tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post113891229570908673..comments2024-03-28T08:57:53.180+00:00Comments on Darwinian Conservatism by Larry Arnhart: Leo Strauss, Charles Darwin, and Natural RightLarry Arnharthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14619785331100785170noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1140052773775677632006-02-16T01:19:00.000+00:002006-02-16T01:19:00.000+00:00Larry,To what degree the debate with the students ...Larry,<BR/><BR/>To what degree the debate with the students of Strauss on this issue reflects the many faces of Strauss. On one level Strauss is very much a partisan of Plato (who on this issue of biology is in significant disagreement with Aristotle which might explain their political disagreements as well) yet there is also the Aristotlian Strauss.. as seen in his Epilogue, his liberal education pieces.. and comments here and there. <BR/><BR/>Clearly the Epilogue is Strauss at his most Aristotlian, yet it is from this that many of the Straussians will attack you and Roger Master's attempt to turn political science to the evidence of biology.. to help give political science a firmer ground to scientifically understand human action.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139490251118707232006-02-09T13:04:00.000+00:002006-02-09T13:04:00.000+00:00Mr. Foley,Your thoughtful comments deserve a long ...Mr. Foley,<BR/><BR/>Your thoughtful comments deserve a long response. But right now I can only give you a brief reply.<BR/><BR/>I agree with Leo Strauss's observation that "the difference between Plato and Aristotle is that Aristotle believes that biology, as a mediation between knowledge of the inanimate and knowledge of man, is available" (correspondence with Kojeve).<BR/><BR/>This points to the influence of Aristotle's biological writings on his writings in moral and political philosophy.<BR/><BR/>In his biologlical works, Aristotle studies the teleological or functional structure of animal behavior in which animals learn how to adjust their behavior to complex and changing environments to better satisfy their natural desires. Thus, animal behavior is inherently normative or value-laden.<BR/><BR/>The good for animals varies according to the nature of each species. So, for example, some animals are solitary, and some are gregarious. Of those that are gregarious, some are political. And of those that are political, some have leaders and others do not. Humans, ants, bees, wasps, and cranes are all political in this way.<BR/><BR/>Similarly, parental care differs across different species. Some animals provide little care for their offspring. But the more political and more intelligent animals provide extensive care for long periods. This means that different species have different social needs depending on the character of parental care.<BR/><BR/>Some non-human animals are capable of voluntary action insofar as they are capable of gathering and assessing information that allow them to adjust their behavior to their environments. But adult human beings are capable of deliberate choice insofar as they can act deliberately to satisfy some conception of a whole life well lived.<BR/><BR/>Modern studies of animal behavior confirm Aristotle's observations about the animal capacity for individual and cultural learning and the normative structure of animal behavior as aiming to satisfy natural desires.<BR/><BR/>I have elaborated these points in DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT and DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM.<BR/><BR/>You can see now why Frans de Waal (in THE APE AND THE SUSHI MASTER) says that I should be credited with having discovered "Darwistotle." Actually, I think Roger Masters discovered this creature long before I did.Larry Arnharthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14619785331100785170noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139286111773932872006-02-07T04:21:00.000+00:002006-02-07T04:21:00.000+00:00Many thanks for your response, Mr. Arnhart--I do t...Many thanks for your response, Mr. Arnhart--I do think this is helpful. We do mean by voluntary motion, purposeful motion. When voluntary motion is denied, (as it is by mechanical determinists--Stephen Hawking, e.g., in A Brief History of Time, p. 12) so is purposeful motion. (Calvin's determinism apparently denies neither.)<BR/><BR/>But I do have trouble with the suggestion that each species of life has distinctive purposes. I don't see what distinguishes a lion's distinct<BR/>purpose from a tiger's, e.g. Or a lion's from a bear's, or a tiger's from a<BR/>camel's, etc. I see distinct means of pursuit of common purposes, (purposes<BR/>pursued by the members of all species in different ways) but I don't see<BR/>distinctive purposes for each species. That motion which is distinctive of<BR/>each species is growth into distinctive forms. But this motion is not<BR/>voluntary motion. A baby lion does not choose to grow into an adult lion,<BR/>as it chooses to pursue this gazelle, or that zebra. But this takes us back<BR/>to a cosmological, rather than an immanent teleology. Unless the connection<BR/>is reproduction. That is, the distinct purpose of a male lion is to mate<BR/>with a female lion. To the extent that lions are distinct, and animals<BR/>discriminate in this way (for the most part) when it comes to reproduction,<BR/>this would be a distinct purpose of the members of a species.