne of God himself, can never be unraveled by any industry of ours. When we go but one step beyond the immediately sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depths. All we do after, is but a faint struggle, that shows we are in an element which does not belong to us."
This reliance on sense experience rather than metaphysical causes is also evident in Burke's understanding of morality. Against Price's metaphysical morality, Burke in the Reflections evoked those "natural feelings" and "moral sentiments" that show "the natural sense of right and wrong" and "the moral constitution of the heart" as the foundation of moral experience. In doing so, Burke indicated his agreement with Hume and Smith in their account of morality as grounded in the moral sentiments of human nature. In fact, Burke had praised Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as "one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory that has perhaps ever appeared."
When Darwin developed his evolutionary theory of morality, he was guided by the moral philosophy of Smith and the other Scottish moral sense philosophers. Darwin showed how this moral sense could have evolved from social instincts and human reason.
Much of the reasoning for Darwinian conservatism turns on the intellectual links between Smith, Burke, and Darwin. While libertarian conservatives look to Smith as their intellectual founder, traditionalist conservatives look to Burke. The intellectual friendship between Smith and Burke shows the fundamental compatibility of libertarian and traditionalist thought. (Some folks--Timothy Sandefur, for example--disagree with this because they see libertarianism as fundamentally opposed to traditionalist conservative thought.) Darwin explained how the moral thought of Smith and Burke could be confirmed by an evolutionary science of morality. This continuity between Smith, Burke, and Darwin manifests the moral philosophy of conservatism as rooted in the evolved nature of human beings as moral animals.
14 comments:
Excellent summary. However, it is still not clear to me whether Burke himself ever resolved the tensions between these two strands. You seem to be suggesting he was a proto-Hayekian in his own mind, but I'm not entirely convinced.
For these and other reasons, perhaps Burke would be a good candidate for your new edition of Political Questions.
Libertarians and Traditionalists may look to Smith and Burke respectively. But are either camps correct? What I mean to suggest is that the compatibility--even friendship--between Burke and Smith does not prove that these strands of "conservatism" (as they understand themselves) can be brought together.
There is no evolutionary science of morality, because there is no evolutionary morality.
The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom--Montaigne
By nature, we have no defect that cannot become a stength, and no strength that cannot become a defect--Goethe
I short, man has no nature, but instead he has...history--Ortega
For Burke, human nature was the text, and history the comment--J R Lowell
Darwin may well have thought he continued in the traditions of Burke and Smith, but they would not have returned his good will. Burke in particular feared and detested atheists, not for their opinions on God, but of man. His experience was not theoretical.
"It is in the nature of greatness not to be exact".
So great was his reputation and his legacy, they felt it necessary to wait fifty years to tear him down.
xlbri,
If you read DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM, you will see that I emphasize the importance of moral custom or tradition, just as Darwin did.
Smith, Burke, and Darwin saw that morality arose from a complex interaction of moral sentiments, moral traditions, and moral judgments.
I am only beginning to read DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM, it is true. Nevertheless, your response has avoided my small point: Burke would reject completely Darwin's understanding of what makes us human, and what is the guiding hand in that. And when you got rejected by Burke, you got a rejection that would last a lifetime and beyond.
That Hayek and Kirk both saw themselves in Burke is not due to a tension in Burke, but a misunderstanding of Hayek. What Hayek saw as adaptive evolution is only another human choice made within what is Goethe saw already stamped within us.
I am informed by your distinction between British empirist evolutionary tradition and French rationalistic design. There are reasons, however misguided, the dreadful movements which consider Darwin their inspiration plague man continually, while none who consider Burke for inspiration do. It is the difference in attitude, of humility.
Hayek, Friedman, Darwin himself, and others who retain their humility and humanity are exceptions to atheism, not the rule. Especially in the world of great intellect.
Tocqueville--If their system could be of some use to man, it would be in giving him a modest opinion of himself. But they do not demonstrate such a truth and when they think they have done enough to prove that they are bruthish, they seem as proud as if they had demonstrated that they were gods.
Dear Professor Arnhart, do you accept the interpretation that Edmund Burke is a romantic philosopher ?
Can you explain what you mean by Burke's romanticism?
IMK there are two competing interpretations of Burke. One is that he was an Enlightenment empiricist, the other is that he was a (proto-)romantic thinker. May I give two examples. Morley (2021) illustres the romantic interpretation: “ He also moved the analysis away from the sublime object and towards the experience of the beholder, thus making his enquiry a psychological one. The sublime, declared Burke, was “the strongest passion,” and he belittled the importance of the beautiful, claiming that it was merely an instance of prettiness. The sublime experience, on the other hand, had the power to transform the self, and Burke, like Longinus, saw something ennobling in this terror-tinged thrill, as if the challenge posed by some threat served to strengthen the self.” https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/a-short-history-of-the-sublime/
McElroy (1992) illustrates the Enlightenment empiricist interpretation: “Burke was perhaps a bit ahead of most Scottish thinkers in recognizing how much of human nature is not rational, and insisting that — rationally—politics must deal with that nature as it really is, and employ the non-rational, or adjust to it, as usefully as possible. Hence, probably, the common misconception that Burke exalts emotion and prejudice over reason, though he thought even instincts, such as that to shun disgrace, to be 'always right' only when 'under the direction of reason' (Letter to a Noble Lord, Works V, 208-9).”
McElroy, G. (1992). Edmund Burke and the Scottish Enlightenment. Man and Nature, 11, 171-185.
I add one example of the romantic interpretation where the author straightforwardly labels Burke's as a romantic (but there is no real justification or development, so that's why I did not use it as an illustration above). "Closely related to his own work in his philosophical treatise, On the Sublime and the Beautiful, Burke introduces into eighteenth-century political thought what will be known after his death as a deep and abiding and inspiring romanticism, against the classicism, the rationalism, the materialism, and the utilitarianism of his antagonists. In Burke’s romantic vision of the human person, he fears that his opponents wittingly or not will stripe man naked, leaving him only to his own base instincts." https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2016/10/romance-edmund-burke-bradley-birzer.html. It comes for a conservative network, the "Imaginative Conservative", so it's a good case to illustrate the issue.
If embracing Smith's moral sentiments is a form of romanticism, then Burke was a romantic.
haha :) the labeling of Burke as a romantic IMK generally stems from his "A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (1757), that is judged romantic and is also because the 19th century romanticists heavily draw upon this book. IMU, the "Enquiry" is an Enlightenment empirical investigation on the psychological relation between reason and emotions, not a romantic piece.
But this question seems to me important because from the German romanticism unfolded a strand of conservativism that, IMO, is as much, if not more, a challenge to our naturalistic conservatism, that is Romantic/Existentialist R/E conservatism (e.g. Herder, de Maistre, Fichte, Coleridge, Gobineau, Baudelaire, Dostoevsky, Scruton, Peterson). You touched to this issue here and there on your blog, but you focus more on the theist conservatism, maybe because, relatively to continental Europe, it is stronger than the R/E conservatism. But R/E (or "continental philosophy") is still slowly penetrating your amazing country, as R/E slowly penetrated classical France after the German counter-Enlightenment (see Isaiah Berlin). Anyway, thank you for your work and your response.
It has been many years since I last read Burke's Enquiry. But as I remember it, I would be inclined to agree with you that it is "an Enlightenment empirical investigation into the psychological relation between reason and emotions, not a romantic piece."
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