<BR/><BR/>Furthermore, the immanent teleology of Strauss's, to which you point, does<BR/>not necessarily settle the problem of the dualism you attempt to solve. The<BR/>immanent teleology you refer to is explicitly limited to human nature, and<BR/>it is contrasted with nature in general, i.e., it comes to sight as<BR/>dualistic. There is the human, the immanently teleological, and there is<BR/>nature in general, the apparently unteleological, or at least, the teleology<BR/>of which is not considered.<BR/><BR/>The discovery of nature, as Strauss presents it in NRH, consists in the<BR/>distinction between man, and the rest of nature, does it not? Man is the<BR/>only being which separates itself unnaturally, i.e., conventionally. As<BR/>Strauss presents it, at first the distinction between the way of one tribe<BR/>and the way of a foreign tribe seems the same as the distinction between the<BR/>way of men and the way of dogs. But the different level of distinguishing<BR/>these groups, tribe from tribe, man from other beings, was immanently<BR/>visible, and eventually came explicitly into view. Differences among the<BR/>ways of foreign tribes are experienced as conflicting. Our way is the right<BR/>way, the way of the other tribe is wrong,. The different way of dogs is not<BR/>experienced as wrong.<BR/><BR/>This means, it seems to me, that the dualism might be overcome by going in<BR/>the opposite direction. If there is natural right, a right which is behind<BR/>all distinction between man and man into tribes, or which is behind all the<BR/>conventional differences, then convention disappears, or at least proves to<BR/>be accidental, and with it goes the dualism of nature and convention, or the<BR/>dualism of human nature and nature in general.<BR/><BR/>Or, to bring in another reference, it is not clear that Strauss leaves the<BR/>problem of cosmology out of account when considering human nature (WIPP, p.<BR/>39).<BR/><BR/>My best,<BR/><BR/>Dan FoleyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139220286990718812006-02-06T10:04:00.000+00:002006-02-06T10:04:00.000+00:00"And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts ..."And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be <I>like one another</I>, or in what they be <I>unlike</I>, or <I>what they serve for</I>, or <I>how they serve to such a purpose</I>, those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a <I>good wit</I>, by which, in this occasion, is meant a <I>good fancy</I>. But they that observe their differences and dissimilitudes, which is called <I>distinguishing</I>, and <I>discerning</I>, and <I>judging</I> between thing and thing, in case such discerning, be not easy, are said to have a <I>good judgment</I>.... In a good history the judgment must be eminent, because the goodness consisteth in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the style." <BR/><BR/>- from Hobbes, <I>Leviathan</I>, Chp. 8<BR/><BR/>You could say, of course, that this has nothing to do with philosophy, that observation of the differences between things only matters for those who are engaged in more practical endeavors.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139180220037141572006-02-05T22:57:00.000+00:002006-02-05T22:57:00.000+00:00To Kent & Dan:Would it help this discussion to giv...To Kent & Dan:<BR/><BR/>Would it help this discussion to give some attention to the possibility of an immanent teleology--as opposed to a cosmic teleology--as the ground of natural right?<BR/><BR/>Even if the universe as a whole is not purposeful, the beings that arise in that universe can be purposeful. That is particularly true for biological phenomena in which any full explanation requires some account of functionality. Living beings act for purposes. Each species of life has distinctive purposes. And for animals that move and think, these natural purposes can be expressed in voluntary movement.<BR/><BR/>Strauss points to such an immanent telelogy in NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (pp. 94-95): "For, however indifferent to moral distinctions the cosmic order may be thought to be, human nature, as distinguished from nature in general, may very well be the basis of such distinctions. . . . We must . . . distinguish between those human desires and inclinations which are natural and those which originate in conventions. Furthermore, we must distinguish between those human desires and inclinations which are in accordance with human nature and therefore good for man, and those which are destructive of his nature or his humanity and therefore bad. We are thus led to the notion of a life, a human life, that is good because it is in accordance with nature."<BR/><BR/>My argument is that if the good is the desirable, then Darwinian science supports natural right by providing a scientific account of those natural desires of the human species that constitute the human good. Specifically, there are at least 20 natural desires that distinguish the human species. So, then, we can judge ways of life as better or worse depending on how well they conform to those natural desires.<BR/><BR/>Unfortunately, the students of Strauss are inclined to dismiss the very idea of "Darwinian natural right" as nonsense, because they start with an overstated Ancients/Moderns dichotomy, and then they place "natural right" on one side of that dichotomy, and Darwin on the other.<BR/><BR/>When Darwin developed the idea of a natural "moral sense," he relied on the Scottish moral sense philosophers, such as Smith and Hume. Darwin's contribution was in showing how the "moral sentiments" could have emerged through the natural evolution of the human species.<BR/><BR/>The students of Strauss see Smith and Hume as "Moderns," and so they fail to see how the ethical naturalism of Smith and Hume is closer to Aristotle than to Hobbes. In fact, both Smith and Hume were explicit in developing their thought in opposition to Hobbes. Through his reading of Smith and Hume, Darwin joined the Aristotelian tradition against the Hobbesian tradition.<BR/><BR/>This tradition of ethical naturalism--from Aristotle to Hume to Smith to Darwin--continues today in the work of Darwinian theorists who account for the moral sentiments as rooted in the evolved desires of the human animal.Larry Arnharthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14619785331100785170noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139174806297404212006-02-05T21:26:00.000+00:002006-02-05T21:26:00.000+00:00Dear Mr. Arnhart,Does it seem to you that Strauss ...Dear Mr. Arnhart,<BR/><BR/>Does it seem to you that Strauss thought there was no ground for natural right absent the achievement of this comprehensive science? He was awaiting<BR/>or anticipating a grounding of natural right through the future acquisition of this comprehensive science?<BR/><BR/>Doesn't Strauss suggest that the absence of such a comprehensive science actually supplies the ground for Socratic natural right, e.g. (NRH, pp. 35-6)?<BR/><BR/>Is the dualism identified in the introduction not implied in the very discovery of nature (p. 82)? And must we not understand the limitation announced on p. 8 of NRH in light of Socrate's manner of inquiry, presented at p. 123?<BR/><BR/>I thank Mr. Guida for bringing your work to my attention. My questions emerge just from what you've written here. I look forward to getting my hands on a copy of your book, which I am sure goes into these questions in much greater detail. <BR/><BR/>My best,<BR/><BR/>Dan FoleyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1139156373444512452006-02-05T16:19:00.000+00:002006-02-05T16:19:00.000+00:00Thanks for this excellent summary. I took the libe...Thanks for this excellent summary. I took the liberty of posting it on the Leo Struauss email list, where the subject of evolution, natural right, and Strauss's statements in NRH recently surfaced.<BR/><BR/>I have a question. You and Roger Masters have done brilliant work in this area, and I am convinced it is the most exciting idea to arise in political philosophy in a long time. But you get the cold shoulder almost everywhere, especially from students of Strauss. How come? What do you think is the biggest stumbling block? Why is it no one can get to first base with this? Or at least that has been my experience over the last ten years.<BR/><BR/>I appreciate your tenacity, among other things. But what does it take to get a hearing?<BR/><BR/>Best regards,<BR/>Kent GuidaKent Guidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00119882444127499607noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1138937630264586502006-02-03T03:33:00.000+00:002006-02-03T03:33:00.000+00:00I love that you have all these wonderful ideas, bu...I love that you have all these wonderful ideas, but my head is aching.<BR/><BR/>How do you feel, in your own work, about how you've met the standard for what political philosophy should aspire to: discovery of the human things, as opposed to being consumed by our power?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16355954.post-1138916737510051542006-02-02T21:45:00.000+00:002006-02-02T21:45:00.000+00:00Dear Larry,Thank you for this article. It reminde...Dear Larry,<BR/>Thank you for this article. It reminded me of one of your classes. This article reminds me of one of the basic problems I have run into with Strauss--he is a great critic of modern rights based theoris but does not really give us much of a solution to the problem. Thank you for pointing to a possible solution.<BR/><BR/>Mark GriffithAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com